This book is a defense of the methods of analytic philosophy against a recent empirical challenge to the soundness of those methods. The challenge is raised by practitioners of “experimental philosophy” and concerns the extent to which analytic philosophy relies on intuition—in particular, the extent to which analytic philosophers treat intuitions as evidence in arguing for philosophical conclusions. Experimental philosophers say that analytic philosophers place a great deal of evidential weight on people’s intuitions about hypothetical cases and thought experiments. This (...) book argues that this view of traditional philosophical method is a myth, part of “metaphilosophical folklore.” Analytic philosophy makes regular use of hypothetical examples and thought experiments, but philosophers argue for their claims about what is true or not true in these examples and thought experiments. It is these arguments, not intuitions, that are treated as evidence for the claims. The book discusses xphi and some recent xphi studies; critiques a variety of other metaphilosophical claims; examines such famous arguments as Gettier’s refutation of the JTB theory and Kripke’s Gödel Case argument against descriptivism about proper names, and shows that they rely on reasoning rather than intuition; and finds existing critiques of xphi, the “Multiple Concepts” and “Expertise” replies, to be severely lacking. (shrink)

Originally published in 1973, this book shows that methods developed for the semantics of systems of formal logic can be successfully applied to problems about the semantics of natural languages; and, moreover, that such methods can take account of features of natural language which have often been thought incapable of formal treatment, such as vagueness, context dependence and metaphorical meaning. Parts 1 and 2 set out a class of formal languages and their semantics. Parts 3 and 4 show that these (...) formal languages are rich enought to be used in the precise description of natural languages. Appendices describe some of the concepts discussed in the text. (shrink)

Reductionist forms of moral realism, such as naturalist realism, are often thought immune to epistemological objections that have been raised against nonnaturalist realism in the form of reliability worries or evolutionary debunking arguments. This article establishes that reductionist realist views can only explain the reliability of our moral beliefs at the cost of incurring repugnant first-order conclusions.

Spivak translates Derrida’s “il n’y a pas de hors-texte” as “there is nothing outside the text.” By considering how the aphorism works within his study of Rousseau on sexual and textual supplements, and by reviewing related expressions in French, a mistranslation is revealed. This is not a simple error, however. The distortion is generated by Derrida’s own broader context. We must not only distinguish signification from reference but also place the aphorism within Derrida’s allusion, in the first part of Of (...) Grammatology, to an all-embracing arche-writing. The paper ends in thus opening out the discussion of a textual “inside” or “outside.”. (shrink)

EDITOR’S ABSTRACTIn this article, Huang provides a historical account of the way intellectuals have conceptualized democracy, representative assemblies, and political parties from the end of the Qing dynasty to the beginning of the Republican period. He outlines thirteen items that characterize Chinese democratic thought during this period, before tracing the historical origins of each.

Gegründet im Jahr 1859, zählt die Juristische Gesellschaft zu Berlin zu den ältesten ihrer Art in Europa und blickt auf eine lange Tradition zurück. In der Schriftenreihe der Juristischen Gesellschaft zu Berlin erscheinen seit 1959 ausgewählte Beiträge aus dem reichhaltigen Vortrags- und Veranstaltungsprogramm der Gesellschaft mit dem Ziel, der juristischen Wissenschaft und Praxis in der Hauptstadt ein anspruchsvolles Forum zu bieten.

In this article I construe Russell's definite description notation as a fragment of an "ideal language"– a language in which, as Russell puts it in the "Logical Atomism" lectures, "the words in a proposition correspond one by one with the components of the corresponding fact." Russell's notation – containing as it does variables, quantifiers and the identity sign – commits him to an ontology that is lavish indeed. It thus conflicts with the spirit of the theory of descriptions, which is (...) developed in the service of ontological frugality. I make use of arguments derived from the Tractatus to show that an ideal language need not contain logical signs. I thus defend the spirit of the theory of descriptions while departing from its letter. (shrink)

Excerpt from Asthetik und Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft: In den Grundzugen Dargestellt Dies Buch ist eigentlich schon seit zwei Jahren fertig. Hemmungen und Ablenkungen haben die Veroffentlichung bis heute hintangehalten. Inzwischen sind einige Systeme der Asthetik und sehr viele Einzeluntersuchungen hervorgetreten. Sie wurden mit dem lebhaftesten Gefuhl der Erlcenntlichkeit benutzt, soweit der schon ge spannte Rahmen es erlaubte; aber gemalz dem Charakter dieser Darstellung, die nur Grundzuge bietet, habe ich es vermieden, mich des naheren mit den zufallig jungsten und gerade jetzt bekanntesten (...) Theorien auseinanderzusetzen. Fur die bis ins Einzelste dringende Erorterung scheint mir eine Zeitschrift geeigneter: die soeben begrundete Zeitschrift fur Asthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschafk wird solchen Forderungen des Tages besser dienen konnen. Ferner habe ich mir im Hinblick auf jene Bucher ernstlich die Frage vorgelegt, ob mein Versuch uberflussig geworden sei. Aus mehreren Grunden glaubte ich doch, verneinend antworten zu durfen. Zunachst tritt die Bemuhung um das Ganze des Gegenstandes hier offenkundiger hervor als in den ubrigen Werken der neueren Literatur. lm vollen BewuBtsein der Tatsache, daBeine umfassende Asthetik aus der Feder eines Mannes ebenso luckenhaft ausfallen mu Bwie etwa die von einem und demselben Autor geschriebene -l(unstgeschichtei, wagte ich das Unternehmen, weil der Vorteil einheitlicher Auffassung mir groBer schien als die unvermeidlichen schaden. jetzt, wo ich denselben Gegenstand in anderer Gliederung vortrage, sehe ich, an wie vielen stellen mir nicht alles nach Wunsch gegluckt ist. Man vollbringt eben selten die Bucher, die man will. Man denkt sie sich bergan, und nachher bleiben sie unbeweglich auf der Ebene. Die ffauptschuld tragt der Geist unseres Zeitalters der Mittelbarkeit, in dem die Beziehung zum Leben zusammenschrumpft und fast nur noch uber Gelesenes gelesen, uber Geschriebenes geschrieben, uber Gesprochenes gesprochen wird. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.". (shrink)

Achieving judgment -- In sensible judgment -- Sentencing -- Dissenting -- Making judgments -- Judging as right -- Living on the premises -- Inferring, judging, arguing -- Questioning critique -- Sting of reason -- Critique's mystique -- Enigma absolute -- Moving establishment -- Being nomadic -- Chasing after modernity -- When to forget.

This title from the De Gruyter Book Archive has been digitized in order to make it available for academic research. It was originally published under National Socialism and has to be viewed in this historical context. Learn more. >.