This symposium on Monique Deveaux’s Poverty, Solidarity, and Poor-Led Social Movements includes commentaries by Sally Matthews, Renante D. Pilapil, Violetta Igneski, and Wouter Peeters, with a reply from Deveaux. The book makes the case that normative thinking about poverty should engage closely with the aims, insights, and actions of poor-led organizations and social movements. Challenging conventional framings of poverty by moral philosophers, Deveaux argues that chronic poverty is centrally about the subordination and dispossession of the poor – not mere (...) needs scarcity. To exclude people living in poverty from shaping antipoverty solutions is therefore to perpetuate their social-political domination and epistemic oppression. Deveaux’s book explains what a political reframing of poverty looks like from the vantage point of several poor-led organizations and social movements, using concrete examples from across the globe, and argues for political responsibility for solidarity with those movements. (shrink)

We show that the Proper Forcing Axiom implies the Singular Cardinal Hypothesis. The proof uses the reflection principle MRP introduced by Moore in [11].

.In this paper, I address Descartes’ claims that sensory perceptions function to aid and preserve the subject in interacting with the world, and focus specifically on the ‘valence’, or agreeable/disagreeable quality, that characterizes many sensations. I show how Descartes considers this aspect of sensation to be a significant factor in the ecological role of sensory perception and I then turn to a kind of case that seems to pose a problem for this view: that of aesthetic pleasure. I consider Descartes’ (...) remarks on a particular kind of aesthetic pleasure – that found in musical consonance – and argue that his discussion of this phenomenon reveals that he distinguishes between two distinct kinds of valence – evaluative sensory valence and aesthetic valence – only one of which functions to report directly on ecological evaluation. Further, I suggest that the best way to understand the distinction between these is by appealing to Descartes’ three grades of sensory perception. (shrink)

Élie HALÉVY (1870-1937), philosophe et historien des idées, fut professeur à l'École libre des sciences politiques, l'ancêtre de l'actuel Sciences Po. Comme son autre grand ouvrage, l'Histoire du peuple anglais au XIXe siècle, paru en six tomes de 1913 à 1932, les trois tomes de La formation du radicalisme philosophique, parus en 1901 pour les deux premiers et en 1904 pour le troisième, reflètent pour partie ses enseignements de l'Ecole libre consacrés à l'histoire britannique. Le premier tome, La jeunesse de (...) Bentham 1776-1789, étudie la doctrine utilitariste non seulement chez celui qu'on regarde comme son fondateur principal, Jeremy Bentham, mais aussi chez les nombreux auteurs qui, en Grande-Bretagne et sur le continent, en dessinèrent avant lui les contours. Le deuxième tome, L’évolution de la doctrine utilitaire de 1789 à 1815, montre comment l'utilitarisme revêtit la forme non seulement d'une école de pensée, mais aussi d'un mouvement pour la réforme économique, sociale et politique. Le rôle coordonnateur nouveau de James Mill, ainsi qu'une convergence de vues avec les économistes, qui poussaient dans le sens des réformes, marquèrent notamment cette évolution. Le troisième tome, Le radicalisme philosophique, continue d'étudier la transformation de l'école en mouvement après la fin des guerres napoléoniennes, lorsque celle-ci commence à engranger ses premiers grands succès réformistes. Bentham, James Mill et les autres penseurs utilitaires sont alors réunis sous l'appellation de philosophic radicals. Le terme temporel de l'ouvrage est le Reform Act de 1932, première étape vers la modernisation du système électoral, que la propagande de ce groupe ne contribua pas peu à faire aboutir. Quoique l'ouvrage d'Halévy vaille en premier lieu par l'immense savoir qu'il déploie, et le nombre et l'excellence des citations qu'il propose, il comporte aussi des thèses historiques et philosophiques originales. On peut citer parmi les premières la thèse, qui relie les trois tomes, voulant que l'utilitarisme britannique trouve sa forme achevée dans l'intervention sur la société, lorsqu'il se mue en radicalisme philosophique, et parmi les secondes, la thèse, énoncée au début du premier tome, voulant qu'il existe trois modèles dominants de jonction des intérêts individuels (la fusion sympathique, l'identification naturelle et l'identification artificielle). Une autre grande thèse, à la fois historique et philosophique, affirme en substance que l'économie politique classique serait un département spécialisé de la pensée utilitaire. La question de savoir jusqu'à quel point Smith, Ricardo et Malthus ont pu adhérer au "principe d'utilité" de Bentham est toujours débattue. En même temps que les élucidations apportées à ce principe, elle contribue à expliquer l'intérêt que les historiens de la pensée économique continuent de porter à l'ouvrage. La réédition de La formation du radicalisme philosophique par les Presses Universitaires de France (P.U.F.) a impliqué un effort collectif. Monique Canto-Sperber en a conçu l'idée et assumé la direction, et l'ouvrage a paru en 1995 dans la collection Philosophie morale dont elle avait alors la responsabilité aux P.U.F. Chacun des trois tomes s'accompagne d'une postface, confiée au philosophe Jean-Pierre Dupuy pour le premier, au politologue Pierre Bouretz pour le second, et à l'économiste Philippe Mongin pour le troisième. Un travail de grande ampleur a été requis, d'une part, pour localiser les références de Halévy dans des sources plus récentes que celles dont il disposait, en particulier, s'agissant de Bentham, dans l'édition toujours en cours de ses œuvres, et d'autre part, pour traduire les très nombreux passages que Halévy citait en langue anglaise. Sophie Jallais et Mary Sokol se sont chargées de la première tâche et Jean-Pierre Cléro de la seconde. Prise après quelques années de circulation de l'ouvrage, la décision des P.U.F. d'en pilonner les exemplaires que ses responsables ne rachèteraient pas a semblé compromettre ce vaste travail. Mais grâce aux efforts du site québécois Les classiques des sciences sociales, et de son directeur Jean-Marie Tremblay, il est devenu possible d'accéder aux trois tomes électroniquement. Les adresses en sont : http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/halevy_elie/radicalisme_philo_t1/radicalisme_philo_t1.html http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/halevy_elie/radicalisme_philo_t2/radicalisme_philo_t2.html http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/halevy_elie/radicalisme_philo_t3/radicalisme_philo_t3.html Avant la réédition de 1995, l'ouvrage de Halévy n'était facilement accessible que grâce à la traduction anglaise plusieurs fois rééditée de Mary Morris, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, New York, Macmillan, 1928. (shrink)

