Pour cette collection d' «Initiations aux Pères de l'Église» où ont déjà pris place un volume sur Maxime le Confesseur et un sur la Règle de saint Augustin, ainsi que des études thématiques, Ph. Henné a choisi de faire autant de place aux textes même d'Origène (O.) qu'à la présentation de sa théologie. Les travaux d'Henri Crouzel, en particulier l'ouvrage paru en 1984 (Origène, Lethielleux, Paris) et ses bibliographies origéniennes, consti­tuent les références permanentes del'A. mais la clart..

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:NECESSARY PROPOSITIONS AND THE SQUARE OF OPPOSITION MARK ROBERTS University of Rhode Island Kingston, Rhode Island IT IS COMMONPLACE to define contradictory, contrary, and subcontrary propositions in the following way: contradictory propositions cannot both be true and cannot both be false; contrary propositions cannot both be true but can both be false; and subcontrary propositions can both be true but cannot both be false. In his Introduction to Logic (...) 1 Irving Copi raises a problem with two of these definitions which he believes forces him to limit the range of propositions which can be used in the square of opposition. Since contrary propositions can both be false, but the falsity of a necessarily true proposition is not possible, a necessarily true proposition has no contrary. Therefore, only contingent propositions can be contraries. Subcontrary propositions can both be true, but the truth of a necessarily false proposition is not possible.2 This problem is rarely raised in other logic texts, but, it is interesting to note, it is mentioned by a number of neoscholastic philosophers, for example, P. Nicholas Russo,3 Rev. H. Grenier,4 1 Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic (New York: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 178-179. Copi first introduced this problem in the fifth edition of his work on the basis of an article by David H. Sanford entitled " Contraries and Subcontraries,'' Nous 2 (1968) : 95-96. Sanford argues that the most reasonable way to resolve the problem of necessary propositions is to assume that contingent propositions comprise the square of opposition. 2 Copi, pp. 178-179. 8 Nicholas Russo, Summa Philosophica (Boston: Apud Marlier et Socios, 1[;85), p. 23. 4 Henri Grenier, Thomistic Philosophy, Vol. I (Charlottetown, Canada: St. Dunstan's University, 1950), p. 69. 427 428 MARK ROBERTS G. Sanseverino,5 Jacques Maritain,6 F.-X. Maquart,7 P. Coffey,8 and others.9 (It is also mentioned by Bishop Whately.10 ) Each of these philosophers makes necessarily true or false propositions an exception to the definition of contrary and subcontrary propositions. The reason is they and Copi interpret the definitions of contrary and subcontrary propositions to mean that the falsity of each contrary proposition is possible and the truth of each subcontrary proposition is possible. It should be mentioned, however, that the position of the philosophers cited above is not entirely the same as Copi's. Copi reasons that these definitions imply that necessary propositions have no contrary or subcontrary. The other philosophers believe that necessary propositions can be contraries and subcontraries. Thus, in the case of necessary propositions contrary and subcontrary propositions are, instead, defined merely in terms of their quantity and quality, not by whether or not they can both be false or can both be true. In fact, Coffey and some of the other philosophers cited above assert that, when the propositions composing the square are necessary, one can infer the truth of the universal from the truth of 5 Gaietano Sanseverino, Philosophia Christiana, Vol. II (Neapoli: Vincentii Manfredi, 1862), pp. DCCXXXVIII ff. 6 J. Maritain, An Introduction to Logic (London: Sheed & Ward, 1937), p. 135, notes 1 & 2. 7 F.-X. Maquart, Elementa Philosophiae, Vol. I (Parisiis: Andreas Blot, 1937)' p. 126 ff. 8 P. Coffey, The Science of Logic, Vol. 1 (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1918), p. 225, 226. 9 Joseph Gredt, Elementa Philosophiae, Vol. I (Friburgi: Herder, 1929), p. 46, notes 1 & 2; Sylvester J. Hartman, A Textbook of Logic (New York: American Book Co., 1936), p. 162 ff; Roland Houde and Jerome J. Fischer, Handbook of Logic (Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Co., 1954), p. 61; Eduard Hugon, Cursus Philosophiae Thomisticae, Vol. I (Parisiis: P. Lethielleux n.d), p. 155; Dennis C. Kane, Logic: The Art of Predication and Inference (Providence: Providence College Press, 1978), p. 98 ff; Francis P. Siegfried, Essentialia Philosophiae (Philadelphia: Dolphin Press, 1927), p. 25; Francis Varvello, Minor Logic, trans. and supplemented Arthur D. Fearon (San Francisco: Univ. of San Francisco Press, 1933), p. 73 ff. 10 Richard Whately, Elements of Logic (Boston: James Munroe & Co., 1854), p. 77 ff. PROPOSITIONS AND THE SQUARE OF OPPOSITION 429 the particular and the falsity of the particular from the falsity of the universal.11 Maritain maintains that in the case... