Avrupa Hristiyan mı? Müslümanlar ve siyaset ilişkisi üzerinde tanınmış çalışmaları olan Olivier Roy’un son eseridir. Avrupa’da sekülerlik, Hristiyanlık ve popülizm denklemini analiz eden kitap, 1054 Doğu-Batı ayrımından günümüze kadar uzanan geniş bir tarih panoraması ve sosyal-siyasi spektrum sunmaya çalışmaktadır. Kitapta Müslüman göçmenler ve onların meseleleri direk bir tartışma konusu değildir; ancak, bir İslam araştırmacısı olan Roy’un ‘Avrupa Hristiyan mı?’ sorusu aslında ‘İslam Avrupa ile uyumlu mu?’ münakaşasına cevap bulmak için ortaya çıkmıştır. Zira, yazara göre, Müslüman göçmenlerin kamusal alanda yeni dini (...) haklar iddia etmeleri, 1990’larda Avrupa’da yeni bir kimlik krizi doğurmuştur. Bu yeni kimlik krizi, 1960’lardaki kültür savaşlarından sonra Hristiyanlıktan uzaklaşan Avrupa’yı Hristiyan dini miras ve aidiyet üzerine yeniden düşünmeye sevketmiş, yeni söylemlerin ortaya çıkmasına sebep olmuştur. Kitap, bu yeni bağlamda Avrupa değerleri ve Hristiyanlık ilişkisinin izlerini sürmeye çalışmaktadır. Avrupa Hristiyan mı?, Avrupa’da din-sekülerlik ilişkisini çalışanlar veya Hristiyanlığın günümüz Avrupa'sındaki yerini anlamak isteyenlerin faydalanabileceği bir kitaptır. (shrink)

In this book, Sorensen presents the first general theory of the thought experiment. He analyses a wide variety of thought experiments, ranging from aesthetics to zoology, and explores what thought experiments are, how they work, and what their positive and negative aspects are. Sorensen also sets his theory within an evolutionary framework and integrates recent advances in experimental psychology and the history of science.

Radikalizam državnog terorizma i terorizma samoubojica u odnosu su frustracijske telerancije. Postoje i mogućnosti međusobnih napada oružjem za masovno uništenje – nuklearnim, biološkim i kemijskim oružjem. Frustracijska tolerancija obaju terorizama – terorom protiv terora – radikalizira njihove međusobne odnose i ostvaruje osvetničke ciljeve, jednake ili veće smrti. Unatoč tome, postoji mogućnost za uljuđenu toleranciju i rješenje sukoba – stabilnu ravnotežu suradnje, mira, sigurnosti i zdravog rivalstva među sukobljenim stranama. Rješenje je u pronalaženju umijeća politike koja pravila ne samo provodi (...) nego ih i mijenja – pronalaženju politike koja nije samo politika političarâ i zadrtih ekstremista koji se orijentiraju na politku sile i dominacije, nego i politika društva koje osuđuje i potiče osudu ekstremističkih tumačenja religija i mitova, koje potiče recepciju svjetskog etosa – čovjeku zajedničkih načela samokontrole, normi i vrijednosti, bez obzira na rasnu, nacionalnu, religijsku i kulturnu pripadnost. Rješenje je i u uvažavanju mnogostrukih identiteta i poticanju mnogostrukog komuniciranja, uključujući i interkulturno komuniciranje među sukobljenim stranama – kao umijeća kretanja kroz kulturne prepreke, ne samo vlada nego i građana – pojedinaca, drušvenih grupa, različitih udruženja i institucija. Izvan svake sumnje, rješenje je i u prevladavanju siromaštva i bijede – najrazornijeg oružja masovnog uništenja. Gospodarstva državnih terorizama i terorizama samoubojica čvrsto su srasla s ‘normalnim gospodarstvima’, pa je nadzor nad njima i financijskim izvorima njihove moći jedna od značajnih pretpostavki prevladavanja terorizama. Na kraju, ali ne manje važno, rješenje je i u snažnoj i nepristrasnoj kritici terorističkih zbivanja mnogih autora i aktivista za ljudska prava. Podsjećamo samo na neka takva imena koja se navode i u ovom tekstu – Yeshayahu Leibowitz, John Rose, Marc Ellis, Jessica Stern, Israel Shahak, Irena Klepfisz, Edward Said, Noam Chomsky, Howard Zinn, Arundhati Roy, Amartya Sen, Amin Maalouf.Radicalism of state terrorism and of suicides terrorism have been keeping some relations of frustrated tolerance. There are and some possibilities of mutual attacks by mass destroing weapon – nuclear, biological and chemical weapon. Frustrated tolerance both of terrorisms – by terror against of terror – radicalizes their mutual relations and realizes of the revengeful purposes, of the equal or the greater death. In spite of, there is a possibility of courtly tolerance and the solution of that conflict – stable balance of cooperation, peace, security and of sound competition between facing sides. The solution is in finding of politics art which some rules not only realises, than of them and changes, too – finding of politics which doesn’t only the politics of politicians and of stubborn extremists that have been closed with politics of power and domination, than and politics of society that doesn’t accept extrem explanations of religions and myths, that keep stimmulatings of reception of world ethos – to man common principles of autocontrol, norms and values, without a consideration to racism, national, religious and cultural appurtenance. The solution is in an accepting of multilateral identities and a stimulating of multilateral communication, including and intercultural communication between conflict sides, too – as an art of movement trough cultural obstacles, not only of some governments, than and of citizens – of individuals, social groups, different civil organisations and institutions. No question of that, the solution is in overcome of a poverty and misery as the most destructive weapon of mass annihilation, too. Economies of state terrorisms and of suicides terrorisms have firm grown with ‘normal economies’. Therefore, a control over them and financial sources of their power is important supposition of overcome of terrorisms. Last but not least, the solution is in strong and impartial critique of terrorism of many authors and activists for human rights, too. We only remember on such names that are adduced in this text – Yeshayahu Leibowitz, John Rose, Marc Ellis, Jessica Stern, Israel Shahak, Irena Klepfisz, Edward Said, Noam Chomsky, Howard Zinn, Arundhati Roy, Amartya Sen, Amin Maalouf. (shrink)