Biological and Cultural Bases of Human Inference addresses the interface between social science and cognitive science. In this volume, Viale and colleagues explore which human social cognitive powers evolve naturally and which are influenced by culture. Updating the debate between innatism and culturalism regarding human cognitive abilities, this book represents a much-needed articulation of these diverse bases of cognition. Chapters throughout the book provide social science and philosophical reflections, in addition to the perspective of evolutionary theory and the central assumptions (...) of cognitive science. The overall approach of the text is based on three complementary levels: adult performance, cognitive development, and cultural history and prehistory. Scholars from several disciplines contribute to this volume, including researchers in cognitive, developmental, social and evolutionary psychology, neuropsychology, cognitive anthropology, epistemology, and philosophy of mind. This contemporary, important collection appeals to researchers in the fields of cognitive, social, developmental, and evolutionary psychology and will prove valuable to researchers in the decision sciences. (shrink)

The brief article deals with the following questions: Was the adaptive toolbox of heuristics ecologically rational and specifically accurate in the initial stages of COVID-19, which was characterized by epistemic uncertainty? In other words, in dealing with COVID-19 did the environmental structural variables allow the success of a given heuristic strategy?

Aesthetic desire and distaste prime everyday life in surprising ways. The Cultural Promise of the Aesthetic casts much-needed light on the complex mix of meanings our aesthetic activities weave into cultural existence. Anchoring aesthetic experience in our relationships with persons, places, and things, Monique Roelofs explores aesthetic life as a multimodal, socially embedded, corporeal endeavor. Highlighting notions of relationality, address, and promising, this compelling study shows these concepts at work in visions of beauty, ugliness, detail, nation, ignorance, and cultural (...) boundary. Unexpected aesthetic pleasures and pains crop up in sites where passion, perception, rationality, and imagination go together but also are in conflict. Bonds between aesthetics and politics are forged and reforged. Cross-disciplinary in outlook, and engaging the work of theorists and artists ranging from David Hume to Theodor W. Adorno, Frantz Fanon, Clarice Lispector, and Barbara Johnson, The Cultural Promise of the Aesthetic lays open the interpretive web that gives aesthetic agency its vast reach. (shrink)

