While the conceptual depths of Aldo Leopold’s land ethic have been limned by environmental ethicists, the relevance of his philosophy to ecologicalrestoration—an applied environmental science—is less well known. I interpret some of his contributions to ecological restoration by framing his work within an expanded evolutionary frame. I especially emphasize the importance of natural beauty to his thinking. Recontextualized as a manifestation of emergent evolutionary complexity, the beauty of nature is fundamental not only to strong ecological restoration, but to reframing (...) our own self-conceptualizations—that is, the human place in the larger order of nature. (shrink)

In order to contribute to the consolidation in the field ofPositive Psychology, we reinvestigated the factor structure of top 10 positive emotions of Barbara Fredrickson. Former research in experimental settings resulted in a three-cluster solution, which we tested withexploratoryandconfirmatorymethodology against different factor models. Within our non-experimental data (N= 312), statistical evidence is presented, advocating for a single factor model of the 10 positive emotions. Different possible reasons for the deviating results are discussed, as well as the theoretical significance to various (...) subfields inPositive Psychology(e.g., therapeutical interventions). Furthermore, the special role ofawewithin the study and its implications for further research in the field are discussed. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION It is a commonplace to observe that the left-Hegelian Max Stirner is little-known.gure in the history of political and philosophical thought. However, that obscurity should not be exaggerated. The author of Der Einzige und sein Eigentum is not only familiar to certain rather specialised and largely academic circles-those with an interest in Hegelianism, for example, or in the early intellectual development of Karl Marx -he is also, and more widely, known as a member of, and in.uence upon, the anarchist (...) tradition. Stirner's best-known work is often excerpted in anthologies of anarchist writings, and his name is regularly included as part of the modern pantheon in historically orientated surveys of anarchist thought. (shrink)

There had been interesting interactions between philosophical reflections, technical developments and the work of artists, poets and designers, starting especially in the 1950s and 1960s with a stimulating cell in Stuttgart and Ulm in Germany spreading mutual international interactions. The paper aims to describe the philosophical background of Max Bense with his research on the intellectual history of mathematics and the upcoming studies on technology and cybernetics. Together with communication theories and semiotics, new aesthetics such as cybernetic aesthetics had been (...) worked out, based on the notions of information and sign. This background stimulated international students, artists and researchers from different creative disciplines for methodical approaches leading to first computer art experiments. The interrelations in these fields with Latin America are in the focus of these studies. Students, artists, and poets from Latin America, especially Brazil, came to Germany for studies and exhibitions in the creative scientific cell around Max Bense. Some of them stayed in Europe, but the exchange developed also in the opposite direction, traveling to and working in Latin America. Some of those fruitful international interrelations will be described and reflected. (shrink)

How has the concept of wild nature changed over the millennia? And what have been the environmental consequences? In this broad-ranging book Max Oelschlaeger argues that the idea of wilderness has reflected the evolving character of human existence from Paleolithic times to the present day. An intellectual history, it draws together evidence from philosophy, anthropology, theology, literature, ecology, cultural geography, and archaeology to provide a new scientifically and philosophically informed understanding of humankind's relationship to nature. Oelschlaeger begins by examining the (...) culture of prehistoric hunter-gatherers, whose totems symbolized the idea of organic unity between humankind and wild nature, and idea that the author believes is essential to any attempt to define human potential. He next traces how the transformation of these hunter-gatherers into farmers led to a new awareness of distinctions between humankind and nature, and how Hellenism and Judeo-Christianity later introduced the unprecedented concept that nature was valueless until humanized. Oelschlaeger discusses the concept of wilderness in relation to the rise of classical science and modernism, and shows that opposition to "modernism" arose almost immediately from scientific, literary, and philosophical communities. He provides new and, in some cases, revisionist studies of the seminal American figures Thoreau, Muir, and Leopold, and he gives fresh readings of America's two prodigious wilderness poets Robinson Jeffers and Gary Snyder. He concludes with a searching look at the relationship of evolutionary thought to our postmodern effort to reconceptualize ourselves as civilized beings who remain, in some ways, natural animals. (shrink)

