What enables individually simple insects like ants to act with such precision and purpose as a group? How do trillions of individual neurons produce something as extraordinarily complex as consciousness? What is it that guides self-organizing structures like the immune system, the World Wide Web, the global economy, and the human genome? These are just a few of the fascinating and elusive questions that the science of complexity seeks to answer. In this remarkably accessible and companionable book, leading complex systems (...) scientist Melanie Mitchell provides an intimate, detailed tour of the sciences of complexity, a broad set of efforts that seek to explain how large-scale complex, organized, and adaptive behavior can emerge from simple interactions among myriad individuals. Comprehending such systems requires a wholly new approach, one that goes beyond traditional scientific reductionism and that re-maps long-standing disciplinary boundaries. Based on her work at the Santa Fe Institute and drawing on its interdisciplinary strategies, Mitchell brings clarity to the workings of complexity across a broad range of biological, technological, and social phenomena, seeking out the general principles or laws that apply to all of them. She explores as well the relationship between complexity and evolution, artificial intelligence, computation, genetics, information processing, and many other fields. Richly illustrated and vividly written, Complexity : A Guided Tour offers a comprehensive and eminently comprehensible overview of the ideas underlying complex systems science, the current research at the forefront of this field, and the prospects for the field's contribution to solving some of the most important scientific questions of our time. (shrink)

1. Wesensbetimmung, Grundprobleme und Disziplinen der Philosophie, von J. K. Mader, S 69.-.

Integration und Desintegration sind ein zentrales Thema der Geisteswissenschaften. Auf makropolitischer Ebene gilt das besondere Interesse dem Entstehen und Vergehen von Staaten, entscheiden sich doch hiermit existenzielle Fragen des Seins einer politischen Gemeinschaft. Auf mikropolitischer Ebene geht es um die Frage, inwieweit dem Bürger "aufgegeben" ist, sich in Gesellschaft und Staat zu integrieren. Supranationalisierung und Globalisierung lassen die Kraft des Nationalstaates schwinden. Dem Übergang der Moderne in die Postmoderne entspricht der Übergang von der Welt der Staaten mit ihren durch Grenzen (...) abgeschlossenen Territorien zur Welt der Kontinente, Gemeinschaften und Netzwerke. Doch gibt es viele Stimmen, die meinen, der Staat sei auf absehbare Zeit nicht wegzudenken und als politische Gemeinschaft zu schützen.Werner Mäder ist anderer Auffassung: "Deutschland ist kein Staat mehr..." lautet sein Befund. Der Autor zieht Parallelen zu Hegels Schrift "Kritik der Verfassung Deutschlands" aus dem Jahre 1801 und seinen Kriterien des Staates. Nach Mäder ist das Grundgesetz nur noch eine "Gedankenverfassung", seine fundamentalen Voraussetzungen Staat, Souveränität, Nation, Volk und Demokratie substanziell ausgezehrt. Für Europa bedeutet dies, sich mit eigener Identität selbst zu behaupten, um den Souveränitätsverlust seiner Länder auszugleichen und auf eine neue Multipolarität der internationalen Beziehungen hinzuarbeiten. (shrink)

Demonstrates the dramatic interplay of elements that comprise the concepts of norm, bisexuality, and development.

Our eyes, bodies, and perspectives are constantly shifting as we observe the world. Despite this, we are very good at distinguishing between self-caused visual changes and changes in the environment: the world appears mostly stable despite our visual field moving around. This, it seems, also occurs when we are dreaming. As we visually investigate the dream environment, we track moving objects with our dream eyes, examine objects, and shift focus. These movements, research suggests, are reflected in the rapid movements or (...) saccades of our sleeping eyes. Do we really see the dream world in the same way that we see the real world? If we do, how could dreaming, usually assumed to be mind-generated hallucinations, replicate such an experience? This problem would be deflated if dreams are not hallucinations at all, but rather imagination, illusion or simply unrealistic. I argue that imagination and illusion views do not satisfactorily explain away the problem of vision and action in sleep. The imagination model is not a complete description of dreaming that is consistent with empirical research, and it is unlikely that the visual dream world is an illusion. Given that the dreaming visual experience is most likely active, hallucinatory, and at times a realistic world simulation, there are important implications for our understanding of visual perception and its relationship to movement. Evidence suggests that our dream eyes investigate the dream world as our waking eyes investigate the waking world. If changes to the unconsciously generated dream environment are perceived as external and unintentional while dream body movements are perceived as self-generated and intentional, current theory of visual perception may have to be expanded to account for how the dreaming mind generates a stable world in which we track and visually explore mind-generated objects. (shrink)