In this article, I address the epistemological role that geometry plays in Kepler’s Harmonices Mundi Libri V and argue that the framework he develops there is meant to address concerns regarding the confirmation of astronomical hypotheses, which are supported by comments in earlier works regarding empirical underdetermination. The geometrical epistemology that he constructs to combat these concerns in the Harmonices Mundi is introduced in Book I and then is extended to his theory of harmonic proportion in Book III, finally providing (...) the foundation for his derivation of the planetary motions in Book V. To argue for these claims, I begin by discussing Kepler’s concern with underdetermination in earlier works. Then I turn to the Harmonices Mundi and argue that Kepler seeks to provide a geometrical system that directly links the theorist with the world. Finally, I show how he applies this system to his astronomy via his harmonic theory. This account not only helps us to understand Kepler’s scientific methodology better but also sheds light on Kepler’s enthusiasm for the results of the Harmonices Mundi by showing how they provide an example of the successful application of his geometrical epistemology. (shrink)

As suggested by the title, Descartes’ Passions of the Soul deals primarily with states of the soul that he calls ‘passions.’ This designation includes all mental states that are actively caused by the body and passively received by the soul. However, as Descartes points out to the reader, there is a more specialized or proper usage of ‘passion’ that picks out a subclass of these and which aligns more-or-less with what we might now call ‘emotions.’ In this paper, I will (...) address how Descartes classifies these ‘proper passions,’ paying special attention to how he distinguishes them from the other species of the passions in general. One of my primary aims will be to highlight an under-appreciated feature of the proper passions; namely, that they are distinct from other perceptions in their systematic divergence in terms of their distal or ‘first’ cause, their intentional object, and how they are ‘referred.’ After arguing for this distinctive feature of the proper passions, I show how it enables Descartes to provide a nuanced and multi-faceted account of our emotional experiences that incorporates external sensory perceptions, internal or bodily perceptions, and various cognitive assessments. (shrink)

1. In the Physics and Metaphysics, Aristotle lays out four kinds of causes and provides examples of each. Bronze and silver are offered as examples of the material causes of artefacts, the father a...

This chapter considers some of the various interpretations that have been offered of Spinoza's views on aesthetics. It examines the possibility that Spinoza might be amenable to some kind of realist account of aesthetic value. The strongest anti‐realist interpretation that can be offered on Spinoza's behalf is a kind of error theory. A more popular interpretation of Spinoza's discussion of aesthetic evaluation is one that understands him as a relativist. This interpretation states that Spinozistic aesthetic judgments capture how one is (...) affected by objects in one's environment. One way of giving a realist interpretation of Spinoza's theory of moral value is to think of our moral evaluations as relative not ultimately to us but to some moral exemplar, most often identified with Spinoza's ‘free man’. As with Spinoza's conception of ‘perfection,’ his understanding of God is very different from this traditional sense of God at play in Augustine. (shrink)

Despite the recent explosion of philosophical literature on forgiveness, relatively few theorists have addressed the possibility of un-forgiving someone for a moral violation. And among those who have addressed the question, “Can we un-forgive?” we find little consensus. In this paper, I consider whether and in what sense forgiveness is rescindable, retractable, or otherwise reversible. In other words, I consider what it might mean to say that a victim who forgave her offender for a particular act of wrongdoing later un-forgave (...) that individual for the very same act. Examining the possibility of un-forgiving positions us to gain richer understandings of both forgiveness and the complexity of navigating moral relationships more broadly. (shrink)

Theorists often conceive of forgiveness as “wiping the slate clean” or something of the sort with respect to the offender’s moral infraction. This raises a puzzle concerning how (or whether) the relevant wrongdoing can continue to play a role in the forgiver’s deliberations, attitudes, and practical orientation toward the offender once forgiveness has taken place. For example, consider an agent who forgives her offender for an act of wrongdoing only to later blame her again for that very same act. Is (...) the relevant agent morally criticizable for breaching a commitment internal to her earlier forgiveness? When, if ever, is “un- forgiving,” justified? In brief, I argue that sometimes, we can genuinely forgive a wrongdoer for a particular transgression and at some later time, justifiably un-forgive her for it. Though the act of un-forgiving is underexplored, I argue that attending to this phenomenon will not only illuminate an important, often overlooked aspect of moral life, but it will also help to inform extant accounts of the nature and ethics of forgiveness. (shrink)

