What is morality? Where does it come from? And why do most of us heed its call most of the time? In Braintrust, neurophilosophy pioneer Patricia Churchland argues that morality originates in the biology of the brain. She describes the "neurobiological platform of bonding" that, modified by evolutionary pressures and cultural values, has led to human styles of moral behavior. The result is a provocative genealogy of morals that asks us to reevaluate the priority given to religion, absolute rules, (...) and pure reason in accounting for the basis of morality. Moral values, Churchland argues, are rooted in a behavior common to all mammals--the caring for offspring. The evolved structure, processes, and chemistry of the brain incline humans to strive not only for self-preservation but for the well-being of allied selves--first offspring, then mates, kin, and so on, in wider and wider "caring" circles. Separation and exclusion cause pain, and the company of loved ones causes pleasure; responding to feelings of social pain and pleasure, brains adjust their circuitry to local customs. In this way, caring is apportioned, conscience molded, and moral intuitions instilled. A key part of the story is oxytocin, an ancient body-and-brain molecule that, by decreasing the stress response, allows humans to develop the trust in one another necessary for the development of close-knit ties, social institutions, and morality. A major new account of what really makes us moral, Braintrust challenges us to reconsider the origins of some of our most cherished values. (shrink)

Via a close reading of The Ethics of Ambiguity and The Second Sex, this chapter examines how Simone de Beauvoir's analogical thinking about race and gender shape her arguments concerning oppression and freedom. First, Beauvoir uses gender as an analytical category to examine women's oppression. In contrast, Beauvoir uses race, age, class and ethnicity as descriptive experiences that provide evidence for her analysis of women's oppression. Second, Beauvoir's analysis of women's oppression relies on an uncritical analogical method to develop arguments (...) about gender oppression, with the race/gender analogy granted special prominence. Third, the substance of Beauvoir's analogies undermines her theory of existentialist freedom: manipulating root metaphors that depict Black people as silent slaves or non‐independent women as complicit in their own subordination makes existential freedom difficult if not impossible for the majority of human beings. (shrink)

In its treatment of the role of emotion in ethics the argument of the book outlines a new way of packing motivational force into moral meaning that allows for a ...

Human Specialization in Design and Technology explores emerging trends in learning and training-standardization, customization, personalization-with a unique focus on human needs and conditions. Analyzing evidence from current academic research as well as the popular press, this concise volume defines and examines the trajectory of instructional design and technologies toward more human-centered and specialized products, services, processes, environments, and systems. Examples from education, healthcare, business, and other sectors offer real-world demonstrations for scholars and graduate students of educational technology, instructional design, ICT, (...) and business development. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I argue that Heidegger offers a philosophy of science by explicating that philosophy of science. The following chapter presents Heidegger's early analysis of modern science, from 1916 to the mid-1930s. During these years Heidegger maintains two theses: that the essence of science is the mathematical projection of nature; and that metaphysics is the science of being. As the latter thesis becomes more problematic, Heidegger turns from metaphysics as a science, to the sciences. ;The pivot for this turn (...) is the experiment. Chapter 3 is an analysis of three specific issues surrounding the experiment. I raise the question of whether a single experimental result is enough to overturn a theory, the problem of the theory-loadedness of observation, and the question of representation. ;These issues serve to explicate Heidegger's claim that the essence of science is research, and to show that Heidegger's philosophy of science shares issues with contemporary analytic philosophy of science. Further, I take Heidegger's claim that the essence of science is the ground from out of which the essence of the modern epoch can be shown, as proof that his consideration of science is not secondary in his thinking but rather is the basis from which his critique of the modern epoch is made. ;Chapter 4 is an account of Heidegger's view of the role of science in the university. Heidegger's vision is that the German university can serve to guide historical destiny. His complete disillusionment with that vision comes with his realization that, whereas he calls for a renewal of science for the sake of the sciences in their service of the people, the Nazi call for a renewal of the sciences is toward their own political ends. What little I have to say about Heidegger's involvement with the Nazis is found in this chapter. ;Chapter 5 considers Heidegger's view of ancient science. It lays out Aristotle's distinction between physis and techne under Heidegger's reading. In Chapter 6, I argue that the ancient distinction between physis and techne is not sustained in the modern epoch under Heidegger's account. ;I close with a brief account of Heidegger on quantum theory. (shrink)

