We explain and explore class-theoretic potentialism—the view that one can always individuate more classes over a set-theoretic universe. We examine some motivations for class-theoretic potentialism, before proving some results concerning the relevant potentialist systems (in particular exhibiting failures of the $\mathsf {.2}$ and $\mathsf {.3}$ axioms). We then discuss the significance of these results for the different kinds of class-theoretic potentialists.

The self-deceived are usually held to be moral responsible for their state. I argue that this attribution of responsibility makes sense only against the background of the traditional conception of self-deception, a conception that is now widely rejected. In its place, a new conception of self-deception has been articulated, which requires neither intentional action by self-deceived agents, nor that they possess contradictory beliefs. This new conception has neither need nor place for attributions of moral responsibility to the self-deceived in paradigmatic (...) cases. Accordingly, we should take the final step toward abandoning the traditional conception, and drop the automatic attribution of responsibility. Self-deception is simply a kind of mistake, and has no more necessary connection to culpability than have other intellectual errors. (shrink)

The author comments on the article “The Neurobiology of Addiction: Implications for Voluntary Control of Behavior,‘ by S. E. Hyman. Hyman’s article suggests that addicted individuals have impairments in cognitive control of behavior. The author agrees with Hyman’s view that addiction weakens the addict’s ability to align his actions with his judgments. The author states that neuroethics may focus on brains and highlight key aspects of behavior but we still risk missing explanatory elements. Accession Number: 24077912; Authors: Levy, Neil (...) 1,2; Email Address: [email protected]; Affiliations: 1: University of Melbourne, Parkville 3010, Australia; 2: University of Oxford; Subject: ADDICTIONS; Subject: ALCOHOLISM; Subject: COGNITION; Subject: BEHAVIOR; Subject: JUDGMENT; Subject: HYMAN, S. E.; Subject: NEUROBIOLOGY; Number of Pages: 2p. (shrink)

In the book’s first chapter, the topic of practical mind is approached via a brief survey of a number of important positions in the history of philosophy. The founding question for a philosophy of practical mind is raised by Aristotle when he asks what it is in the soul that originates movement. I discuss the answers to this question proposed by Plato, Aristotle himself, Hobbes and Hume, before rounding off the historical survey with a look at the introduction of the (...) notion of “pro-attitude” in the last century. The key question put to the various proposals concerns their capacity to give a unitary account of what it is that “moves” agents. Put in terms of the last of the suggestions discussed: is there a single pro-component that unites the diverse ways of being for something under one genus? And if so, is that pro-component the feature that moves us? (shrink)

Douglas N. Walton considers the question of whether the conventions of informal conversation can be articulated more precisely than they are at present. Specifically, he addresses the problem of the fallacy of ad hominem argumentation as it occurs in natural settings. Can rules be formulated to determine if criticisms of apparent hypocrisy in an argument are defensible or refutable? Walton suggests that they can, and ultimately defends the thesis that ad hominem reasoning is not fallacious per se. He carries his (...) analysis to the core of action--theoretic reasoning--by examining a number of specimen arguments. As suggested by the title, the conclusion of ad hominem argument is demonstrated to be relative to the arguer's position. In the appendixes of the book, articles by Gerald McAuliffe and Gordon R. Lowe illustrate vivid and powerful cases in which Walton's contentions are put to the test. (shrink)

To the extent that indeterminacy intervenes between our reasons for action and our decisions, intentions and actions, our freedom seems to be reduced, not enhanced. Free will becomes nothing more than the power to choose irrationally. In recognition of this problem, some recent libertarians have suggested that free will is paradigmatically manifested only in actions for which we have reasons for both or all the alternatives. In these circumstances, however we choose, we choose rationally. Against this kind of account, most (...) fully developed by Robert Kane, critics have pressed the demand for contrastive explanations. Kane has responded by arguing that the demand does not need to be met: responsibility for an action does not require that there be a contrastive explanation of that action. However, this response proves too much: it implies that agents are responsible not only for the actions they choose, but also for the counterfactual actions which were equally available to them. (shrink)

Theories of self-deception divide into those that hold that the state is characterized by some kind of synchronic tension or conflict between propositional attitudes and those that deny this. Proponents of the latter like Al Mele claim that their theories are more parsimonious, because they do not require us to postulate any psychological mechanisms beyond those which have been independently verified. But if we can show that there are real cases of motivated believing which are characterized by conflicting propositional attitudes, (...) however, the parsimony argument against incongruent mental state accounts is undermined. I argue that anosognosia presents us with a real-life example of motivated belief together with (sub)-doxastic conflict. (shrink)

Study on the thought and activities of a mystic philosopher of India.

