Constructive Realism, an increasingly discussed philosophy of science founded by the Viennese philosopher of science Fritz G. Wallner, is the core issue of the texts gathered in this volume. The authors either discuss the constructive-realistic view philosophically or present their research interpreted by the constructive-realistic doctrine. Constructive Realism inspires philosophy as well as natural science and humanities. This volume proves this inspiring feature of Constructive Realism. All texts are written by colleagues, friends and scholars of Fritz G. Wallner (...) to honour his 60th birthday. (shrink)

What are 'emotions'? This book offers a balanced survey of facts and theory.

Recently, Kit Fine's (1994) view that modal truths aretrue in virtue of,grounded in, orexplained byessentialist truths has been under attack. In what follows we offer two responses to the wave of criticism against his view. While the first response is pretty straightforward, the second is based on the distinction between, what we call,Reductive Finean EssentialismandNon-Reductive Finean Essentialism. Engaging the work of Bob Hale onNon-Reductive Finean Essentialism, we aim to show that the arguments against Fine's view are unconvincing, while we acknowledge (...) the presence of a deep standoff between the two views. (shrink)

Fine, Lowe and Hale accept the view that necessity is to be explained by essences: Necessarily p iff, and because, there is some x whose essence ensures that p. Hale, however, believes that this strategy is not universally applicable; he argues that the necessity of essentialist truths cannot itself be explained by once again appealing to essentialist truths. As a consequence, Hale holds that there are basic necessities that cannot be explained. Thus, Hale style essentialism falls short of what Wilsch (...) calls the explanation-challenge (EC) for the metaphysics of necessity. Without endorsing the EC, I argue that Hale’s argument for basic, unexplained necessities fails due to a misunderstanding of the structure of essentialist explanations. Getting clear about the structure of essentialist explanations of necessity leads to a re-evaluation of crucial circularity- and regress-arguments that have been discussed in the debate about essentialism. (shrink)

This paper is about the so-called meta-grounding question, i.e. the question of what grounds grounding facts of the sort ‘φ is grounded in Γ ’. An answer to this question is pressing since some plausible assumptions about grounding and fundamentality entail that grounding facts must be grounded. There are three different accounts on the market which each answer the meta-grounding question differently: Bennett’s and deRosset’s “Straight Forward Account” (SFA), Litland’s “Zero-Grounding Account” (ZGA), and “Grounding Essentialism” (GE). I argue that if (...) grounding is to be regarded as metaphysical explanation (i.e. if unionism is true), (GE) is to be preferred over (ZGA) and (SFA) as only (GE) is compatible with a crucial consequence of the thought that grounding is metaphysical explanation. In this manner the paper contributes not only to discussions about the ground of ground but also to the ongoing debate concerning the relationship between ground, essence, and explanation. (shrink)

Why does the world look to us as it does? As Nico Orlandi argues, it is simply because of how the world is. This answer emerges from understanding vision as situated in a structured environment, and it contrasts with the view that visual perception involves an inference.

Knowledge Societies offers both a critical examination of existing social theory, and a new synthesis of social theory with the actual study of knowledge relations in advanced economies. Some of the elements explored are scientization: the penetration not only of production but of most social action by scientific knowledge; the transformation of access to knowledge through higher education; the growth of experts (managers, accountants, advisors, and counselors) and of corresponding institutions based on the deployment of specialized knowledge; and a shift (...) in the nature of societal conflict from struggles about income and property to claims and conflicts about generalized human needs. Nico Stehr's argument amply demonstrates not only that all social theories now need to take into account the changing nature of social relations around knowledge, but also the parameters within which this analysis should take place. This book is essential reading for all those interested in social theory, sociology of knowledge and science, and the general issue of knowledge in the late 20th century. (shrink)

