Many philosophers have claimed that relying on the testimony of others in normative questions is in some way problematic. In this paper, I consider whether we should be troubled by deference in democratic politics. I argue that deference is less problematic in impure cases of political deference, and most non-ideal cases of political deference are impure. To establish the second point, I rely on empirical research from political psychology. I also outline two principled reasons why we should expect political deference (...) to be untroubling: political problems are difficult and require a division of epistemic labour; furthermore, there is value in exercising epistemic solidarity with those one shares an identity or interests with. (shrink)

In our contemporary world, the rights of nature have become an important legal device for environmental protection. Some of the most influential rights of nature frameworks can be found in non-Western contexts and have been strongly influenced by ecocentric accounts of nature. This article addresses the question of whether rights of nature can be implemented in Western contexts as well, focusing in particular on Europe. It first examines ecocentric justifications of the rights of nature and discusses two possible non-ecocentric alternatives. (...) Second, two models for implementing rights of nature—the nature’s rights model and the legal personhood model—are compared to demonstrate how different combinations of elements from both models can fit different socio-cultural contexts, including Western ones. (shrink)

This book offers a systematic and up-to-date account of the landscape of contemporary epistemology. It presupposes only a minimum of prior philosophical knowledge, and includes an account of the logical and conceptual tools needed for philosophical analysis. Focuses on the writings and ideas of W. Alston, R. Audi, L. BonJour, R. Chisholm, A. Goldman. H. Kornboith, K. Lehrer. A. Plantinga, W. V. Quine, E. Sosa, and B Stroud, among others; links particular theories and arguments to their chief proponents and critics.

Psychiatric research is in crisis because of repeated failures to discover new drugs for mental disorders. Lack of measurement validity could partly account for these failures. If researchers do not actually measure the effects of drugs on the disorders they aim to investigate, one should expect suboptimal treatment outcomes. I argue that this is the case, focusing on depression, and fear & anxiety disorders. In doing so, I show how psychiatric research illustrates a more general phenomenon that I call “validity (...) drift.” A validity drift occurs when, in the course of developing new measurement procedures, researchers end up studying something different from what they originally aimed to study. I analyze the different ways in which scientists attempt to validate procedures for measuring mental disorders for the purpose of testing drugs in animal models. I show how those validation efforts might fail, thereby leading to validity drifts. Overall, this analysis highlights the complex interplay between the development of new measurement procedures, their calibration, and scientific theories of the target phenomena. (shrink)

In this article, I first analyze and assess the epistemological and semantic status of canonical value-range equations in the formal language of Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. I subsequently scrutinize the relation between (a) his informal, metalinguistic stipulation in Grundgesetze I, Section 3, and (b) its formal counterpart, which is Basic Law V. One point I argue for is that the stipulation in Section 3 was designed not only to fix the references of value-range names, but that it was probably also (...) intended to play a regulative role with an eye to Basic Law V. I further intend to shed new light on the status of Frege’s identification of the truth-values with their unit classes in Grundgesetze I, Section 10 and determine its place and importance in his overall logicist project. In a subsequent section, I first discuss the hypothetical extendability of the logical system of Grundgesetze. In what follows, I analyze the incompleteness of that system—were it not inconsistent and hence trivially complete—by focusing on the role of the definite description operator and the axiom governing it (= Basic Law VI) as well as on the role of the application operator. The latter is defined by means of the former. I further comment on the redundancy of an axiom that could be designed to supplement Basic Law VI by incorporating the second clause of Frege’s two-part elucidation of the description operator. I argue that although it seems likely that Basic Law VI could have been shown to be dispensable in Grundgesetze, Frege would probably have been reluctant to dispense with it, despite his commitment to axiomatic parsimony. In my view, the reason is that he considers it essential that every primitive function-name of his formal language be governed and grounded by a basic law that is tailored to the nature and the role of the primitive name occurring at a key point in the law. Toward the end of the article, I propose solutions to two problems with Frege’s use of “=” in the concept-script sentences that result from his definitions involving the replacement of the double stroke of definition with the judgment-stroke. I conclude the article with a summary of the main results that I have achieved. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

The conflict over the classic problem of philosophical anthropology, i. e., what man actually is, is not only a conflict about what – X – determines something to be human. It also requires clarification of the manner in which something is determined to be human by the X in question. There being different options for the latter, the classic anthropological conflict concerns not only definitions of being human, but also models of being human. The present paper investigates four such models: (...) the addition model, the interior model, the privation model, and the transformation model. While the first will serve as a baseline for comparison, the three other models will, in order to escape the danger of making too formal an argument, be discussed exemplarily, i. e. by focusing in each case on a certain proponent of the respective model. Those proponents will be Martin Heidegger for the interior model, Arnold Gehlen for the privation model, and Helmuth Plessner for the transformation model. (shrink)