I use a version of the case in "sophie's choice" as an example of the strongest sort of dilemma, With all options seriously wrong, And no permissible way of choosing one of them. This is worse, I argue, Than a choice between conflicting obligations, Where the agent has an overriding obligation "to choose", And does nothing wrong, Once the choice is made, By ignoring one of his prior obligations. Here, "contra" marcus, Guilt seems inappropriate.

Empirically minded philosophers have raised questions about judgments and theories based on moral intuitions such as Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium. But they work from the notion of intuitions assumed in empirical work, according to which intuitions are immediate assessments, as in psychologist Jonathan Haidt’s definition. Haidt himself regards such intuitions as an appropriate basis for moral judgment, arguing that normal agents do not reason prior to forming a judgment and afterwards just “confabulate” reasons in its defense. I argue, first, (...) that the notion of “considered intuitive judgment” that Rawls spells out when he first presents his method is pre-theoretical, but not at all pre-reflective, in the way Haidt’s definition supposes; it may rest on various forms of reasoning short of systematic derivation from theoretical principles. I go on to take issue with Haidt’s dismissal of ex post facto moral reasoning, arguing that it can play both a causal role in an individual’s later intuitions or judgments and a legitimate normative role, as required by moral competence in judging non-taboo cases. I suggest that the move from intuition to judgment and thence to ex post facto reasoning makes sense as a justificatory version of Peircean abduction, or what is now mainly called “inference to the best explanation.”. (shrink)

This paper updates, modifies, and extends an account of psychopaths’ responsibility and blameworthiness that depends on behavioral control rather than moral knowledge. Philosophers mainly focus on whether psychopaths can be said to grasp moral rules as such, whereas it seems to be important to their blameworthiness that typical psychopaths are hampered by impulsivity and other barriers to exercising self-control. I begin by discussing an atypical case, for contrast, of a young man who was diagnosed as a psychopath at one point (...) but who lacks the element of impulsivity. He exhibits the usual deficits of empathy and related moral emotions, but by now he has developed effective alternative means of conforming to moral rules, essentially on the basis of self-interest. I think it does seem reasonable to hold him morally responsible if he should violate a rule, despite his refusal to acknowledge any specifically moral reasons. I then turn to more typical cases, arguing that blameworthiness is mitigated by the difficulty of learning alternative means of self-control. In a departure from my earlier work, I do not take responsibility to have degrees. But since both blameworthiness and freedom to do otherwise have degrees that depend on the same factors, I go on to explain how it can be reasonable to blame a typical psychopath for an act he may not have been free to avoid. More generally, my suggestion is that notions commonly conflated in philosophers’ treatments of responsibility should be prized apart. (shrink)

Despite the fact that a number of economists and philosophers of late defend insider trading both as a viable and useful practice in a free market and as not immoral, I shall question the value of insider trading both from a moral and an economic point of view. I shall argue that insider trading both in its present illegal form and as a legalized market mechanism undermines the efficient and proper functioning of a free market, thereby bringing into question its (...) own raison d'etre. It does so and is economically inefficient for the very reason that it is immoral. Thus this practice cannot be justified either from an economic or a moral point of view. Insider trading is the reverse of speculation. It is reward without risk, wealth generated — and injury done to others — by an unfair advantage in information ... [T]he core principle is clear: no one should profit from exploitation of important information not available to the public. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Life and Works Desgabets's Philosophical System Cartesianism or Robertism?

