In connection with the traditional principles of Bioethics, we wonder if they are able to make us understand the terminal patient and those who look after him and his family, or if it will be necessary to “go backwards” (Schritt zurück) - to speak in Heidegger’s terms- up to reach that unavoidable principle that guides and inspires the application of the others. The thought of Emmanuel Levinas can place us near an answer. In fact, he insists that it is the (...) “other” in his face the one that it is imposed with its own strength, as a being essentially ethic and before its presence the only response is to recognize him/her as constitutively “indigent”. Precisely, before any other theory or any other argument, the “other” is presented to me face-to-face, his own presence is already existence of his acknowledgment, it is a call and a appeal to responsibility. Since Ethic demands primarily a complete dedication of all the person, that is to say a radical commitment of reason, will and feelings, we ask ourselves in front of these patients to get for them a new shelter. Serenity, availability, comforted mood among threats, patience, gratitude and hope may become founding virtues of interpersonal relationships (Bollnow). (shrink)

The individual, as an actor in the social world, relies on “a stock of knowledge at hand”. However, he also addresses the cultural and historic forms of validity based on the perspectives of his own interests, reasons and wishes, ambitions, religious and ideological commitments. In this sense, not only does the social world constitute the main scene of our actions but also the locus of resistance. These days of highly social complexity and growing cultural interaction mobilize different identification and differentiation (...) processes. In extraordinary situations of change, such as migration for reasons of work or study, or reasons of political or allegedly religious exile, a reformulation of socio-cultural spaces occurs, which is coupled with a rupture of social connections of support and belonging. This refers to a lifestyle under a “transience” status, which may last, in certain cases, all life long. The “place of roots” fails and the subject ends up feeling a stranger even in its own spaces. In this sense, the foreigner’s right to hospitality resides precisely in not being considered the absolute other, the barbarian, the savage who is absolutely excluded and heterogeneous, but in being someone whose identity should be guaranteed. Upon answering this requirement, the foreigner undertakes responsibility before the law and before its hosts: the foreigner becomes “a subject of rights”. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Der Islam Jahrgang: 94 Heft: 2 Seiten: 496-526.