Replicability is widely regarded as one of the defining features of science and its pursuit is one of the main postulates of meta-research, a discipline emerging in response to the replicability crisis. At the same time, replicability is typically treated with caution by philosophers of science. In this paper, we reassess the value of replicability from an epistemic perspective. We defend the orthodox view, according to which replications are always epistemically useful, against the more prudent view that claims that it (...) is useful in very limited circumstances. Additionally, we argue that we can learn more about the original experiment and the limits of the discovered effect from replications at different levels. We hold that replicability is a crucial feature of experimental results and scientists should continue to strive to secure it. (shrink)

Philosophers and scientists refer to the special character of phenomenal consciousness, something supposedly obvious to all conscious persons. However, we had no empirical evidence about the folk view of consciousness until the first studies were carried out in the experimental philosophy of consciousness. According to the leading interpretation of these results, laypersons—people without academic knowledge about consciousness—do not notice the phenomenal aspect of consciousness. The aim of the article is to answer the question of whether we can trust these results. (...) I show that there are serious doubts about the validity of the experimental philosophy of consciousness research. As a result, the leading interpretation should be rejected, and the question about the folk nature of the concept of consciousness must be regarded as open. (shrink)

The article presents a phenomenological investigation of body and music, with particular emphasis on electronic music. The investigation builds on theoretical framework developed in phenomenological investigations in art by Edmund Husserl, Mikel Dufrenne and Roman Ingarden. It is guided beyond these analyses by investigations of particular musical examples in avant-garde acoustic and electronic music. In the former case it tackles music from which body is being consciously erased. In the latter case, the erasure occurs instantly. This negative approach elucidates the (...) function of body in music. In case of electronic music, the article focuses on writings and music of pioneer of musique concrète, Pierre Schaeffer. Central argument is that electronic music always has been and still is defined by absence of body, here phenomenologically considered as Leib. As a consequence of the phenomenological elucidation, it is ultimately shown that erasure of body has been one of the avant-garde music’s crucial techniques, and that this avant-garde residue remains in electronic music as such, both experimental and mainstream. (shrink)

This article discusses the relation between the institutions and the production of entropy as read by Bernard Stiegler and locates this discussion within a more specific debate on institutions in advanced capitalism. Commenting on Stiegler’s approach to the concept of entropy, the article brings into focus the institutional strand of Stiegler’s increasingly hurried writings where this concept is discussed and reframes his critique of political economy as ‘neganthropology’ in relation to what I describe as neganthropic institutions. A full explanation of (...) Stiegler’s positive project of neganthroplogy is offered through an inherent critique of Friedrich Hayek’s economic theory and of his view on institutions. I show that Hayek’s approach to institutions largely stems from his understanding of the theory of biological evolution, which is fundamentally flawed because it neglects the question of entropy with regard to the organisation of the living in general and of the human species in particular. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the formation of habits with the help of self-tracking technologies. Although devices like Fitbit smart bands come with promises of empowerment through the means of increased control over users’ habits, existing literature does not provide conclusive findings about the validity of such claims. I contribute to the ongoing debate by relying on John Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy and its notion of intelligent habit. I demonstrate that from a pragmatist standpoint, habits that are the most likely to (...) accomplish users’ goals contribute to their flourishing need to be reflective (accompanied by adequate deliberation) and flexible (adaptable to the changing circumstances). On this basis I highlight some ethical-epistemic issues surrounding self-tracking technologies that inhibit the formation of habits desirable from a Deweyan standpoint. These include a lack of reflection on the part of the developers, difficulties for users to deliberate and consciously shape the habits developed by their devices, and dependence upon self-tracking tools that makes it difficult to adapt habits to individual needs and circumstances. I conclude the paper by discussing self-tracking’s general impact on flourishing, as well as placing my arguments in the context of the diversity of self-tracking practices and identifying how users attempt to alleviate the shortcomings of the technology and make it more suitable to their goals and needs. (shrink)

The article is an attempt at explaining the category of logical form used by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Tractatus logico-philosophicus by using concepts from Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s The Monadology. There are many similarities and analogies between those works, and the key concept for them is the category of the inner and acknowledged importance of consideration based on basic categories of thinking about the world. The Leibnizian prospect allows for a broader look at Wittgenstein’s analysis of the relation between propositions and (...) facts, between language and the world. Using the Hanoverian philosopher’s terminology allows for the demonstration of the ambivalence of the concept of logical form in the philosophy of Wittgenstein and also the metaphysical nature of his first book. (shrink)

