This study aimed to explore the enabling context of the HIV care continuum as perceived by people living with HIV and healthcare professionals. This qualitative study involved in‐depth individual interviews with eight people living with HIV and group interviews with seven nurses and physicians. These interviews took place between March 5, 2021, and July 13, 2022. Thematic analysis was conducted. The main themes that emerged included “network of support and systems,” “personal gains from the care continuum,” “continuity and practicality of (...) healthcare services,” “presence of significant other(s),” and “social belonging.” These themes were structured within the five levels of the socio‐ecological model (system, individual, organizational, interpersonal, and community levels), and 10 subthemes were identified. With the integration of themes, the enabling context was compared to a “care orbit,” indicating that people diagnosed with HIV start treatment at the system level and continue HIV care at other levels. In addition to primary support at the system level, the enabling context also includes individual commitment to care and regular health habits, hospital services, support from significant others, and community culture. Together, the context helps guide people living with HIV into the “orbit” of the care system. (shrink)

According to contemporary representationalism, phenomenal qualia—of specifically sensory experiences—supervene on representational content. Most arguments for representationalism share a common, phenomenological premise: the so-called “transparency thesis.” According to the transparency thesis, it is difficult—if not impossible—to distinguish the quality or character of experiencing an object from the perceived properties of that object. In this paper, I show that Husserl would react negatively to the transparency thesis; and, consequently, that Husserl would be opposed to at least two versions of contemporary representationalism. First, (...) I show that Husserl would be opposed to strong representationalism, since he believes the cognitive content of a perceptual episode can vary despite constancy of sensory qualia. Second, I then show that Husserl would be opposed to weak representationalism, since he believes that sensory qualia—specifically, the sort that he calls “kinesthetic sensations”—can vary despite constancy in representational content. (shrink)

In this paper, I show that by “Monade” the later Husserl means roughly what he meant by “das reine Bewußtsein” in the period of Ideas I. Of both consciousness and Monade, Husserl claims that objects of perception are immanent to them. I describe this claim as “quasi-representationalist” just because it bears enough similarity to some versions of contemporary representationalism. Since Husserl also claims that perceptual objects are publicly accessible, the inevitable conclusion seems to be that parts of perceptual consciousness must (...) also be publicly accessible. So strong internalist, Cartesian or idealist, interpretations of Husserl must be wrong. By the same token, if perceptual objects are necessarily physical, it then seems Husserl must agree that the physical can be, in some sense, immanent to consciousness. (shrink)

I argue Leibniz could not have been a dualist since his notion of matter is not defined by extension but by mentalistic "primitive passive force." So Leibniz was some kind of idealist. However, Leibniz was neither a phenomenal idealist like Berkeley nor a conceptualist idealist like Hegel. Instead, despite some suggestions in favor of the latter kind of idealism, Leibniz must be regarded as an idealist who admitted extraconceptual considerations irreducible to materialism.

A historically persistent way of reading Leibniz regards him as some kind of conceptualist. According to this interpretation, Leibniz was either an ontological conceptualist or an epistemological conceptualist. As an ontological conceptualist, Leibniz is taken to hold the view that there exist only concepts. As an epistemological conceptualist, he is seen as believing that we think only with concepts. I argue against both conceptualist renditions. I confront the ontological conceptualist view with Leibniz’s metaphysics of creation. If the ontological conceptualist interpretation (...) were right, then Leibniz could not invoke compossibility as a criterion of creation. But since he does invoke compossibility as a criterion of creation, the ontological conceptualist approach cannot be right. I confront the epistemological conceptualist interpretation with Leibniz’s assertion of non-conceptual content. Since Leibniz acknowledges non-conceptual content at least when it comes to metaphysical knowledge, Leibniz could not have been an epistemological conceptualist either. So, Leibniz could not have been a conceptualist at all. (shrink)