The physical sciences include highly developed fields that investigate intensities in the form of intensive quantities like speeds, temperatures, pressures and altitudes. Some contemporary readers of Deleuze interested in the physical sciences at times attribute to Deleuze a common, contemporary scientific concept of intensive magnitude. These readings identify Deleuze's philosophical conception of intensity with an existing scientific conception of intensity. The essay argues that Deleuze does not in fact lift a conception of intensity from the physical sciences to embed it (...) as the fundamental term in his differential ontology. (shrink)

Melanie Sarzano | : In this paper, I compare cases of self-deception and cases of pragmatic encroachment and argue that confronting these cases generates a dilemma about rationality. This dilemma turns on the idea that subjects are motivated to avoid costly false beliefs, and that both cases of self-deception and cases of pragmatic encroachment are caused by an interest to avoid forming costly false beliefs. Even though both types of cases can be explained by the same belief-formation mechanism, only (...) self-deceptive beliefs are irrational: the subjects depicted in high-stakes cases typically used in debates on pragmatic encroachment are, on the contrary, rational. If we find ourselves drawn to this dilemma, we are forced either to accept—against most views presented in the literature—that self-deception is rational or to accept that pragmatic encroachment is irrational. Assuming that both conclusions are undesirable, I argue that this dilemma can be solved. In order to solve this dilemma, I suggest and review several hypotheses aimed at explaining the difference in rationality between the two types of cases, the result of which being that the irrationality of self-deceptive beliefs does not entirely depend on their being formed via a motivationally biased process. | : Dans cet article, je compare les cas classiques de duperie de soi aux cas que l’on trouve dans les débats sur la question de l’empiètement pragmatique et défends l’idée selon laquelle ces deux types de cas peuvent être compris comme étant produits par un même mécanisme visant à éviter la formation de croyances fausses coûteuses. Cette comparaison nous mène naturellement à former un dilemme à propos de la rationalité des croyances. Le dilemme repose sur l’idée que bien que ce mécanisme mène à la formation de croyances irrationnelles dans les cas de duperie de soi, il ne semble pas affecter la rationa-lité du sujet dans les cas d’empiètement pragmatique : alors que les sujets autodupés sont irrationnels, les sujets décrits dans les cas d’empiètement pragmatique ne le sont pas. Pour résoudre ce dilemme sans rejeter les présupposés selon lesquels les croyances issues de la duperie de soi sont irrationnelles et que les cas sur lesquels repose l’empiètement pragmatique sont rationnels, je propose plusieurs hypothèses visant à expliquer cette différence, prouvant ainsi que ce dilemme n’est qu’apparent et que l’irrationalité de la duperie de soi ne peut uniquement dépendre de ce mécanisme sous l’influence de considérations pratiques. (shrink)

Human beings experience themselves through various kinds of collectively experienced time. Medicine that relies upon precarious forms of ancestral or evolutionary explanation generates such collectively experienced forms of time, which are thus essentially politico-medically instituted versions of kin relations. Kin relations structure our ethical relations to each other rather thoroughly, even in Western modernity, especially through legally sanctioned relations. Hence, an ancestral or evolutionary explanation in medicine should be examined for its ethical import via its structuring of etiologically linked kin (...) relations, even if those relations extend beyond the family, people, population or group context back into cosmic and evolutionary origins. (shrink)

From Beauvoir's account in The Second Sex of the upbringing or formation of girls, the chapter extracts her feminist existentialist analysis of the physical and moral orthopedics of girls so as to compare it to Foucault's historical account in Discipline and Punish of the various forms of discipline that have taken children as objects.

The modern idea of progress assumes that time will bring a steady improvement in all things human. This idea was always a contested one. However, since the mid-20th century at the latest philosophical thought about progress has been almost exclusively critical. The present paper introduces the standard arguments of progress’s detractors, particularly the notion that progress should be understood dialectically as the transformation of good intentions into their opposite. It attempts to sketch a more timely conception of progress in opposition (...) to this line of thought. (shrink)

While the Web Ontology Language (OWL) provides a mechanism to import ontologies, this mechanism is not always suitable. Current editing tools present challenges for working with large ontologies an...