Indicative conditionals and tendency causal claims are closely related (e.g., Frosch and Byrne, 2012), but despite these connections, they are usually studied separately. A unifying framework could consist in their dependence on probabilistic factors such as high conditional probability and statistical relevance (e.g., Adams, 1975; Eells, 1991; Douven, 2008, 2015). This paper presents a comparative empirical study on differences between judgments on tendency causal claims and indicative conditionals, how these judgments are driven by probabilistic factors, and how these factors differ (...) in their predictive power for both causal and conditional claims. (shrink)

My preoccupation with witnessing mutated through several phases before it turned into the book you are holding. It germinated while I was writing my PhD dissertation at the Cohn Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Ideas at Tel Aviv University, when the gulf between the theory of testimony that so enchanted contemporary thinking around the ethics of memory on the one hand, and the humanitarian practice of witnessing I was studying on the other, first struck me as (...) philosophically awkward and politically suspect. (shrink)

Serious games are an effective method of reproducing aspects of the complex interplay between environments and stakeholders in business situations. In the game we describe here, The Sustainable Port, players experience what it is like to make decisions in such a complex environment. Their aim in the game is to grow the Port of Rotterdam while keeping economic growth in balance with sustainability goals. In this study, we assessed whether experienced Port of Rotterdam employees (PoR employees) show different psychophysiological patterns, (...) and more specifically EAR-derived features, compared to students. We did this on the assumption that physiological patterns will tell us something about how people who are familiar with the environment of the Port of Rotterdam, more specifically Port of Rotterdam employees, make decisions compared to those lacking such familiarity.Our sample consisted of 28 PoR employees and 65 students, all of whom played The Sustainable Port game and had their faces recorded with a camera. The Eye Aspect Ratio was extracted from these recordings and then from those we extracted EAR-derived features. Our results show that Port of Rotterdam employees perform better than students and that the two groups are characterized by different physiological variations in their EAR-derived features. A logistic regression model used to identify PoR employees and students obtained an F1 score of 0.62, a PR AUC score of 0.64, and a ROC AUC score of 0.70. performing significantly above baseline suggesting the effectiveness of using EAR-derived features for this task. Our interpretation was further confirmed by a pseudo-R2 score used to evaluate the goodness of fit of a logistic regression model on the entire dataset. We found that Port of Rotterdam employees had a lower variation in blink rate per minute (blinks/m) and higher variation in the root mean square difference of successive difference in blinks (RMSSD), the consecutive difference between two continuous blinks. Moreover, this study shows that our methods were robust enough to negate the effects of confounders, such as biological sex and age that affect some other studies that analyze blinks. (shrink)

Despite its popularity in recent theorisations of law as an artifact, the idea that law is an immaterial being, independent from even the documents that contain legal acts, has not been subjected to a focused analysis. This paper fills this noticeable gap. After providing generalizing account of the Immateriality Thesis, based on its different expositions in the literature, the paper criticises it. First, it argues that it is based on the counterfactual assumption that semantic content can exist beyond any carrier (...) for itself. The paper then elaborates on the thesis’ empirical implausibility, particularly its ignorance of how much the law is as it is due to writing. Third, the paper reveals how the thesis is difficult to combine with other jurisprudential issues, notably law’s effectiveness. Following such a critique, the paper considers the possible origins of and reasons for the thesis. Given its highly questionable character, the paper concludes with some general ideas on taking law’s materiality seriously. (shrink)

Intertemporal choice requires one to decide between smaller sooner and larger later payoffs and is captured by discount rates. Across two preregistered experiments testing three language pairs (Polish vs. English, Spanish, and German; Experiment 1) and with incentivized participants (Experiment 2), we found no evidence that using a foreign language decreased the strength or increased the consistency of intertemporal choices. On the contrary, there was some evidence of stronger discounting when a foreign language was used. We confirmed prior findings that (...) more reflective individuals discount less strongly but observed that they were just as (un)affected by using foreign language as less reflective individuals. Thus, we provide preliminary evidence that the foreign language effect is robust to individual differences in cognitive reflection. (shrink)

We study a logic whose formulae are interpreted as properties of a finite set over some universe. The language is propositional, with two unary operators inclusion and extension, both taking a finite set as argument. We present a basic Hilbert-style axiomatisation, and study its completeness. The main results are syntactic and semantic characterisations of complete extensions of the logic.