Until recently, business issues in healthcare organizations were relatively insulated from clinical issues, for several reasons. The hospital at earlier stages of its development operated on a combination of charitable and equitable premises, allowing for providing care to be separated from financial support. Physicians, who were primarily responsible for clinical care, constituted an independent power nexus within the hospital and were governed by their own professional codes of ethics. In exchange for a great deal of control over their conditions of (...) practice, they took almost complete responsibility for patient care. Thus clinical and professional ethics could to some extent be compartmentalized from the business issues—a much easier feat when, as in much of the last few decades, virtually all care was reimbursed from some source or other. In addition, many HCOs were not categorized or treated as businesses, although of course they were presumed to be governed by the same expectation for good management as any other organization. (shrink)

This essay presents some thoughts on schizoanalysis and visual culture around the proposition that cinema survives in the digital age as a type of image that, after the movement-image and the time-image, could be called the neuro-image. By considering clinical schizophrenia as ‘degree zero’ of schizoanalysis in a more critical sense, a reading of The Butterfly Effect unfolds the temporal dimensions of schizoanalysis as typical for a definition of ‘the neuro-image’. The argument is that the neuro-image speaks from the (always (...) speculative) future. (shrink)

This article presents a set of principles for knowledge modeling in knowledge organization systems in specific domains. It discusses the representational problem, comparing the abstraction mechanisms present in the theories related to representation in concept systems, taken from foundational authors of information science, computer science, and terminology approaches. Parallel to this context, several representational possibilities arise to assist the modeler in the activity of elaborating models of representation. It describes the application of theoretical and methodological principles when organizing, representing, and (...) managing navigation on learning paths in the corporate education field. As a concept proof, it exposes a conceptual model of learning paths and discusses a literature review on this subject to verify to what extent these principles are being applied. It concludes that we can consider the principles discussed in this study as relevant, since they expand the modelers’ freedom, not making him hostage to a specific model. (shrink)

Zachariah's description of a wonderful fornicating life for Sam and Dean captures some truth but it also misses the importance women play in shaping the Winchesters' moral decisions. In general, important women in the lives of Sam and Dean fall into three broad categories: mothers, lovers, and monsters. Sam and Dean are all too familiar with this philosophy of utilitarianism. Many times they have sacrificed relationships with women for the sake of their mission. Throughout Supernatural the objectification of the Winchesters (...) is contrasted with a happy domestic life. Sam and Dean are mistaken in thinking that their only value resides in the roles they play in the larger battles of good and evil; if they looked deeper they would see that they both would prefer a loving relationship with a woman. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Abstract Introduction Anti ‐ Realism and Meaning Two Types of Anti ‐ Realism What Functions Are “Language ‐ Games” Supposed to Serve? Realism and (Dummett's) Anti ‐ Realism Resisting Transcendentalism Wittgensteinian Realism References.

Este artículo presenta los vínculos entre el pensamiento de Edith Stein y Simone Weil, ambas destacadas filósofas del siglo XX, respecto a la concepción de la ciencia y técnica moderna. La tesis que guiará nuestro trabajo es que las dos pensadoras recuperan la concepción de la ciencia como contemplación del orden del mundo. Esta perspectiva permite cambiar la mirada fisicalista con respecto a la naturaleza y detener los daños que la excesiva intervención de la técnica ha provocado en la naturaleza. (...) De este modo, la ciencia se transforma en puente que conduce al Creador. En el trabajo, se analizan los conceptos de finalidad; la consideración del espacio y la geometría como integradores de la realidad; la percepción como origen del conocimiento y la dimensión trascendente de la ciencia. Cada uno de estos aspectos es analizado desde la óptica del orden intrínseco de las cosas y de la persona dado por el Creador. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The AOD: On Agency The AOD: On Causation The PND: Continuing Debate.

