Hegel's famous descriptions of the “master–slave dialectic,” and the more general analysis of the struggle for recognition that it is a part of, have been remarkably influential throughout the nine...

In this paper I want to pursue some variations on Hegelian philosophy, some responses and elaborations of aspects of Hegel’s thought, which have appeared in Latin America, and which contribute to a new understanding of the philosophical experience as it has taken place in Latin America.

This paper considers whether Hegel's master/slave dialectic in the Phenomenology of Spirit should be considered as a refutation of solipsism. It focuses on a recent and detailed attempt to argue for this sort of reading that has been proposed by Frederick Beiser ? but it argues that this reading is unconvincing, both in the historical motivations given for it in the work of Jacobi and Fichte, and as an interpretation of the text itself. An alternative reading of (...) the dialectic is proposed, where it is argued that the central problem Hegel is concerned with is not solipsism, but the sociality of freedom. (shrink)

The central axis of the article is the argument thatHistory and Class Consciousnessadopts from the Hegelian dialectics not only the category of totality but also the master–slave dialectic, although it never refers explicitly to the latter. Hence, in this article, we aim to detect the subtle influence that the Hegelian master–slave dialectic exerts onHistory and Class Consciousnessand, more specifically, on the constitution of the Lukacsian concepts of reification, praxis, working class-bourgeoisie interaction, working-class self-consciousness, autonomous (...) subject. Our approach to the Hegelian master–slave dialectic is mostly – but not only – based on its philosophical–anthropological interpretation by A. Kojeve. Kojeve’s interpretation, by attributing a crucial role to labour in the mastery–slavery dialectic, focuses on that aspect of the Hegelian dialectic which, in our estimation, was determining forHCC.In addition, our approach to the Hegelian master–slave dialectic is based on some occasional references Lukacs has to it inYoung Hegelas well as on his interpretation latent inHistory and Class Consciousness. (shrink)

In this article I seek to explain Hegel’s significance to contemporary meta-ethics, in particular to Kantian constructivism. I argue that in the master–slave dialectic in the Phenomenology of Spirit , Hegel shows that self-consciousness and intersubjectivity arise at the same time. This point, I argue, shows that there is no problem with taking other people’s reasons to motivate us since reflection on our aims is necessarily also reflection on the needs of those around us. I further explore (...) Hegel’s contribution to the debate about internal and external reasons. I end by arguing that we should understand reasons as historically constructed in the sense that who counts as an intrinsic bearer of value changes over time. I thus argue that the struggle for recognition is in fact the beginning of the long march toward the idea of recognition and the Kantian kingdom of ends. This march, however, is driven by the need to overcome injustice as it is instantiated at the beginning of history by the master’s absolute domination of the slave. (shrink)

In this article I seek to explain Hegel’s significance to contemporary meta-ethics, in particular to Kantian constructivism. I argue that in the master–slave dialectic in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel shows that self-consciousness and intersubjectivity arise at the same time. This point, I argue, shows that there is no problem with taking other people’s reasons to motivate us since reflection on our aims is necessarily also reflection on the needs of those around us. I further explore Hegel’s (...) contribution to the debate about internal and external reasons. I end by arguing that we should understand reasons as historically constructed in the sense that who counts as an intrinsic bearer of value changes over time. I thus argue that the struggle for recognition is in fact the beginning of the long march toward the idea of recognition and the Kantian kingdom of ends. This march, however, is driven by the need to overcome injustice as it is instantiated at the beginning of history by the master’s absolute domination of the slave. (shrink)