With the advancement of medical technology, various life-sustaining treatments are available at the end of life. Older adults should be encouraged to establish their end-of-life treatment preferences (ELTP) while they are physically and mentally able to do so. The purpose of this study was to explore ELTP among older adults and to compare those preferences in a subset of individuals who had reported their ELTP in a survey completed the previous year. This was a descriptive study of 191 older adults (...) living in a continuing care retirement community. Approximately half of the participants did not want cardiopulmonary resuscitation, to be put on a respirator, or to receive dialysis. The findings in this study suggest that many older adults do not want aggressive interventions at the end of life, but choose rather those measures that will keep them comfortable. Moreover, treatment choices may change over time. Health care providers should initiate discussions about ELTP at regular intervals (yearly) to assist older adults in dictating their end-of-life care. (shrink)

This article aims at an active dialogue between Ulrich Beck and East Asia with respect to cosmopolitan imagination. Beck’s cosmopolitan sociology requires a reflective cosmopolitan publicness to cope with various kinds of global risks. We therefore extract three different layers of publicness from neo-Confucianism – survival-oriented, deliberative, and ecological – and argue that Beck’s cosmopolitan vision can be better conceptualized when properly linked to, or founded upon, the Tianxiaweigong normative potentials of neo-Confucianism. In so doing our intention is to make (...) Beck’s implicit (Asian) sensibilities and the implicit Asian (cosmopolitan) orientations explicit, as a double process of cosmopolitan self-reflection and dialogue. We also draw attention to the analysis of the cosmopolitan actor in East Asia. Finally, we note that the cosmopolitan future of East Asia still remains uncertain and that reconciling global risk politics, national interests and cosmopolitan morality presents a big challenge to second modern transformation. (shrink)

Semantics and metaphysics are different. However, many philosophers maintain that the two are very closely related. Semantics is usually considered as a linguistic subject that deals with the meanings of linguistic expressions. Metaphysics, on the other hand, is a philosophical enterprise that purports to explore the nature of the world and to describe the structures and constituents of it. It is not difficult to see why the two distinct areas can merge so intimately together. After all, we all agree that (...) human languages and the world we know are closely connected. Because of this, some philosophers approach the topics of linguistic issues from the metaphysical perspectives and construct their theses of philosophical semantics based on their metaphysical standpoints. It naturally results invarious confusions of the semantic debates and projects with the metaphysical ones. This paper aims to explore the confusions which lie between semantics and metaphysics and to suggest that we can execute the semantic project successfully without taking up any metaphysical dispute. (shrink)

Nature doesn’t seem reducible to rigid systems and classifications. Although resorting to metaphors may give rise to contradictions, it allows the elaboration of explanatory models which help us to organize thought and to find orientation in the natural world. Giving form through metaphors stands for seeking the way by which mankind looks for both solutions and new configurations to face nature’s enigmas. The creation of morphological and/or evolutionary metaphors framed in a schematic way what Hugo called “man’s groping in the (...) universe of nature”. Circles, arrows, spirals, scales, etc. stood for research directions: for example, scale became metaphor of an “animal universe” that – as it was thought to be in the Eighteenth Century – organized itself in a bottom-up scale. The circle referred to “metamorphosis” , which reminds us of Goethe’s thinking. Metaphors are never an aim in themselves: they always determine a way of thinking as well as choices and research directions. Such a use of the linguistic image deeply influences the very notion of metaphor as figures of speech . If, on the one hand, metaphor shows unknown structures of nature, on the other it rediscovers its own ‘naturalness’. Starting from the deep interconnection between functional and formal tasks in morphological discussion, metaphor turned from “figure” to “figuration”, Gestaltung , and in doing so it revealed a dynamic structure able to make us understand new links and directions in the sense of a metamorphic nature. Far from limiting itself to a historical retrospection, the methodological significance of having recourse to metaphor profoundly informs the most recent questions in the scientific field and notably in life sciences, in the very moment in which it leads and encourages a renewed dialogue between sciences and philosophy. (shrink)

The mythical scientist in early twentieth-century America cut a lone figure, “impersonal as the chill northeast wind” and “oblivious of everything save his experiment.” He toiled through the night in his laboratory, “a place unimpressive and unmagical save for the constant-temperature bath with its tricky thermometer and electric bulbs,” as if working in the lab were a prayer that promised illumination—“alone, absorbed, [and] contemptuous of academic success and of popular classes,” he knew all about material forces, but he was blind (...) to the vital force that created all others. Accustomed to the “beautiful dullness of long labors,” he remained “illimitably ignorant” of literature, art, and music. He believed that unerring techniques in experimentation, impartial observations, and exquisitely minute calculations would bring progress—a steady march toward the truth. He chose the highest calling in the world because he was “intensely religious—so religious that he will not accept quarter-truths, because they are an insult to his faith.” He was “so devoted to Pure Science . . . that he would rather have people die by the right therapy than be cured by the wrong. Having built a shrine for humanity, he wanted to kick out of it all mere human beings.” This autocratic figure, brilliantly insane and tyrannically honest, embodied the cult of science and objectivity. (shrink)