The eclipse riddle -- Seeing surfaces -- The disappearing act -- Spinning shadows -- Berkeley's shadow -- Para-reflections -- Para-refractions : shadowgrams and the black drop -- Goethe's colored shadows -- Filtows -- Holes in the light -- Black and blue -- Seeing in black and white -- We see in the dark -- Hearing silence.

The aim of this paper is to show how thought experiments help us learn about laws. After providing examples of this kind of nomic illumination in the first section, I canvass explanations of our modal knowledge and opt for an evolutionary account. The basic application is that the laws of nature have led us to develop rough and ready intuitions of physical possibility which are then exploited by thought experimenters to reveal some of the very laws responsible for those intuitions. (...) The good news is that natural selection ensures a degree of reliability for the intuitions. The bad news is that the evolutionary account seems to limit the range of reliable thought experiment to highly practical and concrete contexts. In the fifth section, I provide reasons for thinking that we are not as slavishly limited as a pessimistic construal of natural selection suggests. Nevertheless, I promote the idea that biology is a promising source of predictions and diagnoses of thought experiment failures. (shrink)

We are republishing these classic works in affordable, high quality, modern editions, using the original text and artwork.

In “Properties and the Interpretation of Second-Order Logic” Bob Hale develops and defends a deflationary conception of properties where a property with particular satisfaction conditions actually exists if and only if it is possible that a predicate with those same satisfaction conditions exists. He argues further that, since our languages are finitary, there are at most countably infinitely many properties and, as a result, the account fails to underwrite the standard semantics for second-order logic. Here a more lenient version of (...) the view is explored, which allows for the possibility of countably infinite predicates understood as the product of linguistic supertasks. This enriched deflationist account of properties—the Infinitary Deflationary Conception of Existence—supports the standard semantics for models with countable first-order domains, and allows one to prove the categoricity of the second-order Peano axioms. (shrink)

'As an introduction to early modern thinking and the impact of past ideas on present lives, this book can find few equals and no superiors. Porter is a witty, humane writer with an extraordinary vocabulary and a sparkling sense of fun. Whether he is quoting from obscure medical texts or analysing scabrous diaries, dishing the dirt on long-dead bigwigs or evoking sympathy for human suffering, his grasp is masterly and his erudition appealing. I wish I could read it again for (...) the first time: you can.' Times Educational Supplement, Book of the Week In this startlingly brilliant sequel to the prize-winning ENLIGHTENMENT Roy Porter completes his lifetime's work, offering a magical, enthusiastic and charming account of the writings of some of the most attractive figures ever to write English. (shrink)

Prize: One hundred dollars to the first person who identifies a picture of a logical impossibility. I may be willing to pay more for the painting itself. This finder’s fee is simply for pointing out the picture. Let me explain more precisely what I seek.

