The relationship between participatory democracy (the rule of and by a socially diverse citizenry) and constitutional liberalism (a regime predicated on the protection of individual liberties and the rule of law) is a famously troubled one. The purpose of this essay is to suggest that, at least under certain historical conditions, participatory democracy will indeed support the establishment of constitutional liberalism. That is to say, the development of institutions, behavioral habits, and social values centered on the active participation of free (...) and equal citizens in democratic politics can lead to the extension of legally enforced immunities from coercion to citizens and noncitizens alike. Such immunities, here called “quasi-rights,” are at least preconditions for the personal autonomy and liberty in respect to choice-making that are enshrined as the “rights of the moderns.” This essay, which centers on one ancient society, does not seek to develop a formal model proving that democracy will necessarily promote liberal constitutionalism. However, by explaining why a premodern democratic citizenry of free, adult, native males—who sought to defend their own interests and were unaffected by Enlightenment or post-Enlightenment ideals of inherent human worth—chose to extend certain formal protections to slaves, women, and children, it may point toward the development of a model for deriving liberalism from democratic participation. Development of such a model could have considerable bearing on current policy debates. (shrink)

_Tracing practical reason from its origins to its modern and contemporary permutations_ The Greek discovery of practical reason, as the skilled performance of strategic thinking in public and private affairs, was an intellectual breakthrough that remains both a feature of and a bug in our modern world. Countering arguments that rational choice-making is a contingent product of modernity, _The Greeks and the Rational_ traces the long history of theorizing rationality back to ancient Greece. In this book, Josiah Ober (...) explores how ancient Greek sophists, historians, and philosophers developed sophisticated and systematic ideas about practical reason. At the same time, they recognized its limits—that not every decision can be reduced to mechanistic calculations of optimal outcomes. Ober finds contemporary echoes of this tradition in the application of game theory to political science, economics, and business management. _The Greeks and the Rational_ offers a striking revisionist history with widespread implications for the study of ancient Greek civilization, the history of thought, and human rationality itself. (shrink)

What did democracy mean before liberalism? What are the consequences for our lives today? Combining history with political theory, this book restores the core meaning of democracy as collective and limited self-government by citizens. That, rather than majority tyranny, is what democracy meant in ancient Athens, before liberalism. Participatory self-government is the basis of political practice in 'Demopolis', a hypothetical modern state powerfully imagined by award-winning historian and political scientist Josiah Ober. Demopolis' residents aim to establish a secure, (...) prosperous, and non-tyrannical community, where citizens govern as a collective, both directly and through representatives, and willingly assume the costs of self-government because doing so benefits them, both as a group and individually. Basic democracy, as exemplified in real Athens and imagined Demopolis, can provide a stable foundation for a liberal state. It also offers a possible way forward for religious societies seeking a realistic alternative to autocracy. (shrink)

Democracy is shown to be a non-instrumental good-in-itself (as well as an instrument in securing other goods) by extrapolation from the Aristotelian premise that humans are political animals. Because humans are by nature language-using, as well as sociable and common-end-seeking beings, the capacity to associate in public decisions is constitutive of the human being-kind. Association in decision is necessary (although insufficient) for happiness in the sense of eudaimonia. A benevolent dictator who satisfied all other conditions of justice, harms her subjects (...) by denying them opportunity to associate in the decisions by which their community is governed. (shrink)

ABSTRACTSchumpeter’s highly influential theory of democracy, developed in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, is less a market-based theory of party competition than it is a theory of strong leadership, modeled after generalship. As such, it is a weak foundation for rebuilding a democratic theory of party politics. Moreover, Schumpeter’s demolition of the “Classical Doctrine of Democracy” knocks down a straw-man theory: a hybrid of Bentham’s utilitarianism and Rousseau’s communitarianism that few contemporary theorists of democracy would be willing to defend.

