En la presente investigación se valoran las prácticas inclusivas de 6 1 docentes de educación básica de Colima, Sonora y San Luis Potosí adscritos a escuelas urbanas y rurales de México nominadas como exitosas. Se aplicaron varios instrumentos, como la GEPIA, la SACIE, el TEIP, el Cuestionario para Favorecer los Aprendizajes de Mitchell y el Protocolo C ODCA.

RESUMEN: La labor del Tribunal Penal Internacional para la Ex-Yugoslavia tuvo un momento importante en la compresión del principio de legalidad, como principio básico en la garantía de los derechos humanos, al enfrentar no sólo el derecho consuetudinario como fuente de derecho sino también diferentes modos o enfoques en la identificación de este derecho consuetudinario. Esta relación debe ser analizada a la luz de las limitaciones que tiene el derecho internacional y, sobre todo, de los procedimientos de creación de normas. (...) No resulta fácil exigir responsabilidad en el cumplimiento del derecho internacional humanitario y de los derechos humanos. La práctica de este Tribunal abre una vía para la reflexión con la finalidad de asegurar el respeto de los derechos humanos en cualquier circunstancia, incluso de aquellos que llevaron a cabo la comisión de graves crímenes contra la comunidad internacional.ABSTRACT: The work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was important for understanding the principle of legality as a key principle on the guarantee of Human Rights. The former was due to the Tribunal’s work on having faced the customary law as a source of law using different perspectives for its identification. The link between customary law, principle of legality and human rights has to be analyzed taking in account the limits of International law and the procedures for creating legal norms. It is not easy to invoke responsibility in the fulfillment of international humanitarian law and international law of human rights. The practice developed by this Tribunal provides an avenue for thinking about ensuring the respect of the human rights in any case including the commission of grave crimes against international community. PALABRAS CLAVE: derecho internacional de los derechos humanos, principio de legalidad, derecho internacional humanitario, costumbre internacionalKEYWORDS: international law of human rights, principle of legality, international humanitarian law, international custom. (shrink)

La aprobación en junio de 2008 por el Parlamento Europeo de la Directiva de retorno —denominada también Directiva de la infamia o Directiva de expulsión— consolida el proceso de involución que sobre los derechos humanos se viene produciendo en la Unión Europea desde que el miedo a la inmigración irregular se incardinó en sus instituciones. Si bien las legislaciones de extranjería de los años ochenta contenían normas que regulaban el internamiento y la expulsión no es hasta la Directiva 2001/40/CE que (...) comienza a tomar forma una política comunitaria centrada en la inmigración irregular y las expulsiones de migrantes. Las medidas de retorno son, dice la Comisión europea, “una piedra angular de la política de migración de la UE”. Desde entonces, la barbarie de los centros de retención e internamiento, el socavamiento de los derechos y la exclusión y criminalización de los migrantes extranjeros se han convertido en el caballo de batalla de las asociaciones defensoras de los derechos humanos. La erosión que las legislaciones y medidas de expulsión están provocado en los derechos y libertades y en las instituciones del Estado de derecho es inmensa. El retroceso y la erosión en los derechos y libertades es tan grande que ya no es posible continuar hablando sin más de Estados de derecho en la UE, sino más bien de máquinas administrativas para el internamiento y la expulsión, de “Estados expulsores” (1), donde las personas extranjeras son tratadas como semipersonas (2) e incluso como “no-personas” (3). (shrink)

The general hypothesis underlying this work is that mereology (the study of the relations between an entity and its parts) and topology (understood as the study of the qualitative relations of connection and compactness) may jointly constitute adequate grounds for the formal-ontological analysis of the world of ordinary experience. The analysis focuses on certain minimal (structural) principles on the basis of which different philosophical theories may be erected.

Kategoria prawdy budzi kontrowersje od czasów filozofii starożytnej aż do współczesnej. W związku z dyskusjami na temat korespondencyjnej, klasycznej teorii prawdy powstały teorie nieklasyczne, łączące pojęcie prawdy z oczywistością, skutecznym działaniem, koherencją, powszechną zgodą itp. Ostra polemika próbuje w ogóle wyeliminować kategorię prawdy. Powstaje pytanie: czy taka radykalna krytyka jest słuszna i uzasadniona? Wydaje się, że jest ona przesadna. Celem artykułu jest argumentacja za tezą, że prawda — jako wartość i norma („wzorzec”, element systemu odniesienia itp.) — jest niezbywalna (...) przy epistemicznej ocenie twierdzeń, które mają swoje konsekwencje teoretyczne i praktyczne. Strukturę artykułu wyznaczają następujące punkty: (1) krytyka kategorii prawdy, (2) prawda jako wartość i (3) prawda jako norma w systemie odniesienia. W punkcie wyjścia przyjmuję syntetyczną charakterystykę prawdy sformułowaną przez Michaela P. Lyncha w jego monografii pt. Prawda i życie. Dlaczego prawda jest ważna (2020): (a) Prawda jest obiektywna. (b) Prawda jest wartością, jest dobra. (c) Prawda jest wartościowym celem dociekań. (d) Prawda jest wartościowa ze względu na nią samą. Prawda faktycznie jest wartościowa, umożliwia bowiem stwierdzenie, że ktoś myli się, kłamie, popełnia krzywoprzysięstwo, manipuluje kimś w życiu osobistym czy społecznym. Oprócz tego, bez kategorii prawdy nie można nawet stwierdzić — jak to usiłuje czynić sceptycyzm — że prawdą jest, iż prawda nie jest czymś wartościowym, godnym uwagi itp. Kategoria prawdy — pełniąca funkcję poznawczego celu i normy — pomimo różnych kontrowersji jest wciąż niezbywalna przy ocenie wartości logicznej zdań (i wyrażanych przez nie twierdzeń). Kategoria prawdy jest semantyczna, lecz jej rozpoznawanie — uznawanie zdania przez kogoś za prawdziwe (czyli asercja) — jest kategorią pragmatyczną. Stwierdzana post factum skuteczność działania, podjętego na podstawie jakiegoś zdania, jest mocną racją za tym, aby dane zdanie uznać za prawdziwe. Respekt dla prawdy jest lepszy niż jego brak. (shrink)