Epistemic consequentialism has been challenged on the grounds that it is overly demanding. According to the Epistemic Junk Problem, this view implies that we are often required to believe junk propositions such as ‘the Great Bear Lake is the largest lake entirely in Canada’ and long disjunctions of things we already believe. According to the Numerosity Problem, this view implies that we are frequently required to have an enormous number of beliefs. This paper puts forward a novel version of epistemic (...) consequentialism which avoids these twin demandingness problems. The key is to recognise, first, that the final epistemic value of a true belief depends at least in part on the duration for which it is retained by the agent and, second, that our cognitive makeup places important constraints on which beliefs are retained and for how long. (shrink)

Dear Editor, -/- We are pleased to report that we have recently published an article in a well-established bioethics journal where we briefly review the evidence surrounding abortion pill reversal (APR) and argue that those who identify with the pro-choice standpoint should support APR provision (indeed, the ex-CEO of BPAS, Ann Furedi, has agreed in principle with this conclusion of ours in one of her tweets). We also hope that our article will serve as a record in the peer-reviewed and (...) indexed literature of the struggles our fellow CMA UK members have gone through to support women who eventually decided to keep their pregnancies, and the tribulations they had to endure from their colleagues in the medical establishment. It is perhaps somewhat symbolic that our paper has been published in a special issue dedicated to the ‘feminist ethics of care’ as APR and the sacrifice of our colleagues shows what care for women should really look like.(1) -/- We have made sure to spread the word about this as well. One of us has given an interview to Irish pro-life group Protect Life (still to be published) and we have submitted a post to a pro-life collaborative that also awaits publication. Finally, we have also published a post about this paper and current developments in the USA in a well-established bioethics news site, which has been republished in various online outlets.(2) -/- We believe that this promotion of APR is vital, as recent statements from both the UK and the USA indicate that the pressure against APR might grow. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists have published a post entitled ‘Facts Are Important: Medication Abortion "Reversal" Is Not Supported by Science’.(3) Similarly, the UK Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, together with other bodies (including the British Society of Abortion Care Providers) have posted a position statement stating that there is no reputable evidence for using progesterone in APR.(4) One truly wonders why these organisations are pushing this narrative despite the weight of the evidence available being in favour of APR and their organisations’ professed support for women’s choice. (shrink)

The question of the principle of individuation in current analytical philosophy was the subject of medieval discussions, too, in which not only similar proposals of solutions emerged, but also dilemmas invoked by the set of then-discussed proposals appeared. Duns Scotus criticizes the previous theories of individuation and suggests that the difficulties could be avoided by changing the viewpoint from the categorical-quiditative to the transcendental-modal understanding of the principle of individuation. Scotus’ solution is close to the theory of naked substrates, because (...) the substrate and “thisness” act as individuators with modal character. From the relecture of Scotus’ modal understanding of the principle of individuation may arise inspirations that need to be considered in comparison with modern analytical theories of individuation and thus they can be enriched. (shrink)

Artykuł poświęcony jest zagadnieniu apolitycznego charakteru sportu. Badania mają na celu prześledzenie stanowiska Międzynarodowego Komitetu Olimpijskiego wobec upolitycznienia sportu i skonfrontowanie go z faktyczną działalnością MKOl, którą można określić jako polityczną. Badania doprowadziły do wniosku, że apolityczny charakter sportu to tylko mit. Masowa popularność sportu skłoniła wiele państw do prób wykorzystania go do celów politycznych, zmuszając MKOl do zajmowania stanowisk politycznych i przenoszenia sporów politycznych na swoje forum.