Opposing the tendency to read Thucydides as a strong realist, committed to a theory of behaviour that assumes rationality as expected utility maximization, Ned Lebow and Clifford Orwin emphasize Thucydides’ attentiveness to deviations from rationality by individuals and states. This paper argues that Thucydides grasped the principles underlying contemporary prospect theory, which explains why people over-weight small probabilities and under-weight near certain ones. Thucydides offers salient examples of excessive risk-aversion in the face of probable gains and excessive risk-seeking by decision-makers (...) faced with high probability losses. Thucydides suggests that in a democracy, leaders’ rhetoric can limit or exacerbate the political effects of bias in risk assessment. (shrink)

The characterization of the world of the ancient Greek city states as relatively poor and economically static has been refuted by recent advances in Greek economic history. The Greek world grew dramatically, compared to other premodern societies, both in population and per capita consumption from the age of Homer to that of Aristotle. By the fourth century BCE the city-state ecology was densely populated, and median consumption was well above bare subsistence. Athenian income inequality can be roughly measured using income (...) and population estimates from late fourth century BCE. This paper argues that, at least in Athens, economic growth was accompanied by historically low levels of income inequality. Both economic growth and low inequality are explained by the development of citizen-centered political institutions. Growth, inequality, and institutions were important parts of the historical context in which Plato and Aristotle wrote. Attending to that context may elucidate some aspects of Greek political philosophy. (shrink)

Democracy, as collective self-government by citizens, rests on citizens’ capacity to bargain in good faith with those whose interests are not their own. Fair bargains that ensure adequate security and welfare rest on an implicit agreement: Each citizen recognizes that sectional interests (including our conceptions of ideal justice) will never be fully realized, but they are better off inside the bargain than outside of it, and will bargain again another day. Striking and revising civic bargains depend on the education of (...) citizens: In aggregate, the citizenry must develop the requisite civic skills, political knowledge, and capacity for judgment. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIlya Somin's Democracy and Political Ignorance proposes an original, epistemic argument for decentralizing and downsizing democratic government. Somin's argument does not produce a plausible real-world program for government reform, nor does he exhaust the universe of what voting is for, or possible democratic solutions to the epistemic problem of rational ignorance and cognitive limitation. But his proposal is of considerable interest as an advance in political theory. The historical example of the classical Greek world of decentralized authority and small city-states (...) suggests that democracy does benefit, in epistemic ways, from decentralization, reduced scale, and simplification of procedural rules. The tradeoff is, however, increased responsibility on the part of individual citizens to undertake civic services of various kinds. (shrink)

Abstract: Socrates was both a loyal citizen (by his own lights) and a critic of the democratic community's way of doing things. This led to a crisis in 339 B.C. In order to understand Socrates' and the Athenian community's actions (as reported by Plato and Xenophon) it is necessary to understand the historical and legal contexts, the democratic state's commitment to the notion that citizens are resonsible for the effects of their actions, and Socrates' reasons for preferring to live in (...) Athens rather than in states that might (by his lights) have had substantively better legal systems. (shrink)

G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, Athenian Democratic Origins and Other Essays, edited by David Harvey and Robert Parker, with the assistance of Peter Thonemann , pp. vii + 447; £92.00, ISBN 0 19 925517 2.

Classical Athens provides a historical case study of effective joint action by a democratic community, at scale, over time, and across a socially and epistemically diverse population. Athens was concerned both with aggregating diverse knowledge for decision-making and with building common knowledge for coordinated joint action. A preserved prosecution speech delivered in an Athenian treason trial reveals how common knowledge was generated by democratic institutions and employed in legal arguments. Common knowledge facilitated eff ective coordination among citizens through productive alignment (...) cascades. Yet Athenian lawcourt procedures rendered cascading difficult, pointing to an institutionalized awareness that coordination among jurors might violate fairness as equality before the law; such violations threatened democratic values and the equilibrium between elite and non-elite citizens. Common knowledge was promoted by repeated public rituals, public monuments, and public architecture that allowed for the interpresence of large numbers of deliberative and intervisible citizens. (shrink)

"It's the animal in us," we often hear when we've been bad. But why not when we're good? Primates and Philosophers tackles this question by exploring the biological foundations of one of humanity's most valued traits: morality. In this provocative book, primatologist Frans de Waal argues that modern-day evolutionary biology takes far too dim a view of the natural world, emphasizing our "selfish" genes. Science has thus exacerbated our reciprocal habits of blaming nature when we act badly and labeling the (...) good things we do as "humane." Seeking the origin of human morality not in evolution but in human culture, science insists that we are moral by choice, not by nature. Citing remarkable evidence based on his extensive research of primate behavior, de Waal attacks "Veneer Theory," which posits morality as a thin overlay on an otherwise nasty nature. He explains how we evolved from a long line of animals that care for the weak and build cooperation with reciprocal transactions. Drawing on both Darwin and recent scientific advances, de Waal demonstrates a strong continuity between human and animal behavior. In the process, he also probes issues such as anthropomorphism and human responsibilities toward animals. Based on the Tanner Lectures de Waal delivered at Princeton University's Center for Human Values in 2004, Primates and Philosophers includes responses by the philosophers Peter Singer, Christine M. Korsgaard, and Philip Kitcher and the science writer Robert Wright. They press de Waal to clarify the differences between humans and other animals, yielding a lively debate that will fascinate all those who wonder about the origins and reach of human goodness. (shrink)