In this groundbreaking work, C. D. C. Reeve uses a fundamental problem--the Primacy Dilemma--to explore Aristotle's metaphysics, epistemology, dialectic, philosophy of mind, and theology in a new way. At a time when Aristotle is most often studied piecemeal, Reeve attempts to see him both in detail and as a whole, so that it is from detailed analysis of hundreds of particular passages, drawn from dozens of Aristotelian treatises, and translated in full that his overall picture of Aristotle emerges. Primarily a (...) book for philosophers and advanced students with an interest in the fundamental problems with which Aristotle is grappling, Substantial Knowledge's clear, non-technical and engaging style will appeal to any reader eager to explore Aristotle's difficult but extraordinarily rewarding thought. (shrink)

Resumen: Cómo ver la reforma de la iglesia católica en el siglo XVI y su relación con la virtud es un tema importante en el estudio de la filosofía humanista. Los humanistas enfatizan que la educación virtuosa es la base para cultivar la personalidad y creen que restaurar las virtudes de la iglesia es la “cura” para los males de la iglesia moderna temprana. Consilium de emendanda Ecclesia (1537) es la práctica de la virtud de los humanistas católicos. Esto se (...) refleja en propuestas para fortalecer las normas educativas y las disciplinas socio-morales y enfatizar el perfeccionamiento de la virtud clerical como la fuerza impulpara la reforma. Además, bajo la guía de la ética de la virtud, la política de la virtud se convierte en la ideología guía de la práctica política de esos humanistas, donde reconocen la autoridad del papa y de la iglesia y asocian la virtud con la legitimidad del poder. La filosofía de la virtud en Consilium forma el fundamento ideológico para la reforma de la iglesia católica. El erudito chino antiguo Dong Zhongshu (179-104 B.C.) practicó una política similar de la virtud. En las exubergemde la primavera y el otoño, combinla legitimidad del gobierno con la virtud basada en el derecho divino de los reyes, perpetuasí el concepto confuciano del “sabio”. Tanto humanistas católicos como Dong enfatizaron la importancia de la virtud de los gobernantes como agentes de Dios. (shrink)