The papal monarchy is the subject of Thomas Hobbes's Historical Narration concerning Heresy, much of Behemoth, and his long Latin poem, the Historia Ecclesiastica. Hobbes's was not the only account in his day of the papal monarchy as a history of iniquity, or even as “the ghost of the Roman Empire.” The papal creation of a parallel system of offices in the late Roman and Holy Roman Empires is of immense institutional importance. Hobbes's analysis of the second papal strategy, the (...) co‐optation of Roman Law as canon law, is complicated. Hobbes's account of both the institutional and philosophical consequences of the papal monarchy is surprisingly congruent with some of the most authoritative modern accounts. The fourteenth‐century hierocratic publicists belonged as much to the reception of Averroist Aristotelianism as their contemporary antagonists. None of the parties to the struggle between pope and emperor appears to have been immune to the Aristotelianism of the Arabic commentators. (shrink)

In his speech at the University of Dakar in July 2007, the French president Nicolas Sarkozy referred to Africa as the continent that has not yet fully entered history. This article takes this obvious reference to Hegel as its starting point and examines the current significance of ‘Hegel’s Africa’. Through a close reading of The Philosophy of History and The Phenomenology of Spirit, it shows that Hegel’s remarks on Africa are by no means incidental. They constitute rem(a)inders of a modernity (...) that is based on the construction of Africa as its own limit. The return of Hegel’s Africa, the article concludes, can thus not be restricted to a problem of the new European right. It is part of an understanding of modernity that remains haunted by the specters of racism. (shrink)

I first began working on emotions as a project in philosophy of action, without particular reference to moral philosophy. My thought was that emotions have a distinctive role to play in rationality that tends to be underappreciated by philosophers. Bringing this out was meant to counter a widespread tendency to treat emotions as “blind” causes of action (for the general picture, see Greenspan 2009.) Instead, I thought that emotions could be seen as providing reasons. I took their significance as moral (...) motivators to be hard to miss. Of course, philosophers and others sometimes rightly insist that we need to put emotions aside in order to formulate satisfying moral principles, but I would have been surprised to hear anyone deny that moral motivation typically rests on emotion and that we need that basis in early life in order to get to the stage of acting on moral principles. However, I have since come to think that none of the main philosophical approaches to ethics fully appreciates the significance of emotion, in part because of a misconception of practical reasons. Reasons for action are commonly taken as prima facie requirements, so that moral reasons would yield requirements just insofar as they outweigh competing reasons such as reasons of simple self-interest. Someone who recognizes a moral reason as holding “all things considered” would be irrational not to act on it. But I argue in recent work (starting with Greenspan 2005) that even all-things-considered reasons may in one sense be optional: a rational agent can legitimately “discount” them, cancelling their deliberative weight and their force for motivation. What keeps us from setting aside reasons of the sort that underlie moral.. (shrink)

Abstract:This essay suggests that the word decolonial offers analytic power for feminist historians of women. As a category, it creates interpretive space for female experience beyond the elite/subaltern binary, where arguably most women live and work in the modern period. As a reading practice, the decolonial fosters intellectual awareness of social and intellectual practices that neither address the state, as in “anti-imperialism,” nor proffer counter nationalism or counter racialization as responses to coloniality. Offering examples from the archive, the media, and (...) teaching, this essay describes the decolonial as a productive site of women's agency in domains all too easily overlooked when historians focus on the conventional categories of state and nation. (shrink)

In this paper we set out to explore the claims that corporate social responsibility (CSR) itself is little more than a complementary extension of the project of coloniality initiated by the Enlightenment (e.g. Banerjee 2019). We will not dispute that claim. Rather we will develop three points. First, we will apply a non-linear, systems approach to demonstrate how we all, of any color, ethnic origin or historical location are all part of an interconnected interrelated sets of systems—what some thinkers call (...) a complex adaptive system or systems (e.g., Miller and Page 2007) so that dismissing or degrading any particular ethnic, gender, or racial group is dismissing part of our history and origin. Secondly, we will argue that Enlightenment, coloniality, as well as neo-coloniality, and decoloniality sprung up from the Enlightenment projects themselves. Thus, the very critiques of Enlightenment, accurate as they may be, evolved from that perspective and have to be taken into account even in those critiques. Third, what appears to be an “either-or” – that is, that commerce should stick to business and not engage in political activities (forms of neocolonialism) or accept these business-political activities despite critiques – is not a simple choice. Rather, conceding that commerce and political systems cannot be nicely separated, we will provide some principles or ways to evaluate these activities, seemingly ubiquitous particularly in emerging economies. (shrink)