This article explores an overlooked motif in the Critique of Pure Reason: the Damsel in Distress. Kant uses the trope to motivate his first Critique on a narrative level. Reason is depicted as a high-born female subject in a hopeless predicament, unable to free herself. A hero rescues her, not by liberation, but by discipline, mirroring the myth where the rescued female is appropriated through marriage. The paper examines the parallels between this popular trope and the narrative of the first (...) Critique, arguing that Kant’s choice of this motif is due to cultural and political biases. While this narrative aligns with Kant’s goal of establishing philosophy as a strict science, it marginalizes the also present, progressive potential of Kant’s concept of the highest faculty as a hermeneutical, world-making, and orienting capacity as means for universal cum critical thinking. The discussion proceeds from (1) argumentatively relevant methodological considerations, to showing that Kant (2) does use the damsel in distress in the Critique of Pure Reason. Subsequently, (3) with regard to the reasons for the choice of the narrative, it is argued that it is based on the convictions about the nature of women that Kant advocates in the Observations on the Beautiful and the Sublime and in his Anthropology. (4) Insofar as narratives and metaphors shape convictions and delineate the realm of the conceivable, Kant’s narrative choice undermines his own conception of reason, according to which the highest faculty is to be understood positively as an active, hermeneutic and orienting ability as well as a selfreflective basis for critical thinking. The discussion ends (5) with a conclusion. (shrink)

Many recent studies of dynamics in formal argumentation within AI focus on the well-known formalism of Dung’s argumentation frameworks (AFs). Despite the usefulness of AFs in many areas of argumentation, their abstract notion of arguments creates a barrier for operators that modify a given AF, e.g., in the case that dependencies between arguments have been abstracted away that are important for subsequent modifications. In this paper we aim to support development of dynamic operators on formal models in abstract argumentation by (...) providing constraints imposed on the modification of the structure that can be used to incorporate information that has been abstracted away. Towards a broad reach, we base our results on the general formalism of abstract dialectical frameworks (ADFs) in abstract argumentation. To show applicability, we present two cases studies that adapt an existing extension enforcement operator that modifies AFs: in the first case study, we show how to utilize constraints in order to obtain an enforcement operator on ADFs that is allowed to only add support relations between arguments, and in the second case study we show how an enforcement operator on AFs can be defined that respects dependencies between arguments. We show feasibility of our approach by studying the complexity of the proposed structural constraints and the operators arising from the case studies, and by an experimental evaluation of an answer set programming (ASP) implementation of the enforcement operator based on supports. (shrink)

Finean essentialists take metaphysical necessity to be metaphysically explained by essence. But whence the explanatory power of essence? A recent wave of criticism against the Finean account has put pressure on essentialists to answer this question. Wallner and Vaidya (2020) have responded by offering an axiomatic account of the explanatory power of essence. This paper discusses their account in light of some recent criticism by Bovey (2022). Building on work by Glazier (2017), Bovey succeeds in showing that Wallner (...) and Vaidya’s account is in need of modification and clarification. In this paper, I take up Bovey’s challenge and argue that Wallner and Vaidya have the resources available to incorporate the necessary modifications. I discuss the details of this modification, specifically, the question of what kind of metaphysical explanation is at work in the explanation of the necessity of essence itself. To get clear on this, I will introduce the distinction between generative and non-generative metaphysical explanation. In this way the paper contributes to both, the debate about whether essences can explain necessity and to the ongoing debate about metaphysical explanation. (shrink)

Vaidya & Wallner [2021] have recently formulated the Problem of Modal Epistemic Friction (PMEF) for three of the most discussed accounts in the epistemology of modality: conceivability-based, counterfactual-based and deduction-based accounts. They propose essentialist solutions in all three cases, arguing that all three discussed accounts should be supplemented by a suitable epistemology of essence. In this paper I argue that the PMEF also applies to Roca-Royes’ similarity-based account in the epistemology of modality. I also discuss if or to what (...) extent the version of the PMEF that applies to Roca-Royes can be given an essentialist solution. With regard to this question, I argue that besides the inductivist variant of the similarity-based account that Roca-Royes favors, there might also be an essentialist variant that would be successful in at least some cases. As for Roca-Royes’ inductivist variant I argue that the PMEF ultimately boils down to the notorious Problem of Induction. I shall discuss a popular solution to the Problem of Induction and the role essences might play in it. (shrink)