"It's the animal in us," we often hear when we've been bad. But why not when we're good? Primates and Philosophers tackles this question by exploring the biological foundations of one of humanity's most valued traits: morality. -/- In this provocative book, primatologist Frans de Waal argues that modern-day evolutionary biology takes far too dim a view of the natural world, emphasizing our "selfish" genes. Science has thus exacerbated our reciprocal habits of blaming nature when we act badly and labeling (...) the good things we do as "humane." Seeking the origin of human morality not in evolution but in human culture, science insists that we are moral by choice, not by nature. -/- Citing remarkable evidence based on his extensive research of primate behavior, de Waal attacks "Veneer Theory," which posits morality as a thin overlay on an otherwise nasty nature. He explains how we evolved from a long line of animals that care for the weak and build cooperation with reciprocal transactions. Drawing on both Darwin and recent scientific advances, de Waal demonstrates a strong continuity between human and animal behavior. In the process, he also probes issues such as anthropomorphism and human responsibilities toward animals. -/- Based on the Tanner Lectures de Waal delivered at Princeton University's Center for Human Values in 2004, Primates and Philosophers includes responses by the philosophers Peter Singer, Christine M. Korsgaard, and Philip Kitcher and the science writer Robert Wright. They press de Waal to clarify the differences between humans and other animals, yielding a lively debate that will fascinate all those who wonder about the origins and reach of human goodness. (shrink)

Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People. by Josiah Ober Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes. by Mogens Herman Hansen The Classical Athenian Democracy. by David Stockton The Greek Discovery of Politics. by Chistian Meier Athens from Cleisthenes to Pericles. by Charles W. Fornara; Loren J. Samons II Freedom: Freedom in the Making of Western Culture. by Orlando Patterson.

Aristotle's Politics is widely recognized as one of the classics of the history of political philosophy, and like every other such masterpiece, it is a work about which there is deep division.

The birth of political thought has long been associated with the development of either the polis as a new form of political organization in Greece, or of democracy as a new form of government in Athens. This article suggests that this view ought to be expanded. Between the late 6th and 4th centuries bc, the Greek polis of Athens established large, participatory democratic institutions. But the transformation that the polis underwent did not merely affect political structures: in this period, Athens (...) transitioned from an undeveloped, limited access, ‘natural state’ toward a developed open access society – a society characterized by impersonal, perpetual, and inclusive political, economic, legal and, social institutions. Those who witnessed this transformation first-hand attempted to grapple, often critically, with its implications. We show that Thucydides, Plato, and other Greek political thinkers devoted a considerable part of their work to analyzing the polis’ tendency toward not only political, but also economic, social, and legal inclusion. Without understanding this larger picture, we cannot adequately explain the development of Greek political thought. (shrink)

For once the blurbs on the book jacket do not exaggerate. Josiah Ober is one of the most original, wide-ranging, and provocative thinkers we have on Athenian democracy and his book, Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule really is a ‘groundbreaking contribution to classical Greek history, ancient Greek philosophy, and the history of political thought’ and does indeed offer ‘close and insightful’ readings of particular texts . Every chapter is full of fresh interpretations of (...) the most worked-over passages or a shift of focus which alters our reading of an entire text. Moreover, he has more interesting things to say about Ps.-Xenophon than just about anyone I have ever read. And he weaves all this into a richly textured story about modern as well as ancient democracy. (shrink)

