Se muestra cómo la “inteligencia sentiente”, en sus elementos “noológicos”, adquiere cierto carácter “técnico” primario y constitutivo que se despliega en el logos y en la razón de manera individual, social e histórica. En la aprehensión primordial de la realidad se juega la viabilidad misma del hombre en su estar siendo en el mundo como animal humano, donde lo “técnico” juega un papel relevante. En los elementos noológicos primarios de la aprehensión primordial se hallan los cimientos de los que surge (...) la “técnica”, que no es entonces elemento accesorio, sino parte constitutiva del hacerse cargo de la realidad. (shrink)

The number of children with chronic critical illness (CCI) is a growing population in the United States. A defining characteristic of this population is a prolonged hospital stay. Our study assessed the proportion of pediatric patients with chronic critical illness in U.S. hospitals at a specific point in time, and identified a subset of children whose hospital stay lasted for months to years. The potential harms of a prolonged hospitalization for children with CCI, which include over treatment, infection, disruption of (...) family life, and the intensive utilization of resources—combined with the moral distress experienced by the clinicians who care for the children, suggest the need for ethical analysis of this growing issue to identify actions that could be taken at the clinical and health systems levels to reduce the harms associated with prolonged hospital stay.In this article we present three real cases from our study that involved a very long hospital stay. We applied a framework developed by Mackenzie, Rogers, and Dodds to analyze inherent, situational, and pathogenic vulnerabilities to examine the ways that interventions intended to remedy one source of harm for the children in our cohort inadvertently created other harms. We examined the complex ways that children with protracted hospitalization are vulnerable to the choices made by their family and clinicians, as well as by healthcare systems and communities. Finally, we used this analysis to summarize actions and ethical responses to this growing patient population. Such an understanding is essential to making clinical and ethical decisions that arise for children who are at risk for a very long stay in the hospital. (shrink)

Peer interaction has been found to be conducive to learning in many settings. Knowledge co-construction has been proposed as one explanatory mechanism. However, KCC is a theoretical construct that is too abstract to guide the development of instructional software that can support peer interaction. In this study, we present an extensive analysis of a corpus of peer dialogs that we collected in the domain of introductory Computer Science. We show that the notion of task initiative shifts correlates with both KCC (...) and learning. Speakers take task initiative when they contribute new content that advances problem solving and that is not invited by their partner; if initiative shifts between the partners, it indicates they both contribute to problem solving. We found that task initiative shifts occur more frequently within KCC episodes than outside. In addition, task initiative shifts within KCC episodes correlate with learning for low pre-testers, and total task initiative shifts correlate with learning for high pre-testers. As recognizing task initiative shifts does not require as much deep knowledge as recognizing KCC, task initiative shifts as an indicator of productive collaboration are potentially easier to model in instructional software that simulates a peer. (shrink)

Este repertorio registra los artículos sobre Nietzsche que se encuentran en la Hemeroteca de la Biblioteca Central de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. El listado abarca las publicaciones existentes hasta el primer semestre del 2003.

We used social network analysis to examine how adaptive ER strategies and maladaptive ER strategies predict the creation and maintenance of friendship and conflict relationships within a mixed-gender social group. Participants reported on emotion regulation, friendship, and conflict nominations at two time points. Stochastic actor-oriented models revealed that similarity in endorsement of adaptive ER strategies predicted maintenance of friendship and conflict relationships over time. However, new conflict relationships were more likely to form between those who differed in use of adaptive (...) ER. Finally, more frequent use of maladaptive ER strategies was related to termination of existing conflict ties and the creation of new ones. Deploying social network analysis as a methodology for examining social relationships enables the unpacking the dynamics of multiple social relationships, identifying the role of ER for structuring of social relationships among group members. Although cognitive ER is an intra-individual process, it fundamentally occurs within a social environment and our results advance the knowledge of how ER contributes to how this social environment is created in a first place. (shrink)

Essays on The Soul's Logical Life in the Work of Wolfgang Giegerich: Psychology as the Discipline of Interiority is the second collection of essays dedicated to the study and application of Psychology as the Discipline of Interiority - a new 'wave' within Analytical Psychology which pushes off from the work of C. G. Jung and James Hillman. Reflecting upon the notion of psychology developed by German psychoanalyst Wolfgang Giegerich, whose Hegelian turn sheds light on the notion of soul, or the (...) objective psyche, and its inner logic and 'thought', forming a radical new basis from which to ground a modern psychology with soul. The book explores the theme of "the soul's logical life" as it displays itself in various modern phenomena, from overwhelming anxiety, cryptocurrency, the dreams of Japanese college students, and contemporary psychoanalysis, to myth, music, social movements, and the question and relevance of truth in psychology and consciousness. The authors, comprising clinical psychologists, teachers, Jungian analysts, and international scholars, aim to reveal and convey the dialectical inner workings and speculative logic of the modern soul. Essays on The Soul's Logical Life in the Work of Wolfgang Giegerich: Psychology as the Discipline of Interiority will be essential reading for depth and clinical psychologists, Jungian psychoanalysts, and academics and students of post-Jungian studies, and for all those interested in what it means to think in the highly sophisticated and technological world of the twenty-first century. (shrink)

Although theoretically rigorous, the book is comprehensible to the beginning qualitative researcher.