Ahmad Khatib originated from Minangkabau, West Sumatra and after his settlement in the Holy City of Mecca in 1877, he grew into a scholar in Islamic sciences of great repute and eventually died there in 1916. His written work, educational and other activities have played a vital part in the exchange of religious ideas between Mecca and the Malay-Indonesian archipelago and make him an important person in the history of Islam in Southeast Asia. In my paper I will go in (...) detail into a fatwa he gave on the question of whether or not it was allowed to sell chickens to Chinese. The paper aims to shed light on the mufti-ship of Ahmad Khatib and will look into the wider implications of the issue as far as religious authority is concerned, in particular into its locus. (shrink)

Law is usually understood as an orderly, coherent system, but this volume shows that it is often better understood as an entangled web. Bringing together eminent contributors from law, political science, sociology, anthropology, history and political theory, it also suggests that entanglement has been characteristic of law for much of its history. The book shifts the focus to the ways in which actors create connections and distance between different legalities in domestic, transnational and international law. It examines a wide range (...) of issue areas, from the relationship of state and indigenous orders to the regulation of global financial markets, from corporate social responsibility to struggles over human rights. The book uses these empirical insights to inform new theoretical approaches to law, and by placing the entanglements between norms from different origins at the centre of the study of law, it opens up new avenues for future legal research. This title is also available as Open Access. (shrink)

Emotion experience reflects some of the outcomes of the mostly nonconscious processes that compose emotions. In my view, the major processes are appraisal, affect, action readiness, and autonomic arousal. The phenomenology of emotion experience varies according to mode of consciousness (nonreflective or reflective consciousness), and to direction and mode of attention. As a result, emotion experience may be either ineffable or articulate with respect to any or all of the underlying processes. In addition, emotion experience reflects the degree to which (...) the emotion processes control perception, thought, action and bodily arousal. (shrink)

This collection of essays assumes the main thesis of Constructive Realism: reality is created. In this volume, it is constructed by authors from various scientific disciplines and very different cultures. The Festschrift is dedicated to the founder of this philosophical approach, Professor Dr. Friedrich Wallner (University of Vienna), in celebration of his 70th birthday. Dieser Sammelband geht von der Hauptthese des Konstruktiven Realismus aus - wir konstruieren Realität. Hier wird sie von Autoren aus verschiedenen wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen und sehr unterschiedlichen (...) Kulturen aufgebaut. Dem Gründer des philosophischen Ansatzes Professor Dr. Friedrich Wallner (Universität Wien) ist diese Festschrift anlässlich seines 70. Geburtstags gewidmet. (shrink)

There is a certain excitement in vision science concerning the idea of applying the tools of bayesian decision theory to explain our perceptual capacities. Bayesian models are thought to be needed to explain how the inverse problem of perception is solved, and to rescue a certain constructivist and Kantian way of understanding the perceptual process. Anticlimactically, I argue both that bayesian outlooks do not constitute good solutions to the inverse problem, and that they are not constructivist in nature. In explaining (...) how visual systems derive a single percept from underdetermined stimulation, orthodox versions of bayesian accounts encounter a problem. The problem shows that such accounts need to be grounded in Natural Scene Statistics (NSS), an approach that takes seriously the Gibsonian insight that studying perception involves studying the statistical regularities of the environment in which we are situated. Additionally, I argue that bayesian frameworks postulate structures that hardly rescue a constructivist way of understanding perception. Except for percepts, the posits of bayesian theory are not representational in nature. bayesian perceptual inferences are not genuine inferences. They are biased processes that operate over nonrepresentational states. (shrink)

A very influential idea in the epistemology of modality is that we acquire knowledge of metaphysical modality through knowledge of essence. As a consequence, the epistemology of essence becomes crucial in the attempt to answer the question of how we come to know modal propositions. In this paper I investigate Lowe’s and Hale’s approach to the epistemology of essence and argue that both of them remain in a crucial, structural sense incomplete. Systematizing this criticism against Lowe and Hale, I then (...) break down desiderata of what I call a structurally complete picture of the epistemology of essence. Finally, I discuss Husserl’s epistemology of essence and defend it against a notorious objection. However, Husserl’s approach also seems to remain incomplete, due to its appeal to imagination, which operates on the basis of background assumptions that are themselves in need of justification. I indicate, however, that a Husserlian theory of intuitive awareness of universals might supply us with (direct) justification of these background assumptions and, hence, that we might be able to paint a structurally complete picture of the epistemology of essence with Husserlian means. (shrink)

Examines the conflict between modern and postmodern theories in sociology and attempts to bridge the divide between them.