Having a confirmation bias sometimes leads us to hold inaccurate beliefs. So, the puzzle goes: why do we have it? According to the influential argumentative theory of reasoning, confirmation bias emerges because the primary function of reason is not to form accurate beliefs, but to convince others that we’re right. A crucial prediction of the theory, then, is that confirmation bias should be found only in the reasoning domain. In this article, we argue that there is evidence that confirmation bias (...) does exist outside the reasoning domain. This undermines the main evidential basis for the argumentative theory of reasoning. In presenting the relevant evidence, we explore why having such confirmation bias may not be maladaptive. (shrink)

Tradition is a complex phenomenon of which we can find a multiplicity of conceptualizations in the philosophical, sociological, anthropological, and economic literature. In this paper, I offer both a critical and a constructive contribution to answering the question of how tradition should be conceptualized. In the critical part, I argue against attempts to construct a unified conception of tradition. In the constructive part, I discuss three taxonomies proposed in the literature and then develop an analytical grid for conceptions of tradition (...) as an alternative. This analytical grid is based on a sample of 28 accounts of tradition sourced from the contemporary scholarly literature, and makes use of seven dimensions to distinguish among these conceptions. (shrink)

When discussing the philosophical question of the relation between mind and nature, dualistic approaches are often contrasted with scientistic approaches. However, mind can be situated in nature in a non-scientistic manner and outside of nature in a non-dualistic manner. John McDowell represents the first approach, as he connects mind to our second nature. In his attempt to specify the categorial relation between first and second nature, McDowell finds himself in a dilemma which cannot be solved within his framework. The second (...) approach is represented by Nicolai Hartmann, for whom mind does not belong to nature, but to the real world. Hartmann’s ontology of layers is able to avoid McDowell’s dilemma and the unity of the real world is made intelligible. (shrink)

In der Reihe werden herausragende monographische Untersuchungen und Sammelbände zu allen Aspekten der Philosophie Kants veröffentlicht, ebenso zum systematischen Verhältnis seiner Philosophie zu anderen philosophischen Ansätzen in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Veröffentlicht werden Studien, die einen innovativen Charakter haben und ausdrückliche Desiderate der Forschung erfüllen. Die Publikationen repräsentieren damit den aktuellsten Stand der Forschung.

The Gratitude Questionnaire-Six Item Form (GQ-6; McCullough et al., 2002) is a well-established instrument for measuring gratitude. Recently, the Multi-Component Gratitude Measure (MCGM) was developed as a more holistic approach (Morgan et al., 2017). While the GQ-6 mainly focuses on the emotional component of gratitude, the MCGM encompasses conceptual, attitudinal and behavioral aspects. As of today, there is no validated German measure for gratitude. In order to close that research gap, the present study focused on validating the German versions of (...) the GQ-6 (GQ-6-G) and of the MCGM (MCGM-G). In addition, multi-group comparisons were conducted to test for cultural measurement invariance. Construct validity was tested similar to original validation studies of the two scales focusing on affect, well-being, empathy, anxiety and depression. The online survey was completed in random order by 508 participants. The one-factor model of the GQ-6-G and the hierarchical structure of the MCGM-G could be replicated. However, model fit of the Gratitude Questionnaire was significantly better after eliminating one item (GQ-5-G). Multi-group comparisons revealed cultural measurement invariance was established for the GQ-5-G and partial measurement invariance for five of six factors of the MCGM-G, respectively. Reliability analyses revealed good internal consistency for both instruments and measures for criterion-related and discriminant validity have shown hypothesized relationships. Thus, the GQ-5-G and the MCGM-G are two instruments with good reliability and validity for measuring gratitude in Germany. (shrink)

Am 22. April 2024 jährt sich der Geburtstag von Immanuel Kant zum dreihundertsten Mal. Der Philosoph aus Königsberg, dem heutigen Kaliningrad, hat weit über seine Zeit und auch über Europa hinaus die neuzeitliche Philosophie sowie epistemische, ethische, rechtliche und humane Vorstellungen in vielen Gesellschaften und Kulturen geprägt. Von der großen Wertschätzung Kants zeugt die anhaltende weltweite Auseinandersetzung mit seinem Werk. Dieses Buch behandelt Leben, Werk und Wirkung Kants. Mit einer Fülle an Abbildungen legt der Band zugleich einen Akzent auf den (...) Zusammenklang von Kunst und Philosophie und zeigt, wie sich auch die Bildende Kunst von Kant inspirieren ließ. Mit Blick auf die globalen Herausforderungen, vor denen Europa und die Welt im 21. Jahrhundert stehen, wird zudem deutlich, dass die Gedanken der Aufklärung, vor allem in Gestalt der kritischen Philosophie, noch nie so aktuell waren wie heute. (shrink)

