In clinical endocrinology, it is often assumed that the results of thyroid hormone function tests (TFTs) before total thyroidectomy are considered euthyroid when the circulating concentrations of thyrotropin [TSH] and free thyroxine [FT4] are within the normal reference ranges. Postoperative thyroid replacement therapy with levothyroxine (L-T4) is aimed to reproduce the preoperative euthyroid condition. Currently, intra-individual changes in the euthyroid set point before and after total thyroidectomy are only partly understood. After total thyroidectomy, a greater postoperative [FT4] than preoperative [FT4] (...) for equivalent euthyroid [TSH] was found, with differences ranging from 3 to 8 pmol/L. This unexplained difference can be explained by the use of a mathematical model of the hypothalamus-pituitary-thyroid (HPT) axis set point theory. In this article, the postoperative HPT euthyroid set point was calculated using a dataset of total thyroidectomized patients with at least three distinguishable postoperative TFTs. The postoperative [TSH] set point was used as a homeostatic reference for the comparison of preoperative TFTs. The preoperative [FT4] value was equal to the postoperative [FT4] value in 50% of the patients, divided by a factor of ~ 1.25 (within +/- 10%). The factor of 1.25 stems from the lack of postoperative use of thyroidal triiodothyronine (T3). Furthermore, approximately 25% of the patients presented a greater preoperative [FT4] difference than postoperative [FT4]/1.25 combined with a normal [TSH] difference. Based on these observations, the effect of T3 on the value of the [FT4] set point was analyzed and explained from a control theory perspective. (shrink)

This book contains new essays in honor of Melvin J. Lerner, a pioneer in the psychological study of justice. The contributors to this volume are internationally renowned scholars from psychology, business, and law. They examine the role of justice motivation in a wide variety of contexts, including workplace violence, affirmative action programs, helping or harming innocent victims and how people react to their own fate. Contributors explore fundamental issues such as whether people's interest in justice is motivated by self-interest (...) or a genuine concern for the welfare of others, when and why people feel a need to punish transgressors, how a concern for justice emerges during the development of societies and individuals, and the relation of justice motivation to moral motivation. How an understanding of justice motivation can contribute to the amelioration of major social problems is also examined. (shrink)

The revival of interest in pragmatism and its practical relevance for democracy has prompted a reconsideration of John Dewey’s political philosophy. Dewey’s _The Public and Its Problems _ constitutes his richest and most systematic meditation on the future of democracy in an age of mass communication, governmental bureaucracy, social complexity, and pluralism. Drawing on his previous writings and prefiguring his later thinking, Dewey argues for the importance of civic participation and clarifies the meaning and role of the state, the proper (...) relationship between the public and experts, and the source of democracy’s legitimacy. These themes remain as important today as they were when Dewey first engaged them, and this is the work to which scholars consistently turn when assessing Dewey’s conception of democracy and what might be imagined for democracy in our own time. In this carefully annotated edition, Melvin L. Rogers provides an introductory essay that elucidates the philosophical and historical background of _The Public and Its Problems_ while explaining the key ideas of the book. He also provides a biographical outline of Dewey’s life and bibliographical notes to assist student and scholar alike. (shrink)

One approach to the paradoxes of self-referential languages is to allow some sentences to lack a truth value (or to have more than one). Then assigning truth values where possible becomes a fixpoint construction and, following Kripke, this is usually carried out over a partially ordered family of three-valued truth-value assignments. Some years ago Matt Ginsberg introduced the notion of bilattice, with applications to artificial intelligence in mind. Bilattices generalize the structure Kripke used in a very natural way, while making (...) the mathematical machinery simpler and more perspicuous. In addition, work such as that of Yablo fits naturally into the bilattice setting. What I do here is present the general background of bilattices, discuss why they are natural, and show how fixpoint approaches to truth in languages that allow self-reference can be applied. This is not new work, but rather is a summary of research I have done over many years. (shrink)

Bilattices, introduced by M. Ginsberg, constitute an elegant family of multiple-valued logics. Those meeting certain natural conditions have provided the basis for the semantics of a family of logic programming languages. Now we consider further restrictions on bilattices, to narrow things down to logic programming languages that can, at least in principle, be implemented. Appropriate bilattice background information is presented, so the paper is relatively self-contained.