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 68J The Theology of Henri de Lubac: An Overview. By HANS URS VON BALTHASAR. Translated by Joseph Fessio, S. J., Michael M. Waldstein (Preface), and Susan Clements (Conclusion). San Fran· cisco: Ignatius Press/Communio, 1991. Pp. 127. $9.95 (paper). Except for the preface and conclusion, Hans Urs von Balthasar's The Theology of Henri de Lubac first appeared as the long essay, "Henri de Lubac-L'oeuvre organique d'une vie," in (...) Nouvelle Revue Theologique 97 (1975), 897-913 and 98 (1976), 33-59, and translated by Joseph Fessio, S.J., as "The Achievement of Henri de Luhac" in Thought 51 (1976), 7-49. The preface was added soon after for the German edition, Henri de Lubac: Sein organisches Lebenswerk (Frei· burg im Breisgau: Johannes Verlag, 1976). The conclusion was added for Balthasar's and Jesuit Georges Chantraine's Le Cardinal de Lubac: L'Homme et son oeuvre (Paris: Ed. Lethielleux, 1983). While de Lubac denied " a true, personal philosophical or theo· logical synthesis " in the multiplicity of his oeuvre, he did believe that there could he found " a pattern that constitutes its unity " (de Luhac on p. 10). A more systematic work had been planned with Bruno de Solages, Peres Congar, Chenu, and others. In de Luhac's words, " the lightning bolt of Humani Generis killed the project" (p. 11). We can only wonder at what might have been. At the center of de Lubac's thought is a spiritual perception of "the essence of Christian mysticism" (p. 11). A hook on this subject was planned hut never completed; its fundamental importance was indicated by de Luhac in 1956: "I believe my hook on mysticism has inspired me for a long time in everything I work on; in its light I make my judgments and gain the criteria for ordering my thoughts and ideas" (p. 11). The purpose of Balthasar's little book is to trace these "great spiritual options of the master" (p. 26). Balthasar wrote his preface after he had received from de Luhac the manuscript that would he published as his Memoire sur l'occasion de mes ecrits (1989; ET: At the Service of the Church (1993]). Accord· ing to Balthasar, this "meandering" text has great value in display· ing the organic unity of de Luhac's writings in the contexts which occasioned them-" as well as the legendary condemnations and banish· ments prepared for him by his order and by the Church" (p. 9). De Luhac adopted the " fundamental elan " (p. 13) of Blondel, Marechal, and Rousselot. They enabled de Lubac to see in Thomas Aquinas " the paradox of the spiritual creature that is ordained beyond itself by the innermost reality of its nature to a goal that is unreachable for it and that can only he given as a gift of grace " (p. 13). Balthasar is unambiguous in his belief in the correctness of their interpretation. 684 BOOK REVIEWS Blondel, Marechal, and de Lubac were " martyrs for truth " (p. 13). De Lubac " exposed himself to the attacks of a tutiorist scholastic theology, armed with nothing but the historical and theological truth" (p. 13). Of the three, de Lubac was the most persecuted. The conflict with scholasticism is presented in all its sharpness. One must go back to Thomas himself, over the commentatorial tradition of John of St. Thomas and Cajetan, whose work represents, in the words of Gilson, " a successful ' corruptorium Sanctae Thomae.'... Thomas has been castrated by it" (p. 14). Gilson's "unqualified assent" to de Lubac's Thomistic conclusions means much to Balthasar, because it is "the assent of the greatest authority in the field of the history of phi· losophy" (p. 15). Upon reading Sumaturel (1946), Gilson wrote to de Lubac that the difference between the scholastic and the humanist theologians, like de Lubac, in part lies in the way they understand propositions. The scholastics " understand only univocal propositions and those that seem to be univocal. The former [humanist theologiansJ, by contrast, are more interested in the truth that the proposition attempts to formulate and that partly escapes it" (p. 14). In their incomprehension and fear of analogy, the scholastics are represented as hankering after a security that... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:IMMEDIACY AND MEDIATION IN AQUINAS: Introduction "IN I SENT.," Q. 1, A. 5 DOUGLAS c. HALI, Louvain Universtiy Belgium ] ] HE PURPOSE of the present essay is to provide an nalysis of the dialectically related notions of " immediacy " and "med:ia1tion" in Question I, Art~cle 5 of Aquinas' Commentary on the Sentences. "Immediacy" here refers to the non-mediated " light of inspiration " which Aquinas proposes as (...) a principle for theology; while " mediation " refers to the problem of interpretation via,sensible signs in an historical community. It is proposed that there are dialectical tensions unresolved by Aquinas, and usually overlooked by commentators and interpreters.1 1 The most extensive analysis published to date of the theological methodology of Aquinas in this Commentary is by M. Corbin, Le chemin de la theologie chez Thomas d'Aquin (Paris: Beauchesne, 1974). For his analysis of the text in question see pp. 273-290. The present essay seeks precisely to be even more "hegelian" and more "barthian" than Corbin, and to provide some documentation for the validity of,such an interpretation of Aquinas. For a further methodological discussion, see my "Participated Trinitarian Relations : Dialectics of Method, Understanding, and Mystery in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas" (Leuven: S.T.D. dissertation, the Faculty of Theology, 1987). For basic points in the literature see P. Mandonnet, "Chronologie sommaire de la vie et des ecrits de saint Thomas," Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques 9 (1920), 142·152; G. Rossi, "L'autografo di S. Tommaso del Commento al III libro delle Sentenze," Divus Thomas Oommentarium de philosophia et theologia 35 (1932), 532-585; A. Hayen, "S. Thomas a-t-il edite deux fois son Commentaire sure le livre des Sentences," Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale 9 (1937), 219-236. See also the review of this by A. Donclaine, in Bulletin thomiste 6 (1940), 100-108. P. Vanier, "Theologie trinitaire chez S. Thomas d'Aquin. Evolution du concept d'action notionelle," Publications de l'Institut d'etudes medievales 13 (1953), p. 124. 31 DOUGLAS C. BALL The "Prologue" to the Commentary The " Prologue " of Aquinas' Commentary consists of two parts, as did that of Albert the Great, and as was the custom of the time. The first part takes its point of departure from a biblical text, which is then interpreted in accord with the na- >bure of theology and the project of commentary on the four hooks of the Sentences. The theme of Aquinas' biblical meditation is not scientia hut sapientia. The second part of Aquinas' "Pmlogue " consists, as did Albert's, of a question on the status and method of theology. This Question 1 is of particular importance in that it clearly states that sacred doctrine is not principally to he considered soientia. After the biblical reflection-mediation, Aquinas presents an introductory question on the status and method of sacra doctrina in a more "scholastic" manner, specifying five articles that will be addressed: 1) its necessity; 9l) supposing that it exists, whether it is one or many; 3) if it is one, whether it is practical or speculative, and if it is speculative, whether it is wisdom, science, or understanding; 4) its subject; 5) its mode.2 For a critique of this position see the review of Vanier by J. Hamer in Bulletin thomiste 9 (1954-1956), 596-601. See also E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas.Aquinas (New York, 1956); M. D. Chenu, Toward Understanding St. Thomas (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1964); J. Weisheipl, "The Meaning of 'Sacra Doctrina'," The Thomist 38 (1974), 64-67; B. Mondin, St. Thomas.Aquinas' Philosophy in the Oommentary to the Sentences (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975). Good arguments on the dating and circumstances of the work are to be found in J. Weishepil, Friar Thomas d'.A.quino: His Life, Thought, and Work (Garden City: Doubleday, 1974). 2Aquinas, Soriptum Super Libros Sententiarum, vol. 1, ed. Mandonnet (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929), q. 1 (p. 6). [It should be noted that there is as yet no critical edition of this work. All references here will be to this edition, which at least provides a basic text, which is fundamentally a reprint of the Vives edition, and thus differs at times... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AQUINAS ON REINCARNATION MARIE I. GEORGE St. John's University Jamaica, New York I. INTRODUCTION AQUINAS EXPLICITLY addresses the question of whether reincarnation is possible on numerous occasions.1 Not surprisingly, his most extensive and subtle treatment of the subject is found in a work addressed to nonChristians, the Summa Contra Gentiles. Aquinas took it to be his duty as Christian philosopher to address errors which were apt to have a (...) detrimental effect on the faith of Christian believers.2 In this spirit I have undertaken the task of presenting Aquinas's philosophical arguments against reincarnation. For nowadays belief in reincarnation is becoming increasingly widespread, even among Christians, in spite of the fact that it is incompatible with belief in the resurrection of the body. My treatment of the matter will necessarily be summary, both because of the large number of arguments which Aquinas proffers, and because a full understanding of Aquinas's arguments presupposes an understanding of his teachings on natural philosophy, and especially on the soul. 1 A partial listing of the works in which Aquinas discusses reincarnation is as follows: In Super Evangelium S. Matthaei, ed. P. Raphaelis Cai, O.P. (Turin: Marietti, 1951), n. 925, Aquinas refers to transmigrationem animae. Reference is made to the Pythagorean fables on the subject in In Aristotelis Librum De Anima Commentarium (Turin: Marietti, 1959), n. 131 (hereafter cited as De Anima). Extended discussions of reincarnation are found in Summa Contra Gentiles (hereafter cited as ScG), II, c. 83, ed. C. Pera, O.P., et al. (Turin: Marietti, 1961), and in Scriptum super Sententiis (hereafter cited as Sent.), IV, d. 44, q. l, a. 1 (Paris: Lethielleux, 1956). The Index Thomisticus indicates that the word "metempsychoseos" is used twice in the Catena Aurea (Matt.), but does not appear in any of Aquinas's own writings. 