Given the instructional challenges posed by the influx of minority-language children in North America, this article attempts to examine early childhood bi- or multilingualism in one of the fastest growing ethnic minority groups in Canada, Korean-Canadians. By drawing on a Vygotskian perspective, the article focuses on the affective and social aspects of learning for culturally and linguistically diverse (CLD) children and their families. With an emphasis on the integration of language and thought, this article first identifies the instructional applications of (...) Vygotskian perspectives and then describes iterative phases of design-based research aimed at developing technology-mediated collaborative learning environments for trilingual Korean-Canadian children. The technology-mediated collaborative learning environment supported young CLD children's affective, social and cognitive needs and created meaning-centered collaborative learning environments. The paper concludes with a consideration of implications of this technology-mediated collaborative learning environment so as to assist teachers who might be confronted with the educational needs of the growing population of CLD children. (shrink)

Scholars have typically regarded Confucius as an ethical thinker broadly construed and not as an epistemological thinker. This chapter seeks to overturn that view and, in doing so, has three basic goals. The first goal is to make the case that Confucian thought is of epistemological significance. Goal two is to locate the significance of Confucian thought within epistemology while accounting for the past overlooking of this significance. The third goal is to show that Confucian thought is not only of (...) epistemological significance, but that it can make a contribution to progressing contemporary epistemology. (shrink)

In this paper, we defend the claim that reflective knowledge is necessary for extended knowledge. We begin by examining a recent account of extended knowledge provided by Palermos and Pritchard (2013). We note a weakness with that account and a challenge facing theorists of extended knowledge. The challenge that we identify is to articulate the extended cognition condition necessary for extended knowledge in such a way as to avoid counterexample from the revamped Careless Math Student and Truetemp cases. We consider (...) but reject Pritchard’s (2012b) epistemological disjunctivism as providing a model for doing so. Instead, we set out an account of reflection informed by Confucianism and dual-process theory. We make the case that reflective knowledge offers a way of overcoming the challenge identified. We show why such knowledge is necessary for extended knowledge, while building on Sosa’s (2012) account of meta-competence. (shrink)

This volume is by no means out of place for a reader in the twenty first century as resemblances between the age of the machine and our own digital age are surprisingly numerous, particularly with reference to the patterns of intellectual response to unprecedented stimuli. The worrisome parallelisms and analogues are purposefully kept off stage for the imaginative audience to complement the plot of the real drama of the Industrial Revolution as it was witnessed by such imaginative medievalist 'knights' as (...) Carlyle, Cobbett, Southey, Pugin, Ruskin and Morris, intelligent thinkers who performed the universal 'type' rather than the subjective or egocentric in so far as their intellectual responses to the discrepancy between two dissimilar epochs was concerned. The reader is, therefore, expected to be engaged with the arguments of the 'neo-feudal', the 'moral-aesthetic' and the utopian 'social-aesthetic' arguments at the core of the book both imaginatively and intellectually. On the first level, he is requested to shuttle between two centuries separated by the length of a different century. On the second, however, he is expected not only to appreciate the artistically excellent literary works of prominent belletrists, but also to examine the clever polemics they developed as methods of treatment and persuasion aiming at a solution of the social and psychological problems that arose from the incongruity between the present and the past, with specific references to such significant concepts as those of time, history, progress and authority which are examined against the superheated touchstones of democratization, liberty, laissez-faire ethics, mechanization, poverty and social protest in the industrial city. (shrink)