El objeto principal de este trabajo consiste en discutir una propuesta de C. Alchourrón y A. Martino para hacer frente al problema de la fundamentación de la lógica deóntica, planteado por el dilema de Jørgensen. La propuesta criticada se basa en la idea de que no existe obstáculo alguno en compatibilizar la idea de que las normas carecen de valor de verdad con la idea de que poseen una lógica, una vez que se renuncia al "prejuicio filosófico" de que es (...) indispensable caracterizar semánticamente las relaciones y propiedades lógicas y se explica la lógica a partir de la noción abstracta de consecuencia, desligándola de las nociones de verdad y falsedad. Sostienen que el significado de los operadores deónticos, al igual que el de los términos lógicos en la deducción natural, puede quedar totalmente expresado una vez que se explicita su uso mediante reglas de introducción y eliminación. Para ilustrar su propuesta, pretenden ofrecer una fundamentación puramente sintáctica de la lógica deóntica standard. Mis críticas se centran en tres puntos: a) no utilizan auténticas reglas de introducción para los operadores deónticos; b) no derivan la lógica deóntica standard como pretenden haber hecho, y c) no se establecen criterios para relacionar las fórmulas del cálculo con el lenguaje normativo ordinario, con lo que no existen razones para considerar que se trata de una lógica deóntica. Defiendo la idea de que, a los fines de fundamentar semánticamente la lógica deóntica, sólo es necesario que existan interpretaciones admisibles que atribuyan valores de verdad a las normas, y que este requisito es cumplido por la semántica usual de la lógica deóntica standard, con lo que el dilema de Jørgensen resulta ser un seudoproblema. In this paper I discuss a proposal from C. Alchourrón and A. Martino with which they try to face the problem posed to the foundation of deontic logic by Jørgensen' s dilemma. Their proposal is based on the idea that there is no problem at all in compatibilizing the fact that norms lack truth values with their possession of a logic, once it is denied that it is absolutely necessary to offer a semantic characterization of logical properties and relations, and the abstract notion of consequence is taken as primitive. They claim that the meaning of deontic operators, like that of logical terms in natural deduction, is completely expressed through their use, which is explained by means of rules of introduction and elimination. As an illustration, they present a calculus with which they intend to offer a foundation for standard deontic logic. I make three objections: a) They don' t use real rules of introduction for deontic operators; b) They don' t have derived standard deontic logic as they claim; c) There are no criteria for relating the formulas with ordinary normative discourse; so there are no reasons for considering their calculus as a deontic logic. I claim that, in order to give a semantical foundation to deontic logic it is only necessary that there are admissible interpretations that assign truth values to norms, and that this requisite is satisfied by the usual semantic of standard deontic logic. I conclude that Jørgensen' s dilemma is a pseudoproblem. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta um exame da crítica proposta por Morton White em seu artigo “Valor e obrigação em Dewey e Lewis”, em particular, a aquela voltada para o conceito de normatividade e valoração de C.I. Lewis. A crítica afirma que Lewis, ao oferecer um caráter normativo dos juízos éticos, malogra ao articular consistentemente a sua concepção ética com a sua teoria do conhecimento. Isso leva White a concluir que o pragmatista não possui uma solução para o problema fundamental da ética. (...) Argumentarei que tal conclusão é equivocada. O núcleo da minha argumentação repousa na tese de que a crítica de White se origina de uma interpretação incorreta do pragmatismo conceitualista de Lewis, falhando em reconhecer que o apriorismo pragmático é a chave para o entendimento adequado de teoria do conhecimento e para uma explicação da conexão e articulação entre valoração e normatividade no interior da abordagem de Lewis. Nesta linha, mostrarei que, muito pelo contrário, a epistemologia de Lewis destaca os desenvolvimentos éticos e normativos, revelando uma teoria naturalística de valoração que é a base na qual a normatividade emerge pragmaticamente. Sustentarei, também, que essa perspectiva oferece uma concepção profícua de valores e normas que não têm sido suficientemente exploradas; algo que confronta o ceticismo ético, podendo levar em conta o status cognitivo de valores e normas, e que recupera o caráter racional da valoração não apenas para a ética, mas, também, para o conhecimento e a ciência. (shrink)

Resumen: Por medio de una revisión histórica de los vínculos establecidos entre la filosofía y la medicina, el presente articulo examina estas relaciones considerando cuatro aspectos; a) el problema del entendimiento de la vida que elabora la medicina y el determinismo presente en sus acciones científicas de conocimiento; b) la variable de indeterminación que la subjetividad humana introduce ante estos esfuerzos de objetivación; c) la noción de normatividad elaborada por G.Canguilhem, su presencia en la vida humana y en las manifestaciones (...) de la enfermedad; d) el análisis filosófico del sistema de normas existente en las elaboraciones de Canguilhem y su incidencia en los enunciados biopolíticos de Michel Foucault. Abstract: Through a historical review of the links established between philosophy and medicine, this article examines these relations considering four aspects; a) the problem of the understanding of life elaborated by medicine and the determinism present in its scientific actions of knowledge; b) the variable of indeterminacy that human subjectivity introduces before these efforts of objectification; c) the notion of normativity elaborated by G. Canguilhem, its presence in human life and the manifestations of disease; d) the philosophical analysis of the system of norms existing in the elaborations of Canguilhem and its incidence in the statements of human life and the manifestations of disease. Canguilhem, its presence in human life and the manifestations of disease; d) the philosophical analysis of the system of norms existing in Canguilhem’s elaborations and its incidence in Michel Foucault's biopolitical statements. (shrink)

Although in modern times and clinical settings, we rarely see the old characteristics of tribal shamanism such as deep trances, out-of-body experiences, and soul retrieval, the archetypal dreams, waking visions and active imagination of modern depth psychology represents a liminal zone where ancient and modern shamanism overlaps with analytical psychology. These essays explore the contributors' excursions as healers and therapists into this zone. The contributors describe the many facets shamanism and depth psychology have in common: animal symbolism; recognition of the (...) reality of the collective unconscious; and healing rituals that put therapist and patient in touch with transpersonal powers. By reintroducing the core of shamanism in contemporary form, these essays shape a powerful means of healing that combines the direct contact with the inner psyche one finds in shamanism with the self-reflection and critical awareness of modern consciousness. The essays draw from the contributors' experiences both inside and outside the consulting room, and with cultures that include the Lakota Sioux, and those of the Peruvian Andes and the Hawaiian Islands. The focus is on those aspects of shamanism most useful and relevant to the modern practice of depth psychology. As a result, these explorations bring the young practice of analytical psychology into perspective as part of a much more ancient heritage of shamanistic healing. Contributors: Margaret Laurel Allen, Norma Churchill, Arthur Colman, Lori Cromer, Patricia Damery, C. Jess Groesbeck, Pansy Hawk Wing, June Kounin, Carol McRae, Pilar Montero, Jeffrey A. Raff, Janet S. Robinson, Meredith Sabini, Dyane N. Sherwood, Sara Spaulding-Phillips, Bradley A. Te Paske and Louis M. Vuksinick. (shrink)