Rzeczywistość przyrodnicza poznawana jest dzięki metodom empirycznym. Jej tajemnice odkrywane są w dużym zakresie dzięki rozwojowi ich metodologii. Formułowane są hipotezy i tworzone teorie wyjaśniające odkrywane zjawiska. Jednakże w tym uporządkowanym świecie pojawiają się i takie zdarzenia, których wystąpienie ma charakter przypadkowy. Z tej racji zostanie zastosowana filozoficzna koncepcja przypadku wypracowana przez Grzegorza Bugajaka i przewidziana przez niego do analizy treści teorii naukowych oraz klasyfikacji zdarzeń przypadkowych. Zostanie ukazana użyteczność tej koncepcji w obszarze ochrony środowiska. W tym celu na początku (...) zaprezentowana zostanie treść propozycji Bugajaka, a następnie omówione będą okoliczności pojawiania się w przyrodzie zjawisk przypadkowych, rodzących dylematy poznawcze u przyrodników. Podjęte analizy zostaną zilustrowane konkretnymi przykładami. W rezultacie wskazane zostaną te sposoby interpretacji przypadku z koncepcji Bugajaka, które mogą okazać się przydatne w pracach ekologów. -------------- Zgłoszono: 05/08/2020. Zrecenzowano: 16/10/2020. Zaakceptowano do publikacji: 24/11/2020. (shrink)

A class of quantum probabilities is reformulated in terms of non-Newtonian calculus and projective arithmetic. The model generalizes spin-1/2 singlet state probabilities discussed in Czachor (Acta Physica Polonica:139 70–83, 2021) to arbitrary spins _s_. For \(s\rightarrow \infty\) the formalism reduces to ordinary arithmetic and calculus. Accordingly, the limit “non-Newtonian to Newtonian” becomes analogous to the classical limit of a quantum theory.