This work contributes to recent transdisciplinary efforts to view the Haitian slave revolt (1791–1804) as the historical inspiration for Hegel’s master-slave dialectic. Reconstructions offered by contemporary postcolonial scholars argue that the Haitian revolt was chronicled in Minerva as Hegel raced to finish his Phenomenology. Benhabib recently recognized the Hegel-Haiti thesis as entailing the sort of inclusive dialogical learning process necessary to validate subaltern experiences. The thesis has also drawn its share of sceptical scrutiny as Badiou claims (...) that it risks forcing an unnecessary moral dissymmetry, neglects objectionable features of enslavement and imposes a mismatch between apolitical subject and revolutionary. In reply, we appeal to the pioneering work of Tavares to show that the asymmetrical construction of classification schemes for persons of mixed-racial statuses accords with decades of documented literary exchanges between Hegel and Gregoire. We then turn to the work of James on the role of mixed-race merchants in the testimonial accounts of late 18th century French historians to show that European literate publics were well aware of the extremely coercive forms of commodified labour found in Saint-Domingue. We then invoke the archival work of Du Bois on French, British and American parliamentary proceedings that show the provisional colonial identities ascribed to Caribbean subjects did not hinder their self-conscious exercise of political agency. Viewing Hegel in terms of the historiographic records of the racial ontologies of early modern transatlantic literary exchanges helps explain how he adapted these tropes concerning mixed-race subjects in a manner that better explains many of the anomalous features of the dialectic. However, conferring the Haitian revolution its proper world-historical warrant as inspiration for his infamous master-slave dialectic need not lead us to overlook Hegel’s complicity with many of the epistemic and ontological flaws of colonial tropes held in early modern transatlantic print. (shrink)

This article seeks to articulate an interpretation of Fanon’s engagement with G.W.F. Hegel that does not either assume that Fanon rejects Hegel’s normative conclusions or that Fanon’s engagement is incidental to his larger philosophical projects. I argue that Fanon’s take on the master-slave dialectic allows us to better understand the normative claims that undergird Fanon’s calls for violence and revolution in Black Skin, The Wretched of the Earth, and A Dying Colonialism.

ABSTRACT:The section “Lordship and Bondage” in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit offers us, through the criticism of slavery, some indications regarding Hegel’s conception of human nature. In this paper some consequences of this conception for Hegel’s political philosophy are identified and presented. The analysis shows problems may emerge when we analyze some fundamental Hegelian concepts – “recognition” and shows that some “men” – if we take into consideration the way these concepts were defined in the master-slave dialectic. In (...) light of these problems it is pointed out that Hegel’s political philosophy, and also his position regarding slavery, become less cogent and more susceptible to criticism. The last part of the text analyzes some consequences of problems related to the possibility of defining the concepts “recognition” and “men” in terms of Hegel’s model of state. RESUMO:A seção “Dominação e escravidão” da Fenomenologia do espírito de Hegel nos oferece, por meio da crítica da escravidão, algumas indicações com respeito à concepção hegeliana da natureza humana. Neste artigo, serão identificadas e apresentadas algumas consequências dessa concepção para a filosofia política de Hegel. A análise aponta que alguns problemas podem emergir, quando analisamos alguns dos conceitos fundamentais de Hegel, “reconhecimento” e “homem”, se levamos em consideração o modo como estes conceitos foram definidos na dialética do senhor e do escravo. Como resultado desses problemas, é apontado que sua filosofia política, e igualmente sua posição com respeito à escravidão, se tornam menos cogentes e mais suscetíveis a críticas. A última parte do texto analisa algumas consequências dos problemas relacionados às possibilidades de definir os conceitos “reconhecimento” e “homem” para o modelo hegeliano de Estado. (shrink)

This study analyzes the Al-Moallaqa, a poem traditionally hung on the walls of the Kaaba, the holiest shrine for Muslims, by the pre-Islamic poet Antara bin Shaddad, through the lens of Hegel’s Master-Slave Dialectic. It explores the status of marginal identity, focusing on the poet’s portrayal of the suffering endured due to slavery, humiliation, and deprivation of honor in a tribal society that devalues the enslaved. It also examines self-awareness and the desire for change, addressing the essential (...) awakening of the 'Self', which drives a rejection of marginalization and a commitment to struggle and risk in pursuit of freedom. A qualitative textual analysis is employed, focusing on the thematic exploration of identity, self-awareness, and the struggle for recognition within the poem. Antara’s poetry illustrates this self-awareness through vivid depictions of bravery, heroism, and chivalry, emphasizing the idea of testing oneself and others in the existential struggle between life and death. The contribution of this manuscript lies in its application of Hegelian philosophy to classical Arabic poetry, offering a new interpretative framework for understanding the dynamics of identity and freedom in pre-Islamic literature. (shrink)

