Im vorliegenden Aufsatz vertrete ich die These, dass der Erwerb intellektueller Tugenden im Allgemeinen und der Tugend der intellektuellen Aufgeschlossenheit im Besonderen einen gewichtigen Beitrag zur Ausbildung und Perfektionierung argumentativer Fähigkeiten von Schüler_innen leisten. Dabei argumentiere ich für die Annahme, dass intellektuelle Tugenden sowohl die argumentativen Fähigkeiten der Schüler_innen als auch die Motivation, diese Fähigkeiten einzusetzen, signifikant befördern.

The current study investigated age differences in the use of attentional deployment, positive reappraisal and suppression while regulating responses to sadness-eliciting content. We also tested to what extent these emotion regulation strategies were useful for each age group in managing response to age-relevant sad information. Forty-two young participants (Mage = 18.5, SE =.15) and 48 older participants (Mage = 71.42, SE = 1.15) watched four sadness-eliciting videos (about death/illness, four to five minutes long) under four conditions—no-regulation (no regulation instructions), attentional (...) deployment (divert attention away), positive reappraisal (focus on positive outcomes) and suppression (conceal emotional expressions). We assessed negative emotional experience, expression, skin conductance level (SCL) and visual fixation duration while participants watched the emotional clips and followed the instructions for each condition. Results suggest that older adults were more successful than younger adults at implementing both attentional deployment and positive reappraisal. Ability to suppress emotions appears to remain stable with age. Within age-group comparisons suggested that for the older adults, positive reappraisal was a more useful emotion regulation strategy than the others, while the pattern among younger adults was less conclusive. Age-relevant differences in motivation and successful emotion regulatory efforts based on theoretical and empirical literatures are discussed. (shrink)

Extrapolation from a well-understood base population to a less-understood target population can fail if the base and target populations are not sufficiently similar. Differences between laboratory mice and humans, for example, can hinder extrapolation in medical research. Mice that carry a partial or complete human physiological system, known as humanized mice, are supposed to make extrapolation more reliable by simulating a variety of human diseases. But what justifies our belief that these mice are similar enough to their human counterparts to (...) simulate human disease? I argue that, unless three requirements are met in the process of humanizing mice, very little does. My requirements are not meant to provide necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee a particular outcome. Instead, they serve as a heuristic for guiding scientific judgments involving extrapolation. In developing each requirement, I engage with philosophical issues concerning the nature of model-based science and the mechanistic approach (and its limits) to making generalizations in the life sciences. (shrink)

This beautifully illustrated book documents the exceptional postcard collection of Adolf Feller. In 1889 Feller, a Swiss entrepreneur, began collecting postcards on various business trips as mementos of his travels. When news of his hobby reached his friends and relatives, others began sending picture postcards as well. After his death, Feller's daughter, Elisabeth, continued to seek out postcards from around the world. The collection now includes 54,000 postcards from 140 countries, with especially impressive examples from 1893–1930, the height of the (...) picture postcard's popularity. A wonderful testament to one man's obsession, The World in Pocket-Size Format provides a new way to experience the history of the postcard as a means of both artistic expression and communication. (shrink)

The paper is an attempt to reflect on the valuing dimension of the category of the rationality of science, ontological and epistemological problems. Such problems should be solved should rationality be deemed a valuing category. Taking into consideration the discussions on the valuing character of the categories in ethics (good, evil) and the significance of moral judgements as the point of departure, I am posing a question about the importance of expressions with regard to the rationality of science, expressions treated (...) as valuing expressions. Since the beginning of the reflections on science until now it has contained valuing and normative elements. This was irrespective of whether it took the form of logic, epistemology, methodology or philosophy of science. Moreover, the above disciplines were treated as, of their nature, formulating the ideal of knowledge and providing rules of a valuing cognition. In the twentieth century the central concept on which the discussions focused was the category of rationality. The question was how to define a valuable scientific knowledge and how to pursue science. We find some problems when we want to interpret the category of rationality as a valuing category. These problems seem to be good examples of questions that should be answered, while interpreting other epistemic categories as valuing. Including the category of the rationality of science in the valuing categories is tantamount to the conferral of a valuing sense on the statements about the rationality of science, the predicator ,,rational\" and its antonyms. The standpoints in question, the interpretations of valuing statements are as follows: anti-naturalism, naturalism, cognitivism, and acognitivism. They answer such questions as: 1) what kind of feature is rationality? 2) what are its relationships with other features, in particular with the features examined by the natural, or broadly, empirical sciences? 3) does the feature of being rational or the relationship of being a good reason on behalf of something really exist? 4) what kind of predicator of the predicator ,,rational\" and its antonyms? 5) what are their relations to other predicators, in particular those predicators which the natural, or broadly, empirical sciences make use of? 6) what kind of propositions are the statements about the rationality of science? 7) what do the statements about the rationality of science denote, or do they denote anything really existing? 8) what are the relationships of the statements of the rationality of science to other statements, in particular the statements formulated by natural sciences, e.g. cognitive psychology? The review of various manners by which to use the category of rationality in the philosophy of science speaks on behalf of the rejection of extreme interpretations: both extremely cognitivist and acognitivist. In the statements about rationality there are now two components: descriptive (object-related) and valuing. The valuing component may be understood in at least three inseparable and often coexisting manners: approving/disapproving, perfectionist and normative. (shrink)