Our contention is that while what may be termed woke capitalism is the result of real changes in both the material structure of capitalism and its ideological superstructure, those are not changes pulling in the same direction. The main material development is the consolidation of the shift from a quasi-deterministic to a more pronouncedly probabilistic nexus of class and race. But it is unclear that this makes much difference to the material prospects of the vast majority of people of color (...) or indeed of people in general. Indeed, the racial permeability of the upper classes is accompanied by an increased and inverse racial permeability of the underclass. Diversification is so elite-driven that it is unlikely to proceed beyond the cosmetic, and for that reason it seems that diversification does not necessarily correspond to any major structural changes in the relations between groups of people, whether we consider them as arranged by class, race, or the intersection of the two. It follows that the politics of representation should not be regarded as a vehicle for the agenda of the materialist left. We propose instead a responsive universalist approach—responsive to racism and all other forms of marginalization and different from the homogenizing universalism of class-only politics. (shrink)

Communalism and its cognates continue to exercise a vise grip on the African intellectual imaginary. Whether the discussion is in ethics or social philosophy, in metaphysics or even, on occasion, epistemology, the play of communalism, a concept expounded in the next section, is so strong that it is difficult to escape its ubiquity. In spite of this, there is little serious analysis of the concept and its implications in the contemporary context. Yet, at no other time than now can a (...) long-suffering continent use some robust debates on its multiple inheritances regarding how to organize life and thought in order to deliver a better future for its population. Given the continual resort to communalism as, among others, the standard of ethical behavior, the blueprint for restoring Africans to wholeness and organizing our social life, as well as a template for political reorganization across the continent, one cannot overemphasize the importance of contributing some illumination to the discourse surrounding the idea. This essay seeks to offer a little illumination in this respect. Additionally, it offers a criticism of what all—proponents and antagonists alike—take to be a defensible version of communalism: moderate communalism. I shall be arguing that communalism, generally, has a problem with the individual. And the African variant of it, mostly subscribed to by the African scholars discussed below and defended by them as something either peculiar to or special in Africa, has an even harder time accommodating the individual. Yet, as history shows, until the modern age in which individualism is the principle of social ordering and mode of social living, a situation that privileges the individual, above all, various forms of communalism never really accorded the individual the recognition and forbearances that we now commonly associate with the idea. T he strongest variants of moderate communalism discuss ed here have a difficult time taking the individual seriously. I am not aware of anyone else ever having made such a case. These arguments are offer ed to show that Africa and Africans need to take individualism seriously and such have been the historical transformation that our diverse societies have undergone in the course of the last half a millennium that the types of communalism that are on offer do not appear to take this fact of radical change with the necessary urgency. (shrink)

Recent publication How Propaganda Works uses flawed ideologies to explain how propaganda works. I introduce the system of miseducation as an alternative, adapted from Carter G. Woodson’s The Mis-Education of the Negro. Miseducation explains instances of propaganda considered in the book but also another kind altogether, which I term Trojan horse propaganda. I consider the possibility that flawed social structures can themselves exert propagandistic effects, independent of any particular pattern of doxastic uptake by the individuals in that society. If so, (...) this would suggest moving from analyses of how propaganda affects individuals’ beliefs and toward analyses of propaganda’s practical effects, and would count in favor of activist approaches that make strategic use of sites of epistemic power. (shrink)

The public does not desire horror, yet enjoys it in art and suffers it in life. When we deal with the monstrous marriage of the abject and the sublime, the consequent thrill of enjoyment is never appeased, always problematic, often unresolved and finally borders on physiological if not pathological narcissism. The public is well acquainted with this 'rhetoric of effects'; rhetoric of extreme effects, which transforms the spectator into voyeur or victim, into an apathetic torturer, whenever cruelty is shown without (...) respite. A look of horror greets the enjoyment of extremes and enjoyment to the extreme as well; the Eighteenth Century teaches us that lesson. The century of good taste elaborates a sense of the limits, since representing horror means choosing not so much to domesticate it as to render it more enjoyable. It is a game of limits that are not limits anymore, as we can allude to an infinity that often shows the features of the sublime. (shrink)

On six sins generally committed by women, according to Islam; translated from Urdu.

On correct method of understanding various Buddhist philosophical concepts according to sutras and tantras in accordance with Karmapa VIII Mi-bskyod-rdo-rje interpreation.

