Consciousness and mental representation

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):150-151 (1997)
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Abstract

Block (1995t) has argued for a noncognitive and non- representational notion of phenomenal consciousness, but his putative examples of this phenomenon are conspicuous in their representational and functional properties while they do not clearly possess other phenomenal properties.

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Daniel Gilman
University of Chicago

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