From Karl Marx to Alexandre Kojève to Luce Irigaray, many writers have explored the implications of the famous master-slave dialectic in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit.1 An interesting debate has developed out of the possible gender connotations of this dialectic—a debate that has centered largely on the theory that the master could represent man, with the slave consequently representing woman. A close analysis of the Phenomenology reveals that both the master and the slave (...) are, in fact, supposed to be men. But is it possible to preserve the core ideas of the Phenomenology while simultaneously recasting both the master and the slave as women? And what are the ramifications of this reconfiguration?These questions. (shrink)

In Glas, Derrida focuses his attention on a question regarding the family, on the unintelligibility of familial love for which Hegel makes Antigone representative. The account of the emergence of self-consciousness in the family differs in several crucial ways from the standard account of how Hegelian self-consciousness is constituted in the master–slave dialectic. Most notably, the achievement of self-consciousness through familial love involves no risk of life, no struggle to the death, no conflict. While Derrida refrains from (...) interrogating the relation between the master–slave dialectic and sexual difference directly, he interrogates the peaceful recognition that Hegel says occurs between Polynices as brother and Antigone as sister. I explore the silences that punctuate Derrida's discussion of Antigone, especially his silence on Hegel's twofold elision of the master–slave dialectic with the husband–wife relation, and of Antigone with the figure of the wife. By symbolically marrying her off, Hegel subordinates Antigone to a symbolic husband. (shrink)

Simone de Beauvoir incorporates a significantly altered form of the Hegelian master/slave dialectic into "The Ethics of Ambiguity." Her ethical theory explains and denounces extreme wrongdoing, such as the mass murder of millions of Jews at the hands of the Nazis. This essay demonstrates that, in the Beauvoirean dialectic, the Nazi value system (and Hitler) was the master, Adolf Eichmann was a slave, and Jews were denied human status. The analysis counters Robin May Schott's (...) claims that "Beauvoir portrays the attitudes of the oppressor as defined fundamentally in relation to the oppressed" and that her use of the dialectic is "inadequate to account for how human beings create extreme situations of evil, such as that of genocide.". (shrink)

There are at least two different ways of coping with struggles: one is to eliminate them—this is the way that Plato, Hegel, Marx and many others chose—and the other is to institutionalize them—this is Tocqueville's democratic way. I first outline the main elements of Hegel's approach, with a specific focus on the Phenomenology of Spirit. My aim is to emphasize that, for Hegel, the goal of political philosophy must be a reconciled polis, which can happen only if and when the (...) history-long struggle between masters and slaves has ended. I then turn to Tocqueville's Of Democracy in America, which was published about thirty years after Hegel's Phenomenology. Tocqueville is also aware of struggles between masters and slaves, but he prefers embracing democracy as a means of domesticating, rather than eliminating once and for all, political strife. (shrink)

Hegel continues to be credited with the discovery of a "master-slave dialectic". Critics, however, have established that there was no "master-slave dialectic" but rather a Knecht, that is, servant or footman, with the latter a member of an abstract relationship of Herrschaft-Knechtschaft, which is central to Hegel's idea of the journey from dependence to independence. This "primitive scene" sets up a cycle for the whole paradigm, which is a reformulation of the victory over animal (...) life and its appetites, and a reformulation of the birth of nations. Hegel followed Aristotle here; those who risked their own life are given recognition as masters and those who chose to preserve it at the cost of their freedom, are servants. (shrink)

This paper will analyze the evolution and the key aspects of René Girard’s critique of the Hegelian “struggle for recognition” and the master-slave dialectic. Through a discussion of Girard’s views on Identity, Difference, Violence, Desire and Negativity, the study will aim to highlight the philosophical uniqueness of the mimetic theory in respect to French Hegelianism and postHegelianism.