My aim in what follows is to provide and criticise a consistent account of Stirnerian egoism. Despite the many obscurities and complexities surrounding Stirner's conception of self‐interested action, a detailed examination of The Ego and Its Own does, I believe, offer us an interpretation that remains true to the overall aims of the book. My main concern throughout will be to focus on the interpretation of Stirner as a psychological egoist. I believe that the textual evidence in favour of viewing (...) Stirner's brand of egoism in these terms is overwhelming. The result of this exegesis is at the same time a reply to David Leopold's claim that, in The Ego and Its Own, the evidence for Stirner's commitment to this version of egoism is scarce and unconvincing. If my understanding of Stirner's book is correct, his advocacy of psychological egoism is an unwelcome consequence for the Stirnerian viewpoint, given the weaknesses of psychological egoism as a theory of human motivation. It is also damaging for Stirner's conception of selfhood. (shrink)

Postmodernism -- Classical pragmatism : waiting at the end of the road -- Pragmatism, postmodernism, and global citizenship -- Classical pragmatism, postmodernism, and neopragmatism -- Technology -- Classical pragmatism and communicative action : Jürgen Habermas -- From critical theory to pragmatism : Andrew Feenberg -- A neo-Heideggerian critique of technology : Albert Borgmann -- Doing and making in a democracy : John Dewey -- The environment -- Nature as culture : John Dewey and Aldo Leopold -- Green pragmatism : (...) reals without realism, ideals without idealism -- Classical pragmatism -- What was Dewey's magic number? -- Cultivating a common faith : Dewey's religion -- Beyond the epistemology industry : Dewey's theory of inquiry -- The homo faber debate in Dewey and Max Scheler -- Productive pragmatism : habits as artifacts in Peirce and Dewey. (shrink)

The book "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience" is an engaging criticism of cognitive neuroscience from the perspective of a Wittgensteinian philosophy of ordinary language. The authors' main claim is that assertions like "the brain sees" and "the left hemisphere thinks" are integral to cognitive neuroscience but that they are meaningless because they commit the mereological fallacy—ascribing to parts of humans, properties that make sense to predicate only of whole humans. The authors claim that this fallacy is at the heart of Cartesian (...) dualism, implying that current cognitive neuroscientists are Cartesian dualists. Against this claim, we argue that the fallacy cannot be committed within Cartesian dualism either, for this doctrine does not allow for an intelligible way of asserting that a soul is part of a human being. Also, the authors' Aristotelian essentialistic outlook is at odds with their Wittgensteinian stance, and we were unconvinced by their case against explanatory reductionism. Finally, although their Wittgensteinian stance is congenial with radical behaviorism, their separation between philosophy and science seems less so because it is based on a view of philosophy as a priori. The authors' emphasis on the a priori, however, does not necessarily commit them to rationalism if it is restricted to conceptual or analytical truths. (shrink)

A variety of theoretical frameworks predict the resemblance of behaviors between two people engaged in communication, in the form of coordination, mimicry, or alignment. However, little is known about the time course of the behavior matching, even though there is evidence that dyads synchronize oscillatory motions (e.g., postural sway). This study examined the temporal structure of nonoscillatory actions—language, facial, and gestural behaviors—produced during a route communication task. The focus was the temporal relationship between matching behaviors in the interlocutors (e.g., facial (...) behavior in one interlocutor vs. the same facial behavior in the other interlocutor). Cross-recurrence analysis revealed that within each category tested (language, facial, gestural), interlocutors synchronized matching behaviors, at temporal lags short enough to provide imitation of one interlocutor by the other, from one conversational turn to the next. Both social and cognitive variables predicted the degree of temporal organization. These findings suggest that the temporal structure of matching behaviors provides low-level and low-cost resources for human interaction. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION: Capgras delusion is sometimes defined as believing that close relatives have been replaced by strangers. But such replacement beliefs also occur in response to encountering an acquaintance, or the voice of a familiar person, or a pet, or some personal possession. All five scenarios involve believing something familiar has been replaced by something unfamiliar. METHODS: We evaluate the proposal that these five kinds of delusional belief should count as subtypes of the same delusion. RESULTS: Personally familiar stimuli activate the (...) sympathetic nervous system (SNS) much more strongly than unfamiliar stimuli. In Capgras delusion, this difference is absent, prompting the delusional idea that a familiar person is actually a stranger. We suggest this absence of an effect of familiarity on SNS response will occur in all five scenarios and will prompt the idea that the familiar has been replaced by the unfamiliar. CONCLUSIONS: We propose that: (a) all five scenarios be referred to as subtypes of Capgras delusion; (b) in all five, ideas about replacement are prompted by weakness of SNS responses to familiar stimuli; (c) this is insufficient to generate delusion. For a delusional idea to become a belief, a second factor (impaired hypothesis evaluation) must also be present. (shrink)