2 Cf. De Unitate Intellectus Contra Averroistas. 33 34 MARIE I. GEORGE What is reincarnation? The problem in attempting to understand and to form a proper judgment about the idea of reincarnation stems from the fact that this word designates a cluster of disparate beliefs and doctrines, some popular, some philosophical, others religious. If reincarnation has always figured prominently in the religious and cultural fabric of Eastern thought, it has been less present in the West. In spite of some precedents in the past, it is only really quite recently that this idea has been gaining ground here, although in forms quite different from those of the East. The question, then, is a vast one. For this reason, among others, we intend to limit our consideration to those versions for which Western philosophers have offered a defense. Their claim is that upon death the spirits of at least certain people enter into other human bodies (generally those of newly conceived infants), or even into the bodies of lower life forms. Moreover, it is usually maintained that the kind of being one's spirit will enter after death depends upon how one has lived one's previous life. One might thus return as a queen, or as a poor and miserable person, or even as a slug, in correspondence to the goodness or evilness of one's former life. Aquinas's arguments against reincarnation are of two sorts. Sometimes he argues against what he calls the roots of a given version of the theory:' What he means by roots are positions the acceptance of which render reincarnation necessary or plausible. In showing that the roots are unsound, Aquinas refutes a given account of reincarnation, but does not refute the basic doctrine as such, for there may be some other account that would justify the belief. The other sort of argument which Aquinas gives positively establishes that reincarnation is impossible. We intend to consider here both sorts of argument.4 'Cf. IV Sent., d. 44, q. I, a. 1, sol. 1. 4 Note that Aquinas does not address the religious versions of the theory with the exception of Plato's theory which can be considered religious to the extent that it is derived from the Pythagorean mysteries. Aquinas interests himself in those theories known to him that both offer a rational account and have some plausibility. AQUINAS ON... (shrink)

This is a well-behaved concept in Newtonian physics. But a center of gravity is not an atom or a subatomic particle or any other physical item in the world. It has no mass; it has no color; it has no physical properties at all, except for spatio-temporal location. It is a fine example of what Hans Reichenbach would call an abstractum. It is a purely abstract object. It is, if you like , a theorist's fiction. It is not one of (...) the real things in the universe in addition to the atoms. But it is a fiction that has nicely defined, well delineated and well behaved role within physics. (shrink)

Richard Taylor was born in Charlotte, Michigan on 5 November 1919. He received his A. B. from the University of illinois in 1941, his M. A. from Oberlin College in 1947, and his Ph. D. from Brown University in 1951. He has been William H. P. Faunce Professor of Philosophy at Brown University, Professor of Philosophy (Graduate Faculties) at Columbia University, and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Rochester. He is the author of about fifty articles and of five (...) philosophical books. This volume consists of essays presented to Richard Taylor on the occa sion of his sixtieth birthday. Some of the contributors have been Taylor'S students; some have been his colleagues; and all have been, and continue to be, his admirers. I have made several attempts to articulate what it is I (I would not presume to speak for anyone else) admire about Richard Taylor: (1) There is a particular 'flavor' to Taylor's philosophical writing and con versation that is wholly delightful. Like any other flavor, it can be tasted and enjoyed and remembered but never adequately described. (If there should be someone who has picked up this book who does not know what I mean, I recommend that he read the chapter on 'God' in Taylor's Metaphysics. ) (2) Taylor is a masterful dialectician. (shrink)