The aim of this study is to justify the belief that there are biological normative mechanisms that fulfill non-trivial causal roles in the explanations (as formulated by researchers) of actions and behaviors present in specific systems. One example of such mechanisms is the predictive mechanisms described and explained by predictive processing (hereinafter PP), which (1) guide actions and (2) shape causal transitions between states that have specific content and fulfillment conditions (e.g. mental states). Therefore, I am guided by a specific (...) theoretical goal associated with the need to indicate those conditions that should be met by the non-trivial theory of normative mechanisms and the specific models proposed by PP supporters. In this work, I use classical philosophical methods, such as conceptual analysis and critical reflection. I also analyze selected studies in the field of cognitive science, cognitive psychology, neurology, information theory and biology in terms of the methodology, argumentation and language used, in accordance with their theoretical importance for the issues discussed in this study. In this sense, the research presented here is interdisciplinary. My research framework is informed by the mechanistic model of explanation, which defines the necessary and sufficient conditions for explaining a given phenomenon. The research methods I chose are therefore related to the problems that I intend to solve. In the introductory chapter, “The concept of predictive processing”, I discuss the nature of PP as well as its main assumptions and theses. I also highlight the key concepts and distinctions for this research framework. Many authors argue that PP is a contemporary version of Kantianism and is exposed to objections similar to those made against the approach of Immanuel Kant. I discuss this thesis and show that it is only in a very general sense that the PP framework is neo-Kantian. Here we are not dealing with transcendental deduction nor with the application of transcendental arguments. I argue that PP is based on reverse engineering and abduction inferences. In the second part of this chapter, I respond to the objection formulated by Dan Zahavi, who directly accuses this research framework of anti-realistic consequences. I demonstrate that the position of internalism, present in the so-called conservative PP, does not imply anti-realism, and that, due to the explanatory role played in it by structural representations directed at real patterns, it is justified to claim that PP is realistic. In this way, I show that PP is a non-trivial research framework, having its subject, specific methods and its own epistemic status. Finally, I discuss positions classified as the socalled radical PP. In the chapter “Predictive processing as a Bayesian explanatory model” I justify the thesis according to which PP offers Bayesian modeling. Many researchers claim that the brain is an implemented statistical probabilistic network that is an approximation of the Bayesian 7 rule. In practice, this means that all cognitive processes are to apply Bayes' rule and can be described in terms of probability distributions. Such a solution arouses objections among many researchers and is the subject of wide criticism. The purpose of this chapter is to justify the thesis that Bayesian PP is a non-trivial research framework. For this purpose, I argue that it explains certain phenomena not only at the computational level described by David Marr, but also at the level of algorithms and implementation. Later in this chapter I demonstrate that PP is normative modeling. Proponents of the use of Bayesian models in psychology or decision theory argue that they are normative because they allow the formulation of formal rules of action that show what needs to be done to make a given action optimal. Critics of this approach emphasize that such thinking about the normativity of Bayesian modeling is unjustified and that science should shift from prescriptive to descriptive positions. In a polemic with Shira Elqayam and Jonathan Evans (2011), I show that the division they propose into prescriptivism and Bayesian descriptivism is apparent, because, as I argue, there are two forms of prescriptivism, i.e. the weak and the strong. I argue that the weak version is epistemic and can lead to anti-realism, while the strong version is ontic and allows one to justify realism in relation to Bayesian models. I argue that a weak version of prescriptivism is valid for PP. It allows us to adopt anti-realism in relation to PP. In practice, this means that you can explain phenomena using Bayes' rule. This does not, however, imply that they are Bayesian in nature. However, the full justification of realism in relation to the Bayesian PP presupposes the adoption of strong prescriptivism. This position assumes that phenomena are explained by Bayesian rule because they are Bayesian as such. If they are Bayesian in nature, then they should be explained using Bayesian modeling. This thesis will be substantiated in the chapters “Normative functions and mechanisms in the context of predictive processing” and “Normative mechanisms and actions in predictive processing”. In the chapter “The Free Energy Principle in predictive processing”, I discuss the Free Energy Principle (hereinafter FEP) formulated by Karl Friston and some of its implications. According to this principle, all biological systems (defined in terms of Markov blankets) minimize the free energy of their internal states in order to maintain homeostasis. Some researchers believe that PP is a special case of applying this principle to cognition, and that predictive mechanisms are homeostatic mechanisms that minimize free energy. The discussion of FEP is important due to the fact that some authors consider it to be important for explanatory purposes and normative. If this is the case, then FEP turns out to be crucial in explaining normative predictive mechanisms and, in general, any normative biological mechanisms. To define the explanatory possibilities of this principle, I refer to the discussion of its supporters on the issue they define as the problem of continuity and discontinuity between life and mind. A critical analysis of this discussion and the additional arguments I have formulated have allowed me to revise the explanatory ambitions of FEP. I also reject the belief that this principle is necessary to explain the nature of predictive mechanisms. I argue that the principle formulated and defended by Friston is an important research heuristic for PP analysis. 8 In the chapter “Normative functions and mechanisms in predictive processing”, I start my analyzes by formulating an answer to the question about the normative nature of homeostatic mechanisms. I demonstrate that predictive mechanisms are not homeostatic. I defend the view that a full explanation of normative mechanisms presupposes an explanation of normative functions. I discuss the most important proposals for understanding the normativity of a function, both from a systemic and teleosemantic perspective. I conclude that the non-trivial concept of a function must meet two requirements which I define as explanatory and normative. I show that none of the theories I have invoked satisfactorily meets both of these requirements. Instead, I propose a model of normativity based on Bickhard's account, but supplemented by a mechanistic perspective. I argue that a function is normative when: (1) it allows one to explain the dysfunction of a given mechanism; (2) it contributes to the maintenance of the organism's stability by shaping and limiting possible relations, processes and behaviors of a given system; and when (3) (according to the representational and predictive functions) it enables explaining the attribution of logical values of certain representations / predictions. In such an approach, a mechanism is normative when it performs certain normative functions and when it is constitutive for a specific action or behavior, despite the fact that for some reason it cannot realize it either currently or in the long-term. Such an understanding of the normativity of mechanisms presupposes the acceptance of the epistemic hypothesis. I argue that this hypothesis is not cognitively satisfactory, and therefore the ontic hypothesis should be justified, which is directly related to adopting the position of ontic prescriptivism. For this reason, referring to the mechanistic theory of scientific explanations, I formulate an ontical interpretation of the concept of a normative mechanism. According to this approach, a mechanism or a function is normative when they perform such and such causal roles in explaining certain actions and behaviors. With regard to the normative properties of predictive mechanisms and functions, this means that they are the causes of specific actions an organism carries out in the environment. In this way, I justify the necessity of accepting the ontic hypothesis and rejecting the epistemic hypothesis. The fifth chapter, “Normative mechanisms and actions in predictive processing”, is devoted to the dark room problem and the related exploration-exploitation trade-off. A dark room is the state that an agent could be in if it minimized the sum of all potential prediction errors. I demonstrate that, in accordance with the basic assumption of PP about the need for continuous and long-term minimization of prediction errors, such a state should be desirable for the agent. Is it really so? Many authors believe it is not. I argue that the test of the value of PP is the possibility of a non-trivial solution of this problem, which can be reduced to the choice between active and uncertainty-increasing exploration and safe and easily predictable exploitation. I show that the solution proposed by PP supporters present in the literature does not enable a fully satisfactory explanation of this dilemma. Then I defend the position according to which the full explanation of the normative mechanisms, and, subsequently, the solution to the dilemma of exploration and exploitation, involves reference to the existence of constraints present in the environment. The constraints 9 include elements of the environment that make a given mechanism not only causal but also normative. They are therefore key to explaining the predictive mechanisms. They do not only play the role of the context in which the mechanism is implemented, but, above all, are its constitutive component. I argue that the full explanation of the role of constraints in normative predictive mechanisms presupposes the integration of individual models of specific cognitive phenomena, because only the mechanistic integration of PP with other models allows for a non-trivial explanation of the nature of normative predictive mechanisms that would have a strong explanatory value. The explanatory monism present in many approaches to PP makes it impossible to solve the problem of the dark room. Later in this chapter, I argue that the Bayesian PP is normative not because it enables the formulation of such and such rules of action, but because the predictive mechanisms themselves are normative. They are normative because they condition the choice of such and such actions by agents. In this way, I justify the hypothesis that normative mechanisms make it possible to explain the phenomenon of agent motivation, which is crucial for solving the dark room problem. In the last part of the chapter, I formulate the hypothesis of distributed normativity, which assumes that the normative nature of certain mechanisms, functions or objects is determined by the relations into which these mechanisms, functions or objects enter. This means that what is normative (in the primary sense) is the relational structure that constitutes the normativity of specific items included in it. I suggest that this hypothesis opens up many areas of research and makes it possible to rethink many problems. In the “Conclusion”, I summarize the results of my research and indicate further research perspectives. (shrink)