Physicists regularly invoke universal laws, such as those of motion and electromagnetism, to explain events. Biological and medical scientists have no such laws. How then do they acquire a reliable body of knowledge about biological organisms and human disease? One way is by repeatedly returning to, manipulating, observing, interpreting, and reinterpreting certain subjects—such as flies, mice, worms, or microbes—or, as they are known in biology, “model systems.” Across the natural and social sciences, other disciplinary fields have developed canonical examples that (...) have played a role comparable to that of biology’s model systems, serving not only as points of reference and illustrations of general principles or values but also as sites of continued investigation and reinterpretation. The essays in this collection assess the scope and function of model objects in domains as diverse as biology, geology, and history, attending to differences between fields as well as to epistemological commonalities. Contributors examine the role of the fruit fly Drosophila and nematode worms in biology, troops of baboons in primatology, box and digital simulations of the movement of the earth’s crust in geology, and meteorological models in climatology. They analyze the intensive study of the prisoner’s dilemma in game theory, ritual in anthropology, the individual case in psychoanalytic research, and Athenian democracy in political theory. The contributors illuminate the processes through which particular organisms, cases, materials, or narratives become foundational to their fields, and they examine how these foundational exemplars—from the fruit fly to Freud’s Dora—shape the knowledge produced within their disciplines. Contributors Rachel A. Ankeny Angela N. H. Creager Amy Dahan Dalmedico John Forrester Clifford Geertz Carlo Ginzburg E. Jane Albert Hubbard Elizabeth Lunbeck Mary S. Morgan Josiah Ober Naomi Oreskes Susan Sperling Marcel Weber M. Norton Wise. (shrink)