This paper examines six cross-sector partnerships in South Africa and Zambia. These partnerships were part of a research study undertaken between 2003 and 2005 and were selected because of their potential to contribute to poverty reduction in their respective countries. This paper examines the context in which the partnerships were established, their governance and accountability mechanisms and the engagement and participation of the partners and the intended beneficiaries in the partnerships. We argue that a partnership approach which has proven successful (...) in one context can be used as a valuable learning resource. However, a partnership's work, which includes all aspects of the partnership and its activities, cannot necessarily be transferred directly to another partnership without a thorough and locally informed analysis of the context in which it is implemented. In addition, we suggest that it is difficult to assess whether the good intentions behind partnerships were translated into real benefits for target groups as effective monitoring and evaluation procedures were not in place in the partnerships studied. Similarly, the absence of regularised governance and accountability systems in partnerships made it difficult to support partner and beneficiary participation and engagement. We conclude that there is a need to move beyond a 'one-size-fits-all' approach to partnerships and that partnership replication should focus more strongly on the transfer of learning about partnership processes instead of simply copying partnership activities. Moreover, the development of stronger mechanisms for assessing and ensuring accountability towards both partners and intended beneficiaries is required if partnerships are to meet their intended objectives. (shrink)

THIS PUBLICATION IS AVAILABLE OPEN ACCESS. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights acknowledges the Right to Know as part of state obligations to combat impunity and thereby protect and promote human rights in the aftermath of “serious crimes under international law”. In light of such an institutionally acknowledged epistemic right of victims, this paper explores the normative foundations of the idea of epistemic reparation in the aftermath of genocide. I argue that such epistemic reparation requires not only fulfilment of (...) the informational needs of victims, survivors and descendants, including access to knowledge about the violations. By taking into account epistemic injuries, which are part and parcel of genocide, it ought to also re-establish victims’ epistemic standing. This is because genocide is enabled, justified and even prescribed through a genocidal epistemology involving the propagation of falsehoods and misinformation about social reality as well as abuses of epistemic authority and epistemic authoritarianism. Hence, epistemic reparation ought to correct the dysfunctional epistemic practices that underlie and sustain a genocidal epistemology. It thereby provides victims, survivors and descendants with epistemic recognition that has been systematically withdrawn from them, making epistemic reparation a crucial element of restorative justice. (shrink)

Research studying the effects of non-financial goals on stakeholder relationships remains inconclusive, with scholars disagreeing on which goals increase or decrease a firm’s proactive stakeholder engagement (PSE). Instead of examining which goals act as forces for good or evil, we shift the focus of recent discussions by emphasizing the mechanisms that can explain the positive and negative stakeholder outcomes of non-financial goals under the umbrella of one theoretical lens. We do so by introducing an ethics of care perspective. Specifically, we (...) first show that four of the five most distinctive non-financial goals of family owners jointly stipulate care-based morality, which likely enhances PSE. However, we subsequently argue that one goal, namely, the wish to exert power and influence, interacts with other goals and related care-based morality to lower PSE. Finally, we show how female family directors temper these interactions. Our insights into the additive and interactive effects of non-financial goals on PSE contribute to corporate social responsibility research, to the organizational goal literature, to family business studies and to work drawing on care ethics in management studies. (shrink)

Nietzsche and Foucault have given us the idea of conducting a philosophical genealogy of a practice that varies across history. Foucault's work also implies that we can view some abstraction as a practice. These points jointly imply that we can conduct a genealogy of “abstractive practices.” Indeed, a good deal of Foucault's work can be understood as exactly this sort of investigation. But a genealogy of abstractive practice raises a difficult methodological problem. This is the problem of how to determine (...) which definitions of abstraction to use, from amongst the various theoretical accounts of abstraction that we find in the history of thought, to craft our genealogy of abstractive practices. In other words, what will count as an abstractive practice for the purpose of conducting such a genealogy will depend on what we identify as abstraction. This article seeks to expose this problem to demonstrate the methodological difficulties that must be confronted in order to steer a path between ignoring the historical-epistemological limits to the kinds of abstraction we can employ at any given present, on the one hand, and having our sensitivity to these limits halt our historical-philosophical reflections on abstraction as a historical practice, on the other. (shrink)