Resumo O objetivo deste artigo é interpretar o livro Dialética do esclarecimento e seus principais argumentos, considerando a dominação masculina que perpassa a racionalidade moderna. Para isso, sugere-se uma interpretação acerca do entrelaçamento entre mito e esclarecimento, durante o processo de civilização ocidental, indicando que os argumentos de Adorno e Horkheimer tomam a modernidade como um projeto fundamentalmente masculino.This article aims to interpret the book Dialectic of Enlightenment and its main arguments considering the masculine domination which permeates the modern rationality. (...) In order to do this an interpretation about the intertwining between myth and enlightenment during the process of western civilization is suggested, indicating that the arguments of Adorno and Horkheimer take modernity as a fundamentally male project. (shrink)

A set of six publications have introduced, commented, criticized and defended Amir Alexander’s book on infinitesimals published in 2014. The aim of the following article is to bring the various arguments together.

Recent work in ethical theory brings into question the ability of master-principle theories (utilitarianism, deontology, rights and duties, and social contracts) to provide guidance for normative behaviour and ethical reflection. Business ethics education and corporate ethics programmes are still heavily influenced by these theories which have been found to be deficient in adequately dealing with ethical reflection and guiding practice. There appears to be a dissonance between the fields of ethical theory and business ethics education. This paper explores this dissonance (...) by developing a business ethics pedagogical model which compliments master-principle theories with an enhanced or enlightened virtue ethics that incorporates the notions of pluralism, particularism, and intuitionism. Practical insights are provided through interviews with a sample of thirty-three directors in New Zealand. (shrink)

In The Future of the Image (2007) Jacques Rancière states that the end of images is behind us. He argues for an aesthetics of the image that acknowledges the continuing power of images as educating documentations of traces of history, as directly affecting interruptions, and as open-to-combining signs of the visible and the sayable ad infinitum. But does Rancière's claim also concern the future of cinema? His cinematic references, in a Deleuzian sense, are mostly to modern time-images. Is the future (...) of film indeed a form of the time-image, or has the ‘heart’ of cinema moved beyond this image-type? This paper proposes to look at a third category of cinematographic images, based in the third synthesis of time as developed by Deleuze in Difference and Repetition. This filmic image, that could be called the neuro-image, is connected to the impure regime of images typical for the database logic of the digital age. By comparing Alain Resnais's Hiroshima Mon Amour (1959) to the television seriesFlashForward (2009), I will analyse the temporal operations of the image of the time-image to these images of a new regime of images, the image of and from the future.1. (shrink)

The target article presented a model to stimulate further research and ultimately, a more definitive theory of the ontogeny and phylogeny of hierarchically organized sequential activity. Methodologically, it was intended to stimulate methods for integrating data from different neuropsychological techniques. This response to Givon and Swann focuses on several substantive areas: the role of automaticity in hierarchically organized activity and its neural substrate, the neural ontogeny of planning, cognitive and neural architecture for language functions, and the role of environmental input (...) and interaction in the ontogeny and phylogeny of language, tools, and brain. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Social hope, shared hope which relates to the future of communities, is distinguished from personal hopes. Democrats, it is claimed, cannot entertain the kind of social hope found in the Marxist and Christian traditions. However, they do need hope in democracy. Social hope depends on the closely related value of social confidence. Therefore democrats need confidence in democratic values to support their democratic hopes. In school social confidence in democratic values can be promoted by the process of framing whole (...) school policies, as well as by the policies themselves. (shrink)