This article attempts to clarify the commitments of a predictive coding approach to perception. After summarizing predictive coding theory, the article addresses two questions. Is a predictive coding perceptual system also a Bayesian system? Is it a Kantian system? The article shows that the answer to these questions is negative.

The proposed dynamic systems model of emotion generation indeed appears considerably more plausible and descriptively adequate than traditional linear models. It also comes much closer to the complex interactions observed in neurobiological research. The proposals regarding self-organization in emerging appraisal-emotion interactions are thought-provoking and attractive. Yet, at this point they are more in the nature of promises than findings, and are clearly in need of corroborating psychological evidence or demonstrated theoretical desirability.

In his seminal Islam Observed: Religious Developments in Morocco and Indonesia from 1968, the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz placed the comparative study of Muslim societies on the research agenda. In view of my knowledge on the history of Islam in Indonesia, it stroke me that the political dimension of religion did not take an important place in the book. This is the more remarkable because during Geertz’s fieldwork in Java in 1953-4 manifestations of political Islam regularly popped up, and Geertz (...) did not only notice those, but also recorded them in his book The Religion of Java from 1960. In this paper I will go into the question of why Geertz did not give a more prominent place to political Islam in his analysis of Muslim cultures, and what concepts of both Islam and religion he used. (shrink)

Es ist in der Literatur weithin bekannt, dass im Gesundheitswesen auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen Allokationsentscheidungen getroffen werden. Während es auf der Makroebene um gesellschaftlich-politische Strukturfragen geht, stehen die Akteure der Mikroebene vor der Aufgabe, begrenzte Ressourcen in einer Organisation sinnvoll einzusetzen. In den ethischen Analysen der Mikro-Allokationsebene werden zumeist Entscheidungen der Healthcare Professionals thematisiert, weil sie eine unmittelbare Auswirkung auf die konkreten Patienten haben. Weniger in den Blick geraten Allokationen des Managements, welche die Rahmenbedingungen für Ressourcenzuteilungen beim Patienten betreffen. Hierbei geht (...) es nicht bloß um den Einsatz von Sachmitteln (z. B. Medikamenten- oder Gerätebudgets), sondern auch um den Personaleinsatz. Das Personalmanagement ist damit in wichtige Allokationsentscheidungen eingebunden und trägt eine dreifache Verantwortung: für die Gesundheit der Patienten, der Mitarbeiter und der Organisation. Der vorliegende Beitrag geht der Frage nach, welche Aspekte der Allokationsethik aus der Sicht des Personalmanagements in einem Krankenhaus zu bedenken sind, um der dreifachen Verantwortung gerecht zu werden. Dadurch zeigt sich, dass Allokationsethik in einem Krankenhaus nicht adäquat erfasst werden kann, ohne sich mit dem Personalmanagement zu beschäftigen, da das Personal die wertvollste Ressource ist, die es in einem Krankenhaus zu allozieren gilt. (shrink)

In den letzten Jahren wird intensiv darüber diskutiert, ob und in welcher Weise das Gewissen im Kontext der Apotheke zu schützen ist. Der Status quo in Deutschland und Österreich sieht keine gesetzliche Regelung für dieses Problem vor. Der ethische Rahmen für eine Bewältigungsstrategie im Umgang mit dem Problem der Gewissensfreiheit in der Apotheke wird deutlich gemacht. Unter Anwendung des rechtsethischen Verhältnismäßigkeitsprinzips wird das Problem mit Berücksichtigung des deutschen und österreichischen Verfassungsrechts sowie der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention auf individueller, korporativer und gesellschaftlicher Ebene (...) analysiert. Auf individueller Ebene sind die berechtigten Interessen und Güter des Apothekers einerseits und der Patientin andererseits durch eine grundrechtliche Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung zu einem schonenden Ausgleich zu bringen. Auf korporativer Ebene legitimiert das auf der Religions- und Weltanschauungsfreiheit basierende Selbstbestimmungsrecht die ideologisch profilierte Apotheke als Organisation und kann in der Binnenbeziehung der Apotheke einen Loyalitätskonflikt verursachen. Auf gesellschaftlicher Ebene stehen vier Optionen der proaktiven rechtspolitischen Gestaltung der Gewissensproblematik zur Verfügung: sozialstaatlich, libertär, professionsbezogen und kommunitär. Wie Konflikte auf individueller oder korporativer Ebene gelöst werden können, hängt von den Optionen ab, die auf gesellschaftlicher Ebene gewählt werden. Für den Fall einer Änderung des Status quo wird für zwei Lösungsansätze argumentiert: a) die Einführung einer qualifizierten Gewissensklausel für Apotheker (mit Beratungs-, Verweis-, Notfall- und Verständigungspflicht); b) die auf einen Kompromiss zwischen ideologisch profilierter pharmazeutischer Korporation (Apotheke oder Apothekervereinigung) und Sozialstaat abzielende „weiche“ kommunitäre Option. Beide Ansätze werden einem schonenden Ausgleich berechtigter Güter gerecht. (shrink)