These essays are intended to illustrate various ways in which ideas about language may be used to clarify philosophic problems. They contain careful interpretations and criticisms of theories of language.

To be able to produce and understand metaphorical statements is nothing much to boast about: these familiar skills, which children seem to acquire as they learn to talk, are perhaps no more remarkable than our ability to tell and to understand jokes. How odd then that it remains difficult to explain what we do in grasping metaphorical statements. In a provocative paper, "What Metaphors Mean,"1 Donald Davidson has recently charged many students of metaphor, ancient and modern, with having committed a (...) "central mistake." According to him, there is "error and confusion" in claiming "that a metaphor has, in addition to its literal sense or meaning, another sense or meaning." The guilty include "literary critics like Richards, Empson, and Winters; philosophers from Aristotle to Max Black; psychologists from Freud and earlier to Skinner and later; and linguists from Plato to Uriel Weinreich and George Lakoff." Good company, if somewhat mixed. The error to be extirpated is the "idea that a metaphor has a special meaning". If Davidson is right, much that has been written about metaphor might well be consigned to the flames. Even if he proves to be wrong, his animadversions should provoke further consideration of the still problematic modus operandi of metaphor. · 1. In "What Metaphors Mean," Critical Inquiry 5 : 31-47. All further references in text. Max Black is Susan Linn Sage professor of philosophy and humane letters emeritus at Cornell University and senior member of the Cornell program on science, technology, and society. His many influential works include Models and Metaphors, A Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, and, most recently, Caveats and Critiques. During the fall of 1978 he was Tarner Lecturer at Cambridge University and is currently preparing a book on rationality based on those lectures. (shrink)

Population counts and longitude and latitude coordinates were estimated for the 50 largest cities in the United States by computational linguistic techniques and by human participants. The mathematical technique Latent Semantic Analysis applied to newspaper texts produced similarity ratings between the 50 cities that allowed for a multidimensional scaling (MDS) of these cities. MDS coordinates correlated with the actual longitude and latitude of these cities, showing that cities that are located together share similar semantic contexts. This finding was replicated using (...) a first‐order co‐occurrence algorithm. The computational estimates of geographical location as well as population were akin to human estimates. These findings show that language encodes geographical information that language users in turn may use in their understanding of language and the world. (shrink)

Are there universals of reading? There are three ways of construing this question. Is the region of the brain where reading is implemented identical regardless of what writing system the reader uses? Is the mental information-processing system used for reading the same regardless of what writing system the reader uses. Do the word's writing systems share certain universal features? Dehaene offers affirmative answers to all three questions in his book. Here I suggest instead that the answers should be negative. And (...) I ask: if reading is not universal in any sense, what does this imply about Dehaene's Neuronal Recycling hypothesis for reading? (shrink)

This paper develops a critique of the concept of ‘ethical identity’ as this has been used recently to distinguish between ‘cynical’ and ‘authentic’ forms of corporate responsibility. Taking as our starting point Levinas’ demanding view of responsibility as ‘following the assignation of responsibility for my neighbour’, we use a case study of a packaging company—PackCo—to argue that a concern with being seen and/or seeing oneself as responsible should not be confused with actual responsibility. Our analysis of the case points first (...) to the allure of programmes of strategic corporate responsibility and the ways in which, through identification, they can provide a tacit form of moral sanction to managers in their aggressive pursuit of profit. It then contrasts the responses of different managers to negative staff feedback to illustrate the difference between managers’ attempts to defend their identity of being ‘responsible’ managers, and responsible conduct itself. The paper concludes that a potent danger of programmes of corporate responsibility is that they allow managers to deceive not just others, but also themselves in relation to the exercise of responsibility. (shrink)