The political outlook of the so-called ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’ has been a subject of controversy in the scholarly literature, with some commentators judging him to be a committed democrat, while others see in him a partisan of aristocracy or even oligarchy. This disagreement is not surprising, for the text contains passages that seem to pull in opposite directions. The article suggests that we move beyond the one-dimensional oligarch-or-democrat model traditionally employed and instead approach the issue from a fresh angle, applying the (...) more nuanced typology for understanding ancient social criticism developed by Josiah Ober.The article begins by situating the author within the social landscape of classical Athens. The resulting characterization presents the author as a representative of a distinctive social type: the Athenian ‘rich quietist’, who prefers private economic endeavours to engagement in public affairs, and who is ideologically committed to democratic government but also highly critical of how democratic society treats its wealthy citizens. This characterization helps make better sense of the seemingly contradictory political indications in the text. In particular, fragments 6 and 7 should be read as a single line of argument, which takes the form of an ‘immanent critique’ of contemporary Athenian democracy. According to ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’, democratic society rightly praises the rule of law as a distinctive democratic value, but it falls disappointingly short of that ideal in its treatment of its own wealthy elite citizens. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Isocrates and Civic EducationRobert G. SullivanIsocrates and Civic Education. Edited by Takis Poulakis and David Depew. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004. Pp. x + 277. $50.00, hardcover.Henry Burrowes Lathrop, in his magisterial Translations from the Classics into English from Caxton to Chapman, adopted a distinctly apologetic tone for having included in that book a lengthy gloss of Isocrates' writings. He felt constrained to do so, noting, "This (...) fairly long exposition has been necessary, since Isocrates is little read nowadays." Well, of course, "nowadays" Isocrates is read a great deal, and he is generally considered to be one of the more important figures in the classical rhetorical tradition. There are a variety of reasons for the revival of Isocrates' fortunes; he has always been accepted as an exemplar of style, and has exerted strong influences in a number of historical eras, but he is seen increasingly as an original and significant rhetorical theorist. However, the strongest attraction to scholars of our era is the connection by Isocrates of two concepts, rhetorical discourse and civic education, in what he called hê tôn logôn padieia. At the nexus of these ideas is not merely a historically interesting aspect of classical rhetorical theory but an important link between rhetorical theory and political practice, of heightened importance to a democratic culture.The volume under consideration gathers some of the best informed contemporary scholars to address this confluence. The ten essays include work by classicists, philosophers, and rhetoricians, all of whom are working in an explicitly interdisciplinary posture. The volume is divided into five thematic sections, with two essays contributed on each of the themes, each pair addressing different aspects of Isocrates' notion of civic education.The first section addresses the shape and purpose of the Isocratean program of civic education. The central question addressed by these essays is fundamental. If we grant the generality that Isocrates has a program of civic education, what are the particular goals of his pedagogy? Simply put, what civic virtues can one expect to acquire from an education in the Isocratean system? For Josiah Ober the route to the answering of this question is a careful and extraordinarily interesting reading of Isocrates great apologia, Antidosis. Ober sees Isocrates attempting to develop in his students a "complex and integral identity" (39) that will allow them to remain both true to themselves and useful to the city, a careful blending of soul-craft and state-craft. Takis Poulakos focuses on the epistemological foundation of Isocratean practice by making a careful account of Isocrates' use of the term doxa. Poulakos does an excellent [End Page 174] job of cutting through the thicket of Isocratean nuance and correctly identifies the theoretically charged notion of doxa as being both the process and product of informed conjecture.The next six essays are, in essence, comparative, laying Isocratean concepts of civic virtue and pedagogy against those of the sophists, Aristotle, and Plato. John Poulakos deftly separates Isocrates' purposes and pedagaogy from the sophists Protagoras and Gorgias. Particularly striking is the distinction Poulakos draws between how Isocrates and the sophists conceived of the power of language. The sophists, having a "dynastic" conception of language, imagine that mastering rhetoric gives one direct access to tyranical power over the individual psyche. Isocrates, less sure of (or perhaps ethically nervous about) language's capacity for political witchcraft, adapts a "hegemonic" notion of logos as acivilizing force, a means of leadership toward good ends. Ekaterina Haskins contrasts the "playful iconoclasm" of Gorgias with the "political responsibility" of Isocrates (85) in the varying ways they make use of the mythopoetic tradition. Davis Konstans contributes an extremely interesting examination of important matters upon which Isocrates and Plato find themselves in agreement, notably the deficiencies of Athenian democracy and the preferred role of the intellectual in society. Konstans' position is very stimulating, if at first glance counterintuitive, as the greater part of modern scholarship has aimed to force these two figures into opposing camps. Kathryn Morgan also begins her essay by focusing on those things Plato and Isocrates agreed upon, noting that both were deeply dissatisfied with conventional civic education in Athens. From this, Morgan turns to... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics of Popular RuleJennifer T. RobertsJosiah Ober. Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. xvi + 417 pp. Cloth, $35, £24.95.Making sound political decisions requires hard thinking. Most people do not want to think very hard, and some lack the capacity to do so. Many make decisions on the basis of narrow self-interest, (...) and most lack vision. Given that this is so, it is not surprising that Athenian democracy has come in for a good deal of criticism. What is striking about this criticism, however, is its origins in the writings of Athens' own intellectuals. In this carefully argued and beautifully written book Josiah Ober explores in depth the critiques of democracy in several texts of the fifth and fourth centuries. His theses are several and extend from the centrality of the democracy debate in Athenian intellectual life to the interactive relationship between Greek history and contemporary political writing: the obvious contrast between the bloodthirstiness of the Thirty and the restraint shown by the restored democracy, he contends, mandated that analysis of democracy and its flaws become increasingly sophisticated and in some cases downright labyrinthine. The core of the book, however, is not what Ober sees as sociological analyses of Athenian democracy--the early work of the so-called Old Oligarch and the late work of Aristotle--but rather those critiques that focused, he suggests, on the Athenians' preoccupation with words, and on their efficacy as Austinian "speech acts." It is the middle chapters, tied together by the thread of this preoccupation, that are the most ingenious.Since the logos/ergon relationship is, I would suggest, more nuanced in Thucydides' work than in that of the other authors Ober examines, I leave discussion of it for last and begin with the chapter on Aristophanes' Ecclesiazusae. This chapter offers an exciting reading of the play, one in which the potentially trendy Austinian speech-act theory proves an excellent tool of analysis. Like most readers of the play, Ober sees Aristophanes raising the question whether "the attributes essential for the exercise of citizenship" were "unique to Athenian biological males" (135); what is distinctive about his approach is the emphasis on questions that the playwright raises about the relationship of speech to reality. Can words create equality? This is the question, Ober argues, to which Aristophanes is directing his democratic audience's attention. Are there limits to the sociopolitical realities that the Assembly can enact? Does saying make it so? To what extent are notions of male and female fixed by nonverbal physis, and to what degree are they social constructions made by spoken (and [End Page 479] then written) psephismata? Could a decree of the Assembly create female participatory citizens in the way it could create a state of war? (Questions, of course, do not presuppose answers, and in this respect Aristophanes remains maddening to classicists trying to reconstruct the political views of this important thinker on the Athenian scene.)Moving ahead to Plato, Ober explores the word/fact nexus in the Apology, Crito, Gorgias, and the Republic. Gorgias, of course, is the locus classicus for Plato's attack on democracy and rhetoric, which the philosopher represents as a package deal. It is there that Socrates gets Gorgias to concede that rhetoric works its magic on the ignorant more easily than on those who know, and that on the subject of medicine, for example, the most persuasive orator will be he who has studied not medicine but the art of speaking, and similarly with the other arts: there is no need to know pragmata as long as one has discovered a mechane for persuasion (i.e., appearance can substitute for reality). Socrates thus forces Gorgias into a position which we the readers recognize as untenable but poor Gorgias does not. When Socrates concludes that rhetoric must then consist of the blind leading the blind, Gorgias rejoices in the ease and efficiency of it all: how pleasant to skip all the drudgery of learning one art after another, when all one really needs to know is the art of persuasion! (459A-C, passim... (shrink)