A naturalistic account of the strengths and limitations of cladistic practice is offered. The success of cladistics is claimed to be largely rooted in the parsimony-implementing congruence test. Cladists may use the congruence test to iteratively refine assessments of homology, and thereby increase the odds of reliable phylogenetic inference under parsimony. This explanation challenges alternative views which tend to ignore the effects of parsimony on the process of character individuation in systematics. In a related theme, the concept of homeostatic property (...) cluster natural kinds is used to explain why cladistics is well suited to provide a traditional, verbal reference system for the evolutionary properties of species and clades. The advantages of more explicitly probabilistic approaches to phylogenetic inference appear to manifest themselves in situations where evolutionary homeostasis has for the most part broken down, and predictive classifications are no longer possible. (shrink)

In this issue we include contributions from the individuals presiding at the panel All in a Jurnal's Work: A BABEL Wayzgoose, convened at the second Biennial Meeting of the BABEL Working Group. Sadly, the contributions of Daniel Remein, chief rogue at the Organism for Poetic Research as well as editor at Whiskey & Fox , were not able to appear in this version of the proceedings. From the program : 2ND BIENNUAL MEETING OF THE BABEL WORKING GROUP CONFERENCE “CRUISING IN (...) THE RUINS: THE QUESTION OF DISCIPLINARITY IN THE POST/MEDIEVAL UNIVERSITY” SEPTEMBER 21ST, 2012: SESSION 13 MCLEOD C.322, CURRY STUDENT CENTER NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY, BOSTON, MA. Traditionally, a wayzgoose was a celebration at the end of a printer’s year, a night off in the late fall before the work began of printing by candlelight. According to the OED, the Master Printer would make for the journeymen “a good Feast, and not only entertains them at his own House, but besides, gives them Money to spend at the Ale-house or Tavern at Night.” Following in this line, continent. proposes in its publication(s) a night out and a good Feast, away from the noxious fumes of the Academy and into a night of revelry which begins, but does not end, at the alehouse or Tavern. continent. proposes that the thinking of the Academy be freed to be thought elsewhere, in the alleys and doorways of the village and cities, encountered not in the strictly defined spaces of the classroom and blackboard (now white) but anticipated and found where thinking occurs. Historically, academic journals have served a different purpose than the Academy itself. Journals (from the Anglo-Fr. jurnal , "a day," from O.Fr. jornel , "day, time; day's work," hence the journalist as writer of the news of the day ) have served as privileged sites for the articulation and concretization of specific modes of knowledge and control (insemination of those ideas has been formalized in the classroom, in seminar). In contrast, the academic journal is post-partum and has been an old-boys club, an insider trading network in which truths are (re)circulated against themselves, forming a Maginot Line against whatever is new, or the distinctly challenging. All in a Jurnal’s Work will discuss (in part) the ramifications of cheap start-up publications that are challenging the traditional ensconced-in-ivory academic journals and their supporting infrastructures. The panel will be seeking a questioning (as a challenging) towards the discipline of knowledge production/fabrication (of truth[s]) and the event of the Academy (and its publications) as it has evolved and continues to (d)evolve. Issues to be discussed will revolve around the power of academic publishing and its origins, hierarchical versus horizontal academic modules (is there a place for the General Assembly in academia?) and the evolving idea of the Multiversity as a site(s) of a (BABELing) multivocality in the wake of the University of Disaster. A CONTINUOUS ACT Nico Jenkins In Pierre Hadot’s extraordinary book, Philosophy as a Way of Life , the practices of philosophy—that is the exercise of what we can term pre-institionalized love of wisdom, what Philo of Alexandria described as a training towards wisdom—are described as, following the Stoics, “a continuous act, permanent and identical with life itself, which had to be renewed at each instant.” This renewal of thinking, this coming to be of being itself —meeting itself on its own ground, concerns the way philosophy is practiced, and more often, taught, or rather not taught. Hadot continues his thinking with a description of what happens to the structure of thought in the medieval