In his Metaphysics of Morals (particularly in the Doctrine of Virtue), but also in other late works, Kant extends and refines the content of his earlier works on ethics (Groundwork and Critique of Practical Reason) to a considerable extent. These revisions and extensions not only show the limitations of an exclusive interpretation of Kants ethics as a deontological ethics of principles. His thoughts are also relevant for a large number of questions of theoretical morality currently under discussion. Thus, the distinction (...) drawn in the Doctrine of Virtue between perfect and imperfect obligations informs the problem of the solvability of moral conflicts and the role of supererogatory actions. Kant goes further into the question of what it means to be a good person, what moral significance is contained in close human ties such as friendship, and what role is played by happiness and the so-called obligations towards oneself. The papers each discuss Kants central ideas in the context of his earlier writings, but also within the context of our contemporary ethical debates. Thus attention is drawn to the significance and possible extent of an ethics of virtue understood in the Kantian sense. (shrink)

It has become increasingly common to talk about the second person in the theory of mind debate. While theory theory and simulation theory are described as third person and first person accounts respectively, a second person account suggests itself as a viable, though wrongfully neglected third option. In this paper I argue that this way of framing the debate is misleading. Although defenders of second person accounts make use of the vocabulary of the theory of mind debate, they understand some (...) of the core expressions in a different way. I will illustrate this claim by focusing on Reddy’s and Gallagher’s accounts and argue that these authors use the notions of knowing and of understanding other minds differently than traditionally assumed. As a consequence, second person accounts thus conceived do not directly address the questions that gave rise to the theory of mind debate. They invite us, however, to critically reflect upon the way the debate has been set up. (shrink)

Human–nonhuman chimeras have been the focus of ethical controversies for more than a decade, yet some related issues remain unaddressed. For example, little has been said about the relationship between the origin of transferred cells and the morally relevant capacities to which they may give rise. Consider, for example, a developing mouse fetus that receives a brain stem cell transplant from a human and another that receives a brain stem cell transplant from a dolphin. If both chimeras acquire morally relevant (...) capacities as a result of transplantation, and if those capacities are indistinguishable, should the difference in cell origin matter to how we classify these creatures? I argue that if morally relevant capacities are easy to detect, cell origin is irrelevant to how the chimera ought to be treated. However, if such capacities are hard to detect, cell origin should play a role in considerations about how to treat the chimera. (shrink)

Recenzja książki: R. Dunbar, Człowiek. Biografia, tłum. Łukasz Lamża, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2015, ss. 414.

The purpose of this article is to describe how expansive learning in organisations can become a resource for learning in a wider community of practice (CoP). The “developmental work research” approach (DWR) based on cultural historical activity theory (CHAT) is beneficial for analysing and interpreting the requirements in a field of action. Engeström’s specific form of “action research” focuses on expansive learning in activity systems. However, complex socio-technical change processes cannot be initiated and managed by the local community of practise (...) alone. In order to establish the use of new tools, new methodologies or organisational solutions in a field of work, a double path of expansive learning is needed: Findings from the participative analysis and interpretation of contradictions in the local activity system have to be transferred to wider communities of practice. This paper illustrates a double path of expansive learning by presenting the experiences of research and development in machine and plant engineering companies in Germany. In the AQUIMO project, a project team has developed an adaptable software tool for multidisciplinary mechatronical engineering and created a related qualification program. The support from external social researchers has helped to initiate, disseminate and establish new ways to organise the division of labour in teams of engineers. (shrink)

The year 2012 is forever associated with protest from Occupy Wall Street protesters in America to the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt, and popular unrest in the face of austerity measures in Greece and Spain. The evening news covers these events in one-and-a half minute segments, accompanied by a flood of images, making them difficult for viewers to assess.