Como pensar a ética a partir das contradições de um mundo que, no mesmo espaço e ao mesmo tempo, produz uma ciência e intelectuais dedicados a pesquisar princípios de vida e armas de morte; progressos nas comunicações e mecanismos sutis e aberrantes de censura? Eis as questões: falso bem, falsa justiça, falsa liberdade, falsa virtude, que, ao criarem o homem da concórdia, da submissão e da boa-fé, o tornam duas vezes escravo: da superstição e das convenções. Os textos que compõem (...) essa obra, originalmente produzidos para o curso livre Ética, procuram, assim, pensar as razões pelas quais os homens se comportam de determinada maneira e por que a maioria das doutrinas morais conserva vestígios da servidão, no momento mesmo em que promete instaurar a liberdade.ÍndiceCenários - Adauto NovaesA tragédia grega e o humano - Nicole LorauxHumanidade e justiça na historiografia grega, V-I a. C. - Catherine Darbo-PeschanskiAs delícias do jardim - José Américo Motta PessanhaA culpa dos reis: mando e transgressão no Ricardo II - Antonio CandidoO retorno do bom governo - Renato Janine RibeiroAs fronteiras da ética: Maquiavel - Newton BignottoPolítica do céu (anti-Maquiavel) - Antonio Alcir Bernárdez PécoraDilemas da moral iluminista - Sergio Paulo RouanetUma reinvenção da ética socialista - Nelson LevyEstado e Terror - Paulo Sérgio PinheiroO eterno retorno do mesmo: tese cosmológica ou imperativo ético? - Scarlett MartonA mentira: um capítulo das relações entre a ética e a política - Celso LaferMoralidade pública e moralidade privada - José Arthur GianottiO sujeito e a norma - Gerd BornheimA mulher e a lei - Maria Rita KehlImpasses da ética naturalista: Gide e o homoerotismo - Jurandir Freire CostaBom dia, senhor Coubert! - Jorge ColiVer o invisível: a ética das imagens - Nelson Brissac PeixotoIlusões perdidas - José Miguel WisnikPúblico, privado, despotismo - Marilena Chauí. (shrink)

Con la promulgación de la Ley 30 de 1986, se incluyó el concepto del consumo de la dosis personal de drogas. La Corte Constitucional, mediante sentencia C-221 de 1994, resolvió la demanda de constitucionalidad presentada por el ciudadano Alexandre Sochandamandou, ratificando el concepto de “dosis personal de consumo de drogas”, y despenalizando el mismo. En este artículo se plantea el desconocimiento de la legislación y la jurisprudencia acerca de la opinión técnico-científica en cuanto a esta temática, que originó diversas inconveniencias, (...) inconsistencias, vacíos e imprecisiones técnico-científicas que riñen con normas y tratados internacionales de ética médica, al igual que con evidencia médica encontrada sobre los efectos adversos ocasionados por las drogas en la salud de los consumidores de estas sustancias. (shrink)

p { margin-bottom: 0.21cm; } O objetivo do presente artigo é discutir a concepção de Direito, Justiça e Estado no pensamento estoico greco-romano, demonstrando a atualidade do tema e suas conexões com problemas contemporâneos tratados pela Filosofia do Direito, tais como os da legitimidade do poder e do universalismo da ordem jurídica. Em um primeiro momento são apresentados e problematizados elementos centrais da filosofia estoica, tais como as noções de lei natural, liberdade interior, igualdade formal e universalismo. Em seguida, mediante (...) uma análise histórica e filosófica de caráter crítico-comparativo são apresentados os três principais projetos de república pensados pelos estoicos: 1) a república radical e igualitarista de Zenão (ap. 334 a.C. – 262 a.C.), na qual se nega a juridicidade, eis que o direito é entendido como construção artificial que impede a fruição da liberdade; 2) a república legalista de Cícero (106 a.C. – 43 a.C.), quando o direito natural é positivado para servir enquanto instância racional de auto-reflexão e de auto-fundamentação das normas jurídico positivas e, finalmente, 3) a “república” de Sêneca (4 a.C. – 65 d.C.), na qual o direito inicialmente se deixa absorver pelo poder pessoal do Imperador Romano para, em um segundo momento, mostrar-se como elemento universal, preparando assim as bases para a futura concepção de direitos fundamentais própria da modernidade. (shrink)