ages as it becomes adopted—co-opted— by the university, and by extension, by the institution of the church. Philosophy becomes no longer a way of living, no longer a praxis as such but becomes a condition that is locked in a theoretical construct, one which was literally removed from life (and in life we read then love, wisdom, being etc, also the home, the market, the field, the street) and secured behind the high walls of the monastery (which were shortly replaced by the high walls of the Academy) where thinking unfortunately rests for the most part today. Hadot writes further that this dangerous movement of removal reduces thinking to a theoretical practice akin to the mythical Ouroborous; “education was thus no longer directed toward people who were to be educated with a view to becoming fully developed human beings, but to specialists, in order that they might learn how to train other specialists.” Thought then is trapped behind the walls of the academy, and with the exception of such thinkers as Spinoza, Descartes, and Liebnitz as well as others who think from an outside in, thought remains, in the form of Kant, Fichte, Hegel, a practice reduced or removed from life and restricted to what Schopenhauer will call “mere fencing in front of the mirror.” This is of course the tendency today and philosophy remains, for the most part, a discourse produced and thought inside the academy and disseminated, in seminated through university presses and of course the academic journal. It seems necessary to me that we have to have a place, a return, to a thinking which is closer to the Stoics, closer to the pre-Socratics, to a thinking which is a practice of becoming, a training to think, to live, to die. this is not south romantic than imperative . This thinking is one of a deep ir responsibility because it is not known, it is not figured out. It requires a risk and what Heidegger calls a leap (for there is no bridge to it). I call it irresponsible because for too long sanctioned thought has had as its premise the idea that thinking has a goal, a direction, a telos ; that it is not an activity but a process which gives a product; that the responsibility of thinking in turn demand an answer. In my mind, only freed from that goal can thinking, in contrast, bask in its own thinking, bask in a state in which the unknown can remain unknown, that mystery can rest as mystery. This is not to say that the world needs no answers, or to promote a Whitmanesque “leaning and loafing” as the only valid practice. It is only to say that for too long, thinking has been validated by the academy, by the answerable, by the already decided. To me, this requires—as an answer— the ir responsibility of thought, what Nancy calls, “a world for which all is not already done (played out, finished, enshrined in a destiny), nor entirely still to do (in the future for always future tomorrows).” This is a thinking not sanctified by the academy, made sacred by the church or the palace but rather it takes place on the périphérie , beyond the ring road, in alleyways behind the marketplace, in cafes stained with the syphilitic patina of irresponsible talk, of loose talk, the kind of talk made loose not only by the tankard and the goblet by the practice and training of attuned thinking. continent. was formed as a collective of thinkers coming out of the European Graduate School (also known as the University of Disaster) three years ago, in an effort to combat, or challenge, the dominant paradigm which isolates thinking from the street, from life, from where perhaps wisdom tends to emerge. We feel that not only is the university herself no longer the privileged site of where true thinking takes place—and where only official thought can take place—but that the very artificiality of the academy denies thinking—at times—authentic, thought. Our goal at continent. is to create a media agnostic publication which is rigorous in its intellectual underpinnings but which will remain permanently beyond and out of reach of the academy. Though many of us butter our bread with academic paychecks (maid!) we attempt to keep continent. as a refuge—and a refugee—from the University in ruins, from the University as a site of preformed and institutionalized pre-set dialogues. In concert with other publications-both cyber and print—as well as various blogs we are attempting to re-dialogize the dialogue of thinking. We are attempting both to speak to— as well as with and against —the university as a site of accreted knowledge. We have not been utterly successful and continue to attempt to define what that role of being perpetually beyond is (while still trying to maintain rigorous intellectual standards) but it is just that, a goal, which is perpetually opening, perpetually unanswered, perhaps even by design, perpetually unanswerable. