This experimental writing piece by the Earth Unbound Collective explores the ethical, political and pedagogical challenges in addressing climate change, activism and justice. The provocation Earth Unbound: the struggle to breathe and the creative thoughts that follow are inspired by the contagious energy of what Donna Haraway calls response-ability or the ability to respond. This energy ripples through monthly reading groups and workshops organised by this interdisciplinary collective that emerged organically in January 2020.

The aim of this paper is focused on presenting the method of historical analysis built by Michel Foucault in his book Histoire de la Folie à l’Âge Classique as a “History of the Other”. Such term appears for the first time at Les Mots et les Choses’s Preface, in which Foucault analyses his method in the quoted book on madness (but also in La Naissance de la Clinique). In this sense, firstly we have to verify the hypothesis of this relation (...) between Foucault’s archeological method as a Thought of the Otherness, precisely concerning to that “Other History” proposed by the philosopher. Secondly, we need to analyse specifically Histoire de la Folie as a privileged work, as far as the approach on the relation with the other is concerned. KEY WORDS – Archeology of knowledge. History. Alterity. Madness. (shrink)

To summarise, the phenomenon of temporal displacement came to light through astronomy and it formed one of the first problematic issues of experimental psychology. It represented, in fact, a typical case of dissimilarity between the characteristics of physical reality and those of erceptive reality.Nearly a century ago Benussi had, with deep philosophical awareness, grasped the complexity of the phenomenon. Such awareness was derived from his understanding of the sophisticatedGegenstandstheorie that evolved from the Graz theory. Moreover, with great experimental skill, he (...) succeded in formulating and describing the controlled situations in which such a discrepancy manifested itself.Thereore, current research, which is carried out within the difficult discipline of the ‘psychology of time,’ cannot ignore his pioneering contribution. (shrink)

Summary This paper examines the experimentum crucis under the light of the Duhem’s holistic thesis. This methodological instrument is not usable in physics, because physical theories are always logically connected to many assumptions. On the contrary, it is usable in psychological research oriented to perceptual laws, when these laws are, without any hypothetical term, isolated systems. An application of experimentum crucis in Experimental Phenomenology of perception is presented. In conclusion, the role of perceptual knowledge as an essential assumption in other (...) scientific disciplines that have a high degree of theoricity is also underlined. (shrink)

At the heart of Youth Justice Conferencing, a form of restorative justice aimed at addressing youth crime, is the notion that young persons who have committed an offence should be ‘reintegrated’ into their communities (Braithwaite in Crime, shame and reintegration. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989). This paper focuses on the role of parents as support persons, in particular the ‘crying mum’, an identity often leveraged by the Convenor when prompting the young person to express remorse to the circle. We explore (...) an Avouchment genre that we have observed whereby support persons vouch for the character of the young person. Our analysis considers the ways in which values are composed (as ideational categories are coupled with evaluative interpersonal ones) and unfold in discourse as invitations for participants to align. In Knight’s (2010) terms, when shared, couplings of ideation and evaluation engender bonds through which participants may commune. (shrink)

BackgroundCommentators believe that the ethical decision-making climate is instrumental in enhancing interprofessional collaboration in intensive care units. Our aim was twofold: to determine the perception of the ethical climate, levels of moral distress, and intention to leave one's job among nurses and physicians, and between the different ICU types and determine the association between the ethical climate, moral distress, and intention to leave.MethodsWe performed a cross-sectional questionnaire study between May 2021 and August 2021 involving 206 nurses and physicians in a (...) large urban academic hospital. We used the validated Ethical Decision-Making Climate Questionnaire and the Measure of Moral Distress for Healthcare Professionals tools and asked respondents their intention to leave their jobs. We also made comparisons between the different ICU types. We used Pearson's correlation coefficient to identify statistically significant associations between the Ethical Climate, Moral Distress, and Intention to Leave.ResultsNurses perceived the ethical climate for decision-making as less favorable than physicians. They also had significantly greater levels of moral distress and higher intention to leave their job rates than physicians. Regarding the ICU types, the Neonatal/pediatric unit had a significantly higher overall ethical climate score than the Medical and Surgical units and also demonstrated lower moral distress scores and lower “intention to leave” scores compared with both the Medical and Surgical units. The ethical climate and moral distress scores were negatively correlated ; moral distress and "intention to leave" was positively correlated ; and ethical climate and “intention to leave” were negatively correlated.ConclusionsSignificant differences exist in the perception of the ethical climate, levels of moral distress, and intention to leave between nurses and physicians and between the different ICU types. Inspecting the individual factors of the ethical climate and moral distress tools can help hospital leadership target organizational factors that improve interprofessional collaboration, lessening moral distress, decreasing turnover, and improved patient care. (shrink)