My thesis is that you can lie with ‘ P therefore Q ’ without P or Q being lies. For you can lie by virtue of not believing that P supports Q. My thesis is reconciled with the principle that all lies are assertions through H. P. Grice’s account of conventional implicatures. These semantic cousins of conversational implicatures are secondary assertions that clarify the speaker’s attitude toward his primary assertions. The meaning of ‘therefore’ commits the speaker to an entailment thesis (...) even though the speaker does not enter that commitment into the text. Insincere conventional implicatures are akin to insincerely asserted footnotes. An absence of lies in the text is compatible with the presence of lies in the meta-text. (shrink)

At the center of the following essay is an analysis of At the Mind's Limits by Jean Améry––philosopher and survivor of Auschwitz. The essay tries to define and refine, via comparison and contrast with works by Hannah Arendt and René Descartes, the unique conception of morality that arises from Améry's text. “Victim morality,” as it will be called here, is a non-normative morality which is patient and victim-based rather than agent or actor-based. It is grounded in a heightened exposure and (...) sensitivity to reality and suffering, which results from a reduction of a human being to “a bundle of reactions.” This process cannot be voluntarily undertaken but is violently undergone. The claim is that morality not only survives the loss of humanity but is only fully exposed where humanity falters. My torturers were not interested in degrees of pain. They were interested only in demonstrating to me what it meant to live in a body, as a body, a body that can entertain notions of justice only as long as it is whole and well …. They did not come to force the story out of me of what I had said to the barbarians and what the barbarians had said to me …. They came to my cell to show me the meaning of humanity, and in the space of an hour they showed me a great deal. –J. M. Coetzee, Waiting for the Barbarians. (shrink)

The paper comments on David Rosenthal’s claim that saying “p” is performance-conditionally equivalent to saying “I believe that p”. It is argued, by way of counterexamples, that the proposed performance-conditional equivalence does not hold in this generality. The paper further proposes that avowal expressivism gives necessary conditions for the performance-conditional equivalence: it holds only if the speaker’s utterance of “p” is a non-explicit expressive act expressive of the belief that p and the utterance of “I believe that p” is an (...) explicit expressive act expressive of the very same belief. If that is correct, the performance-conditional equivalence thesis provides an argument against Rosenthal’s preferred avowal descriptivism and in favor of avowal expressivism. (shrink)

In ‘Epistemic Modals’ (2007), Seth Yalcin proposes Stalnaker-style semantics for epistemic possibility. He is inspired by John MacFarlane’s ingenious defence of relativism, in which claims of epistemic possibility are made rigidly from the perspective of the assessor’s actual stock of information (rather than from the speaker’s knowledge base or that of his audience or community). The innovations of MacFarlane and Yalcin independently reinforce the modal collapse espoused by Jaakko Hintikka in his 1962 epistemic logic (which relied on the implausible KK (...) principle and heavy idealizations). I respond to this new challenge with fresh objections to the underlying S4 equivalence: p p . I also propose counter-analyses of the intriguing data which Yalcin cites in support of his new semantics. A key collateral motivation for this defence of irredundant iterations is to ward off a threat to higher order vagueness. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson’s Modal Logic as Metaphysics is a book-length defense of necessitism about objects—roughly put, the view that, necessarily, any object that exists, exists necessarily. In more formal terms, Williamson argues for the validity of necessitism for objects (NO: ◻︎∀x◻︎∃y(x=y)). NO entails both the (first-order) Barcan formula (BF: ◇∃xΦ → ∃x◇Φ, for any formula Φ) and the (first-order) converse Barcan formula (CBF: ∃x◇Φ → ◇∃xΦ, for any formula Φ). The purpose of this essay is not to assess Williamson’s arguments either (...) for necessitism (although discussion of these arguments will play a central role in the dialectic) or for necessitism’s two famous corollaries. Instead, the focus shall be a general principle governing abstract objects—the abstract of principle (or AOP) —instances of which seems to be at work in some of Williamson’s central arguments for necessitism. The AOP can be straightforwardly formulated and applied within the neo-logicist framework—in fact, arguably the principle is most naturally formulated in neo-logicist terms. -/- After closely examining, and carefully formalizing, the AOP, the remainder of the paper focuses on arguments for necessitism-like claims (the exact meaning of “necessitism-like” will become clearer as the essay progresses) based on the AOP. In particular, we shall focus on the instance of the AOP that applies to the abstract objects governed by the most well-known and most fully studied abstraction principle: Hume’s Principle (HP). It turns out that, although we cannot reconstruct a valid argument for necessitism based on this numerical instance of the AOP, we can obtain valid arguments for weaker, but equally interesting conclusions. In particular, we shall show that, although HP combined with the AOP (and some additional, related assumptions) allows the contents of the domains of possible worlds to vary, the size of those domains must remain constant. The paper concludes by developing and critiquing some related arguments for necessitism based on applying relevant instances of the AOP to abstraction principles governing sets (or extensions), and to a simple objectual abstraction principle. (shrink)