In the academic world, Joseph Margolis is best known as the proponent of a particular combination of radical historicism and robust relativism. In his publications, he argues that “humankind is the measure of all things” with regard to aesthetics, history, natural and social sciences, and philosophy. In doing so, he effortlessly interacts with authors from the continental, pragmatist, and analytic traditions. His book Three Paradoxes of Personhood is a collection of the three Venetian lecture...

Philosophical anthropology offers two ways of structuring the concept of person, either by locating the essence of man in his being a person or by providing a bio- philosophy of personhood. Building on the work of Helmuth Plessner, this essay aims at conciliating both structurings. It argues for the thesis that personhood is the life-form of man and discusses the main structural features of human life-form.

This chapter contains sections titled: The Pure Subject of Cognition The Artist as Pure Subject of Cognition Notes References Further Reading.

In this paper, we provide a re-interpretation of qualitative and quantitative modeling from a representationalist perspective. In this view, both approaches attempt to construct abstract representations of empirical relational structures. Whereas quantitative research uses variable-based models that abstract from individual cases, qualitative research favors case-based models that abstract from individual characteristics. Variable-based models are usually stated in the form of quantified sentences. This syntactic structure implies that sentences about individual cases are derived using deductive reasoning. In contrast, case-based models are (...) usually stated using context-dependent existential sentences. This syntactic structure implies that sentences about other cases are justifiable by inductive reasoning. We apply this representationalist perspective to the problems of generalization and replication. Using the analytical framework of modal logic, we argue that the modes of reasoning are often not only applied to the context that has been studied empirically, but also on a between-contexts level. Consequently, quantitative researchers mostly adhere to a top-down strategy of generalization, whereas qualitative researchers usually follow a bottom-up strategy of generalization. Depending on which strategy is employed, the role of replication attempts is very different. In deductive reasoning, replication attempts serve as empirical tests of the underlying theory. Therefore, failed replications imply a faulty theory. From an inductive perspective, however, replication attempts serve to explore the scope of the theory. Consequently, failed replications do not question the theory per se, but help to shape its boundary conditions. We conclude that quantitative research may benefit from a bottom-up generalization strategy as it is employed in most qualitative research programs. Inductive reasoning forces us to think about the boundary conditions of our theories and provides a framework for generalization beyond statistical testing. In this perspective, failed replications are just as informative as successful replications, because they help to explore the scope of our theories. (shrink)

Studies of the history of 20th century philosophy usually suggest a sharp antagonism between Martin Heidegger on the one hand and Philosophical Anthropology, as founded by Max Scheler and Helmuth Plessner, on the other. In contrast I will argue that one of Heidegger′s texts, namely his lecture The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. World – Finitude – Solitude, held in the 1929/30 winter semester is in fact very close to the theoretical approach of Philosophical Anthropology. The measure for determining this proximity (...) is taken from Joachim Fischer′s study Philosophische Anthropologie. Eine Denkrichtung des 20. Jahrhunderts . Its main systematic thesis posits that the theoretical approach of Philosophical Anthropology is constituted by a core identity, which can be accurately defined by a set of features. In my paper I use these features heuristically to examine the question whether Heidegger, who prima facie is not an adherent of the theoretical approach, in his lecture The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics actually does argue like an exponent of Philosophical Anthropology. (shrink)

This paper explores the philosophical approach of the Swedish-born thinker John Elof Boodin. It will be shown that Boodin’s philosophical development ran through various stages, beginning with more or less “orthodox” pragmatism and ending with what he labeled “functional” realism. My principal thesis is that, in the last analysis, Boodin failed in establishing a stable systematic point of view. However, his philosophical development is worth considering in some detail because it nicely reflects the situation of a European-born philosopher in early-twentieth (...) century America. (shrink)