Concepts for sustainable bioeconomy systems are gradually replacing the ones on linear product chains. The reason is that continuously expanding linear chain activities are considered to contribute to climate change, reduced biodiversity, over-exploitation of resources, food insecurity, and the double burden of disease. Are sustainable bioeconomy systems a guarantee for a healthy planet? If yes, why, when, and how? In literature, different sustainability indicators have been presented to shed light on this complicated question. Due to high degrees of complexity and (...) interactions of actors in bioeconomy systems, trade-offs and non-linear outcomes became apparent. This fueled the debates about the normative dimensions of the bioeconomy. In particular, the behavior of actors and the utilization of products do not seem to be harmonized according to the environmental, social, and economic pillars of sustainability. Potential conflicts require a new conceptual framework that is here introduced. It consists of a ‘sustainability’ cylinder captured between an inner-cylinder, representing order, and an outer-cylinder for chaos, based on the laws of physics and complex adaptive systems. Such a framework permits (bioeconomy) systems to propagate in the sustainability zone only if they follow helical pathways serving as the new norms. Helices are a combination of two sinusoidal patterns. The first represents here the sustainable behavior of interacting actors and the second the balanced usage of resources and products. The latter counteracts current growth discourses. The applicability of the conceptual cylinder framework is positively verified via 9 cases in Europe, which encompass social-organizational and product-technological innovations. –. (shrink)

This book, now open-access from OUP, develops a normative theory of political responsibility for solidarity with poor populations by engaging closely with empirical studies of poor-led social movements in the Global South. Monique Deveaux rejects familiar ethical framings of problems of poverty and inequality by arguing that normative thinking about antipoverty remedies needs to engage closely with the aims, insights, and actions of “pro-poor,” poor-led social movements. Defending the idea of a political responsibility for solidarity, nonpoor outsiders—individuals, institutions, and (...) states—can help to advance a transformative anti-poverty agenda only by supporting the efforts of these movements. (shrink)

Il s'agit, dans cet ouvrage, de faire deux choses en meme temps. D'un cote, determiner les differents sens donnes par Platon au terme philosophia : denommant, dans les premiers dialogues, l'activite propre et la force qui anime un personnage, Socrate, la philosophia recoit du Phedon jusqu'au Phedre ses dimensions interieures et est pensee comme nature; ensuite, sa modalite dialectique se precise tandis que s'opere sa deduction politique et cosmologique. De l'autre, lire chaque dialogue comme l'exercice d'une philosophia, ce qui signifie (...) ne pas s'encombrer de theses, de theories et de methodes et lire avec scrupule et liberte les textes les plus subtilement ironiques, les plus volontairement fragmentes, les plus multiplement mediatises qui soient. (shrink)

We often use the term “attachment” to describe our emotional connectedness to objects in the world. We become attached to our careers, to our homes, to certain ideas, and perhaps most importantly, to other people. Interestingly, despite its import and ubiquity in our everyday lives, the topic of attachment per se has been largely ignored in the philosophy literature. I address this lacuna by identifying attachment as a rich “mode of mattering” that can help to inform certain aspects of agency (...) and emotion. First, drawing on insights from Ancient stoicism and developmental and clinical psychology, I suggest that the relevant form of attachment involves a felt need for its object and a particular relationship between the object and the attached agent’s sense of security. I then argue that these features serve to distinguish the attitude from the more philosophically familiar notion of caring. Finally, I show that recognizing this form of attachment as a distinct mode of mattering has important implications for understanding grief. (shrink)

Increasing privacy concerns are arising from expanding use of aggregated personal information in health practices. Conversely, in light of the promising benefits of data driven healthcare, privacy...

The mind-society problem deals with the relations between mental and social phenomena. The problem is crucial in the main methodologies of social sciences. The thesis of hermeneutics is that we can only understand but not explain the relationship between beliefs and social action because mental and social events are not natural events. The thesis of social holism is that social phenomena are emergent and irreducible to mental phenomena. The thesis of rational choice theory is that social phenomena are reducible to (...) mental phenomena and this reduction is explained by unrealistic a priori principles of rationality. These theses depend on their different solutions to the following fundamental philosophical issues: the mind-body identity; the causal nature of social explanation; the realistic goal of science. A positive answer to these issues implies support of a different solution to the mind-society problem: social phenomena are conventional concepts and they can be reduced and explained in terms of realistic concepts describing the causal mechanisms of individual reasoning and decision-making. Cognitive psychology seems to supply us some initial tentative models to explain social action, but research into neuropsychology might be able to generate the proper causal representations of the relation between mind and action. (shrink)