Nishitani deems Nietzsche a nihilist, but they both sought to overcome idealism. This shared commitment has normative and descriptive implications for the relationship between affect and history. Normatively, Nishitani praises Nietzsche for thinking history passionately. Descriptively, this praise suggests a shared belief that affectivity is in some significant respect constituted by historical inheritance. For these reasons, Nietzsche’s conception of affect and his genealogical inquiry can be part of the problem of nihilism but also integral to its solution. I make this (...) case through Nishitani’s analysis of Nietzsche’s historical-existential standpoint. From this standpoint, I revisit the nearly thirty-year debate over Nishitani’s critique of Nietzsche to argue that Nishitani’s view of Nietzsche as a consummate nihilist has a bivalent significance. On the one hand, Nishitani needs Nietzsche’s thought to negate nihilistic conceptions of affect derived from Hegel and Feuerbach. On the other hand, Nietzsche’s negation appears to remain limited by an abstract conception of space, which would impede the full liberation of affect from nihilism. (shrink)

“Aesthetics” is not a concern that figures prominently in Isabelle Stengers’s work and it is not difficult to find the reasons why. Reading the discipline of aesthetics through a historical and systematic perspective derived from Stengers and Alfred North Whitehead, the invention of modern aesthetics as a philosophical discipline in the 18th century can be read as the flipside to “the invention of modern science” described by Stengers in her seminal book with just this title. Understood in this historical sense (...) as the philosophical discipline founded by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten and Immanuel Kant, aesthetics instills and cements what Alfred North Whitehead termed “the bifurcation of nature,” the implicit... (shrink)

In recent years, the established paradigm of the three Rs of animal research—refinement, replacement, and reduction—has come under scrutiny. A crucial weakness in use of the three Rs is uncertainty about how they should be prioritized. Events like pandemics have the power to alter the research landscape, fast‐tracking innovation and setting new precedents. Existential threats can raise perceptions of social benefit and can lower animal‐welfare thresholds. The rush to develop new research models may also undermine progress in reducing or replacing (...) animal models. By circumventing the barrier posed by animal models that are poorly matched to human conditions, new technologies like CRISPR can enhance the refinement component while undermining reduction and replacement. This pandemic has exposed the need for an urgent review of the efficacy of the three Rs, with the potential to establish a new set of protocols for animal research, both inside and beyond the context of an emergency. (shrink)

1. Parmenides bis Hegel -- 2. Das 19. und 20. Jahrhundert.

The paper examines the relation between Foucault’s account of modern race and racism in the "Society Must Be Defended" lectures and his analysis of the emergence of the modern notion of life and its science in The Order of Things . In "Society Must Be Defended ," Foucault uses the term ‘life’ both with respect to pre-modern and modern political regimes, arguing that in the pre-modern eras there was a particular relation of sovereign power to life and death that differs (...) from the relation to life and death which prevails in the modern era. In The Order of Things , Foucault also discusses the concept of life and the historical emergence of the science of life, biology, in the nineteenth century. For Foucault, modern biological racism is a specifically scientific death sentence. The paper argues that the kind of death at issue in this modern racism must be understood in light of the new evolutionary accounts of life as a transorganismic continuity that emerge in the life sciences. (shrink)

Agamemnon’s death cries elicit an elaborate choral debate structured to track and satirize the movement from interventionist impulse to evasion and inaction, and characterized by procedural terminology, the categories speech/delay/action, and self-conscious reflections on its own deliberative practice. These are familiar themes from later strictures of public discourse, in history and political oratory, and from that perspective the dramatic chorus too may be read as a meta-rhetorical comment on ekklesiastic deliberation where logoi and erga fly out of sync. I argue (...) that the inconclusive debate glances beyond its immediate context and resonates with the extra-textual experiences of Aeschylus’ audience. (shrink)