Úvodní část kritické stati stručně představuje autorku a prezentuje strukturu a obsah knihy Rámce války: za které životy netruchlíme?. Zohledněn je širší kontext a zvláštní ohled je věnován představení dosavadní publikační činnosti Judith Butlerové. Cílem je poukázat na to, že tematické zaměření a hlavní ideová východiska knihy mají v celém díle autorky nepopiratelnou kontinuitu.Následující pasáže se zaměřují na zprostředkování vybraných myšlenek více do hloubky, s důrazem zejména na rozbor autorčiny pozice k fenoménu my a oni a vztahu já k druhému. (...) Kromě toho je pozornost věnována i konceptu rámování, v jehož osvojení tkví zvláštní význam pro porozumění hlavním autorčiným závěrům. Hlavní výhrady a polemika příležitostně prostupují celou prací, závěr poskytuje pouze shrnutí. The introductory part of the critical essay briefly introduces the author and presents the structure and content of the book Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?. Special regard is given to the broader context, particularly to referring to other works of Judith Butler that have already been published. The purpose is to point out the fact that the thematic interest and ideological basis of the book are deeply rooted and have undeniable continuity across Butler`s work. The following passages aim to present selected ideas in more detail, with a special focus on the analysis of the author's position to the Us and Them phenomenon or relation between Self and the Other. Besides this, attention is paid to the explanation of the concept called framing, in order to understand its particular importance for drawing key conclusions of the author. Major objections and reasons for disputation occasionally appear throughout the essay, the final part offers summary only. (shrink)

W państwach, które określają się demokratycznymi, są takie cykliczne momenty, które mobilizują sporą część społeczeństwa. Mobilizacja ta widoczna jest w różnych obszarach, które dotyczą przestrzeni publicznej: w jednostkach samorządu terytorialnego, w organach władzy samorządowej i centralnej, w środkach społecznego przekazu, we wspólnotach religijnych itd. Ta pewnego rodzaju „nadaktywność” wynika z tego, iż w porządku demokratycznym władze są wybierane przez lud poprzez akt wyborczy. Doświadczenie życiowe oraz przykład polskiej demokracji po 1989 r. pokazuje, iż powyższe założenia w przeważającej części nie zawsze (...) są realizowane. Można jednak mówić o przynajmniej dwóch niepożądanych działaniach kandydatów w ramach kampanii wyborczej: obietnicach wyborczych i korupcji wyborczej. Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie problematyki dotyczącej korupcji wyborczej w świetle etyki personalistycznej. Wybór, pomimo że subiektywny, wydaje się uzasadniony z tego powodu, iż personalizm dotyka kwestii problemów społeczno-politycznych z perspektywy koncepcji dobra wspólnego. (shrink)