In this paper I take up the question of the nature of the doxastic attitudes we entertain while inquiring into some matter. Relying on a distinction between two stages of open inquiry, I urge to acknowledge the existence of a distinctive attitude of cognitive inclination towards a proposition qua answer to the question one is inquiring into. I call this attitude “hypothesis”. Hypothesis, I argue, is a sui generis doxastic attitude which differs, both functionally and normatively, from suspended judgement, full (...) belief, credences, and acceptance. In closing, I point to the epistemological significance of hypothesis. More specifically, I contend that holding an attitude of hypothesis enables us to respond rationally to peer disagreement, and I suggest that such an attitude offers a suitable articulation of the view, originally put forward by Philip Kitcher, that cognitive diversity in inquiry has epistemic benefits. (shrink)

Abstract:Considering diverse approaches made to investigate modalities of spatial thinking through the discipline of a Fine Art drawing practice, this paper aims to prospect for embodied strategies so as to address spatial drawing concerns, responding to a conversation between the body present and a set of waypoints used to explore developments of spatial thinking and its relational turn within arts practice. Methodologies of walking and drawing are employed to encounter the land, mindful of Frédérique Gros' observation that the landscape is (...) a set of tastes, colours and scents which are absorbable by the body, in this instance, absorbed through my walking gendered body. (shrink)

The concept of cultural capital has been increasingly used in American sociology to study the impact of cultural reproduction on social reproduction. However, much confusion surrounds this concept. In this essay, we disentangle Bourdieu and Passeron's original work on cultural capital, specifying the theoretical roles cultural capital plays in their model, and the various types of high status signals they are concerned with. We expand on their work by proposing a new definition of cultural capital which focuses on cultural and (...) social exclusion. We note a number of theoretical ambiguities and gaps in the original model, as well as specific methodological problems. In the second section, we shift our attention to the American literature on cultural capital. We discuss its assumptions and compare it with the original work. We also propose a research agenda which focuses on social and cultural selection and decouples cultural capital from the French context in which it was originally conceived to take into consideration the distinctive features of American culture. This agenda consists in 1) assessing the relevance of the concept of legitimate culture in the U.S.; 2) documenting the distinctive American repertoire of high status cultural signals; and 3) analyzing how cultural capital is turned into profits in America. (shrink)

This article presents a fairness principle for evaluating decision-making based on predictions: a decision rule is unfair when the individuals directly impacted by the decisions who are equal with respect to the features that justify inequalities in outcomes do not have the same statistical prospects of being benefited or harmed by them, irrespective of their socially salient morally arbitrary traits. The principle can be used to evaluate prediction-based decision-making from the point of view of a wide range of antecedently specified (...) substantive views about justice in outcome distributions. (shrink)

This issue of the American Journal of Bioethics shines a light on abortion, recognizing that reproductive freedom as understood for the past fifty years no longer exists in the United States. Some...