Wenn die Rede auf den Fortschritt kommt, geht es um die Verbesserung der menschlichen Lebensverhältnisse. Doch die Erfahrungen modernen Gesellschaften mit Tyrannei, Kriegen, Wirtschaftskrisen und Umweltzerstörung haben das Vertrauen in die Überwindung natürlicher Abhängigkeiten und sozialer Über erschüttert. Viele sehen heute im Fortschritt eine bloße Illusion oder einen Mythos. Es scheint mir angesichts der allgegenwärtigen scharfen Kritik an der Fortschrittsidee im zeitgenössischen Denken angebracht, von einer Psychologie des Fortschritts zu sprechen. Damit meine ich nicht das Fühlen und Verhalten, das Fortschritt (...) bedingt oder umgekehrt durch ihn hervorgerufen wird; ich meine die Psychologisierung des Fortschritts: die Annahme, er sei eine reine Kopfsache, etwas Ausgedachtes oder Erhofftes, das sich durch seine Projektion auf historische oder soziale Prozesse zu einer gefahrvollen Erzählung verfestigt. "Psychologisierung des Fortschritts" ist also meine Chiffre für die projektivistische Fortschrittskritik, die ich hier ihrerseits kritisiere und der ich ein kulturalistisches Menschenbild entgegensetze. (shrink)

In _Jain Approaches to Plurality_ Melanie Barbato offers a new perspective on the Jain teaching of plurality and how it allowed Jains to engage with other discourses from Indian inter-school philosophy to global interreligious dialogue.

This article describes our efforts to screen and enrol clinical trial participants conscientiously in the COVID-19 pandemic setting. We present the standard screening and enrolment process prior to, and our process of adapting to, the pandemic. Our goal was to develop a way to screen and enrol people for clinical trials that was both equitable and effective. In addition, we outline the steps our research department took to ensure that ethical, clinical and logistical factors were considered when matching a patient (...) to a clinical trial. (shrink)

The National Science Foundation (NSF) evaluates grant proposals based on two criteria: intellectual merit and broader impacts. NSF gives applicants wide latitude to choose among a number of broader impacts, which include both benefits for the scientific community and benefits for society. This paper considers whether including potential societal benefits in the Broader Impacts Criterion leads to enhanced benefits for society. One prerequisite for realizing societal benefit is to transfer research results to potential users in a meaningful format. To determine (...) whether researchers who discuss broader impacts for society are more likely to engage in broad dissemination activities beyond the scientific publication, I analysed proposed broader impacts statements from recent award abstracts. Although 43% of researchers discussed potential benefits for society, those researchers were no more likely to propose dissemination of results to potential users than researchers who only discussed broader impacts for science. These findings suggest that considering potential societal benefit as a broader impact may not lead to more actual societal benefits and that many potentially useful results may not be disseminated beyond the scientific community. I conclude with policy recommendations that could increase the likelihood of realizing potential societal benefits from academic research. (shrink)

Many researchers have documented how AI and data driven technologies have the potential to have profound effects on our lives—in ways that make these technologies stand out from those that went before. Around the world, we are seeing a significant growth in interest and investment in AI in healthcare. This has been coupled with rising concerns about the ethical implications of these technologies and an array of ethical guidelines for the use of AI and data in healthcare has arisen. Nevertheless, (...) the question of if and how AI and data technologies can be ethical remains open to debate. This paper aims to contribute to this debate by considering the wide range of implications that have been attributed to these technologies and asking whether current ethical guidelines take these factors into account. In particular, the paper argues that while current ethics guidelines for AI in healthcare effectively account for the four key issues identified in the ethics literature (transparency; fairness; responsibility and privacy), they have largely neglected wider issues relating to the way in which these technologies shape institutional and social arrangements. This, I argue, has given current ethics guidelines a strong focus on evaluating the impact of these technologies on the individual, while not accounting for the powerful social shaping effects of these technologies. To address this, the paper proposes a Multiscale Ethics Framework, which aims to help technology developers and ethical evaluations to consider the wider implications of these technologies. (shrink)

This book sets out to generate new ways of reflecting ethically about the purposes and values of contemporary higher education in relation to agency, learning, public values and democratic life, and the pedagogies which support these.

We examine the relation between worker substance abuse and workplace fraud in a sample of medical doctors. Relative to their peers, we observe that doctors engaging in substance abuse are between 50 and 100 times more likely to commit fraud in a given year. This result is consistent with research suggesting that substance abuse both creates financial pressures and impairs the functioning of cognitive self-regulatory mechanisms. Our results are robust in within-subject tests and between-subject tests, as well as in tests (...) using instrumental variables that exploit exogenous variation in the state-level availability of opioids, a commonly abused substance. (shrink)