Otávio Bueno gives a positive and accurate summary of my defense of Platonism, with special emphasis on the epistemological issues. He criticizes “skeptical nominalism”, and proposes instead an “agnostic nominalism”, which treats mathematical objects as “objects of thought”, and neither rejects nor accepts abstract entities. In my response I argue that the main problem for nominalism is to account for abstract properties and relations, and that treating mathematical objects as objects of thought does not provide a satisfactory solution to that (...) end.Otávio Bueno apresenta um resumo positivo e correto de minha defesa do Platonismo, com ênfase especial nos aspectos epistemológicos. Ele critica o “nominalismo cético” e propõe um “nominalismo agnóstico” que trata os objetos matemáticos como “objetos de pensamento”, sem rejeitar ou aceitar entes abstratos. Em minha réplica argumento que o problema principal para o nominalismo é dar conta das propriedades e relações abstratas, e que tratar os objetos matemáticos como objetos de pensamento não é uma solução satisfatória para esse fim. (shrink)

Moral principles or the rules of conduct are based in the society. If the purpose of ethics in research is to take into consideration the needs and the rights of the experimental subject, his social milieu must then largely determine the ethical considerations of a projected study. The inability to comprehend such rights may often be due to ignorance, disease and his societal values. Blood letting, biopsy and post-mortem examinations may so conflict with local beliefs that so called 'consent' to (...) these is much more than a surrender of the rights of the individual. It is difficult to conform with the highest principles of ethics in research in any uniform society. It is more so when the many variables are further complicated by cultural demands and social taboos. The best custodians of ethical standards must relate intimately with the norms of the local population. (shrink)

Marco Ruffino compares the notion of sense developed in my book with Frege’s notion of sense, and argues that whereas there are ontological similarities, my notion faces epistemological and semantic problems. In my response I discuss the various issues he raises, arguing that my notion of sense can confront them at least as well as Frege’s notion.Marco Ruffino compara a noção de sentido desenvolvida em meu livro com a noção de sentido de Frege, argumentando que mesmo havendo semelhanças ontológicas, minha (...) noção está sujeita a problemas epistemológicos e semânticos. Em minha réplica considero os problemas levantados por Marco, argumentando que minha noção de sentido pode confrontá-los pelo menos tão adequadamente quanto a noção de Frege. (shrink)

In §1 I discuss the pragmatic and semantic objections that Dirk raises against the claim that sentences refer to states of affairs. In §2 I explain in which sense I maintain that true sentences identify states of affairs.

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Education in Philosophy of Education, Department of Educational Foundations.

What is moral philosophy? That is the question with which this important volume grapples. Its starting point is the famous critique made in 1958 by Elizabeth Anscombe, who argued that moral philosophy begins from a mistake: that it is fundamentally wrong about the sort of concept that the word 'moral' represents. Anscombe rejected moral philosophy as it was then (and mostly now still is) practised. She offered instead a blueprint for the task moral philosophers must embrace if they are to (...) speak intelligibly to society about good and bad, right and wrong, duty and obligation. The chapters in this book are inspired by Anscombe's classic text. One of the most powerful voices here, among many authoritative voices, is that of Philippa Foot – Anscombe's lifelong friend – who asserts that 'any account of practical reason evacuated of an understanding of what human beings need to flourish is inadequate and must be rejected.'. (shrink)

Introducing a new cross-disciplinary genre co-published with The Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, this volume argues that any attempt to break into the intertextuality of Marx's philosophy, economics, history, and sociology, or to separate him from Hegel and the classical economists, merely results in crude reductions of Marx's achievement.