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Response to Anthony J. Palmer, “A Philosophical View of the General Education Core”Nico SchülerAnthony J. Palmer's paper is not only an interesting one but it also continues an absolutely necessary discussion on the general education core curriculum for American undergraduate students. Initially, Palmer summarized the global conditions with which we are presently confronted. This discussion led him to the re-examination of the general education core at the undergraduate (...) level. The goal of such education should be to "prepare students to develop a world where haphazard processes be minimized.... To accomplish that goal, the student must be enabled to integrate a wide variety of facts and ideas, theories, and applications that will become holistic in substance and unified in practice." More specifically, he then focused on the general education courses for music education students and finally, since the current concept is failing in presenting integrated knowledge, he proposed a new philosophy of the general education core. This new philosophy contains three steps: (1) cultivating personal qualities, (2) understanding multiculturalism, and (3) understanding the complexities of humanity itself and its relationship to the earth. [End Page 198]This philosophy is intriguing and does indeed deserve a broad discussion. To start that discussion, I would like to raise several fundamental issues. First, such a philosophy of general education cannot exist as a pure philosophy of the undergraduate general education core (nor can it specifically focus on music students). The ultimate goal of such a philosophy must be to turn toward the general education core of all levels of education, especially beginning with the youngest age groups. A student, educated according to existing philosophies up to age eighteen, will have the hardest time in suddenly connecting the various areas and fields of study in a globalized worldview. The reasons for this problem are cultural. At eighteen, students are culturally so formed that a new cultural opening is hardly possible. The philosophy should, instead, focus on the spiral that professors stimulate: our graduates are the teachers of the next generation, some of whom become teachers and will educate the following generation, and so on. Palmer's goal can, in my opinion, only be reached if we first focus on the general education of all ages, and then stimulate a slow but continuous change throughout the next generations. This change may exploit the cultural open-mindedness of students of all ages within the educational and cultural limitations that were set by their previous education. Indeed, such cultivation in early adulthood can benefit our university students, as Palmer states, but cultivation at such a late stage is limited.Second, the philosophy suggested by Palmer may be hard to realize practically. All mass media would work against such a realization. The organization of classes is, with our current commercialized course offering system, impractical in terms of Palmer's suggestions. Academic units within universities generate money through large general education classes. Who would pay for smaller classes? (I am not speaking about the small, private liberal arts colleges that Palmer mentions but about public colleges and universities, many of which are very large.) If general education were to be moved to a newly created academic unit, as Palmer suggests, who would reimburse the academic units that would lose the credit hours? How could we create the additional classes that would be needed to bring all the areas together that he suggests (music, art, religion, myth, history, language, philosophy, psychology, paleontology, archeology, anthropology, biology, and zoology)? In addition, some of his philosophy is based on Carl Roger's view of personal relationships, which parents as well as teachers have to establish. But how are the parents of our students to establish such relationships? And who is going to educate the parents? American culture itself would certainly be an obstacle for the realization of such an educational philosophy. Furthermore, how do we select the students who are unsuccessful in becoming self-initiated learners? How do we identify those who are not well-read? Should they not be removed? Much of the current educational system is based on the assumption that all, or most, [End Page 199] students are very talented. Realizing Palmer's philosophy would mean... (shrink)