La intención de este trabajo consiste en perfilar algunos de los fundamentos filosóficos que envuelven la agonía existencial que se percibe a lo largo de la obra La Tía Tula de Miguel de Unamuno. Para ello hemos comparado el pensamiento de este autor con el de Kierkegaard, siendo la idea de inmortalidad la que sirve de vínculo entre ambos. Desde esta perspectiva de análisis la lucha entre fe y razón, expuesta por Unamuno, deja claro que el anhelo de inmortalidad se (...) enfrenta a categorías universales, mientras que para Kierkegaard la fe está por encima de la razón ante toda decisión por absurda que parezca. (shrink)

Comparative genomicists seem to be convinced that the unit of measurement employed in their studies is a gene that drives the function of cells and ultimately organisms. As a result, they have come to some substantive conclusions about how similar humans are to other organisms based on the percentage of genetic makeup they share. I argue that the actual unit of measurement employed in the studies corresponds to a structural rather than a functional gene concept, thus rendering many of the (...) implications drawn from comparative genomic studies largely unwarranted, if not completely mistaken. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Utah, 215 South Central Campus Drive, Carolyn Tanner Irish Humanities Building, 4th Floor, Salt Lake City, UT 84112; e‐mail: monika[email protected]. (shrink)

Our daily lives unfold continuously, yet our memories are organised into distinct events, situated in a specific context of space and time, and chunked when this context changes (at event boundaries). Previous research showed that this process, termed event segmentation, enhances object-context binding but impairs temporal order memory. Physiologically, peaks in pupil dilation index event segmentation, similar to emotion-induced bursts of autonomic arousal. Emotional arousal also modulates object-context binding and temporal order memory. Yet, these two critical factors have not been (...) systematically studied together. To address this gap, we ran a behavioural experiment using a paradigm validated to study event segmentation and extended it with emotion manipulation. During encoding, we sequentially presented greyscale objects embedded in coloured frames (colour changes defining events), with a neutral or aversive sound. During retrieval, we tested participants’ memory of temporal order memory and object-colour binding. We found opposite effects of emotion and event segmentation on episodic memory. While event segmentation enhanced object-context binding, emotion impaired it. On the contrary, event segmentation impaired temporal order memory, but emotion enhanced it. These findings increase our understanding of episodic memory organisation in laboratory settings, and potentially in real life with perceptual changes and emotion fluctuations constantly interacting. (shrink)

Actions expressing emotions (such as caressing the clothes of one's dead friend in grief, or tearing apart a photograph out of jealousy) pose a notorious challenge to action theorists. They are thought to be intentional in that they are in some sense under the agent's control. They are not thought to be done for a reason, however, because they cannot be explained by considerations that favor them from the agent's point of view. This seems to be the case, at least, (...) if one subscribes to the Davidsonian standard model of action explanation. So far, philosophers have had three different reactions to this challenge. Rationalists insist that such actions can be rationalized by re-interpreting them. Arationalists insist that there simply is no reasoning process moving agents in emotional states to act. A third reaction questions the intentionality of such actions altogether. All three reactions, however, share the assumption underlying the standard account: if an agent is thought to act for a reason - and hence acts intentionally - he must entertain a desire and some means-end belief reflecting his reasoning process about how to attain what he desires by acting. In this paper, I try to show that this reflective reasoning mechanism is only one way to rationalize an action. Another way is by tracing an action to an unreflective valuing stance respresenting reasons the agent has from his point of view. Emotions are attitudes that help to grasp reasons the agent has. Since emotions come with a strong motivational potential they move the agent to act expressively. But the agent typically allows himself to do so, thereby monitoring the way in which he does it. To the extent that the agent unreflectively acts on a motive that is itself representative of his point of view, his expressive actions can be regarded as rationalizable. (shrink)