The massive introduction of artificial intelligence has triggered significant societal concerns, ranging from “technological unemployment” and the dominance of algorithms in the work place and in everyday life, among others. While AI is made by humans and is, therefore, dependent on the latter for its purpose, the increasing capabilities of AI to carry out productive activities for humans can lead the latter to unwitting slavish existence. This has become evident, for example, in the area of social media use, where AI (...) programmers tie psychology and persuasion to the human social need for approval and validation in ways that few users can resist. We argue that AI should serve humans with humans as masters and not the other way around. Moreover, we propose that virtue ethics might play a role to solidify the human as master of AI and guard against the alternative of AI as the master. (shrink)

The subject of this paper is the comparison of the master-slave dialectic with the Marxist concept of class struggle. The master-slave dialectic is presented not only in its source – Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit – but also in its reception by later authors: Alexander Kojève and Jacques Lacan. Alexandre Kojève focuses on the resolution of the antago­nism between slave and master in Empire, the society of the Citizen, by which history ends. Lacan (...) proposes considering this theoretical construct from the position of the “death of the master” and in the situation of the “sophisticated domination” (which the slave possesses and through which an immanent break is made in the structure of the master’s absolute knowledge). One of the sources of the concept of class struggle in classical Marxism is the Hegelian master-slave dialectic, which is reconceptualized in a more rev­olutionary, practice-oriented way. Concept of class struggle opposes to the speculative Hegelian construction, which is trying to describe self-consciousness in a more abstract way. Marx also borrows Hegelian terminology from The Science of Logic, because he wants to describe the structure of class as a research object (consciousness that has not come to self-consciousness, the class-in-itself) and as an active, revolutionary subject (consciousness that has entered the struggle for recognition – and thereby has gained self-consciousness, the class-in-itself). A comparative analysis of these concepts allows us to see the sources of the Marxist doctrine of class and class struggle and to open the way of a synthesis between the Marxist and “post-Hegelian” reading of the master-slave dialectic. (shrink)

Responding to long-standing warnings that robots and AI will enslave humans, I argue that the main problem we face is not that automation might turn us into slaves but, rather, that we remain masters. First I construct an argument concerning what I call ‘the tragedy of the master’: using the master–slave dialectic, I argue that automation technologies threaten to make us vulnerable, alienated, and automated masters. I elaborate the implications for power, knowledge, and experience. Then I (...) critically discuss and question this argument but also the very thinking in terms of masters and slaves, which fuels both arguments. I question the discourse about slavery and object to the assumptions made about human–technology relations. However, I also show that the discussion about masters and slaves attends us to issues with human–human relations, in particular to the social consequences of automation such as power issues and the problem of the relation between automation and (un)employment. Finally, I reflect on how we can respond to our predicament, to ‘the tragedy of the master’. (shrink)

The claim that theoretical foundations are historically contingent does not draw the same intensity of fire as it did one or especially two decades ago. The aftermath of debates on the political boundaries created by foundations allows for a deeper exploration of the foundations of feminist theory. This article re-examines the (anti)-Hegelian foundations of the feminist standpoint put forward by Nancy Hartsock and argues that the Hegelian subject of the early Phenomenology of Spirit resists gender codification in its experience of (...) ongoing rediscovery and fallibility in knowing. The subject against which the feminist self was constituted does not fit the masculinity thought to be natural. Hegel’s master-slave dialectic and phenomenological subject reveal contradictions that cannot be resolved by an opposing feminist standpoint, and may provide resources that resist the rigid gender categories upon which the standpoint depends. Key Words: abstract masculinity • feminist standpoint • feminist theory • foundations • Nancy Hartsock • Hegel • master-slave dialectic • subjectivity. (shrink)