La finalidad de este artículo es triple. Primero, las secciones 1 y 2 expondrán la estructura del argumento de Jürgen Habermas respecto a las tecnologías de mejora humana. Para ello, éste será descompuesto en tres partes, que son sus pilares básicos: a) los sujetos diseñados no pueden auto-concebirse a sí mismos como autores únicos de sus vidas; b) la distinción kantiana entre objetos y personas se desvanece como consecuencia del modo en que los sujetos modificados experiencian su cuerpo; c) la (...) relación entre los padres y su descendencia se vuelve asimétrica, de modo que es contraria a las normas de la acción comunicativa. Segundo, en la sección 3, que es concebida como un diálogo entre Habermas y sus críticos, se presentarán algunas objeciones teóricas a su argumento. Tercero, la sección 4 analizará la validez de los argumentos habermasianos y afirmará firmemente que la posición de Habermas arroja luz sobre el modo correcto de analizar las tecnologías de mejora humana desde un punto de vista moral. A saber, en función de la influencia que tienen sobre el modo en que los sujetos se auto-conciben como seres autónomos y responsables.The aim of this paper is threefold. First, the structure of Jürgen Habermas’ argument on human enhancement technologies shall be exposed in sections 1 and 2. In order to do so, this paper shall discompose Habermas’ argument in the following three parts, which will be taken to be its central pillars: a) designed people cannot self-conceive themselves as the sole authors of their lives; b) the Kantian distinction between objects and persons falls apart due to the way in which modified people experience their bodies; c) the relationship between parents and their modified offspring turns into an asymmetric one, so it is contrary to the rules of communicative action. Secondly, several objections to Habermas’ claims shall be exposed in section 3, which is mainly conceived as a dialogue between Habermas and his critics. Thirdly, section 4 shall analyse the validity ofHabermas’ claims. It shall firmly argue that his position sheds light on the right way to analyse human enhancement technologies from a moral point of view. (shrink)

When, after the agreeable fatigues of solicitation, Mrs Millamant set out a long bill of conditions subject to which she might by degrees dwindle into a wife, Mirabell offered in return the condition that he might not thereby be beyond measure enlarged into a husband. With age and experience in research come the twin dangers of dwindling into a philosopher of science while being enlarged into a dotard. The philosophy of science, I believe, should not be the preserve of senile (...) scientists and of teachers of philosophy who have themselves never so much as understood the contents of a textbook of theoretical physics, let alone done a bit of mathematical research or even enjoyed the confidence of a creating scientist. On the latter count I run no risk: Any reader will see that I am untrained (though not altogether unread) in classroom philosophy. Of no ignorance of mine do I boast, indeed I regret it, but neither do I find this one ignorance fatal here, for few indeed of the great philosophers to explicate whose works hodiernal professors of phil osophy destroy forests of pulp were themselves so broadly and specially trained as are their scholiasts. In attempt to palliate the former count I have chosen to collect works written over the past thirty years, some of them not published before, and I include only a few very recent essays. (shrink)

Grzegorczyk, A. O pewnych formalnych konsekwencjach reizmu.--Hiż, H. O rzeczach.--Kołakowski, L. Determinizm i odpowiedzialność.--Kotarbińska, J. Tak zwana definicja dejktyczna.--Ossowska, M. Norma prawna i norma moralna u Petrażyckiego.--Ossowski, S. Od "Kodeksu natury" do "Sprzysiężenia równych."--Lazari-Pawłowska, I. Tworzenie pojęć nauk humanistycznych według koncepcji Leona Petrażyckiego.--Pawłowski, T. Klasyfikacja sztuczna a klasyfikacja naturalna w biologii.--Pelc, J. Szkic analizy znaczeniowej terminu "ideologia dzieła literackiego."--Poznański, E. Operacjonalizm po trzydziestu latach.--Przełęcki, M. Postulat empiryczności terminów przyrodniczych.--Pszczołowski, T. Prakseologiczne pojęcie pracy.--Stonert, H. Analiza logiczna teorii atomistycznej w (...) klasycznej chemii.--Szaniawski, K. O indukcji eliminacyjnej.--Wallis, M. Koncepcje biologiczne w humanistyce. (shrink)

