We study how people attend to and memorize endings of events that differ in the degree to which objects in them are affected by an action: Resultative events show objects that undergo a visually salient change in state during the course of the event (peeling a potato), and non‐resultative events involve objects that undergo no, or only partial state change (stirring in a pan). We investigate general cognitive principles, and potential language‐specific influences, in verbal and nonverbal event encoding and memory, (...) across two experiments with Dutch and Estonian participants. Estonian marks a viewer's perspective on an event's result obligatorily via grammatical case on direct object nouns: Objects undergoing a partial/full change in state in an event are marked with partitive/accusative case, respectively. Therefore, we hypothesized increased saliency of object states and event results in Estonian speakers, as compared to speakers of Dutch. Findings show (a) a general cognitive principle of attending carefully to endings of resultative events, implying cognitive saliency of object states in event processing; (b) a language‐specific boost on attention and memory of event results under verbal task demands in Estonian speakers. Results are discussed in relation to theories of event cognition, linguistic relativity, and thinking for speaking. (shrink)

When processing political arguments, people are strongly affected by their prior ideological beliefs. Political cognition often relies on two types of ideological biases. Firstly, confirmation bias leads addressees of political communication to accept arguments that affirm their preferred ideological positions. Secondly, disconfirmation bias probes reasoners to reject arguments that provide attitudinally incongruent evidence. Here, we report the findings of an experiment aimed at investigating the role of biased reasoning on perceptions of argument soundness. We focused on the processing of the (...) strawman fallacy to determine whether strawman effectiveness is contingent upon the activation of different ideological biases. We examined argument comprehension, argument evaluation and fallacy identification by means of a memory task, a rating task and an interview. Our data suggests that ideological biases and fallacy effect are associated with deliberative cognitive settings and marks a distinction between evaluative attitudes and the capacity to identify fallacies in political argumentation. (shrink)