The study of legal transplants provides a vital critical supplement to mainstream theories about legal change. Legal transplants are not exceptional or isolated occurrences, despite the economic, social, political and cultural barriers that separate the world’s legal systems. This Article goes beyond traditional approaches to the study of transplants by substituting the figurative language of transplants with explicit theory about how legal change is produced. It first provides a brief account of what the literature on legal transplants has achieved so (...) far in terms of "macro" explanations of legal change currently available. It then argues that legal transplants as social acts performed by individuals call for a study of the "micro" level of engagement with legal change by individuals. The key notion that is advanced to explore this dimension is the notion of mediated action, which denotes action that is performed by individuals making use of features of the environment as tools to interact in a specific setting. The notion of mediated action was first introduced in cultural-historical psychological investigations of the social formation of the mind. As social acts, legal transplants represent instances of mediated action. The last part of this Article highlights how legal transplants raise questions of justice and discusses briefly how the new approach to the study of transplants advocated here relates to them. (shrink)

The paper proposes an account of the rational response to higher‐order evidence whose key claim is that whenever we acquire such evidence we ought to engage in the inquiring activity of double‐checking. Combined with a principle that establishes a connection between rational inquiry and rational belief retention, the account offers a novel explanation of the alleged impermissibility of retaining one's belief in the face of higher‐order evidence. It is argued that this explanation is superior to the main competitor view which (...) appeals to the notion of defeat. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce que la foi? Sous ce nom on met un peu tout et n'importe quoi. Et comme le fait remarquer Claude Tresmontant, il règne de nos jours un malentendu sur le sens de ce mot. Cet auteur a le mérite de rétablir ce que l'orthodoxie, depuis les débuts de l'Église, entend par la 'foi'. En traduisant l'Évangile il lui préfère le terme de 'certitude de la vérité'. Car le terme apparaît de nombreuses fois dans le Nouveau Testament. Il a paru (...) approprié à Michèle Juin de répertorier toutes ces occurrences, qui sont riches de compréhension, pour cerner tout ce qui concerne la foi, ainsi que ce que cela implique, et d'en faire un livre. (shrink)

Permissivism is the view that, sometimes, there is more than one doxastic attitude that is perfectly rationalised by the evidence. Impermissivism is the denial of Permissivism. Several philosophers, with the aim to defend either Impermissivism or Permissivism, have recently discussed the value of (im)permissive rationality. This paper focuses on one kind of value-conferring considerations, stemming from the so-called “truth-connection” enjoyed by rational doxastic attitudes. The paper vindicates the truth-connected value of permissive rationality by pursuing a novel strategy which rests on (...) two main planks: first, there is a distinction between a fine-grained and a coarse-grained type-individuation of belief-forming methods. Secondly, different kinds of decision-theoretic reasoning, i.e. expected-accuracy reasoning and accuracy-domination reasoning, must be paired with a fine-grained and a coarse-grained type-individuation of methods, respectively. I argue that while the first pair is wholly irrelevant to the question of the truth-connection, the second affords the means to a permissivist explanation of the truth-connected value of rationality. (shrink)

Sometimes, a metaphysical theory has revisionary ethical consequences: for example, some have thought that modal realism entails that there are no moral obligations. In these cases, one may be tempted to reject the metaphysical theory on the grounds that it conflicts with commonsensical ethics. This is an ethics-to-metaphysics inference. My claim is that this inference is in general irrational, and that the fact that a metaphysical theory has highly revisionary ethical consequences is no reason at all to reject the theory. (...) I argue for this claim on the basis of general epistemic principles about the transmission of justification, and what makes for a good argument. Furthermore, I argue that my account can explain why a certain narrow class of ethics-to-metaphysics inferences are rational. (shrink)

Tradition has it that first-person thought is somehow special. It is also commonplace to maintain that the first-person concept obeys a rule of reference to the effect that any token first-person thought is about the thinker of that thought. Following Annalisa Coliva and, more recently, Santiago Echeverri, I take the specialness claim to be the claim that thinking a first-person thought comes with a certain guarantee of its pattern of reference. Echeverri maintains that such a guarantee is explained by a (...) fairly flatfooted interpretation of the thinker-reflexive rule. I argue, however, that the explanatory aspirations of the thinker-reflexive rule are fulfilled only if we accept an epistemically loaded gloss on the notion of a thinker of a thought featuring the rule. That gloss is unpacked in terms of the subject’s ability to be acquainted with the phenomenal character of their thoughts. (shrink)