Beginning with an analysis of the problematic relation of ‘the particular’ to ‘the universal’ in canonical political texts, this paper explores a variety of frameworks for the study of classical Greek political thought. Specifically, after investigating the influence of Quentin Skinner’s contextualism, the paper examines the ideas, approaches, and methods of Bernard Williams, Leo Strauss, and Josiah Ober. I draw attention to each figure’s distinctive motivations for returning to ancient Greece and to the influence of particular political ideals (...) on those motivations. I also assess their strengths and weaknesses and offer a critical commentary on their chief ideas. Toward the end of the paper, I outline a novel dialectical framework for the study of classical Athens – one that emphasizes the remoteness of the ancient past and the contribution that our studies might make to self-knowledge. In sketching this framework, I focus on what I call ‘ethical Athens’, ‘philosophical Athens’, and ‘critical Athens’. (shrink)

The lead text of this book is based on primatologist Frans de Waal’s 2003 Tanner Lectures at Princeton University, to which he adds three short appendices. There are commentaries by Robert Wright, Christine Korsgaard, Philip Kitcher, and Peter Singer, followed by a 20-page response. Josiah Ober and Stephen Macedo provide a brief introduction. As befits a Tanner lecturer, de Waal’s scope is broad, his writing accessible, and the pace lively. He continues his crusade against the “veneer theory”—the idea (...) that humans are naturally sociopaths and that empathy, altruism, and morality are the result of recent cultural forces. The extent to which de Waal dichotomizes this debate, however, masks much of interest. One can agree with the seemingly obvious fact that humans are obligatorily gregarious organisms—replete with various prosocial mechanisms—while still expressing reasonable doubt that our capacity to make moral judgments is the result of an innate mechanism dedicated to that task. De Waal is an unparalleled source of rich first-hand primatological data, arguing cogently that humans show continuity with other apes regarding empathy, consolation behavior, peacemaking, and reciprocal relations. Yet he admits these “building blocks” are “by no means sufficient” for morality, and in his Response discusses two further levels of morality: rule enforcement for the community’s good, and disinterested moral reasoning. He doesn’t address whether this third, uniquely human, level is a distinct innate adaptation, apparently not appreciating that if it isn’t, and yet is necessary for being literally accorded a “moral sense”, then moral nativism is false and at least some of human morality is “veneer.” In characteristic non-philosopher manner, de Waal ultimately rejects the question as “semantics” and thus “mostly a waste of time”. It seems a surprising blemish that the author of a book subtitled “How Morality Evolved” should grow impatient with those wondering what precisely is necessary and sufficient for morality, and what specifically has evolved. (shrink)

