We have argued elsewhere that moral responsibility over time depends in part upon the having of psychological connections which facilitate forms of self-control. In this chapter we explore the importance of mental time travel - our ordinary ability to mentally travel to temporal locations outside the present, involving both memory of our personal past and the ability to imagine ourselves in the future - to our agential capacities for planning and control. We suggest that in many individuals with dissociative (...) disorders, forms of amnesia, or other frontal lobe damage, our capacity for mental time travel is impaired, resulting in commensurate losses to agency autonomy, and a forensic condition essential for holding persons responsible: in legal terms, the capacity for mens rea. (shrink)

By examining an exemplar sample of mental health nursing educational policies and related legislation, in this article, we trace the discursive production of madness as an “othered” identity category. We engage in a critical discourse analysis of mental health nursing education in Canada, drawing on provincial and federal policies and legislation as the main sources of data. Theoretically framed by critical posthumanism and mad studies, this article outlines how the mad subjectivity becomes decontextualized out of its identity‐based understanding (...) and recontextualized as an inferior category of “the human,” circulating within discourses of pedagogy, economics, law, and psychiatry. The article maps the intertextual nexus of the discourse of mental health nursing education, making visible the complex, the arbitrary, and the sometimes‐contradictory nature of the discipline's grappling with identity‐based mental health concepts. We close with several implications for nursing policy, education, and practice. (shrink)

Mental representation is one of core theoretical constructs within cognitive science and, together with the introduction of the computer as a model for the mind, is responsible for enabling the ‘cognitive turn’ in psychology and associated fields. Conceiving of cognitive processes, such as perception, motor control, and reasoning, as processes that consist in the manipulation of contentful vehicles representing the world has allowed us to refine our explanations of behavior and has led to tremendous empirical advancements. Despite the central (...) role that the concept plays in cognitive science, there is no unanimously accepted characterization of mental representation. Technological and methodological progress in the cognitive sciences has produced numerous computational models of the brain and mind, many of which have introduced mutually incompatible notions of mental representation. This proliferation has led some philosophers to question the metaphysical status and explanatory usefulness of the notion. This book contains state-of-the-art chapters on the topic of mental representation, assembling some of the leading experts in the field and allowing them to engage in meaningful exchanges over some of the most contentious questions. The collection gathers both proponents and critics of the concept of mental representation, allowing them to engage with topics such as the ontological status of representations, the possibility of formulating a general account of mental representation which would fit our best explanatory practices, and the possibility of delivering such an account in fully naturalistic terms. (shrink)

We use mental files to present an analysis of children's developing understanding of identity in alternative naming tasks and belief. The core assumption is that younger children below the age of about 4 years create different files for an object depending on how the object is individuated. They can anchor them to the same object, hence think of the same object whether they think of it as a rabbit or as an animal. However, the claim is, they cannot yet (...) link their files to one another to represent that they have the same referent. Without linking the information contained in one file is not available in the other file. Hence, when thinking of the object as a rabbit the information that it is also an animal is not available. For representing a person's belief about an object a vicarious file contains what the person believes about the object. To capture that the belief is about that object the vicarious file has to be linked to the regular file, which by assumption children younger than 4 years cannot do. This assumption can therefore explain why problems with alternative naming and understanding false beliefs are overcome at the same age. (shrink)

Este texto utiliza los análisis sobre la enfermedad mental de Merleau-Ponty para plantearse ciertas preguntas básicas: cuáles son las fronteras entre lo normal y lo patológico, qué tipo de distorsiones introduce la enfermedad mental y en qué ámbitos de la existencia, cómo caracterizar las variaciones de la conducta espaciotemporal a las que nos referimos habitualmente cuando hablamos de enfermedad. Se pone a Merleau-Ponty en diálogo con otros pensadores (señaladamente Erving Goffman) y se articulan sus conceptos respecto de una (...) investigación empírica concreta. (shrink)

It is argued that the relation between ‘occurrents’ as characterized by Honderich and familiar ‘contentful’ mental states like beliefs and thoughts is a very murky one. Occurrents are distinct when and only when they can be distinguished by consciousness. By contrast, the criteria of individuation for contentful mental states invoke factors that are not distinguishable by consciousness. It is also suggested that Honderich's strategy for individuating occurrents may sometimes be difficult to apply.