This paper examines the ways Merleau-Ponty and Nancy think about light, a central theme in Western philosophy closely tied with form and intelligibility. The first section of this paper points out that each thinker replaces the “highest moment of light,” where it is relieved of its weight and materiality, with darkness, where light instead emerges from some apophantic depth indissociable from the material. The second section of this paper gives a critique of darkness in Nancy from Merleau-Ponty’s perspective. According to (...) the latter’s view, Nancy’s claim that darkness is distinct from the structures of intentionality and instead has to do with a presentation of the inappropriable fact of things would be untenable. The difference between the thinkers relates to how each thinks about negation after their very similar critiques of light and form. Still, I argue, the same critique of presentation in Nancy ought to also be applied to Merleau-Ponty, or at least to the usual way he is thought to favour the sensible instead of intelligibility. In the third section of this paper I consider one of Merleau-Ponty’s phrases, “there is no painting before painting,” a statement I take to be about how explicit formal structures, and thus also light and line, comes from a sensible register that does not lack variation and is not totally “deformed,” to use Nancy’s word that describes the homogeneity of a sensible field. Cet essai examine les différentes façons qu’ont Merleau-Ponty et Nancy de penser la lumière, un thème central de la philosophie occidentale, et qui est étroitement lié avec les idées de forme et d’intelligibilité. La première section montre que les deux penseurs remplacent le « plus haut moment de la lumière », qui est sans poids ni matérialité, par l’obscurité, si bien que la lumière émerge d’une profondeur apophantique indissociable de la matérialité. La deuxième section propose un critique de l’obscurité chez Nancy d’une perspective merleau-pontienne. Pour Merleau-Ponty, l’affirmation de Nancy selon laquelle l’obscurité se distingue des structures de l’intentionalité et a plutôt affaire à la présentation du fait inappropriable de la chose serait tout à fait intenable. La différence entre les deux penseurs concerne la façon dont chacun pense la négation à partir d’une critique similaire de la lumière et de la forme. J’avance pourtant que la même critique de la présentation chez Nancy devrait aussi être appliquée à Merleau-Ponty, ou du moins à la façon dont il est habituellement vu comme préférant le sensible contre l’intelligible. Dans la troisième section, j’évalue la phrase de Merleau-Ponty, « la peinture n’existe pas avant la peinture », phrase qui selon moi concerne la façon dont les structures formelles explicites, et donc la forme et la ligne, proviennent d’un registre sensible qui n’est pas sans variations et donc pas totalement « déformé », pour utiliser le mot que Nancy emploie pour décrire l’homogénéité du champ sensible.Questo articolo prende in esame i modi in cui Merleau-Ponty e Nancy riflettono sulla luce, un tema centrale nella filosofia occidentale e strettamente connesso a quelli della forma e dell’intelligibilità. La prima sezione dell’articolo mostra come entrambi i pensatori sostituiscano “il più alto momento della luce”, che la libera dal suo peso e dalla sua materialità, con l’oscurità, in cui invece la luce emerge da una profondità apofantica indissociabile dalla sfera materiale. La seconda sezione offre una critica del concetto di oscurità in Nancy dal punto di vista di Merleau-Ponty. Secondo una prospettiva merleau-pontiana, la tesi di Nancy che l’oscurità sia distinta dalle strutture dell’intenzionalità e sia invece connessa a una presentazione dell’aspetto inappropriabile delle cose sarebbe insostenibile. La differenza tra i due pensatori riguarda il modo in cui ciascuno di essi elabora l’idea di negazione, a partire da due analisi della luce e della forma molto simili. Tuttavia, come cerco di mostrare, la stessa obiezione all’idea di presentazione in Nancy dovrebbe essere applicata anche a Merleau-Ponty, o quantomeno al modo in cui di norma si ritiene egli prediliga il sensibile piuttosto che l’intelligibile. Nella terza sezione, prendo in esame una frase di Merleau-Ponty, “non c’è pittura prima della pittura”, che a mio avviso si riferisce a come le strutture formali esplicite, e dunque anche la luce e la linea, provengano da un registro sensibile che non è privo di variazioni e che non è totalmente “deformato”, per impiegare un termine di Nancy che descrive l’omogeneità di un campo sensibile. (shrink)

Este artigo argumenta que uma Epistemologia da Conversação deve ser compreendida como um campo da Epistemologia Social que se dedica a investigar as normas estritamente epistêmicas que regem a interação entre duas ou mais pessoas acerca de suas crenças e outros estados epistêmicos. Uma definição elementar de conversação é: um ato comunicativo cooperativo nos quais os participantes assumem propósitos comuns e o compromisso de contribuir com declarações (asserções) relevantes. Partindo dessa definição elementar, o artigo apresenta quatro temas que deveriam ser (...) considerados por uma Epistemologia da Conversação: a) que o desacordo é um motivo relevante para a conversação; b) que a conversação é um meio ou método de investigação em casos de desacordo entre pares; c) que as virtudes esperadas dos participantes são virtudes epistêmicas; e d) que qualquer resultado de uma conversação realizará um bem epistêmico. (shrink)