Bilattices, due to M. Ginsberg, are a family of truth value spaces that allow elegantly for missing or conflicting information. The simplest example is Belnap’s four-valued logic, based on classical two-valued logic. Among other examples are those based on finite many-valued logics, and on probabilistic valued logic. A fixed point semantics is developed for logic programming, allowing any bilattice as the space of truth values. The mathematics is little more complex than in the classical two-valued setting, but the result provides (...) a natural semantics for distributed logic programs, including those involving confidence factors. The classical two-valued and the Kripke/Kleene three-valued semantics become special cases, since the logics involved are natural sublogics of Belnap’s logic, the logic given by the simplest bilattice. (shrink)

"This book offers a prophetic vision of art in a digital future.

The variety of semantical approaches that have been invented for logic programs is quite broad, drawing on classical and many-valued logic, lattice theory, game theory, and topology. One source of this richness is the inherent non-monotonicity of its negation, something that does not have close parallels with the machinery of other programming paradigms. Nonetheless, much of the work on logic programming semantics seems to exist side by side with similar work done for imperative and functional programming, with relatively minimal contact (...) between communities. In this paper we summarize one variety of approaches to the semantics of logic programs: that based on fixpoint theory. We do not attempt to cover much beyond this single area, which is already remarkably fruitful. We hope readers will see parallels with, and the divergences from the better known fixpoint treatments developed for other programming methodologies. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to both discuss commands as a species of speech act and to discuss commands within the broader framework of how they are used and ...

Kleene’s well-known strong three-valued logic is shown to be one of a family of logics with similar mathematical properties. These logics are produced by an intuitively natural construction. The resulting logics have direct relationships with bilattices. In addition they possess mathematical features that lend themselves well to semantical constructions based on fixpoint procedures, as in logic programming.

In a forthcoming paper, Walter Carnielli and Abilio Rodrigues propose a Basic Logic of Evidence whose natural deduction rules are thought of as preserving evidence instead of truth. BLE turns out to be equivalent to Nelson’s paraconsistent logic N4, resulting from adding strong negation to Intuitionistic logic without Intuitionistic negation. The Carnielli/Rodrigues understanding of evidence is informal. Here we provide a formal alternative, using justification logic. First we introduce a modal logic, KX4, in which \ can be read as asserting (...) there is implicit evidence for X, where we understand evidence to permit contradictions. We show BLE embeds into KX4 in the same way that Intuitionistic logic embeds into S4. Then we formulate a new justification logic, JX4, in which the implicit evidence motivating KX4 is made explicit. KX4 embeds into JX4 via a realization theorem. Thus BLE has both implicit and explicit possibly contradictory evidence interpretations in a formal sense. (shrink)

Few thinkers exerted a greater influence upon British thought and public policy between 1880 and 1914 than T. H. Green. In his appraisal Richter applies to Green, usually studied as a philosopher, the techniques of analysis taken from sociology and the history of ideas. The result is important both as a study of a man who considerably affected the thought of his time and also as a contribution to the social and intellectual history of Victorian England. The chapter headings include: (...) Idealism and the Crisis of the Evangelical Conscience; Metaphysical Foundations; the Principles of Political Obligation; From the Old Liberalism to the New: Private Property, Capitalism and State Intervention; and the Life of Citizenship. (shrink)

