With Narrative and the Natural Law Pamela Hall brings Thomistic ethics into conversation with ongoing debates in contemporary moral philosophy, especially virtue theory and moral psychology, and with current trends in narrative theory and the philosophy of history. Pamela M. Hall's study offers a solid, challenging alternative to rigid, legalistic interpretations of the substantial discussion of law in Aquinas's Summa theologiae and defends Aquinas's ethics from charges of excessive legalism. Hall argues that Aquinas's characterization of the content and (...) relationship of natural, human and divine law indicates that his understanding of the quest for the human good is practical, communal, and historical. Hall maintains that natural law, the ongoing inquiry into what is the human good, is narrative both in terms of its internal structure and its being informed by the specific story of Scripture. According to Aquinas the discovery of natural law is enacted historically and progressively within communities and by individuals through a process of practical reasoning. Hall then goes on to show how natural law requires articulation by human law, and how both are connected to divine law (salvation history) as Aquinas understands it. Aquinas represents inquiry into the human good as a kind of historical narrative or story with stages or "chapters"; thus knowledge of natural law requires time and experience, as well as sustained reflection by individuals and by whole communities. Such learning of natural law implies the operation of prudence and the assistance of the moral virtues. (shrink)

The Arabic translation of the De Gen. Anim., made at the beginning of the ninth century by Yahyā ibn al-Bitrīq from a Syriac version, contains seven long omissions, noted by Drossaart Lulofs in his edition. Six of these represent approximately 110 letters or a multiple thereof in the Greek: 728b33–729a2 , 761a9–25 , 762a6–8 , 762b34–763a2 , 768a18–20 and 781a7–12 . The seventh omission is too long to be useful, as the scope for accidental errors is too great.

It is generally agreed that the Topics is one of Aristotle's earliest works. But after saying this most writers are unwilling to commit themselves any further and discuss the work, if they discuss it at all, with a vagueness about dating that leads them to do it less than justice. Part of the difficulty, no doubt, lies in the fact that the Topics consists of a central, early, core, surrounded by later additions, and cannot therefore be dealt with as a (...) whole. The suggestions about its date that I wish to make now are concerned solely with what I take to be the original Topics—or such part of it as remains—which I believe can be delimited almost exactly. (shrink)

It is odd that something that Wittgenstein says is clear should have been so puzzling to English-speaking philosophers. 5.542 begins:— ‘Es ist aber klar, dass “A glaubt, dass p”, “A denkt p”, “A sagt p” von der Form, “p ‘sagt p” sind.’ I would like to suggest that one reason for the difficulties that have been felt with this lies in a misleading translation, particularly of, “p ‘sagt p”. For this both English translations have “p” says p’. But since German (...) has a single present tense where English has two, ‘sagt’ may be rendered either ‘says’, or ‘is saying’, and I want to argue that ‘“p” is saying p’ is preferable. (shrink)

I examine the role of tragedy within the ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre and Iris Murdoch. MacIntyre argues for a narrative conception of the self, stressing the need for coherence and intelligibility and for the virtues which promote them. Tragic dilemma presents a successful self with severe frustration but not with destruction of its overall project. Murdoch, on the other hand, holds little hope for the self's coherence, and in fact champions tragic art's capacity for disturbing and even disrupting the self's (...) fantasies of control and coherence. Her virtues correspondingly help the agent to confront the tragic realities of life. I suggest one way to bring these two accounts, of tragedy and the virtues, together: by considering tragic experience in the context of moral pedagogy. (shrink)

Utilitarianism has had an unfortunate history. Its most influential exponents, Bentham and John Stuart Mill, set it out in such a way as to expose it to facile criticism and even to ridicule, and it has never fully recovered from this ill-omened start. In spite of the criticism and the ridicule, however, it still bulks large in ethical studies, and many people still have a hankering sympathy with it.

Geison's model of a research school is applied to the case of Agnes Chase, agrostologist at the Bureau of Plant Industry, United States Department of Agriculture, and curator, U.S. National Herbarium, Smithsonian Institution. Chase developed a geographically dispersed research school in systematic agrostology across the Americas in the first half of the twentieth century. Despite her gender-based lack of institutional power, Chase used her scientific expertise, mentoring skills, and relationships based on women's groups to develop a cohesive school of grass (...) specialists focused on her research program to collect, observe, describe, identify, and classify the grasses of the Americas. Geison's model is extended to encompass geographically dispersed schools led by a non-university based mentor without institutional power. (shrink)

In honoring Carroll Izard’s contributions to emotion research, we discuss infant facial activity and emotion expression. We consider the debated issue of whether infants are biologically prepared to express specific emotions. We offer a perspective that potentially integrates differing viewpoints on infant facial expression of emotion. Specifically, we suggest that evolution has prepared infants with innate action readiness patterns, which are crucial for early infant–caregiver social interaction, and in the course of social interaction specific facial configurations acquire functional significance, becoming (...) associated with specific emotions. Research has not confirmed the presence of innate neurophysiological action patterns that map onto discrete emotions but evidence indicates that the possibility has not been ruled out. (shrink)

Mr Newton-Smith and Mr Boyce, in discussion notes in the January 1972 number of Philosophy , have raised a number of interesting points about my original paper. But I feel that they have not gone beyond a simple denial of the central argument, which is to be found on pp. 124–126 and 128–130 of the April 1971 number, and that much of what they say therefore fails by petitio.

The interpretation of these words is important for understanding the meaning of in Aristotle. For here, exceptionally, it has been taken to refer to sense-perceptions rather than images. I quote the Oxford translation of 462a15–24 : ‘From all this, then, the conclusion to be drawn is that the dream is a sort of presentation (), and, more particularly, one which occurs in sleep; since the phantoms just mentioned are not dreams, nor is any other a dream which presents itself when (...) the sense-perceptions are in a state of freedom. Nor is every presentation which occurs in sleep necessarily a dream. (shrink)

The interpretation of these words is important for understanding the meaning of in Aristotle. For here, exceptionally, it has been taken to refer to sense-perceptions rather than images.I quote the Oxford translation of 462a15–24 : ‘From all this, then, the conclusion to be drawn is that the dream is a sort of presentation (), and, more particularly, one which occurs in sleep; since the phantoms just mentioned are not dreams, nor is any other a dream which presents itself when the (...) sense-perceptions are in a state of freedom. Nor is every presentation which occurs in sleep necessarily a dream. (shrink)

This is a concise and easy-to-read account of the ethical philosophy of the Greeks, from the Sophists to the Stoics. With particular emphasis on Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, the author skillfully traces the themes of law and nature, virtue, knowledge and happiness, and love and friendship, giving a comprehensive account of the meanings the Greeks attached to expressions such as "justice", "voluntary action", "virtue", and "good".

The Greater Alcibiades has been dismissed as spurious by a great many scholars including most of the major Platonists, and for a variety of reasons. Many of these reasons are to my mind extremely weak, and would apply with equal force to some of the undoubtedly genuine dialogues: Bluck has argued that nearly all can be met by supposing that Plato wrote it for some special purpose, for instance as a reply to Polycrates' attack on Socrates. It is noteworthy that (...) several scholars, while rejecting die work, do so with reluctance and a hint of misgiving. Shorey, for instance, sees touches worthy of Plato himself, and de Strycker thinks the work may actually have been revised by Plato. (shrink)