Le sujet de cette étude est la manière dont Plotin, dans une perspective qui reste essentiellement platonicienne, interprète la notion de noeîn dans Parménide, surtout à la lumière du bien connu Fr. 3 DK, sur l’identité de l’être et de la pensée, dont Plotin, avec Clément d'Alexandrie, est notre source. Cette interprétation est essentielle pour comprendre la nature et la fonction ontologique-métaphysique de l’hypostase plotinienne du Noûs. La conception parménidienne de noeîn est profondément remaniée par Plotin et intégrée dans une (...) perspective compatible avec l’ontologie platonicienne et la métaphysique néoplatonicienne. (shrink)

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the debate on expert evidence has constantly been growing. This article tries to give two separate contributions to a subsection of this debate, the one related to the alternative between deference and education. First, it contains an attack to the arguments that Ronald Allen and others have given in favor of the thesis according to which experts should perform a merely educational role at trial. Second, it maintains that the question of whether fact finders (...) should ever “defer” to experts or should be allowed to draw on their opinions only if they “understand” them should be clarified by introducing a distinction between two different senses “deference”, which is paralleled by a similar distinction between two senses of “understanding”. (shrink)

While it seems hard to deny the epistemic significance of a disagreement with our acknowledged epistemic peers, there are certain disagreements, such as philosophical disagreements, which appear to be permissibly sustainable. These two claims, each independently plausible, are jointly puzzling. This paper argues for a solution to this puzzle. The main tenets of the solution are two. First, the peers ought to engage in a deliberative activity of discovering more about their epistemic position vis-à-vis the issue at stake. Secondly, the (...) peers are permitted to do so while entertaining a sui generis doxastic attitude of hypothesis. (shrink)

In this paper I aim to illuminate the significance of thought insertion for debates about the first-person concept. My starting point is the often-voiced contention that thought insertion might challenge the thesis that introspection-based self-ascriptions of psychological properties are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person concept. In the first part of the paper I explain what a thought insertion-based counterexample to this immunity thesis should be like. I then argue that various thought insertion-involving scenarios do not give (...) rise to successful counterexamples to the immunity of the target class of self-ascriptions. In the second part of the paper I turn to defend a Metasemantic Explanation of why the immunity thesis holds. The Metasemantic Explanation rests on a reference-fixing story about the mental ‘I’ whose key contention is that introspective impressions play an essential role in fixing its reference. It is part of my argument in favour of the proposed reference-fixing story, as well as of the Metasemantic Explanation, that they respect the paradigmatic features of self-ascriptions of inserted thoughts. (shrink)

In his refutation of skepticism in book IV of De rerum natura, Lucretius uses argumentative methods typical of Epicurus: the περιτροπή is in many ways similar to that used by the philosopher in book XXV of Περὶ φύσεως, the same book where, in a passage dedicated to the criticism against determinists, can be found a reference to the criterion of the πρόληψις, that Lucretius exploits in his refutation. Moreover, Lucretius develops a strong demonstration concerning the irrefutability of αἴσθησις as a (...) criterion of truth, which finds significant points of contact with a large fragment, transmitted by Diogenes Laertius and generally traced back to the Canon of Epicurus. The last argument used by the poet is a pragmatic one: for the skeptic it would be impossible to live. The argument is similar to the praxis-based argument used by Epicurus in the Περὶ φύσεως against the partisans of determinism. But the pragmatic argument goes back to a very ancient layer of anti-skeptical polemics, even prior to Epicurus and already present in book Γ of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Although later influences cannot be excluded, Lucretius appears to be a faithful witness of Epicurus. Probably in a lost section of the Περὶ φύσεως, the philosopher of Samos showed positions going against skeptical or proto-skeptical attitude, contemporary or earlier to the time of the philosopher, probably developed in a Democritean or a Socratic context. Epicurus’ ad hominem strategy is very close to that of the philosopher in the Principal Doctrines XXIII–XXV, and certainly follows Aristotle’ strategy in book Γ of Metaphysics against those who deny the principle of non-contradiction. In a similar way, Epicurus does not have one figure as the objective of his refutation but constructs a hypothetical dialectical opponent capable of embodying a series of philosophical tendencies judged by the founder of Kepos to be extremely dangerous not only for the correct exercise of thought but for the human being’s life itself. (shrink)

