The Ukrainian book for children of this period and date remains little investigated link of domestic book science. Somewhere she is actually excluded from the scientific circle. In particular, in the realm of religious studies studios. And here it is indicated a number of promising areas of scientific research.

The present study examines cross-cultural differences in people’s concept of lying with regard to the question of whether lying requires an agent to _say_ something they believe to be false. While prominent philosophical views maintain that lying entails that a person explicitly expresses a believed-false claim, recent research suggests that people’s concept of lying might also include certain kinds of deception that are communicated more indirectly. An important drawback of previous empirical work on this topic is that only few studies (...) have investigated people’s concept of lying in non-Western samples. In the present study, we compare people’s intuitions about lying with indirect deceptions (i.e., presuppositions, conversational implicatures, and non-verbal actions) in a sample of _N_ = 255 participants from Russia and _N_ = 300 participants from the United Kingdom. Our findings show a strong degree of similarity between lie ratings of participants from Russia and the United Kingdom, with both samples holding it possible for agents to lie with deceptive statements and actions that do not involve the agent _saying_ something they believe to be false. (shrink)

Exclusionary defeat is Joseph Raz’s proposal for understanding the more complex, layered structure of practical reasoning. Exclusionary reasons are widely appealed to in legal theory and consistently arise in many other areas of philosophy. They have also been subject to a variety of challenges. I propose a new account of exclusionary reasons based on their justificatory role, rejecting Raz’s motivational account and especially contrasting exclusion with undercutting defeat. I explain the appeal and coherence of exclusionary reasons by appeal to commonsense (...) value pluralism and the intermediate space of public policies, social roles, and organizations. We often want our choices to have a certain character or instantiate a certain value and in order to do so, that choice can only be based on a restricted set of reasons. Exclusion explains how pro tanto practical reasons can be disqualified from counting towards a choice of a particular kind without being outweighed or undercut. (shrink)

Upon doing something generous for someone with whom you are close, some kind of reciprocity may be appropriate. But it often seems wrong to actually request reciprocity. This chapter explores the wrongness in making these requests, and why they can nevertheless appear appropriate. After considering several explanations for the wrongness at issue (involving, e.g. distinguishing oughts from obligation, the suberogatory, imperfect duties, and gift-giving norms), a novel proposal is advanced. The requests are disrespectful; they express that their agent insufficiently trusts (...) the hearer to recognize their own reasons to reciprocate, and the close relationship between them morally requires this kind of trust. This proposal is articulated and situated in the recent discussion of the normativity of requests. The chapter concludes by explaining how these requests may appear appropriate. Agents in these relationships often have standing to make requests, though the standing is lacking in these particular cases. (shrink)

"--Brian Greene, Columbia University "This book includes material that is intellectually innovative and comes as a surprise even to specialists in the field.

A systematic study of rational or justified belief, which throws fresh light on current debates about foundations and coherence theories of knowledge, the validation of induction and moral scepticism. Dr Nathan focuses attention on the largely unsatisfiable desires for active and self-conscious assurance of truth liable to be engendered by philosophical reflection about total belief-systems and the sources of knowledge. He extracts a kernel of truth from the doctrine that a regress of justification is both necessary and impossible, contrasts the (...) resultant scepticism with more familiar complaints about the inapplicability of supposedly essential cognitive concepts and explores the feasibility of non-Humean modes of consolation. This is an original and carefully constructed book, which will interest professional philosophers and advanced students of epistemology. (shrink)

The author recounts major personal and moral tensions that arose during an 11-month period living in Ghana and shares how she has since learned to reconcile those tensions.

Ravelingien et al1 argue that, given the restrictions that must be imposed on recipients of xenotransplanted organs, we should conduct clinical trials of xenotransplantation only on patients in a persistent vegetative state. I argue that there is no ethical barrier to using terminally ill patients instead. Such patients can choose to waive their rights to the liberties that xenotransplantation would probably restrict; it is surely rational to prefer to waive your rights rather than to die, and permissible to allow patients (...) to make this choice.Perhaps the single most important advance in the history of moral thought occurred when it came to be generally recognised that all people are protected by rights that are inviolable, at least without their consent. The precise nature and content of these rights is controversial, but there is a consensus among reasonable people over their core. We all have a right to life, to liberty, to security of person and to equality before the law. Other rights—so-called positive rights, such as the right to economic security, or cultural rights, for instance—may be controversial, but we all agree at least on these.Ravelingien et al1 therefore seem to be on solid ground when they conclude that it would not be permissible to use living persons as subjects in clinical trials of xenotransplantation, as such trials, potentially or actually, result in the violation of the core human rights of the subjects. Their argument is as follows:" Xenotransplantation carries with it a currently unquantifiable risk of the transmission of viruses, from the animal that is the source of the organ transplanted, to the human recipient. Such viruses could have potentially catastrophic consequences, up to and including triggering a global and devastating pandemic. Therefore, it would be necessary to monitor the health status of recipients of … ". (shrink)

Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligences has been further developed to focus on the research of human cognitive activities. Thus, the concept of emotional intelligence, which is the topic of the current paper, was introduced by John D. Mayer, Peter Salovey and ‎Daniel Goleman. General intelligence can be defined as the capacity to carry out abstract reasoning to understand meanings, to recognize the similarities and differences between two concepts and to make generalizations. Emotional intelligence is not a part of general intelligence. (...) Emotional intelligence can be defined as an ability of a human to perceive oneself and interact with others with the help of obtained and processed emotional information. Language acquisition is mediated by the necessity to communicate with others. Consequently, the ability to manage the process of communication is of utmost importance in learning a language. Virtual learning environment reduces dramatically the immediate interaction of the participants of the process of education. It undoubtedly affects the process of acquisition and demands to reconsider the distribution of different learning activities. (shrink)

Die Herrschaft des Behaviorismus in der Psychologie ist gebrochen! Das ist die Ausgangsthese dieses Buches, die im Rahmen des Modells revolutionärer Wissenschaftsentwicklung (Kuhn) als Behauptung eines Paradigmawechsels präzisiert wird. Die Argumentation beschränkt sich nicht nur auf den Nachweis des Niedergangs des Behaviorismus, sondern gibt auch konstruktiv das mögliche neue Paradigma an: als Psychologie des reflexiven Subjekts, das wie der Wissenschaftler (subjektive) Theorien aufstellt, überprüft, bewertet. Der Aufriss einer solchen Psychologie des epistemischen Subjekts unter allgemein-, sozial-, pädagogisch- und klinisch-psychologischem Aspekt thematisiert (...) vor allem: die Rationalität der Reflexionen, Normenkritik und -begründung im Austausch von wissenschaftlichen und naiven Theorien sowie die Berücksichtigung von Reflexivität in der therapeutischen Praxis. Die Rückwendung dieser pychologisch-metatheoretischen Perspektiven auf die Wissenschaftstheorie führt auch zu einer neu. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the target article “Who Conceives of Society?” by Ernst von Glasersfeld. Excerpt: In the face of modern neuroscience we should give up on constructivism, even more so on radical constructivism, and stick to the physical and psychological reality given in science and daily life, even if it is the brain’s illusion from associative networks. The illusion of constructivism may hurt!