This article discusses two complementary themes that play an important role in contemporary South African political philosophy: (1) the racist tradition in Western philosophy; and (2) the role of ubuntu in regaining an authentic African identity, which was systematically suppressed during the colonial past and apartheid. These are also leading themes in Mogobe Ramose’s African Philosophy Through Ubuntu. The first part concentrates on John Locke. It discusses the thesis that the reprehensible racism of many founders of liberal political philosophy has (...) lethally infected liberal theory. This view neglects the distinction between genesis and justification. Political liberalism has since cleansed itself of the prejudices of its spiritual ancestors. Liberal human rights exclude racism as a matter of principle. The second part discusses the claim that the ubuntu philosophy provides a better basis for a constitution in a modern society than political liberalism. A major problem is that ubuntu is an essentially contested concept. Some philosophers consider ubuntu to be a moribund notion (Matolino); others see it as a vital concept par excellence. In the latter case, it is elaborated from sundry incompatible political views, ranging from African nationalism (Ramose) via humanist communitarianism (Metz) to liberalism (Mboti). Conclusion: as an essentially contested ideological concept, ubuntu should not be a decisive constitutional standard for the application of state force. In contrast, the constitutional model of political liberalism provides a reasonable alternative, as it is designed precisely to solve the problem of social plurality and ideological contest. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Reviewed by Sextus, Montaigne, Hume: Pyrrhonizers by Brian C. Ribeiro Donald C. Ainslie Brian C. Ribeiro. Sextus, Montaigne, Hume: Pyrrhonizers. Brill: Leiden, 2021. Pp. 165. Hardback, $154.00. Brian C. Ribeiro’s Sextus, Montaigne, Hume: Pyrrhonizers is a charming and quirky investigation of his three titular skeptics. It is perhaps best understood as a skeptical investigation of skepticism. By that I mean that, like a good Pyrrhonist, Ribeiro explains how (...) things appear to him without claiming to lay down a doctrine or dogma. His topic is how and why skepticism still matters (7). And he suggests that those who are moved by skeptical arguments can learn intellectual modesty from them and thereby achieve a degree of philosophical “calmness of soul” (141).Ribeiro approaches his three figures by taking the cogency of their skeptical arguments for granted. There is little investigation of why these philosophers call various beliefs into question, and his concern is rather what remains once the skeptical doubts are taken on board. Because what he calls “Pyrrhonizing” philosophers reveal that large swaths of our beliefs lack epistemic merit, they also show us how we are not fully rational creatures in our everyday lives. In the case of Sextus, Ribeiro’s focus is on the famous question of whether skeptics can live their skepticism once they have actually suspended all belief. With Sextus, as with Montaigne and Hume, Ribeiro opts for the more radical of the interpretive options; he is not persuaded by Michael Frede’s suggestion that Pyrrhonists restrict their suspension only to abstruse matters, not the everyday (51). But even if we follow the “four-fold way” (20–23) that Sextus offers us as guides for life—the directives of nature, feelings, custom, and expertise—Ribeiro still thinks we will inevitably fall back into belief. He concludes that the original Pyrrhonists should be read aspirationally: insofar as we develop our capacities [End Page 517] to argue on both sides of every question and thus are able to suspend judgment, to that extent we will achieve tranquility. In the case of Montaigne, Ribeiro focuses on his Christian fideism. Once he recognizes the incapacity of reason to resolve intellectual problems, he falls back on faith. And Ribeiro argues that the Catholic flavor of this faith is simply a reflection of Montaigne’s surroundings. In a different community, he could just as easily have embraced a different faith. The heart of the book concerns Hume, whom Ribeiro discusses in three chapters, as opposed to the one each devoted to Sextus and Montaigne. In keeping with his interpretive preferences, Ribeiro’s Hume is a radical skeptic, though he acknowledges the significant yet “utterly perplexing” (95n22) naturalist strains that are also present. Ribeiro takes the resulting tension to be insoluble (98), though I was not convinced. Consider that, in both the Treatise and the Enquiry, Hume uses causal reasoning to investigate causal reasoning. He learns that our ideas are caused by prior impressions; that repeated experience of conjoint events causes us to associate our ideas of similar events; and so on. In the Treatise, he concludes the argument that association is at the root of such causal reasoning by presenting a set of rules, a “logic,” for it. The argument is not as such skeptical, though when Hume “recasts” it in the first Enquiry, he does so in terms of “sceptical doubts” and a “sceptical solution.” In the Treatise, “total” and “extravagant” skepticism come into play only as “systems of philosophy” that Hume uses to shed light on his own core commitments. The problem, I think, is that Ribeiro tends to read Hume a little too literally, as if he is himself falling prey to the skeptical upheaval of the conclusion to the first book of the Treatise, or the final section of the first Enquiry. But I would suggest that Hume is rather deploying the rhetoric of skepticism in these discussions, using it for his ultimate philosophical ends (a point that is especially clear in Ribeiro’s favorite of Hume’s works, the Dialogues). He is showing his reader how his naturalistic philosophical project is itself rooted in human nature, and thus does not yield insight into the intrinsic structure of... (shrink)

Bobbio, N. Hacia una teoría funcional del derecho.--Bulygin, E. Sobre la regla de reconocimiento.--Gargaglione de Yaryura Tobías, E.L. El conocimiento y su validación.--Gómez, A.C. Acerca de la vinculación de la regla de reconocimiento con las restantes reglas secundarias.--Grün, E. y Farrel, M.D. Problemas de verificación en el derecho. Guibourg, R.A. La nulidad y su definición.--Klug, U. Consideraciones sobre las definiciones semánticas en derecho.--Miró Quesada, F. Sobre el derecho justo.--Nino, C.S. El concepto de validez y el problema del conflicto entre normas (...) de diferente jerarquía en la teoría pura del derecho.--Raggio, A.R. La refexión.--Ross, A. La finalidad del castigo.--Soler, S. La idea de "bien común."--Spolansky, N.E. El castigo del acto anterior al hecho prohibido.--Vernengo, R.J. Norma jurídica y esquema referencial.--Wright, G.H. von. Reencuentro con la lógica deóntica. (shrink)

Most whistleblowers talk as if they never had a choice about whether to blow the whistle. This doesn't mean they acted suddenly, or impulsively, only that they believe they could not have done otherwise. Trying to make sense of this near universal answer to the question "Why did you do it?" the essay draws on narrative theory. Narrative theory distinguishes between actant and sender—that is, between actor and his or her values. This distinction helps to explain what it means to (...) face a difficult choice over something about which one feels one never had a choice. (shrink)