In Medical Entanglements: Rethinking Feminist Debates About Healthcare, Kristina Gupta adopts a feminist social constructionist approach to medicine and utilizes feminist science studies, queer studies, disability studies and intersectional approaches to analyze three controversial medical interventions: transition-related care, sexuopharmaceuticals and weight-reduction interventions. Her motivation for writing the book originated from her experience thinking about drug treatments for “female” sexual dissatisfaction. Those arguing on behalf of drug treatments for sexual dissatisfaction maintained that women have the right to experience sexual pleasure and (...) ought to... (shrink)

Richard Kennington, a professor for many years at Pennsylvania State University and the Catholic University of America, was renowned for his insight in reading and teaching early modern philosophy. Although he published articles and spoke widely, never before have his writings been collected in a book. On Modern Origins deftly shows how modern thinkers assessed the errors of the classical tradition and established in its place a philosophy that fuses a new meaning of nature and of theory with humanitarian goals. (...) This volume is an essential source for scholars seeking to understand the contemporary significance of the dawning of the modern era. (shrink)

Feminist philosophy of religion as a subject of study has developed in recent years because of the identification and exposure of explicit sexism in much of the traditional philosophical thinking about religion. This struggle with a discipline shaped almost exclusively by men has led feminist philosophers to redress the problematic biases of gender, race, class and sexual orientation of the subject. Anderson and Clack bring together new and key writings on the core topics and approaches to this growing field. Each (...) essay exhibits a distinctive theoretical approach and appropriate insights from the fields of literature, theology, philosophy, gender and cultural studies. Beginning with a general introduction, part one explores important approaches to the feminist philosophy of religion, including psychoanalytic, poststructualist, postmetaphysical, and epistemological frameworks. In part two the authors survey significant topics including questions of divinity, embodiment, autonomy and spirituality, and religious practice. Supported by explanatory prefaces and an extensive bibliography which is organized thematically, Feminist Philosophy of Religion is an important resource for this new area of study. (shrink)

Barrett, Pamela Believers or atheists, generous or tight, Hero or coward, black, yellow or white, Female or male, fully grown or a child, Those of vast wealth or the desperately poor, At the end we're all equal. We are all shown the door..

Barrett, Pamela My name is Lucky and I am, because I'm a dog..

Confusion remains about the concept “nursing science.” Definitions vary, depending on country, context and setting. Even among nurse scholars and scientists there is disagreement about the content and boundaries of nursing science. There is an urgent need for an acceptable definition that can guide nursing knowledge development, education, and practice. In this article, we highlight the problems for the profession of this sort of conceptual ambiguity, arguing that it is an ethical responsibility for the profession to gain clarity about the (...) meaning and apt focus of our knowledge development initiatives. We parse out nursing and science as separate concepts and synthesize from this analysis a simple yet comprehensive definition of nursing science. We propose that this definition is capable of unifying ongoing nursing endeavors and should serve as the basis for evaluating nursing's knowledge development and educational initiatives. (shrink)

En una perspectiva �postsecular�, siguiendo a Habermas, puede afirmarse que no sólo la ratio sino también las culturas basadas en fides, pueden contribuir con �traducciones� que aporten significativamente a la comprensión del ser sí mismo humano y su télos, reflexión exigida por la filosofía moral hoy. El artículo propone algunos elementos del pensamiento de San Agustín que podrían abrirse a un diálogo fecundo con la ética contemporánea, tales como: el ser sí mismo capaz de ratio y veritas; la interioridad como (...) pilar último de la comunidad y de la sociedad; temporalidad y anhelo de felicidad; la experiencia del mal y la supremacía del bien; la tensión entre caritas y cupiditas; libertad y gracia; ciudadanía terrena y celeste. (shrink)

The present work proposes to explore the discourse on migration in Arabic language media outlets. Present scientific literature in discourse analysis studies consistently analyzed discourses on migration and displayed the consistency of its features. In this paper, we will analyze how the Arabic discourse on migration in the Mediterranean area, either inbound or outbound, are realized and if they are shaped by the European discourse, in order to add an Arabic language contribution to the scientific discussion. The research showed that, (...) while most established categories typical of discourses of racism were present, others were put into discussion, and a context-bound system of representation emerged, with its specificities concerning the reality of migration into and from Arabic countries. However, the European discourse resulted a strong presence, even in the representation of outbound migration of the specific ingroup. (shrink)

This chapter gives an elaboration of the will and addresses the question of whether there is an entity called “free will” or not. It looks at various cases that are seen from the perspectives of cultural anthropology. This chapter uses a literary example that takes a look at the significant consequences of using free will and shows how the cosmological dimension implicates the will of the spirits, in relation to the willed actions of people.