A general method is provided whereby bizarre revisions of consistent theories with respect to contingent sentences that they refute can be delivered by revision-functions satisfying both the basic and the supplementary postulates of the AGM-theory of theory-revision.

A growth in consumer and media ethical consciousness has resulted in the need for organizations to ensure that members understand, share and project an approved and unified set of ethics. Thus understanding which variables are related to sharing and variation of ethical reasoning and moral intent, and the relative strength of these variables is critical. While past research has examined individual (attitudes, values, etc.), social (peers, significant others, etc.) and organizational (codes of conduct, senior management, etc.) variables, it has focused (...) on their influence on the individual – and not on their role in relation to patterns of group sharing and variation in an organization. Introduced as a new methodology to study ethics, microcultural analysis stipulates that to explain patterns of sharing and variation, one must understand how individual, social and organizational variables influence sharing and variation. Key hypotheses predict that managers who share in individual, social or organizational determinants will be more likely to share in ethical reasoning and moral intent. Qualitative and quantitative research supports the key hypotheses, finding social ties, personal moral intensity, Machiavellianism, locus of control and codes of ethics as significant determinants. Individuals who share in these determinants are more likely to share in ethical reasoning and moral intent. Additionally, regression analysis reveals social ties and personal moral intensity to be the strongest determinants. Based on these results, managerial recommendations focus on a holistic approach, manipulating these three determinants to cultivate a unified code of ethics within an organization. (shrink)

This Major Reference series brings together a wide range of key international articles in law and legal theory. Many of these essays are not readily accessible, and their presentation in these volumes will provide a vital new resource for both research and teaching. Each volume is edited by leading international authorities who explain the significance and context of articles in an informative and complete introduction.

This volume examines why Sir Karl Popper's view of empirical falsifiability as the distinguishing characteristic of science has found appeal among economists.

An old Arab proverb runs as follows: He who knows not, and knows not that he knows not, is a fool; shun him. He who knows not, and knows that he knows not, is a child; teach him. He who knows, and knows not that he knows, is asleep; wake him. But he who knows, and knows that he knows, is a sage; follow him.

But what is a man? Shall I say a rational animal? Assuredly not; for it would be necessary forthwith to inquire into what is meant by animal, ...

Descartes's Dioptrics is more than a mere technical treatise on optics; it is an essay in the "practical philosophy" that he claimed could render us "masters and possessors of nature." Descartes's practical intent is indicated first by the instrumentalist character of his derivation of the sine law of refraction, which is based on a heuristic and readily mathematizable model that requires no consideration of light's "true nature." Descartes's subsequent discussion of human vision is an extended critique of nature's workmanship that (...) grounds the possibility of improving vision by artificial means. I suggest that this critique is the source of Descartes's doctrine that the purpose of sensory perception is to preserve the mind-body composite, not to provide knowledge of the essential nature of things. Accordingly, the ultimate goal of the Dioptrics is to "master" human vision by raising it from a mere means of self-preservation to an instrument of scientific knowledge. -/- . (shrink)

Autonomy and valuing are two significant practical phenomena that have been analysed in terms of higher-order wanting. I argue that reference to higher-order capacities is indeed required to make sense of both concepts, but also that such analyses need a more differentiated understanding of "wanting to want" than has hitherto been proposed. Central for autonomy is the instantiation of four types of optative relationship by an accountable agent under conditions of rationality. Valuing requires the disposition to instantiate only one of (...) the relevant structures. Clarity on this allows an analysis of the precise relationships between the two phenomena. (shrink)

Gewohnheitshandlungen stellen für die kausale Handlungstheorie eine Herausforderung dar: Einerseits werden sie offenkundig auf weite Strecken nicht durch vorgängige bewusste Wünsche gesteuert. Andererseits glauben wir, dass dabei der Akteur in der Regel über sie diejenige Form von Kontrolle ausübt, die sie als seine absichtlichen Handlungen qualifiziert. Somit kann es den Anschein haben, dass Gewohnheitshandlungen entscheidende Gegenbeispiele für eine Theorie liefern, die die für Absichtlichkeit entscheidende Handlungskontrolle an die Verursachung durch bewusste Wünsche bindet. Der Artikel untersucht drei einschlägige Typen von routinemäßig (...) ausgeführten Handlungen: erstens komplexe Alltagshandlungen wie Autofahren oder Ins-Bett-Gehen, die häufig 'geistesabwesend' vollzogen werden; zweitens Routinen, die, wie die Vorführung eines Akrobaten, aus eingeschliffenen körperlichen Sequenzen bestehen, deren erfolgreiche Ausführung die Abwesenheit bewusster Interventionen geradezu erfordert; und drittens 'gedankenlos' ausgeübte Mikrohandlungssequenzen wie das Herumprobieren mit einem Schlüssel im Schlüsselloch. Es zeigt sich nicht nur, dass alle drei Handlungstypen einer kausalen Analyse zugänglich sind, sondern auch dass ihre Analyse wichtige Dimensionen des Phänomens der Handlungskontrolle zutage fördert. (shrink)