Este livro procura ilustrar que o ser professor não resulta de um evolucionismo natural do qual a vocação ou o dom seriam consequências lógicas. Ao contrário, a presença do docente e a presença do discente são buscadas no campo historiográfico seja pela memória individual e coletiva deles em seus escritos, seja pelos novos enfrentamentos suscitados não só pela sociedade de classes, mas também pelas diversidades que aí se aninham. Sumário - Prefácio - Carlos Roberto Jamil Cury; Apresentação - Mauro Passos; (...) Parte I - Teoria e confrontos temáticos; Parte II - História e condições de trabalho; Sobre os autores. (shrink)

Comparative study on philosophical position (siddhānta) of the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācārya, and Mādhyamika schools of Buddhism.

Within modern scholarship on Indian philosophy, religious studies, and Indology Purva-Mimamsa unfortunately features as a rather under-represented area. The present edition and translation of the Mimamsanyayasamgraha by James Benson is a most welcome exception in two respects: On the one hand it makes accessible the major premises and topics of Purva-Mimamsa to students and scholars in a rather simple and brief manner. On the other hand it represents the first translation of a work from the late 17th century, i.e. from (...) the "new school" of Purva-Mimamsa. So far no major texts from this period are available and little is known about the school's developments and changes in those times. Thus, besides providing a solid and understandable introduction to the system, this book will also be valuable to advanced students of Purva-Mimamsa interested in its newer branches. It will therefore be of use not only for Indologists, but also to students and scholars dealing with South Asian religions, ritual and intellectual history. (shrink)

During Einstein’s lifetime, the special and general theories of relativity were quite frequently interpreted by philosophers. Most of these interpretations actually were misinterpretations. Even today interpretative statements about relativity theory are often false or highly misleading. Why is this so? In my Ph.D. dissertation (Hentschel 1990a), I analyzed (mis)interpretations by 10 different philosophical schools active in the early twentieth century which widely differed in their approaches, emphasis and blind spots. Many of these interpreters – including philosophers of high standing such (...) as Ernst Cassirer, Moritz Schlick or Joseph Petzoldt – had studied the theory intensely and many even had close contact with Einstein himself or with one of the members of his “protective belt” of close friends and allies. Rather than declaring all of these (mis)interpreters as either luminaries or idiots (which would be implausible, if not downright silly), I show structurally how these misunderstandings arose and why they were kind of unavoidable, even for highly qualified and often well-informed interpreters. More popular texts about relativity theory were often second-order interpretations of these first-order accounts, thus multiplying the first-order errors of misinterpretations. I will give a few characteristic examples but my focus will rather be on structural characteristics of these misinterpretations. I will discuss how to analyze them historically by means of interpretational frames. A link will also be made to Ludwik Fleck’s thesis that socially and cognitively stabilized “thought collectives” (“Denkkollektive”) exert strong constraints on human thinking and interpretation (“Denkzwang”). My concept of interpretational frames is one method to formalize and analyze the complex interrelations between different assumptions and inferences within such a frame of thinking (“Denkstil”). Semantic frames and word clouds are also discussed as alternative approaches but both are discarded as unsuitable for the purpose of reconstructing interpretative frames. (shrink)

The frequency and opportunity for unethical behavior by MIS professionals is examined empirically. In addition, the importance of top management's ethical stance, one's sense of social responsibility and the existence of codes of ethics in determining perceptions of the frequency and opportunity for unethical behavior are tested.Results indicate that MIS professionals are perceived as having the opportunity to engage in unethical practices, but that they seldom do so. Additionally, successful MIS professionals are perceived as ethical. Finally, while company codes of (...) ethics were uncommon, top management was seen as supporting high ethical standards. (shrink)