A well-known problem with Hintikka-style logics of knowledge is that of logical omniscience. One knows too much. This breaks down into two subproblems: one knows all tautologies, and one’s knowledge is closed under consequence. A way of addressing the second of these is to move from knowledge simpliciter, to knowledge for a reason. Then, as consequences become ‘further away’ from one’s basic knowledge, reasons for them become more complex, thus providing a kind of resource measurement. One kind of reason is (...) a formal proof. Sergei Artemov has introduced a logic of explicit proofs, LP. I present a semantics for this, based on the idea that it is a logic of knowledge with explicit reasons. A number of fundamental facts about LP can be established using this semantics. But it is equally important to realize that it provides a natural logic of more general applicability than its original provenance, arithmetic provability. (shrink)

Among non-monotonic systems of reasoning, non-monotonic modal logics, and autoepistemic logic in particular, have had considerable success. The presence of explicit modal operators allows flexibility in the embedding of other approaches. Also several theoretical results of interest have been established concerning these logics. In this paper we introduce non-monotonic modal logics based on many-valued logics, rather than on classical logic. This extends earlier work of ours on many-valued modal logics. Intended applications are to situations involving several reasoners, not just one (...) as in the standard development. (shrink)

This is a thorough treatment of first-order modal logic. The book covers such issues as quantification, equality (including a treatment of Frege's morning star/evening star puzzle), the notion of existence, non-rigid constants and function symbols, predicate abstraction, the distinction between nonexistence and nondesignation, and definite descriptions, borrowing from both Fregean and Russellian paradigms.

A sequent calculus of a new sort is extracted from the Prolog program leanTAP. This calculus is sound and complete, even though it lacks almost all structural rules. Thinking of leanTAP as a sequent calculus provides a new perspective on it and, in some ways, makes it easier to understand. It is also easier to verify correctness and completeness of the Prolog implementation. In addition, it suggests extensions to other logics, some of which are considered here.

Contract law doctrines can be ranged along various spectra. One of these spectra runs from the static to the dynamic. A contract law doctrine lies at the static pole of this spectrum if its application turns entirely on what occurred at the moment in time when a contract was formed. A contract law doctrine lies at the dynamic pole if its application turns in significant part on a moving stream of events that precede, follow, or constitute the formation of a (...) contract. Another spectrum runs from the binary to the multifaceted. Contract law doctrines are binary if they organize the experience within their scope into only two categories. Contract law doctrines are multifaceted if they organize the experience within their scope into several categories, including one or more intermediate categories. Classical contract law was a rigid, rather than a supple, instrument. Its rules were often responsive to neither the actual objectives of the parties, the actual facts and circumstances of the partiesâ transaction, nor the dynamic character of contracts. Instead, the rules of classical contract law were centered on a single moment in time, the moment of contract formation. accordingly, classical contract law doctrines were almost wholly static and also tended to be binary. The twentieth century witnessed the development of a modern contract law that has largely overthrown classical contract law. This overthrow has occurred in two ways. To begin with, in many cases modern contract law has reversed or fundamentally modified the rules of classical contract law. More important than the overthrow of specific rules of classical contract law, however, has been the overthrow of the deep structure of classical contract law. Where classical contract law had an overriding preference for rules that were objective and standardized, modern contract law has been highly flexible in adopting rules that are individualized and even subjective. Where classical contract law rules were typically binary, modern contract law rules are often multifaceted. Finally, where classical contract law was largely static, modern contact law is, in large part, dynamic. So, for example, static rules of interpretation have been replaced by dynamic rules that take into account events before and after the moment of contract formation; the static legal-duty rule has withered almost completely away, to be largely replaced by a dynamic modification regime that takes into account the value of ongoing reciprocity; a static judicial review of liquidated damages provisions is giving way to a dynamic review that takes account of the actual loss; and static offer-and-acceptance rules have been replaced by dynamic rules, such as the duty to negotiate in good faith. (shrink)

This vibrant collection of papers by an interdisciplinary group of authors -- psychologists, theologians, and social scientists -- presents brilliant new perspectives on spirituality, ethics, and relationship. In their diversity of views, their Intellectual and spiritual dynamism, the authors bring power and hope to this subject so central to the human experience.