The great speech of the Protagoras still leaves many questions open. Particularly striking is the presence of doctrines that later on will be taken up and further developed by Plato in such dialogues as the Politicus, the Timaeus and the Laws. For this reason, many scholars tend to think that the words of Protagoras are just a product of Plato’s invention that bear no relation to Protagoras’ actual doctrines. Nevertheless, it is possible to propose a different interpretation. At the beginning (...) of the Protagoras, Socrates develops the image of the sophist as the merchant of various μαθήματα: to sell his products, the sophist praises them all indiscriminately without knowing which of them are useful and which are harmful. But he who has the ability to make this distinction can still purchase the μαθήματα from Protagoras or anyone else. Through the dialectic, Plato is able to examine them without any danger in the Protagoras and then take them up and further develop in new ways in his later dialogues. (shrink)

As scholars have rushed to either prove or refute cultural group selection, the debate lacks sufficient consideration of CGS's potential moderators. We argue that pressures for CGS are particularly strong when groups face ecological and human-made threat. Field, experimental, computational, and genetic evidence are presented to substantiate this claim.

The domains of religious doctrine and practice provide ground for double bind analysis, particularly as applied to race, religion, and bioethics. In these spheres, reconciling church doctrine with social or medical practice is often challenging; the demands from each sphere are unique and sometimes irreconcilable. This chapter uses double bind theory as a framework to engage in a dialogue concerning race, religion, and bioethics. It offers a dialogue that scrutinizes conservative religious thought in what is colloquially known as the “black (...) church” regarding the challenges of medical ethics and race. (shrink)

We characterize the positional social preference correspondences (spc) satisfying the qualified majority property for any given majority threshold. We also characterize the positional spcs satisfying the minimal majority property. We next evaluate the probability that the Borda, the plurality and the antiplurality spcs fulfil the two aforementioned properties under the Impartial and Anonymous Culture assumption in the presence of three and four alternatives for various sizes of the society. Our results show that the Borda spc is the positional spc which (...) better behaves in relation with the qualified majority principle and the minimal majority principle. (shrink)

Las relaciones entre jueces y política pueden analizarse desde numerosos puntos de vista. Dado que no es posible agotar en este texto un campo de argumentos tan complejo, desarrollaré algunas consideraciones teniendo como punto de partida definiciones específicas de los dos términos, “jueces” y “política” que están relacionados con el tema del seminario.

In this paper we argue that transparency of machine learning algorithms, just as explanation, can be defined at different levels of abstraction. We criticize recent attempts to identify the explanation of black box algorithms with making their decisions (post-hoc) interpretable, focusing our discussion on counterfactual explanations. These approaches to explanation simplify the real nature of the black boxes and risk misleading the public about the normative features of a model. We propose a new form of algorithmic transparency, that consists in (...) explaining algorithms as an intentional product, that serves a particular goal, or multiple goals (Daniel Dennet’s design stance) in a given domain of applicability, and that provides a measure of the extent to which such a goal is achieved, and evidence about the way that measure has been reached. We call such idea of algorithmic transparency “design publicity.” We argue that design publicity can be more easily linked with the justification of the use and of the design of the algorithm, and of each individual decision following from it. In comparison to post-hoc explanations of individual algorithmic decisions, design publicity meets a different demand (the demand for impersonal justification) of the explainee. Finally, we argue that when models that pursue justifiable goals (which may include fairness as avoidance of bias towards specific groups) to a justifiable degree are used consistently, the resulting decisions are all justified even if some of them are (unavoidably) based on incorrect predictions. For this argument, we rely on John Rawls’s idea of procedural justice applied to algorithms conceived as institutions. (shrink)