The relationship between teacher and student is an important element of school education and as such irreplaceable: If we want schools to be good places for those who teach and learn there, we must make sure that the educational relationships between teachers and students are good, too. In research about school education, surprisingly little attention is paid to the normative dimension of the relationship between teacher and student. This lacuna points to a desideratum in the philosophy of education: More should (...) be said about the normative structure of the teacher-student relationship, its role in teaching and learning, and its final value for teacher and student. Answering these fundamental philosophical questions is the core of this book. It offers a normatively rich concept of a good teacher-student relationship that is based on the analysis of two major relationship goods: trust and care. Moreover, the book explains the instrumental value of a good educational relationship for the student’s achievement of epistemic aims of school education as well as the final value of such a relationship for teacher and student. (shrink)

To showaffective empathyis to share in another person's experiences, including her emotions. Most philosophers who write about emotions accept the broadly cognitivist view that emotions are rationally connected with beliefs. We argue that affective empathy is also rationally connected with belief; you can only share in another's emotions insofar as you can share certain of her beliefs. In light of that claim, we argue that affective empathy brings both epistemic dangers and epistemic benefits, that the ideal of universal empathy cannot (...) be built upon affective empathy, and that affective empathy cannot be the basis of morality. (shrink)

Humans have a fundamental need to belong. This, need, as Kimberley Brownlee argues in her book Being Sure of Each Other grounds the human right against social deprivation. But in addition to having a human right against social deprivation, we also have a right to associational freedom, which is grounded in our right to autonomy. We cannot be forced into relationships; we are free to choose our friends and loved ones.? In this paper I discuss what our right to associational (...) freedom morally permits us to do when are already in an intimate relationship and, relatedly, what our relationship-dependent duties require of us in such cases. What exactly are the constraints on our right to associational freedom? And what is the content and scope of our relationship-dependent duties, given that our right to associational freedom conflicts with the fulfillment of these duties?? After providing some clarifications as to how we should understand intimate relationships that have ended, I will first highlight what relationship-dependent duties are and how they correlate with a right to associational control. I will then discuss several break-up scenarios, the aim of which is to determine the conditions that justify constraints being imposed on the right to associational freedom and to delineate the scope of relationship-dependent duties. (shrink)

Author: Korzeniowska Monika Title: “ANALYSIS OF HAPPINESS” AND JOY („O szczęściu” i radości) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.13/14, number: 2011/2-3, pages: 689-698 Keywords: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ’S PHILOSOPHY, JOY, HAPPINESS Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The main aim of this article is to present Władysław Tatarkiewicz’s concept of joy in the context of his research on the issue of happiness. The phenomenon of joy is shown as a very important but not (...) well known problem, playing a clue role in the philosophy of Plato, Plotinus, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Meister Eckhart, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Lévinas, not only in the ethical but also in the epistemological context. W. Tatarkiewicz’s Analysis of Happiness is one of a very few works in Polish humanities, which is possible to treat as the frame of reference for the philosophical euforiology. In Analysis of Happiness he compares the joy and the happiness, according to such a differences between them as intensity, permanence, transcendence or mentality. The phenomenon of joy is also interpreted as a base for the happiness in the psychological understanding. Tatarkiewicz formulates a hierarchy of good states of mind, placing the joy between the pleasure and the jollification. The work Analysis of Happiness contains also the typology of joy – from the joy of life, Elysian joy, mystical joy, the joy of love, to the joy understood as the happiness of the moment. (shrink)

Willing and Understanding elucidates a variety of issues in and approaches to debating the will-intellect interplay in the late Middle Ages. Authored by prominent scholars in the field, the contributions offer different perspectives on the development of late medieval theories of the will. Charting a dense map of voluntarist and epistemological ideas - entrenched leitmotifs of late medieval philosophy, seminal insights sparking original trends, and ephemeral novelties - the volume is a testimony to the conceptual multidimensionality and ethical complexity of (...) the past and present iterations of the debate on the will. Contributors are Pascale Bermon, Magdalena Bieniak, Michael W. Dunne, Riccardo Fedriga, Giacomo Fornasieri, Tobias Hoffmann, Severin V. Kitanov, Monika Michałowska, Riccardo Saccenti, Sonja Schierbaum, Michael Szlachta, Łukasz Tomanek, and Francesco Omar Zamboni. (shrink)