After publishing the first part of Democracy in America, Tocqueville travelled through England and Ireland. With his impressions of the early industrial revolution still fresh, he read and annotated Machiavelli's Florentine Histories. Tocqueville's interest was present-minded: could Florence be used 'as an argument for or against democracy in our time?' Rejecting charges that modern democracies share the defects that bought down the Florentine Republic, Tocqueville contrasted late medieval and modern republicanisms; direct and representative democracies; the politics of city states to (...) those of larger modern nations with substantial urban and rural populations. Comparing renaissance Florence to industrial revolution Manchester and Birmingham led Tocqueville to consider redefining equality in economic rather than purely social terms. These notes suggest that in 1836, he held a view of the relationships between manufacturers and workers different from that of his later chapter 'How Industry could Give Rise to Aristocracy' in the 1840 Democracy. (shrink)

The main thesis of this dissertation is that John Dewey's conception of philosophy began and culminated with his concern about the problem of truth. It is asserted here that Dewey's mature conception of philosophy and his notion of truth may be quite profitable for resolving some of our more recent contemporary philosophical problems. To clarify his mature thoughts about philosophy and truth, this study surveys the stages of Dewey's development during his long life-time of ninety-three years. ;Using a general approach, (...) I trace the historical progression of his thinking and try to show the relevance of his conceptions of philosophy and truth to our contemporary problems. In doing so, I attempt to elucidate the terminological difficulties that he encountered with language while trying to communicate his own concept of philosophy and his notion of truth. Moreover, I examine criteria that may be used to judge Dewey's work in the field of philosophy in the Western tradition. Under the headings of Early, Middle and Later years, I provide a triadic survey of his life-work, focusing on his academic and religious views. My reflections try to provide information concerning the biological, semiotic, and psycholinguistic basis of his perspective, as it eventually evolved into a form of pragmatic naturalism. ;In concluding, I highlight Dewey's belief that the business of philosophy should deal with cultural problems. Focusing on the implications of his matured position, I try to show the importance of his perspective for solving some critical issues of our own time. A careful examination of his logic indicates that open-minded and honest communication must be the keystone to understanding his view. Therefore, I endeavor to illustrate the value of Dewey's mature concept of philosophy and his notion of truth for addressing some of our pressing problems in a practical manner. (shrink)

First we have individual variables, as usual in first-order logics. (We do not have individual constants, but this is a minor point.) The propositional logic LP has justification constants, but in FOLP these are generalized to allow individual variables as arguments. Thus we have as justification constants c, c(x), c(x, y), . . . . Similarly LP has justification variables, but in FOLP these can be parametrized with individual variables p, p(x), p(x, y), . . . . To keep terminology (...) in line with past papers, we will still refer to things as justification constants and justification variables, even though they have structure to them. As in LP, justification terms are built up from justification constants and justification variables using ·, +, ! as usual. In addition there is a new constructor, genx, introduced by Artemov, and there is one further new constructor, exsx, introduced in this paper. If t is a justification term and x is an individual variable, genxt and exsxt are justification terms. An individual variable x is free in a justification term unless it is bound by genx or exsx. More specifically, the free variables of p(x, y, . . .) and of c(x, y, . . .) are {x, y, . . .}, the free variables of s · t and of s + t are the free variables of s together with the free variables of t, the free variables of !s are the free variables of s, and the free variables of genxt and of exsxt are the free variables of t except for x. Formulas are built up from atomic formulas, including ⊥, in the way standard in first-order logic, together with the additional formation rule: t:X is a formula provided t is a justification term, X is a formula, and all free variables of X occur in t. We assume ⊃, ⊥, and ∀ are basic, with other connectives and quantifier defined. The axiomatization used here is a combination of an LP axiomatization and a standard axiomatization of first-order logic, together with a version of the Barcan formula, and one additional axiom that corresponds to the converse Barcan formula.. (shrink)

“The primary purpose of this book has been to provide a single source of containing the basic information about systematic and theoretical psychology which any student of psychology should have. It is mainly directed at the senior undergraduate major and the beginning of the graduate student.”-Publisher.