Felt necessity, or the phenomenon of experiencing some person or object as a felt need, plays important roles in structuring human agency. Philosophical treatments of the relationship between agency and felt necessity have tended to focus on appetitive needs and necessities arising from a particular type of care. I argue that we have much to gain by considering a third underexplored variety of felt necessity that I call “attachment necessity.” Attachment necessity has its own distinct parts to play in structuring (...) agency, and like its more familiar relatives, it can also illuminate important aspects of addiction and love. (shrink)

Morally responsible agency and agentive authority are familiar themes in the philosophical literature on ethics and agency. Morally responsible agents are those who are apt candidates for the blaming attitudes and actions by which we hold one another accountable for moral violations. Those who lack morally responsible agency—e.g., non-human animals, very young children, and (some) individuals with severe cognitive impairments—are typically considered exempt from moral responsibility. Agentive authority is a normative position that grounds powers, claims, and rights to which one (...) is entitled in virtue of being a particular kind of agent. As an autonomous agent, you have a claim-right against me (and I, a corresponding obligation to you) not to interfere with certain of your self-regarding decisions. In this paper, I consider whether and how exemption from moral responsibility might imply diminished agentive authority. Using (one type of) psychopathic agency as a test case, I argue that, contra some theoretical frameworks, one can retain agentive authority even if exempt from moral responsibility. (shrink)

It is not uncommon for philosophers to name disinterestedness, or some like feature, as an essential characteristic of love. Such theorists claim that in genuine love, one’s concern for her beloved must be non-instrumental, non-egocentric, or even selfless. These views prompt the question, “What, if any, positive role might self-interestedness play in genuine love?” In this paper, I argue that attachment, an attitude marked primarily by self-focused emotions and emotional predispositions, helps constitute the meaning and import of at least some (...) kinds of adult reciprocal love. In this way, attachment represents a type of self-interestedness that not only contributes positively to such relationships but is also essential to them. (shrink)

We analyze the notion of guessing model, a way to assign combinatorial properties to arbitrary regular cardinals. Guessing models can be used, in combination with inaccessibility, to characterize various large cardinal axioms, ranging from supercompactness to rank-to-rank embeddings. The majority of these large cardinal properties can be defined in terms of suitable elementary embeddings j:Vγ→Vλ. One key observation is that such embeddings are uniquely determined by the image structures j[Vγ]≺Vλ. These structures will be the prototypes guessing models. We shall show, (...) using guessing models M, how to prove for the ordinal κM=jM) many of the combinatorial properties that we can prove for the cardinal j) using the structure j[Vγ]≺Vj. κM will always be a regular cardinal, but consistently can be a successor and guessing models M with κM=ℵ2 exist assuming the proper forcing axiom. By means of these models we shall introduce a new structural property of models of PFA: the existence of a “Laver function” f:ℵ2→Hℵ2 sharing the same features of the usual Laver functions f:κ→Hκ provided by a supercompact cardinal κ. Further applications of our analysis will be proofs of the singular cardinal hypothesis and of the failure of the square principle assuming the existence of guessing models. In particular the failure of square shows that the existence of guessing models is a very strong assumption in terms of large cardinal strength. (shrink)

This book offers a persuasive new argument for reconciling the tensions that arise when liberal democratic states try to protect two important kinds of equality: sexual equality and cultural equality.

Rien n'est plus précieux dans notre littérature "que la lucidité implacable de ce regard, plus que la sincérité courageuse de cette voix qui ne s'est rien caché par timidité et qui n'a rien dissimulé par prudence des tares de la société", écrivait Marcel Jouhandeau préfaçant Les Caractères ou les Moeurs de ce siècle de La Bruyère. Cette appréciation est tout à fait transposable au livre de Monique Charles qui, pour ce qui est du style, serait quelque chose ou quelqu'un (...) entre La Bruyère et Céline, donc littérairement inclassable (Freud et Lacan sont passés par là!), mais terriblement efficace. C'est vivant, buissonnier, digresseur (mais on ne regrette pas les détours imprévus qui, changeant le décor, font rebondir la réflexion). De l'expérience, de la faconde, du souffle. Des réflexions intéressantes sur le deuil, l'amour, les rapports entre les sexes, le couple, le mariage, le problème du Mal, la douleur, le désir, les passions, la psychologie du Tueur... Et pour clore ce parcours du combattant à cloche-pied sur tant de faits, d'idées, de drames, arrêtons-nous à celui-ci : Non la femme n'est pas celle qui tire l'homme vers le bas, "l'éteignoir de l'homme". Monique Charles les réveillerait plutôt! Elle a enseigné avec passion. Maintenant il faut la lire. (shrink)

Tandis qu'une main de femme en moi écrivait des textes positifs, argumentés, d'ordre métaphysique, historique ou poétique, l'attente des jours se déroulait dans une aridité, une pauvreté qui se répétait elle-même.

