In Defence of Non-Ideal Political Deference

Episteme 19 (2):264-285 (2022)
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Abstract

Many philosophers have claimed that relying on the testimony of others in normative questions is in some way problematic. In this paper, I consider whether we should be troubled by deference in democratic politics. I argue that deference is less problematic in impure cases of political deference, and most non-ideal cases of political deference are impure. To establish the second point, I rely on empirical research from political psychology. I also outline two principled reasons why we should expect political deference to be untroubling: political problems are difficult and require a division of epistemic labour; furthermore, there is value in exercising epistemic solidarity with those one shares an identity or interests with.

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Matthias Brinkmann
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

Citations of this work

Political legitimacy.Fabienne Peter - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
What's Wrong with Partisan Deference?Elise Woodard - forthcoming - In Tamar Szabó Gendler, John Hawthorne, Julianne Chung & Alex Worsnip, Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Vol. 8. Oxford University Press.
Testimony of Oppression and the Limits of Empathy.Katharina Anna Sodoma - 2024 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 27 (2):185-202.
Truth and Loyalty.Matt Sleat - 2024 - Political Theory 52 (4):581-604.

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References found in this work

Fake News and Partisan Epistemology.Regina Rini - 2017 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 27 (S2):43-64.
Epistemic Trust in Science.Torsten Wilholt - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (2):233-253.
In defense of moral testimony.Paulina Sliwa - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):175-195.
A Defense of Moral Deference.David Enoch - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (5):229-258.

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