He also tells a very interesting personal story of his battles to get these trajectories used, and how he was able to save the Hiten spacecraft and get it to the moon. This is a great story, and he tells it very well.

This paper argues that analyses of the ways in which Big Data has been enacted in other academic disciplines can provide us with concepts that will help understand the application of Big Data to social questions. We use examples drawn from our Science and Technology Studies analyses of -omic biology and high energy physics to demonstrate the utility of three theoretical concepts: primary and secondary inscriptions, crafted and found data, and the locus of legitimate interpretation. These help us to show (...) how the histories, organisational forms, and power dynamics of a field lead to different enactments of big data. The paper suggests that these concepts can be used to help us to understand the ways in which Big Data is being enacted in the domain of the social sciences, and to outline in general terms the ways in which this enactment might be different to that which we have observed in the ‘hard’ sciences. We contend that the locus of legitimate interpretation of Big Data biology and physics is tightly delineated, found within the disciplinary institutions and cultures of these disciplines. We suggest that when using Big Data to make knowledge claims about ‘the social’ the locus of legitimate interpretation is more diffuse, with knowledge claims that are treated as being credible made from other disciplines, or even by those outside academia entirely. (shrink)

This article focusses upon defining those factors which may contribute to the pathogenesis of cancer. The molecular basis of tumour etiology is discussed with reference to cancer predisposing syndromes, and in particular to the human inherited disease, Bloom's sysdrome. In Bloom's syndrome, patients are predisposed to a wide variety of malignant disease. We propose a model in which overexpression of the ubiquitous c‐myc proto‐oncogene contributes to this process.

Of the future technologies arising from the Human Genome Project, pharmacogenomics will probably be the first to have a widespread impact on the everyday practice of medicine. This technology offers great benefits but also presents some difficult ethical challenges. This paper explains what pharmacogenomics is and examines three of the issues that it raises: orphan populations, the use of ethnicity in drug trials, and potential obstacles to informed consent for genetic testing.

Nietzsche and Hume agree that desire drives all human action and practical reasoning. This shared view helps them appreciate continuities between human and animal motivation and sets them against a long tradition of rationalist rivals including Kant and Plato. In responding to Kant, Nietzsche further developed the Humean views that Kant himself was responding to. Kantians like Christine Korsgaard argue that reflective endorsement and rejection of options presented by desire demonstrates reason’s ability to independently drive reasoning and action. In Daybreak (...) 109, Nietzsche provides a simpler Humean explanation: reflective endorsement and rejection involve reflecting on one desire from the viewpoint of another, with desire as the only motivational force. This explains the attentional and hedonic phenomenology of reflective endorsement without ascribing any motivational force to rational processes independent of desire. (shrink)

Sovereignty in premodern times evoked the dynastic figure of the 'sovereign' or territorial monarch. In modern times, it became a more abstract idea, referring to the power of the state, later of the people or 'the popular sovereign' as articulated and refined through constitutional arrangements. Today these inherited understandings of sovereignty confront various new challenges, including those of globalization, privatization of power, and the rise of sub-state nationalism. An examination of key historical writers and trends from the seventeenth century onwards, (...) including Hobbes, Bodin, Constant, Rousseau and Schmitt, brings out these developments and challenges. Sovereignty remains a malleable and 'active' feature of the global configuration of power. Will sovereignty become a redundant concept over time, or will it remain a key part of the grammar of modern politics? (shrink)

I WOULD LIKE TO respond to the four commentaries in turn. In each case I have started by setting out what I think the commentaries are claiming; in doing so, I may reveal that I have misunderstood or misconstrued, and I apologize where this is the case. My responses in many cases are provisional: the commentaries have given me much to think about. Also, my responses are selective—there are many points not touched upon here that deserve consideration. Finally, the order (...) of my responses is arbitrary. (shrink)