The functionalist theory of mind proposes to analyze mental states in terms of internal states of Turing machine, and states of the machine’s tape and head. In the paper, I perform a formal analysis of this approach. I define the concepts of behavioral equivalence of Turing machines, and of behavioral individuation of internal states. I prove a theorem saying that for every Turing machine T there exists a Turing machine T’ which is behaviorally equivalent to T, and all of (...) whose internal states of T’ can be behaviorally individuated. Finally, I discuss some applications of this theorem to computational theories of mind. (shrink)

Ontologically, brains are more basic than mental representations. Epistemologically, mental representations are more basic than brains and, indeed, all other non-mental entities: it is, and must be, on the basis of mental representations that we know anything about non-mental entities. Since, consequently, mental representations are epistemically more fundamental than brains, the former cannot possibly be explained in terms of the latter, notwithstanding that the latter are ontologically more fundamental than the former. There is thus (...) an explanatory gap, notwithstanding the presumptive truth of materialism. (shrink)

Mental accounting is a concept associated with the work of Richard Thaler. According to Thaler, people think of value in relative rather than absolute terms. They derive pleasure not just from an object’s value, but also the quality of the deal – its transaction utility (Thaler, 1985). In addition, humans often fail to fully consider opportunity costs (tradeoffs) and are susceptible to the sunk cost fallacy. Why are people willing to spend more when they pay with a credit card (...) than cash (Prelec & Simester, 2001)? Why would more individuals spend $10 on a theater ticket if they had just lost a $10 bill than if they had to replace a lost ticket worth $10 (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984)? Why are people more likely to spend a small inheritance and invest a large one (Thaler, 1985)? According to the theory of mental accounting, people treat money differently, depending on factors such as the money’s origin and intended use, rather than thinking of it in terms of the “bottom line” as in formal accounting (Thaler, 1999). An important term underlying the theory is fungibility, the fact that all money is interchangable and has no labels. In mental accounting, people treat assets as less fungible than they really are. Even seasoned investors are susceptible to this bias when they view recent gains as disposable “house money” (Thaler & Johnson, 1990) that can be used in high-risk investments. In doing so, they make decisions on each mental account separately, losing out the big picture of the portfolio. (See also partitioning and pain of paying for ideas related to mental accounting.) . (shrink)

The authors describe the ethical considerations underlying the inclusion of mental health services into a prioritized health care system. The Oregon Health Plan is a process for defining and delivering basic health services to an entire state. As the plan was developed, the mental health community needed to decide whether or not to participate in the process and, if so, how. Lengthy discussions among mental health consumers, family members, and providers led to a strategy that emphasized the (...) integration of mental health and chemical dependency services into a comprehensive and universal health care program. This approach appears to have achieved relative parity for mental health. (shrink)

Anselm Müller; VIII*—Mental Teleology, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Pages 161–184, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristote.

In the psychiatric field, since the first decades of the XX century, some phenomenologically-oriented authors pointed out the importance of gathering patients’ experience of illness and meaning making. In the current literature, a few interventions for people suffering from mental illness and their families/caregivers, aimed at supporting them in making meaning, are available. Yet, also relatives have to confront with the “loss” of mental health in their family, just like patients themselves. Relatives could therefore perceive the need to (...) make meaning through narrating that loss. In this paper, we will report a few narrative-based interventions for relatives of patients suffering from mental health problems. We will conclude with some reflections, guided by phenomenological-existential pedagogy, which considers search for meaning as a fundamental educational practice, when caring for a wounded existence. (shrink)

Patients who are subject to compulsory care constitute a substantial proportion of the work-load of mental health professionals, particularly psychiatric nurses. This article examines the traditional ‘beneficence-autonomy’ approach to ethics in compulsory psychiatric care and evaluates it against the reality of daily practice. Risk to the public has always been an important but often unacknowledged consideration. Inequalities exist among ethnic and socio-economic groups and there is a lack of agreement on what constitutes mental disorder. Two major changes in (...) compulsory psychiatric care - community orders and care for patients with untreatable severe personality disorders - further challenge the traditional ethical approach. There are also important human rights implications. The simple patient-health professional relationship no longer provides an adequate framework for mental health professionals on which to base their ethical decisions. The public and organizations may have different perspectives and their interests are becoming increasingly important. Mental health professionals, particularly psychiatric nurses, may face ethical dilemmas because of these different perspectives. (shrink)