Dieser Band umfasst 35 Texte des Wiener Philosophen und Wissenschaftstheoretikers Friedrich G. Wallner aus den 1980er Jahren. Sie setzen sich allesamt auseinander mit dem sprachphilosophischen Denken des fruhen wie spaten Wittgenstein. Die Auseinandersetzung erfolgt dabei in einer zweifachen Weise: In einem ersten Teil gilt es den Texten, Grundgedanken Wittgensteins zu analysieren, zu erhellen sowie deren Pragungen und Einflusse aufzuzeigen. Dabei werden der Ansatz seines Denkens sowie dessen Bedeutung fur Wissenschaftstheorie und Dichtung erortert. In einem zweiten Teil verfolgen die Texte (...) das Ziel, im Anschluss an Wittgenstein ein Konzept von Philosophie auszuarbeiten, welches Philosophie als Therapie begreift. Ein Konzept, welches im Horizont der Einzelwissenschaften mehrfach zur Anwendung kommt.". (shrink)

Bestimmend fur die hier getroffene Auswahl der Arbeiten ist Friedrich Wallners Interesse an der Tradition der osterreichischen Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie: Dieses richtet sich nicht so sehr auf die historiographische Rekonstruktion, sondern viel mehr auf die theoretisch-philosophische Entwicklung solcher Traditionen als Beitrage zur zeitgenossischen Debatte in der Epistemologie. Der programmatische Titel "Strategien indirekter Rationalitat" gilt richtungweisend fur alle im Buch vorhandenen Gebiete der Forschung und beschreibt eine pluralistische, vielseitig orientierte Perspektive. Diese Perspektive beweist - nach einer der wichtigsten Lehren Wittgensteins - (...) wie sich das philosophische Tun nicht in einer -einseitigen Diat- erschopfen kann, sondern aus mehreren Methoden und -gleichsam verschiedenen Therapien- besteht.". (shrink)

As its title suggests, this anthology is a collection of papers presented at a conference on feelings and emotions held in Amsterdam in 2001. One of the symposium’s main goals was to draw some of the most prominent researchers in emotion research together and provide a multi-disciplinary ‘snap shot’ of the state of the art at the turn of the century. In that respect it is truly a cognitive science success story. There are articles from a wide range of fields, (...) encompassing, e.g., philosophy, neuroscience, anthropology, sociology, and psychology. Another.. (shrink)

Considering the importance of possible-world semantics for modal logic and for current debates in the philosophy of modality, a phenomenologist may want to ask whether it makes sense to speak of “possible worlds” in phenomenology. The answer will depend on how "possible worlds" are to be interpreted. As that latter question is the subject of the debate about possibilism and actualism in contemporary modal metaphysics, my aim in this paper is to get a better grip on the former question by (...) exploring a Husserlian stance towards this debate. I will argue that the phenomenologist’s way to deal with the problem of intentional reference to mere possibilia is analogous to the actualist’s idea of how “possible worlds” are to be interpreted. Nevertheless, I will be pointing to a decisive difference in the metaphilosophical preconditions of what I call "phenomenological actualism" and analytical versions of actualism. (shrink)

Husserl famously argues that it is essential to perception to present the perceived object in perspectives. Hence, there is no – and there cannot be – perception without perspectival givenness. Yet, it seems that there are counterexamples to this essentialist claim, for we seem to be able to imagine beings that do not perceive in perspectives. Recently, there have been some accounts in the literature that critically discuss those counterexamples and assess to what extent they succeed in challenging Husserl’s essentialist (...) claim. In this paper I discuss three different answers to these counterexamples, all of them are found wanting. I offer a novel solution, taking into account some crucial findings of the contemporary debate about imagination and modality. I argue that this new solution is capable of fully vindicating Husserl’s essentialist claim. Finally, I reconstruct Husserl’s own way to treat such counterexamples, in order to showcase the notion of modality Husserlian phenomenology relies on. I argue for the hitherto widely underappreciated point that Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology cannot appeal to strictly absolute modality but that the kind of modality in Husserlian phenomenology is conditional on the facticity that we have the transcendental structure we do in fact have. (shrink)

A review of the literature was conducted to better understand the (potential) role of mental health professionals in physician-assisted suicide. Numerous studies indicate that depression is one of the most commonly encountered psychiatric illnesses in primary care settings. Yet, depression consistently goes undetected and undiagnosed by nonpsychiatrically trained primary care physicians. Noting the well-studied link between depression and suicide, it is necessary to question giving sole responsibility of assisting patients in making end-of-life treatment decisions to these physicians. Unfortunately, the use (...) of mental health consultation by these physicians is not a common occurrence. Greater involvement of mental health professionals in this emerging and debated area is advocated. Beyond describing mental health professionals' role in the assessment of patient competency or decision making capacity, other areas of potential involvement are described. A discussion of ethical principles relevant to this area follows, along with comments on the training necessary to adequately serve patient needs. (shrink)