Nietzsche no perdió la ocasión de menospreciar a Mill como el típico inglés de mentalidad pasiva, en cambio los intérpretes actuales de Nietzsche son cautelosos en este aspecto, pues el filósofo alemán leyó muy minuciosamente a Mill, en particular su obra Sobre la libertad. Cuando él propicia que Zaratustra hable acerca de «el más frío de todos los monstruos fríos», lo hace con una promesa de futuro: «Allí, donde el Estado acaba, ahí comienza el ser humano que no es superfluo (...) […]. Allí, donde el Estado acaba, — ¡miradme de este modo hacia allá hermanos míos! ¿No los veis, al arcoíris y los puentes del suprahumano?». El presente trabajo establece una comparativa entre la visión de Dios y del Estado en la época moderna y la reflexión que hace Friedrich Nietzsche en Así habló Zaratustra acerca del Estado como algo monstruoso. Para este propósito se utilizarán respectivamente pasajes de la obra de Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Arthur Schonpenhauer, Friedrich Leopold Stolberg, Karl Marx, Max Sterner, Wilhelm von Humboldt y John Stuart Mill. (shrink)

A recent article in this journal (Patterson & Plaut, 2009) argued that cognitive neuropsychology has told us very little over the past 30 or 40 years about “how the brain accomplishes its cognitive business.” This may well be true, but it is not important, because the principal aim of cognitive neuropsychology is not to learn about the brain. Its principal aim is instead to learn about the mind, that is, to elucidate the functional architecture of cognition. I show that this (...) is so (a) via extensive quotations from leading figures in this field and (b) by analysis of the subject matter of articles in the leading journal in the field, Cognitive Neuropsychology. Recent reviews of the past 25 years of work in this field (Coltheart & Caramazza, 2006) have concluded that cognitive neuropsychology has told us much about the functional architecture of cognition in a variety of cognitive domains. Patterson and Plaut (2009) did not consider this aim of cognitive neuropsychology. Therefore, their conclusions that cognitive neuropsychology has not been successful, and that this is because the particular methods it uses are flawed, are not justified. (shrink)

The question posed by Dunn and Kirsner (D&K) is an instance of a more general one: What can we infer from data? One answer, if we are talking about logically valid deductive inference, is that we cannot infer theories from data. A theory is supposed to explain the data and so cannot be a mere summary of the data to be explained. The truth of an explanatory theory goes beyond the data and so is never logically guaranteed by the data. (...) This is not just a point about cognitive neuropsychology, or even about psychology in general. It is a familiar point about all science. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Causality is a concept which is sometimes claimed to be easy to illustrate, but hard to explain. It is not quite clear whether the former part of this claim is as obvious as the latter one. I will not present any specific theory of causation. Our aim is much less ambitious; to investigate the formal counterparts of causal relations between events, i.e. to propose a formal framework which enables us to construct metamathematical counterparts of causal relations between singular events. This (...) should be a good starting point to define formal counterparts for concepts like causal law, causal explanation and so on. (shrink)

In his famous work on the stranger, Alfred Schutz focuses on the interpretative discrepancies between in-groups and out-groups from the per­spective of a stranger approaching a new group. In doing so, Schutz emphasizes that strangers can overcome their strangeness within a social group by adapting to the prevalent cultural patterns. Shifting the perspective from the stranger to the in-group this essay aims to argue that the experience of the Other’s strangeness due to a discrepancy of interpretative schemes is only one (...) dimension of how the stranger is perceived in everyday life. A second dimension can be derived from Schutz’ work on appresentation. This essay will follow four analytical steps. First, this essay summarizes the Schutzian approach on perceiving the Other as a taken-for-granted part of everyday life within an assumed intersubjective understanding based on an assumed reciprocity of perspectives. Referring to Eberle’s description of an irreciprocity of perspectives, the second section analyzes the Schutzian stranger based on an intersubjective understanding. The third section then focuses on the appresentational pro­cesses of perceiving the stranger in everyday life. By using Goffman’s distinction between virtual and actual social identity, the interplay of categorizing and experiencing the Other in everyday life can be described. Finally, considering the question of how it comes that people can find themselves strangers in their own society, this paper closes by merging the argumentation with a description of the Schutzian perspective on the processes of stigmatization. (shrink)