Johann August Eberhard gründet 1788 die Zeitschrift "Philosophisches Magazin", um die sog. Leibniz-Wolffsche Schulphilosophie gegen die zunehmend erfolgreichen Angriffe der kantischen Philosophie zu verteidigen. Zu diesem Zweck publizierte er insgesamt sieben Artikel, um seiner Leserschaft zu zeigen, dass die ältere Philosophie Leibnizens bereits eine gründliche Vernunftkritik enthalte, die der neueren Vernunftkritik Kants nicht nur ebenbürtig, sondern sogar überlegen sei. Als Anhänger der leibnizianischen Vernunftkritik war Eberhard vor allem deswegen von ihrer Überlegenheit überzeugt, weil man mit ihr noch eine dogmatische Metaphysik (...) alten Zuschnitts begründen und verteidigen könne. -/- Immanuel Kant, der aus arbeitsökonomischen Gründen nur selten auf Angriffe auf seine kritische Philosophie reagierte, fühlte sich von Eberhard so sehr herausgefordert, dass er – wie zuvor auch schon einmal bei Emanuel Swedenborg – eine Ausnahme machte. Während es für ihn bei seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Swedenborg gerade auf die deutliche Abgrenzung von dessen konkretistischer Auffassung vom mundus intelligibilis und von dessen Verwechslung von philosophischer Metaphysik mit spekulativem Okkultismus ankam, ging es bei seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Eberhard bloß um eine innerphilosophische Abgrenzung von einer anderen Konzeption der formalen Struktur und epistemischen Reichweite der menschlichen Vernunft. (shrink)

The emergence of so-called ‘gig work’, particularly that sold through digital platforms accessed through smartphone apps, has led to disputes about the proper classification of workers: Should platform workers be classified as independent contractors (as platforms typically insist), or as employees of the platforms through which they sell labor (as workers often claim)? Such disputes have urgency due to the way in which employee status is necessary to access certain benefits such as a minimum wage, sick pay, and so on. (...) In addition, classification disputes have philosophical significance because their resolution requires some foundational account of why the law should make a distinction between employed and freelance workers in the first place. This paper aims to fill this foundational gap. Central to it is the idea that employment involves a worker ceding certain freedoms in return for a degree of security, at least with respect to income. Insofar as the misclassification objection has force against digital platforms, it is when a platform is attempting to have it both ways: Workers are giving up freedom but not being granted a proportionate increase in security. As I shall explain, this approach offers some flexibility as to how actual disputes might be resolved – justice may be indifferent between whether platforms offer greater security or permit workers greater freedom, provided they do at least one of these things. (shrink)

This article is concerned with some of the ramifications of the affective dimension of Fanon’s writing. In their latest book, Commonwealth, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri take Fanon’s attempt to transcend European universality through the struggle for a ‘new universality’ as an exemplary schema that informs their politics of alter-modernity. In the article, I show that the affective dimension of Fanon’s search for a new universality is far more anti- than alter-European, albeit in an ambivalent way. I analyse how this (...) difference between an affective ‘anti’ and an intellectual ‘alter’ arises in Fanon’s analysis and experience of racism. I refer to this particular experience as mis-interpellation and analyse the equally particular affect it generates. More generally, I show that if one is to make use of Fanon’s work today one cannot separate the intellectual and the affective that are so intertwined in his analytical work as Hardt and Negri do. To do so is to abstract from the serious political ramifications that the presence of this affective dimension entails. (shrink)

More generally, within videogame studies, glitches are often described as an interesting part of the player experience, for example as possibilities to gain unfair advantages in games (Bainbridge & Bainbridge 2007; Newman 2008; Meades 2015), expressive tools to create humorous effects (Jaroslav Švelch 2014), jarring confrontations with forms of non-human agency (Janik 2017; Gualeni 2019), or as ways to create glitch-art (Menkman 2011). But when it comes to the specifically fictional experience of videogames, there seems to be a consensus that (...) glitches have no role to play except for breaking the players’ feeling of immersion and the reality effect of the game’s fictional environment (cf. Holmes 2010: 261; Kubiński 2014: 135; Janik 2017: 75). -/- Here, we focus on the underexplored fictional relevance of videogame glitches. For this purpose, we will make use philosophical theories on fiction, as well as standard suggestions about how best to deal with unintended errors within fiction. Focusing on glitches like that of Red Dead Redemption's so-called manimals, we argue that glitches, more than any kinds of mistakes in traditional, non-interactive fictions, can actually have a significant influence on the fictional worlds of the work in which they appear. In particular, we will show that some glitches generate new fictional content without this content being intended by a videogame’s creators, and will offer practical ways for dealing with the inconsistencies that inevitably accompany such glitch-generated fictions. (shrink)