Background Coercion can cause harm to both the patient and the patient’s family. Few studies have examined how the coercive treatment of a close relative might affect young next-of-kin. Research questions We aimed to investigate the views and experiences of health professionals being responsible for supporting young next-of-kin to patients in mental health care (children-responsible staff) in relation to the needs of these young next-of-kin in coercive situations and to identify ethical challenges. Research design We conducted a qualitative study (...) based on semistructured, focus group interviews and an individual interview. Participants and research context We held three focus group interviews with six to seven children-responsible staff in each group (a total of 20 participants) and one individual interview with a family therapist. The participants were recruited from three hospital trusts in the eastern part of Norway. Ethical considerations The study was approved by the National Data Protection Official for Research and based on informed consent and confidentiality. Findings Coercion was not a theme among the participants in relation to their work with young next-of-kin, and there was much uncertainty related to whether these young people need special support to deal with the coercive treatment of their close relative. Despite the uncertainty, the study indicated a need for more information and emotional support among the youth. Discussion Few studies have addressed the potential impact of coercive treatment of a close family member on young next-of-kin. The findings were consistent with existing research but highlighted disagreement and uncertainty among the children-responsible staff about to what extent the young next-of-kin should visit and whether they should enter the ward unit or not. We identified ethical challenges for the children-responsible staff related to the principle of not inflicting harm ( nonmaleficence). Conclusion From the perspective of children-responsible staff, it appears that the coercive treatment of a close family member entails a need for extra support of young relatives both in relation to information and the facilitation of visits, but more systematic knowledge about these issues is needed. (shrink)

In his book Personal Agency, E. J. Lowe has argued that a dualist theory of mental causation is consistent with “a fairly strong principle of physical causal closure” and, moreover, that it “has the potential to strengthen our causal explanations of certain physical events.” If Lowe’s reasoning were sound, it would undermine the most common arguments for reductive physicalism or epiphenomenalism of the mental. For it would show not only that a dualist theory of mental causation is (...) consistent with a widely held scientific principle, but also that there is some positive reason for accepting the theory. However, I argue that Lowe’s reasoning is unsound, for it requires that causation both is, and is not, transitive: a contradiction. I conclude that if Lowe succeeds in proving that a dualist theory is consistent with physical causal closure, he fails to show that it serves an explanatory purpose. (shrink)

Revisiting the history of postwar LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide) research illuminates how the work of a chemist at the Rockefeller Institute contributed to the development of a biochemical paradigm for mental functioning. Dilworth Wayne Woolley proposed one of the first theories of the biochemistry of mental illness based on empirical evidence. His research with LSD and serotonin had wide-ranging repercussions for pharmacology and fit neatly into the emerging medicalization of mental illness. Reevaluating Woolley’s ideas and the fruits (...) of psychopharmacology leads to possible new approaches toward mental health and illness when considered alongside lessons learned from past research with psychedelic substances, and exemplifies a broader paradigm shift in cultural studies toward a biopsychosocial model that acknowledges the intersections between biology and culture. (shrink)

Discourse and rhetoric of service-user involvement are pervasive in all mental health services that see themselves as promoting a Recovery ethos. Yet, for the service-user movement internationally, ‘Recovery’ was articulated as an alternative discourse of overcoming and resisting an institutionalized and oppressive psychiatric model of care. Power is all pervasive within mental health services yet often overlooked in official discourse on user-involvement. Critical research is required to expose the unacknowledged structural and power constraints on participants. My research problematizes (...) practices of user involvement in one mental health service area in Ireland. Part I of this article examines the background context of policies and practices of user-involvement from the service-user perspective and explains developments in relation to service-user involvement in the case of Ireland. Participants in my study articulate their motivation for engagement with mental health service reform in terms of the right to participate in social justice terms, of wanting to improve services and humanise care. Power dynamics emerge as one of the primary obstacles to equitable involvement. Part II of this article presents an explanatory framework of power, using a model developed in the field of development studies; Gaventa’s (2006) ‘power cube.’ The three dimensions of the cube represent the forms, spaces and levels of power. The explanatory potential of this model to highlight how hidden and invisible power operates in mental health services is illustrated by selected comments from the same participants. The power cube is a useful tool to illuminate the dynamics occurring in service-user involvement spaces. Showing how different forms of power operate in the spaces and levels of mental health involvement can develop service-users’ awareness of the hidden and invisible aspects of power. Through this awareness, they can strategize around their potential to influence decision-making in mental health services. (shrink)

Mental models theorists have proposed that reasoners tend to focus on what is explicit in their mental models, and that certain debiasing procedures can induce them to direct their attention to other relevant information. For instance, Green and Larking 1995; also Green, 1995a facilitated performance on the Wason selection task by inducing participants to consider counterexamples to the conditional rule. However, these authors acknowledged that one aspect of their data might require some modification to the mental models (...) theory. This research is discussed here, and it is suggested that the results may be better accommodated by mental inference rules theory than by mental models theory. (shrink)