En este artículo analizaré dos importantes aproximaciones contemporáneas a la democracia ateniense. Se trata de las interpretaciones enfrentadas de dos helenistas que han arrojado nueva luz sobre el conocimiento de la democracia clásica. Mogens H. Hansen se ha centrado especialmente en el estudio de las instituciones como fundamento del poder democrático, mientras Josiah Ober, basándose en los textos retóricos, pretende reconstruir la ideología popular a la que hace responsable del dominio político del dêmos sobre la elite. Intentaré, a (...) su vez, trazar las líneas de filiación teórica de ambas posturas y, para ello, abordaré una segunda cuestión, la de qué es la polis griega, un estado o una sociedad sin estado. Mi conclusión es que la lectura de Hansen está muy cercana a la historiografía liberal de G. Grote, mientras que la de Ober no es ajena a las lecturas antropológicas y comunitaristas. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Capitalism in “Wealthy Hellas”? PETER W. ROSE Josiah ober has taken on the very ambitious task of analyzing a vast swath of ancient Greek history— precisely the periods—as his opening quotation from Byron (1) implies—most admired by those who have devoted any time to the study of Greek antiquity: Fair Greece! sad relic of departed worth! Immortal, though no more! Though fallen, great!1 At the same time, (...) again as suggested by the repetition of Byron’s lines (206, also mentioned on 293), Ober’s book falls within the large category of celebratory works about ancient Greece—like Werner Jaeger’s once popular three volumes of Paideia or, at the outset of the twentieth century, Alfred Zimmern ’s The Greek Commonwealth.2 It does not, on the other hand, fit in with a plethora of relatively recent, relatively short (as opposed to George Grote’s twelve volumes) histories of Greece aimed at the potentially lucrative textbook market for general more comprehensive overviews of Greek civilization.3 As such, the basis on which Ober celebrates ancient Greece merits close scrutiny. history and the overriding thesis ober’s conception of “history” here is heavily weighted towards the theoretical elaboration and justification of an Josiah Ober, The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece (Princeton University Press 2015), hardback, 415 pages. A truncated, arbitrarily reorganized version of this review appeared in New Left Review 103 (2017) 139–49. Thanks to Daniel Tompkins for full comments on an earlier version, and to Peter Green and Stephen Hodkinson for clarifications on specific points. arion 26.3 winter 2019 overriding thesis. Five initial chapters of a total of eleven are devoted to that task before five chronologically focused chapters, which offer a cursory romp through Greek history from ca. 1000 BCE to 334 BCE and some brief suggestions about the period down to the decisive takeover of Greece by Rome, usually dated to 31 BCE. The volume is capped by a final summary and overview chapter. Ober is admirably forthright about his agenda. Immediately in his preface he declares, “in states where citizens keep rulers in check, public authority protects individual rights and the rule of law pertains most of the time. These political conditions promote economic growth. The conjunction of democratic politics and a strong economy is, in practice, available only to affluent citizens of highly developed countries.... Democracy and growth define the normal, although not yet the usual, conditions of modernity” (xiii, my emphasis).4 This somewhat utopian conception of the present-day interface of democratic institutions and economic growth—posited as an unquestioned desideratum in sublime disregard of “ecology” in the literal sense5—underlies Ober’s whole project. While acknowledging the obvious negatives of ancient slavery,6 “denial of rights to women, and glorified war,” he argues “if we are interested in the conjunction of political and economic exceptionalism, we must start somewhere, and classical Greece was the society in which the wealth-and-democracy package first emerged in a form that can be studied in depth” (xv). Athenian democracy has been at the center of Ober’s impressive scholarly career at least since the publication of his study of fourth-century BCE Athenian rhetoric, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens (Princeton 1989). “Athens” or “democracy” have featured in the titles of all his subsequent book publications7—not to mention the extraordinary output of more specialized essays in multiple venues. One overriding question about his latest book is whether the unique phenomenon of Athenian democracy is being unduly generalized to “Classical Greece.” 142 capitalism in “wealthy hellas”? The special focus of his interest here in ancient Greece, the “conjunction of political and economic exceptionalism,” is further clarified in his opening chapter which begins with the quotation from Byron cited above: “Byron’s vision of greatness was inspired by ancient Greek cultural and intellectual achievement: art and architecture, literature, visual and performance art, scientific and moral thought.... Hellas was great because of a cultural accomplishment that was supported by sustained economic growth. That growth was made possible by a distinctive approach to politics” (1–2). Greek cultural achievements, however, are bracketed (and in practical terms dismissed)8 in favor of the “wealth-anddemocracy... (shrink)

This book consists of an introduction by Carnes Lord and nine essays: Stephen Salkever on Aristotle's social science; Cames Lord on Aristotle's anthropology; Abram Shulsky on Aristotle's economics; Josiah Ober on Aristotle's sociology of class, status, and Order; David O'Connor on Aristotle's conception of justice; Stephen Salkever on Plato and Aristotle on women, soldiers, and citizens; Waller Newell on Aristotle on monarchy; Barry Strauss on Aristotle on Athenian democracy; and Richard Bodéus on Aristotle on law and regime.

A very significant aspect of Josiah Royce's philosophical achievement is carefully and fully treated with special emphasis on his contribution as a philosopher of spirituality.