Do we need light to see? I argue that the black experience of a man in a perfectly dark cave is a representation of an absence of light, not an absence of representation. There is certainly a difference between his perceptual knowledge and that of his blind companion. Only the sighted man can tell whether the cave is dark just by looking. But perhaps he is merely inferring darkness from his failure to see. To get an unambiguous answer, I switch (...) the focus from perceptual knowledge to non-epistemic seeing. My conclusion is that we see even in the limiting case of absolute darkness - regardless of whether we believe we are seeing. We see little of pratical interest. But in terms of basic information, we see about as much as we do when the lights are on. Depending on what has gone before and after, we may even see ordinary objects. (shrink)

But a winner must supply a nonevasive picture with no limit on potential detail--a purely imagistic depiction that does not rely on a mere description of an impossibility. There are logical minded philosophers from David Hume to Saul Kripke who think the prize cannot be won: What is conceivable is possible and whatever is depicted is thereby conceived, therefore, impossibilities cannot be depicted. Yet there is a rich aesthetics of inconsistency, best known through M. C. Escher. So I proceed with (...) the fine print for the competition. (shrink)

We consider domains with a natural property called top-circularity. We show that if such a domain satisfies either the maximal conflict property or the weak conflict property, then it is dictatorial. We obtain the result in Sato :331–342, 2010) as a corollary. Furthermore, it follows from our results that the union of a single-peaked domain and a single-dipped domain is dictatorial.

Positive thinkers love Watty Piper's The little engine that could. The story features a train laden with toys for deserving children on the other side of the mountain. After the locomotive breaks down, a sequence of snooty locomotives come up the track. Each engine refuses to pull the train up the mountain. They are followed by a weary old locomotive that declines, saying "I cannot. I cannot. I cannot." But then a bright blue engine comes up the track. He manages (...) to chug over the mountain by averring "I think I can. I think I can. I think can.". (shrink)

Kripshe treats ‘god’ as an empty natural kind term such as ‘unicorn’. She applies Saul Kripke's fresh views about empty natural kinds to ‘god’. Metaphysically, says Kripshe, there are no possible worlds in which there are gods. Gods could not have existed, given that they do not actually exist and never did. Epistemologically, godlessness is an a posteriori discovery. Kripshe dismisses the gods in the same breath that she dismisses mermaids. Semantically, the perspective Kripshe finds most perspicacious, no counterfactual situation (...) is properly describable as one in which there are gods. Perhaps it is not quite a necessary truth that there are no gods. According to Saul Kripke, failed natural kind terms are ill-defined. Incorporating ill-defined terms into declarative sentences yields only mock propositions. Just as the meteorologist has no professional interest in mock thunder, the logician has no professional interest in mock propositions. Kripshe disagrees with agnostics who assign a low probability to ‘There is at least one god’. The bearers of probabilities must be propositions. Despite this deference to science, Kripshe agrees with the a priori atheist that, necessarily, no future experience could constitute an encounter with a god. Divine revelation is impossible. Kripshe's a posteriori necessary atheism compares favorably to familiar forms of atheism and to non-cognitivists. It reveals interesting challenges to a coherent formulation of atheism. (shrink)

En el artículo realizaré un estudio de algunos pasajes de Troyanas de Eurípides, en busca de posibles sentidos de justicia en el texto. En primer lugar, analizaré el pacto realizado entre Poseidón y Atenea en la primera parte del prólogo ; a continuación, me concentraré en la paradójica intervención de Casandra, antes de ser embarcada como esclava de Agamenón ; para terminar, resaltaré algunos puntos del agón entre Hécuba y Helena, que tiene como juez a Menelao. Considero que en estos (...) pasajes hay alguna alusión a débiles concepciones de justicia, aunque llegaré a conclusiones pesimistas al respecto. (shrink)

Unique in presenting a thoroughgoing examination of the mathematical aspects of the neo-logicist project (and the particular philosophical issues arising from these technical concerns).

The poster boy for my paper is the King's Messenger in Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking Glass. Recall that since the White Queen lives backwards, her memory works forwards. She pities Alice who can only remember things after they happen. Alice asks which things the Queen remembers best: `Oh, things that happened the week after next,' the Queen replied in a careless tone. `For instance, . . . there's the King's Messenger. He's in prison now, being punished: and the trial (...) doesn't even begin till next Wednesday: and of course the crime comes last of all.' (Chapter V) Is the King's Messenger being treated unjustly? Why not prepunish people for their future crimes? True, it is generally easier to have knowledge about past crimes than future crimes. But is unpredictability the only problem with prepunishment? (shrink)

in Sounds and Perception: New Philosophical Essays, ed. by Matthew Nudds and Casey O’Callaghan (Oxford University Press, forthcoming in 2008).

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps, and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely (...) copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)