This article aims at giving insight into Norwegian mental health service by exploring the ideologies of two diametrical philosophers, the American Robert Nozick (1938–2002) and the German Axel Honneth (1949‐). Nozick proposes as an ideal a minimal state in which citizens have a “negative right” to the absence of interference and to follow their own interests without restriction from the state. On the other side, Axel Honneth claims that there is no freedom without state interference. In his view, governmental (...) involvement is understood as a prerequisite for personal freedom. We may call this state an opposite of the minimal state; a maximal state. To get a better understanding of these opposite philosophies, we use texts written from conversations with people suffering from mental health problems, nurses and other caregivers in four Norwegian municipalities. Nozick's notion of the minimal state and Honneth's political philosophy of freedom and recognition were used as analytical tools. Among patients and helpers, there were different opinions about good care and how much caregivers should intervene. Some emphasized autonomy, independency, minimal involvement in human contact by nurses and other caregivers, similar a minimal state. Others perceived good care as bonding between helpers and service‐users. They underlined equal and personal relationships, as well as helping with practicalities, similar a maximal state. In the discussion, we focus on how people with chronic illnesses are supposed to transform themselves into self‐cared individuals, able to manage their own condition successfully with minimal help from public welfare and at a lower cost. Finally, we express concerns about who will care for disempowered patients without family and other resources in a minimal state. (shrink)

This study examined the association between mental rotation ability and facial masculinity preference in gay and bisexual men in China. The participants (436 gay/bisexual men, 132 heterosexual men and 254 heterosexual women) completed an online Shepard and Metzler-type mental rotation task and a forced-choice preference task of ten pairs of masculinized/feminized male faces. The results revealed that mental rotation ability was significantly associated with preference for masculinized faces in both gay and bisexual men. There were no significant (...) correlations between mental rotation ability and facial masculinity preference in both heterosexual men and women. The findings imply homogamy in partner preference in gay and bisexual men in terms of masculinity. (shrink)

In two of his more recent papers, Donald davidson has argued for the "a priori" truth of what he calls "the principle of the anomalism of the mental." my concern in this paper is with examining that principle and davidson's defense of it. After clarifying the principle, I discuss three considerations which davidson gives in its defense and argue that they are not persuasive. Then I argue that although the principle of the anomalism of the mental cannot be (...) known "a priori" to be true, There are some arguments and some neurophysiological evidence which make it reasonable to believe that the principle is, Indeed, True. (shrink)

The use of coercive measures in mental health care is an issue of ongoing concern (Cf. Fisher 1994; Janssen et al. 2008; Paterson and Duxbury 2007; Prinsen and Van Delden 2009; Widdershoven and Berghmans 2007; Wynn 2006). On the one hand, coercive interventions seem to infringe the patient’s right to self-determination (principle of autonomy). However, professionals are also committed to providing the care they deem necessary (principle of beneficence). In other words, professionals in mental health care are often (...) caught between the two (opposing) ideals of beneficence and autonomy. In medical practice, the right of self-determination is operationalized in the principle of informed consent. A medical physician is .. (shrink)

Explaining Mental Illness est un manuel de sociologie sur la santé mentale dont l’ambition est explicitée dès l’introduction: il s’agit d’articuler les recherches sur la santé mentale avec la sociologie générale. Le livre est coécrit par Baptiste Brossard et Amy Chandler, tous les deux spécialistes de l’automutilation et du suicide, ainsi que chercheurs à l’université de York (Royaume-Uni). L’originalité de l’ouvrage se reflète dans son titre, il s’agit d’expliquer (explaining) la santé menta...

Mental health professionals rightfully experience significant anxiety regarding their duty to protect when working with potentially dangerous individuals. This work dispels myths and provides readers with a resource addressing the situations where a duty to protect may apply.

Este artigo focaliza a construção de novos espaços para a loucura no processo de fortalecimento de pessoas que transitaram do papel de usuárias de um serviço de saúde mental para o lugar de cuidadores. Realizamos um estudo de caso no Movimento de Saúde Mental Comunitário do Bom Jardim (Fortaleza/Cea..

Block (1995t) has argued for a noncognitive and non- representational notion of phenomenal consciousness, but his putative examples of this phenomenon are conspicuous in their representational and functional properties while they do not clearly possess other phenomenal properties.