The political self is a concept which is fundamental to political theory. This work focuses an liberal democratic theory because this type of political theory privileges the individual. It is ideal ground for rethinking a concept of the political self. ;I propose to look at abstractions and idealizations which are theoretical tools used in determining a concept of the political self. These: valuable theoretical manoeuvres are not value-neutral. A critical stance must always be taken when such conceptualizations are undertaken. The (...) conception of the political person in the theory of John Rawls will be examined through the lens of the concepts of autonomy and difference. This will focus our attention to the particular theoretical endeavours which-have excised certain features from the concept of the political person. I argue that the fiction of the 'persons in the original position' in Rawls's theory has been extended to an ideal of the political person which excludes certain individuals. This extension is unwarranted and detrimental to some individuals. ;I analyze the categories of the public-private since these are tied to a notion of the self. I claim that profound difference cannot be accommodated within the public realm of traditional liberal theory; it forces the concerns of certain individuals, such as care givers and persons with severe incapacities, into the private realm. These individuals are relegated to the private sphere only and consequently suffer from a devalued moral status. This devalued moral status within political society comes from the fact that they can not approximate the ideal of a fully cooperating member of society. This, I argue, goes against the ideal of a just society which values selves as individuals of equal moral worth. ;Finally, I suggest that our theorisation has always involved a certain detachment from bodily concerns. These have been erased from our theoretical considerations; I claim they have theoretical import. I suggest that we need to think of the political self as a whole self. The liberal focus on interests or goods should be supplemented by an understanding of needs. The latter address our interdependency as well as our vulnerability. The call for political presence is more than just a call to be heard, it's a call to be seen and recognized in the flesh. (shrink)

The purpose of this communication is to present some recent advances on the consequences that forcing axioms and large cardinals have on the combinatorics of singular cardinals. I will introduce a few examples of problems in singular cardinal combinatorics which can be fruitfully attacked using ideas and techniques coming from the theory of forcing axioms and then translate the results so obtained in suitable large cardinals properties.The first example I will treat is the proof that the proper forcing axiom PFA (...) implies the singular cardinal hypothesis SCH, this will easily lead to a new proof of Solovay's theorem that SCH holds above a strongly compact cardinal. I will also outline how some of the ideas involved in these proofs can be used as means to evaluate the “saturation” properties of models of strong forcing axioms like MM or PFA.The second example aims to show that the transfer principle ↠ fails assuming Martin's Maximum MM. Also in this case the result can be translated in a large cardinal property, however this requires a familiarity with a rather large fragment of Shelah's pcf-theory.Only sketchy arguments will be given, the reader is referred to the forthcoming [25] and [38] for a thorough analysis of these problems and for detailed proofs. (shrink)

Women use power in more prosocial ways than men and they also engage in more emotional labor. However, these two constructs have not been previously connected. We propose that gendered emotional labor practices and pressures result in gender differences in the prosocial use of power. We integrate the literature on emotional labor with research on the psychology of power to articulate three routes through which this happens. First, women may be more adept than men at the intrapersonal and interpersonal processes (...) entailed in emotional labor practices—a skill that they can apply at all hierarchical levels. Second, given women’s stronger internal motivation to perform emotional labor, they construe power in a more interdependent manner than men, which promotes a more prosocial use of power. As a result, female powerholders tend to behave in more prosocial ways. Third, when they have power, women encounter stronger external motivation to engage in emotional labor, which effectively constrains powerful women’s behaviors in a way that fosters a more prosocial use of power. We discuss how, by promoting prosocial behavior among powerholders, emotional labor can be beneficial for subordinates and organizations, while simultaneously creating costs for individual powerholders, which may reduce women’s likelihood of actually attaining and retaining power by making high-power roles less appealing, guiding women toward less prestigious and more precarious leadership roles, draining powerful women’s time and resources without equitable rewards, and making it difficult for women to legitimize their power in the eyes of subordinates. Thus, emotional labor practices can help explain the underrepresentation of women in top leadership positions. (shrink)