In this paper, I investigate whether there are nonreligious, epistemic reasons that could justify consulting religious traditions. In this way, I supplement the ongoing debate on the value of tradition, which has focused mostly on practical values for maintaining traditions, with an examination of epistemic reasons for consulting traditions. To do so, I focus on the problem-solving aspect of religious traditions and their epistemic resources. I discuss whether consulting traditions of religious wisdom, religious practical knowledge, religious institutions, or religious rationalities (...) can be justified based on their continuous transmission, the test of time, an intergenerational learning process, or moral enquiry. (shrink)

Theories of epistemology make reference—via the perspective of an observer—to the structure of information transfer, which generates reality, of which the observer himself forms a part. It can be shown that any epistemological approach which implies the participation of tautological structural elements in the information transfer necessarily leads to an antinomy. Nevertheless, since the time of Aristotle the paradigm of mathematics—and thus tautological structure—has always been a hidden ingredient in the various concepts of knowledge acquisition or general theories of information (...) transfer. We hold that Darwin’s Evolutionary Theory is the first scientific theory which consistently presupposes a non-tautological structure for the information transfer and, at the same time, keeps it strictly distinct from the tautological metric of scientific observation. The consequences of this technique—namely the dissociation of information from intentionality—have not yet been fully drawn. (shrink)

Der Sammelband versammelt verschiedene Autoren, die mehr oder weniger dem methodischen Kulturalismus nahestehen. Der Band ist Herrn Prof. Dr. Peter Janich zum 60. Geburtstag gewidmet und die Beiträge befassen sich mit Themen, die das philosophische Schaffen von Herrn Janich ausgemacht haben.

No artigo que se segue, iremos relacionar o tema „intuição“ e „pensamento“ao problema, virulento no idealismo alemão, da sistemática filosófica. Depois que aconcepção kantiana de sistema assente na “Arquitetônica da razão” foi criticada comoformalista e que, ao mesmo tempo, se propagou no século XVIII a crítica aos sistemasracionalistas, exercida antes pelo empirismo, irrompeu no final desse século uma crisena filosofia, expressa talvez de modo mais marcante em um “fragmento” de FriedrichSchlegel: "É igualmente mortal ao espírito ter um sistema e não (...) ter nenhum". Fichte eSchopenhauer tratam da questão do sistema reportando-a à relação entre intuição epensamento. (shrink)

Schopenhauer gilt als Vorreiter oder erster Vertreter der Lebensphilosophie, wie sie später von Dilthey, Nietzsche, Bergson und anderen entfaltet wurde. Im Unterschied zur klassischen Lebensphilosophie und zu den an sie anknüpfenden ethischen Entwürfen wird das Leben bei Schopenhauer aber nicht als Zweck betrachtet, sondern als Mittel zu einem anderen Zweck, nämlich für die Ethik, die in der Verneinung des Willens zum Leben gipfelt. Schon in den frühesten handschriftlichen Aufzeichnungen verwendet Schopenhauer verschiedene Metaphern, um das Leben als Medium der ethischen Erkenntnis (...) zu charakterisieren. Besonders häufig tritt dabei das Bild vom Leben als Spiegel auf, in dem der Mensch sein eigenes Wesen und damit auch das Wesen der Welt erblickt. Im Hauptwerk wird dann dieses Bild vom Begriff der Objektivation des Willens abgelöst. Insofern die höchste und deutlichste Objektivation des Willens der Lebenslauf des menschlichen Individuums darstellt, ist Schopenhauers Lebensbegriff eng mit seiner Charakterlehre verknüpft. In dem Beitrag wird das verwickelte Verhältnis von Leben, Erkennen und Ethik vor dem Hintergrund der proto-hermeneutischen Metaphysikkonzeption Schopenhauers anhand der Entwicklung der Spiegelmetapher betrachtet. Schopenhauer is said to be precursor or first exponent of the philosophy of life as it has been developed later on by Dilthey, Nietzsche, Bergson and others. However, in contrast to classical philosophy of life and to the ethical conceptions going back to it, in Schopenhauer life is not viewed as an end but as a means to another end, namely to the ethics which culminates in the denial of the will-to-live. Already in the earliest hand-written manuscripts Schopenhauer uses different metaphors in order to characterize life as a medium of ethical knowledge. In particular the image of life as a mirror in which a human being sees his own nature and thus realizes the essence of the world often occurs. In the mature work this image is replaced by the concept of objectivation of will. As far as the highest and clearest objectivation of will is the life story of a human individual Schopenhauer’s concept of life is bound up with his theory of character. In my essay I consider the complicated relationship between life, knowledge and ethics in Schopenhauer on the background of his proto-hermeneutic metaphysics by following the development of his use of the mirror-metaphor. (shrink)