Justification logics are logics of knowledge in which explicit reasons are formally represented. Standard logics of knowledge have justification logic analogs. Connecting justification logics and logics of knowledge are Realization Theorems. In this paper we give a new, constructive proof of the Realization Theorem connecting S5 and its justification analog, JS5. This proof is, I believe, the simplest in the literature.

A refutation mechanism is introduced into logic programming, dual to the usual proof mechanism; then negation is treated via refutation. A four-valued logic is appropriate for the semantics: true, false, neither, both. Inconsistent programs are allowed, but inconsistencies remain localized. The four-valued logic is a well-known one, due to Belnap, and is the simplest example of Ginsberg’s bilattice notion. An efficient implementation based on semantic tableaux is sketched; it reduces to SLD resolution when negations are not involved. The resulting system (...) can give reasonable answers to queries that involve both negation and free variables. Also it gives the same results as Prolog when there are no negations. Finally, an implementation in Prolog is given. (shrink)

This is an expository paper in which the basic ideas of a family of Justification Logics are presented. Justification Logics evolved from a logic called LP, introduced by Sergei Artemov [1, 3], which formed the central part of a project to provide an arithmetic semantics for propositional intuitionistic logic. The project was successful, but there was a considerable bonus: LP came to be understood as a logic of knowledge with explicit justifications and, as such, was capable of addressing in a (...) natural way long-standing problems of logical omniscience. Since then, LP has become one member of a family of related logics, all logics of knowledge with explicit knowledge terms. In this paper the original problem of intuitionistic foundations is discussed only briefly. We concentrate entirely on issues of reasoning about knowledge. (shrink)

First-order modal logics, as traditionally formulated, are not expressive enough. It is this that is behind the difficulties in formulating a good analog of Herbrand’s Theorem, as well as the well-known problems with equality, non-rigid designators, definite descriptions, and nondesignating terms. We show how all these problems disappear when modal language is made more expressive in a simple, natural way. We present a semantic tableaux system for the enhanced logic, and (very) briefly discuss implementation issues.

We present non-clausal resolution systems for propositional modal logics whose Kripke models do not involve symmetry, and for first order versions whose Kripke models do not involve constant domains. We give systems for K, T , K4 and S4; other logics are also possible. Our systems do not require preliminary reduction to a normal form and, in the first order case, intermingle resolution steps with Skolemization steps.

Mevlin Konner's explanations of why we behave and feel the way we do are relevant to many new stories, both good and bad. He disavows the extreme nature-nurture arguments, and shows how Mother Nature has drawn from both to create the most successful creature on the planet.

The family of all stable models for a logic program has a surprisingly simple overall structure, once two naturally occurring orderings are made explicit. In a so-called knowledge ordering based on degree of definedness, every logic program P has a smallest stable model, sk P — it is the well-founded model. There is also a dual largest stable model, S k P, which has not been considered before. There is another ordering based on degree of truth. Taking the meet and (...) the join, in the truth ordering, of the two extreme stable models sk P and S.. (shrink)

One can add the machinery of relation symbols and terms to a propositional modal logic without adding quantifiers. Ordinarily this is no extension beyond the propositional. But if terms are allowed to be non-rigid, a scoping mechanism (usually written using lambda abstraction) must also be introduced to avoid ambiguity. Since quantifiers are not present, this is not really a first-order logic, but it is not exactly propositional either. For propositional logics such as K, T and D, adding such machinery produces (...) a decidable logic, but adding it to S5 produces an undecidable one. Further, if an equality symbol is in the language, and interpreted by the equality relation, logics from K4 to S5 yield undecidable versions. (Thus transitivity is the villain here.) The proof of undecidability consists in showing that classical first-order logic can be embedded. (shrink)