The paper deals with Martin Buber’s claim that responsibility “is the basic theme of my work in general.” As I show in the opening section of the article, his statement applies to the dialogical period of his work, but not the pre-dialogical. In the mystical phase of Buber’s thought there is no place for responsibility because the very nature of mysticism excludes that possibility. The incompatibility of mysticism and interpersonal responsibility is confirmed in the autobiographical fragment “conversion,” one of the (...) two biographical moments I discuss in relation to the shift in his thinking on responsibility. The second is his relationship with his wife Paula Winkler, which profoundly influenced his thinking about the importance of love and marriage for an understanding of responsibility. I then explore his view of responsibility as a doctrine, which developed along with his dialogical philosophy. Finally, I examine his critical views on four basic ways of avoiding responsibility, which highlight the close connection between freedom and responsibility: belief in fate, individualism, collectivism, and religious acosmism. (shrink)

The aim of our study was to test the effectiveness of the “three good things for others” intervention. We used the randomized controlled trial method, with four measurements (pretest, posttest, follow-up after 2 weeks, follow-up after 4 weeks) and with random assignment of participants to experimental and placebo control groups. We investigated the effects of the intervention on prosocial behavior, and in addition on positive and negative affect, and positive orientation (a general tendency to approach reality in a positive way). (...) The results showed an increase in positive affect and a decrease in negative affect in the experimental group a day after the intervention. These effects, however, did not endure over the next 2 or 4 weeks. We also observed a statistically significant increase in prosocial behavior in the placebo control group, in which participants were engaged in a task of recalling childhood memories. The results are discussed and recommendations for future studies are proposed. (shrink)

In the first part of the text the distinction between first- and second-order impartiality, along with Brian Barry?s thorough elaboration of their characteristics and the differences between them, is examined. While the former impartiality is related to non-favoring fellow-persons in everyday occasions, the latter is manifested in the institutional structure of society and its political and public morality. In the second part of the article, the concept of public impartiality is introduced through analysis of two examples. In the first example, (...) a Caledonian Club with its exclusive membership is considered as a form of association which is partial, but nevertheless morally acceptable. In the second example, the so-called Heinz dilemma has been reconsidered and the author points to some flaws in Barry?s interpretation, arguing that Heinz?s right of giving advantage to his wife?s life over property rights can be recognized through mitigating circum-stances, and this partiality can be appreciated in the public sphere. Thus, public impartiality imposes limits to the restrictiveness and rigidity of political impartiality implied in second-order morality. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the differences between ontic and epistemic conceptions of scientific explanation, mainly in relation to the so-called new mechanical philosophy. I emphasize that the debate on conceptions of scientific explanation owes much to Salmon’s ontic/epistemic distinction, although much has changed since his formulations. I focus on the interplay between ontic and epistemic norms and constraints in providing mechanistic explanations. My conceptual analysis serves two aims. Firstly, I formulate some suggestions for recognising that both sets of norms (...) and constraints, ontic and epistemic, are necessary for scientific theorising. Secondly, I emphasize that there are multiple dimensions involved in scientific explanation, rather than clear-cut alternatives between ontic and epistemic aspects. I conclude with a general observation that although contextual aspects of explanations are unavoidable, the epistemic-relativity of our categories, explanations and models can in fact be compatible with their objectivity. Instead of making hastily drawn ontological implications from our theories or models, we should carefully scrutinize them from the ontic-epistemic perspective. (shrink)