Much research on women’s religious participation centers on their abilities to act within constricted institutional spaces. Drawing on five years of ethnographic fieldwork, this study analyzes how African American Muslim women use the mosque as a physical space to enact public performances of religious identity. By occupying, protecting, and appropriating spaces in the mosque for meaningfully gender-specific ways of engaging Islam, the women further a project of religious self-making that bonds African American Muslim women together. In their maneuverings of different (...) forms of physical space as a sisterhood, the women enable themselves to resist gender, economic, and racial oppression. This study reveals that even within men-dominated religious organizations with limited symbolic and material spaces for women, women participants successfully exert agency over their own religious experiences. (shrink)

A good number of people currently thinking and writing about reasons identify a reason as a consideration that counts in favor of an action or attitude.1 I will argue that using this as our fundamental account of what a reason is generates a fairly deep and recalcitrant ambiguity; this account fails to distinguish between two quite different sets of considerations that count in favor of certain attitudes, only one of which are the “proper” or “appropriate” kind of reason for them. (...) This ambiguity has been the topic of recent discussion, under the head “the wrong kind of reasons problem.”2 I will suggest that confusion about “the wrong kind of reason” will be dispelled by changing our account of what a reason is. While I agree both that reasons are considerations and that certain.. (shrink)

A common line of thought claims that we are responsible for ourselves and our actions, while less sophisticated creatures are not, because we are, and they are not, self-aware. Our self-awareness is thought to provide us with a kind of control over ourselves that they lack: we can reflect upon ourselves, upon our thoughts and actions, and so ensure that they are as we would have them to be. Thus, our capacity for reflection provides us with the control over ourselves (...) that grounds our responsibility. I argue that this thought is subtly, but badly, confused. It uses, as its model for the control that grounds our responsibility, the kind of control we exercise over ordinary objects and over our own voluntary actions: we represent to ourselves what to do or how to change things, and then we bring about that which we represent. But we cannot use this model to explain our responsibility for ourselves and our actions: if there is a question about why or how we are responsible for ourselves and our actions, it cannot be answered by appeal to a sophisticated, self-directed action. There must be some more fundamental account of how or why we are responsible. I replace the usual account with a novel but natural view: responsible mental activity can be modeled, not as an ordinary action, but as the settling of a question. This shift will require abandoning the tempting but troublesome thought that responsible activity involves discretion and awareness—which, I argue, we must abandon in any case. (shrink)

I will argue that making a certain assumption allows us to conceptualize more clearly our agency over our minds. The assumption is this: certain attitudes (most uncontroversially, belief and intention) embody their subject’s answer to some question or set of questions. I will first explain the assumption and then show that, given the assumption, we should expect to exercise agency over this class of attitudes in (at least) two distinct ways: by answering for ourselves the question they embody and by (...) acting upon them in ways designed to affect them according to our purposes—in roughly the way we exercise agency over most ordinary objects. (shrink)

Many assume that we can be responsible only what is voluntary. This leads to puzzlement about our responsibility for our beliefs, since beliefs seem not to be voluntary. I argue against the initial assumption, presenting an account of responsibility and of voluntariness according to which, not only is voluntariness not required for responsibility, but the feature which renders an attitude a fundamental object of responsibility (that the attitude embodies one’s take on the world and one’s place in it) also guarantees (...) that it could not be voluntary. It turns out, then, that, for failing to be voluntary, beliefs are a central example of the sort of thing for which we are most fundamentally responsible. (shrink)

In this article, I follow the evolving visual form of the plant illustrations produced by the 17th-century physician and microscopist Nehemiah Grew. I trace the changing appearance of a variety of magnified plants throughout the course of their manifestation in illustration: beginning with their unsteady earliest appearance in 1672 in the publication The Anatomy of Vegetables Begun, into their reworking in the popular French translation, which was reissued and reprinted multiple times, and finally to Grew's magnum opus a decade later, (...) The Anatomy of Plants (1682). In addition to addressing the epistemic significance of these shifts in style, I also consider the importance of the translation process for the refining of Grew's ideas. (shrink)

This article is made available under Creative Commons licence CC BY-NC-ND, which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited.

This article begins with the assumption that criminal disenfranchisement is at least sometimes theoretically defensible, as a component of punishment. From this assumption, I argue that it is only legitimate in a constrained set of cases. These constraints include: implementing disenfranchisement only for serious crimes; tying disenfranchisement to both the electoral cycle and to the length of imprisonment imposed for an offence; and assessing a background condition of sufficient justice present within the state that wishes to disenfranchise. Once these constraints (...) are considered, I argue that there are very few instances in which disenfranchisement is defensible. To prove this, I examine both current disenfranchisement practices and the commonly present factors that undermine the constraints outlined above. (shrink)

I hope to show that, although belief is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, "believing at will" is impossible; one cannot believe in the way one ordinarily acts. Further, the same is true of intention: although intention is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, the features of belief that render believing less than voluntary are present for intention, as well. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that you can no more intend at will than believe at will.