Ethical difficulties arise in health-care practices. However, despite extensive research findings that demonstrate that most nurses are involved in recurrent ethical problems, institutions are not always able to effectively support nursing care professionals. The limited availability of ethics consultation services and traditional nursing training fails to meet the frequent and strong requests by health workers to support their ethical dilemmas. A questionnaire was administered to 374 nurses attending a specialist training and a lifetime learning programme in Italy. The respondents reported (...) a high frequency of ethically sensitive situations, and they described the poor development of ethics support and a scarcity of ethics training programmes. The results suggest the importance of promoting ethics services that include consultation and ethics training. A need for systematic ethics educational activities was identified for improving the capacity of nurses to manage ethical issues in patient care. (shrink)

An adequate theory of rights ought to forbid the harming of animals to promote trivial interests of humans, as is often done in the animal-user industries. But what should the rights view say about situations in which harming some animals is necessary to prevent intolerable injustices to other animals? I develop an account of respectful treatment on which, under certain conditions, it’s justified to intentionally harm some individuals to prevent serious harm to others. This can be compatible with recognizing the (...) inherent value of the ones who are harmed. My theory has important implications for contemporary moral issues in nonhuman animal ethics, such as the development of cultured meat and animal research. (shrink)

On history and political studies in Vietnam.

En el presente artículo se analizan cinco modos de entender el ideal de completitud de los sistemas jurídicos, teniendo como punto de referencia las ideas de Carlos Alchourrón. En este trabajo se propone distinguir los criterios de identificación de los textos jurídicamente relevantes; los métodos o reglas que permiten pasar de un contenido C a un contenido C1, y los criterios de validez o pertenencia de normas al sistema. En la concepción predominante entre los teóricos del derecho, las reglas lógicas (...) sirven para justificar el paso de un contenido a otro, sin embargo, no se admiten como criterios de pertenencia de normas al sistema jurídico. Esto significa que el derecho no es concebido como un sistema deductivo y que un ideal de completitud absoluta es lógicamente posible. En el trabajo se llega a la conclusión de que hay sólo dos formas no banales de entender el ideal de completitud absoluta de los sistemas jurídicos. O bien, en un espíritu formalista, mediante la introducción de reglas residuales de clausura o bien, en un espíritu moralista, aceptando que la moral crítica funcione como criterio de pertenencia al derecho. This paper analyses five different ways of understanding completeness as an ideal of legal systems. In doing so it essentially relies on the thesis discussed by Carlos Alchourrón regarding this subject. The paper stresses the need to distinguish the criteria for the identification of the legally relevant texts, the methods or rules that justify the passage from a content C to another content C1 and, the criteria for the identification of valid norms belonging to the system. According to the dominant conception in legal theory, the rules of logic justify the passage from a content to another; such rules, however, are not accepted as membership criteria. This means that the notion of system that legal theorists use to organize the law is not the notion of a deductive system. In this conception the ideal of absolute completeness is a logically possible ideal. The conclusion reached in the article is that there are only two ways of understanding the ideal of "plenitude" or absolute completeness of a legal system: in a formalist view, through the introduction of residual rules of closure, or, in a moralistic view, by accepting critical morality as a criterium for legal validity. (shrink)

Since the inception of the euthanasia debate, the differentiation be-tween active and passive euthanasia – distinguishing between “let-ting die” and “actively killing” – has emerged as a central point of contention. In this paper, we will contend that: a) the boundary be-tween active and passive euthanasia is inherently nebulous, b) there exists no morally substantive disparity between active and passive euthanasia, and c) if such a disparity could be admitted, it would probably favor active euthanasia over passive. We will seek (...) support for this final claim of ours in the three principal traditions of norma-tive ethics, namely deontology, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics. (shrink)

In The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan argues that although all subjects-of-a-life have equal inherent value, there are often differences in the value of lives. According to Regan, lives that have the highest value are lives which have more possible sources of satisfaction. Regan claims that the highest source of satisfaction, which is available to only rational beings, is the satisfaction associated with thinking impartially about moral choices. Since rational beings can bring impartial reasons to bear on decision making, (...) Regan maintains that they have an additional possible source of satisfaction that nonrational beings do not have and, consequently, the lives of rational beings turn out to have greater value.. (shrink)

Higher-order thought theories maintain that consciousness involves the having of higher-order thoughts about mental states. In response to these theories of consciousness, an attempt is often made to illustrate that nonhuman animals possess said consciousness, overlooking an alarming consequence: attributing higher-order thought to nonhuman animals might entail that they should be held morally accountable for their actions. I argue that moral responsibility requires more than higher-order thought: moral agency requires a specific higher-order thought which concerns a belief about the rightness (...) or wrongness of affecting another’s mental states. This “moral thought” about the rightness or wrongness is not yet demonstrated in even the most intelligent nonhuman animals, thus we should suspend our judgments about the “rightness” or “wrongness” of their actions while further questioning the recent insistence on developing an animal morality. (shrink)