Resumen: El presente trabajo se centra en el análisis del Anteproyecto de reforma de la legislación civil española en materia de capacidad jurídica de las personas con discapacidad publicado recientemente por el Gobierno español. Su objetivo consiste en determinar la adecuación de las principales modificaciones planteadas en este anteproyecto a las exigencias del artículo 12 de la Convención Internacional sobre los Derechos de las Personas con Discapacidad tal y como han sido interpretadas por su Comité en la Observación General Nº1 (...) Abstract: This paper focuses on the analysis of the prelimimary Draf Law of reform of the Spanish civil legislation on legal capacity of persons with disabilities, published by the Spanish Government on September 26th 2018. Its aim is to determine the conformity of the main modifications proposed in this preliminary Draft to the requirements of article 12 of the Conventionon the Rights of Persons with Disabilitiesas interpreted by its Committee in the General Comment Nº 1. (shrink)

Sustainability education entails transforming values and habits as well as developing skills. Much progress has been made in developing the appropriate teaching and learning strategies which not only impart knowledge but shape attitudes and behaviour. However little attention has been given to the education of the educators who often are teaching and learning at the same time. A particularly important but also challenging competency to teach is systems thinking. This paper is based on the teaching and learning experience of two (...) of the authors who teach the same sustainability paper in different semesters in a business faculty. A two-tier reflection presents their learning journey. The reflection of the first author focuses on the challenges experienced with teaching systems thinking in the first semester. The reflection of the second author is based on the next iteration of the course modified in light of the first author’s learnings including the incorporation of student-faculty partnerships. The paper outlines practices and learning associated with this intervention. (shrink)

The content of emotion sometimes seems to be conflated with its object, but we can distinguish between content and object on the model of Fregean sense versus reference. Fear, for instance, refers to something the subject of fear is afraid of and represents that object of fear as dangerous, so that the emotion can be said to have evaluative content. Here I attempt to clarify and defend my view of emotional discomfort or other affect as what does the evaluating. Some (...) current accounts of the unpleasantness of physical pain take a similar view, but in application to emotion they call for an explanation of how emotional affect can simultaneously evaluate both the affective symptoms of emotion and the emotion's object. I suggest an explanation and indicate how it supports the link between emotional valence and motivational force. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this paper I examine some of the issues surrounding the moral status of the therapy known as ‘deprogramming’. I argue against the extreme view that all deprogrammings are morally impermissible. In certain instances deprogramming is morally justified because it is quite capable of restoring the conditions needed for the exercise of autonomy. The view of autonomy I am following is that constructed by Gerald Dworkin, wherein two conditions must be met in describing a person as autonomous—authenticity and procedural (...) independence. Autonomy of another type, described by Dworkin as authenticity plus substantive independence, may be lost by persons involved in cults but in those instances deprogramming as reconstructed in this paper is not a morally justified measure. (shrink)

Este artigo pretende examinar alguns aspectos da doutrina social de Proudhon e de Bakunin, procurando relacioná-los com suas propostas de transformação social.Cet article a Vintention d'examiner quelques aspects de la doctrine sociale de Proufhon et Bakounine en faisant le rapport avec leurs propositions de transformation sociale.

_Inclusion in the City_ explores inclusion and exclusion in the context of policy and practice in one English city - Birmingham. Here, a commitment to redressing the inequalities experienced by many learners has been inhibited by difficulty in securing agreement to a definite policy for inclusion and, consequently, in sustaining initiatives for strengthening participation in community comprehensive education. Grounded in an understanding of inclusion as a political and moral project, the book presents a range of perspectives from policymakers and practitioners. (...) Detailed case studies, based on research specially undertaken for this book, relate inclusion to key issues in contemporary education such as; the effects of selection by attainment; faith schools and their communities; single sex education and inclusive schools; participation in further education; and social mobility. Insightful, thought provoking and original, _Inclusion in the City_ detaches processes of inclusion and exclusion from the language of educational reform. In so doing it highlights links between participation in education and poverty, gender and cultural background, as well as the absence of a link between urban and educational renewal. (shrink)