The interaction between syntax and its semantics is one which has been well studied in categorical logic. The results of this particular study are employed to understand how the brain is able to create meanings. To emphasize the toy character of the proposed model, we prefer to speak of the homunculus brain rather than the brain per se. The homunculus brain consists of neurons, each of which is modeled by a category, and axons between neurons, which are modeled by functors (...) between the corresponding neuron-categories. Each neuron has its own program enabling its working, i.e. a theory of this neuron. In analogy to what is known from categorical logic, we postulate the existence of a pair of adjoint functors, called Lang and Syn, from a category, now called BRAIN, of categories, to a category, now called MIND, of theories. Our homunculus is a kind of “mathematical robot”, the neuronal architecture of which is not important. Its only aim is to provide us with the opportunity to study how such a simple brain-like structure could “create meanings” and perform abstraction operations out of its purely syntactic program. The pair of adjoint functors Lang and Syn model the mutual dependencies between the syntactical structure of a given theory of MIND and the internal logic of its semantics given by a category of BRAIN. In this way, a formal language and its meanings are interwoven with each other in a manner corresponding to the adjointness of the functors Lang and Syn. Higher cognitive functions of abstraction and realization of concepts are also modelled by a corresponding pair of adjoint functors. The categories BRAIN and MIND interact with each other with their entire structures and, at the same time, these very structures are shaped by this interaction. (shrink)

In the original version of the publication, Figs. 2, 3 and 4 have been included incorrectly and these have been removed with this Correction and the corresponding text have been updated as mentioned below.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the constitutional considerations of the possibility of establishing the Ombudsman as a body to receive reports of violations of the law under the authority of Directive Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of October 23, 2019 on the protection of whistleblowers. The results of the research lead to the conclusion of the possible admissibility of such a solution, but with the need for appropriate system changes. However, the (...) author recommends entrusting this competence to a newly created body. (shrink)

There have been repeated calls to ensure that clinical artificial intelligence (AI) is not discriminatory, that is, it provides its intended benefit to all members of society irrespective of the status of any protected characteristics of individuals in whose healthcare the AI might participate. There have also been repeated calls to ensure that any clinical AI is tailored to the local population in which it is being used to ensure that it is fit-for-purpose. Yet, there might be a clash between (...) these two calls since tailoring an AI to a local population might reduce its effectiveness when the AI is used in the care of individuals who have characteristics which are not represented in the local population. Here, I explore the bioethical concept of local fairness as applied to clinical AI. I first introduce the discussion concerning fairness and inequalities in healthcare and how this problem has continued in attempts to develop AI-enhanced healthcare. I then discuss various technical aspects which might affect the implementation of local fairness. Next, I introduce some rule of law considerations into the discussion to contextualise the issue better by drawing key parallels. I then discuss some potential technical solutions which have been proposed to address the issue of local fairness. Finally, I outline which solutions I consider most likely to contribute to a fit-for-purpose and fair AI. (shrink)

In the paper I discuss Geach’s rejection of volitions (inner acts of the will) both in the exegesis of Aquinas and in systematic action theory – a rejection followed by some analytical commentators of Aquinas (like Davies and Kenny). I claim that Geach’s interpretation of Aquinas’s action theory in terms of tendencies (treating the will as a special kind of tendency) enables – pace Geach – a sound defense of volitionism both in the exegesis of Aquinas and in the action (...) theory. In other words, I offer arguments in favour of volitions (inner acts of the will) starting from some insights to be found in Geach, and I response to some standard objections against volitionism. Moreover, I try to sketch a framework (based on an ontology of tendencies suggested by Geach) suitable to discuss some other volitionist claims. I proceed in four steps: first I introduce the definition of a volition or inner act of the will that may be ascribed to various camps in the volitionism debate; then I discuss three main arguments of Geach against volitionism – the argument from trying, the argument from voluntary omissions, and the argument from natural theology. I pay special attention to the issue of the timing of volitions. (shrink)

Most of the phenomena described in this book have arisen as a result of various crises, disasters, threats, and forms of violence (such as wars, refugee crises, and political regimes, but also devastating practices of the anthropogenic drive and environmental pollution). Others are a form of response to new political, social and cultural changes that we are experiencing due to the rapid development of technology or progressive economic stratification. The research perspective proposed in Postcollectivity draws on the authors' approaches, combining (...) academic and theoretical discourse with social engagement and artistic practice with critical thought. Contributors are: Harshavardhan Bhat, Stephen Dersley, Adela Goldbard, Carly E. Gray, Agnieszka Jelewska, Peter H. Kahn, Jr., Michał Krawczak, Grant Leuning, Ania Malinowska, Anna Nacher, Andrzej W. Nowak, Julian Reid, Pepe Rojo, Sarena Sabine, Jens Schröter, Jan Stasieńko and Brett Zehner. (shrink)