Othering is the construction and identification of the self or in-group and the other or out-group in mutual, unequal opposition by attributing relative inferiority and/or radical alienness to the other/out-group. The notion of othering spread from feminist theory and post-colonial studies to other areas of the humanities and social sciences, but is originally rooted in Hegel’s dialectic of identification and distantiation in the encounter of the self with some other in his “Master-Slave dialectic”. In this paper, (...) after reviewing the philosophical and psychological background of othering, I distinguish two kinds of othering, “crude” and “sophisticated”, that differ in the logical form of their underlying arguments. The essential difference is that the former is merely self-other distantiating, while the latter – as in Hegel’s dialectic – partially depends on self-other identification. While crude othering is closer to the paradigmatic notion of othering, sophisticated othering is closer to Hegel’s, but so is quasi-othering, which is nearly identical in form to sophisticated othering, but which misses the defining feature of othering – attributing relative inferiority and/or radical alienness. Because Hegel’s dialectic applies to any encounter of an interpreting self with some other, sophisticated or quasi-othering is at least potentially a very common occurrence in the interpretation of others, especially of those who do not belong to the in-group. However, although othering is usually undesirable, the Hegelian varieties can provide a “mirror”, which can be used as a tool to improve understanding of both the other and the interpreting self, and the malignant aspects of othering can be avoided through charity. (shrink)

This paper offers a reading of Todd Solondz Happiness (1998) in relation to Lacan’s notion of sexual difference. It argues that both the film and theorist present a ‘logic’ of sexuality and sexual difference which seems to owe much to Hegel’s master-slave dialectic but that in the end owes more to Kojève’s (mis)reading than to Hegel himself. It outlines the usefulness of an expanded notion of the dialectic to understand sexual difference through the inclusion of the (...) Hegelian figures of the stoic, the sceptic and the unhappy consciousness. It also suggest that the priority of identity and non-identity to dialectic logic has been obscured by this focus on the master-slave relationship and that an analysis of the role of the autoerotic develops modes of sexual similarity and difference that cuts across heteronormative gender lines. The anxiety both Lacan and the film seem to suffer with regard to autoerotic is then used to critique their sexual conservatism and their prescriptive rather than descriptive representation of sexual relationships. (shrink)

The article analyzes the reception of Hegel’s philosophy in feminist theory on the example of the concepts of Simone de Beauvoir, Luce Irigaray, and Judith Butler. The first part of the article examines Hegel’s teaching on the role of women in the family, identifies the place of the feminine in Hegel’s system and analyzes the Hegelian interpretation of Sophocle’s “Antigone”. The second part of the article presents an interpretation of Si­mone de Beauvoir. I affirm that the oppositions “woman – man” (...) and “the Other – I” are heirs to the “slave – master” opposition. The third part of the article discusses Irigaray’s in­terpretation of Hegel’s Antigone. It is argued that Antigone in Irigaray’s view goes be­yond the dialectic of slave and master, and therefore becomes a symbol of anti-woman. The fourth part of the article examines the paradox of bodily submission during the transi­tion to the Unhappy Consciousness by Judith Butler. The historical and philosophical study of influence is accompanied by a conceptual analysis of the problems that arise in the inter­pretation of feminist versions of the slave – master dialectic. At the end of the article, I briefly formulate the problems identified during the study and present possible solutions. (shrink)

Psychologists and moral philosophers have much to say about self-awareness and so it is no surprise that in leadership research self-awareness also has come to play an important role. For some time now, leadership research has been dominated by psychologists and we argue that their version of the self-awareness is very thin. It is empty of morality and therefore offers only a partial understanding of humanity. That make its conclusions for leadership ineffective and unethical. Psychology-driven approaches to leadership stress effectiveness: (...) leaders make followers work towards a given goal in an effective manner. Self-awareness, to them, is a thorough understanding of one’s strengths, weaknesses, values, how others see one, all with the goal of turning people into followers. Since ethics is excluded, this view of self-awareness lacks a foundational moral concept: respect/dignity and is closer to self-assessment. Building on Immanuel Kant and other German Idealists, Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel proposed a theory of the development of self-awareness that is more holistic as it situates the individual in a social and moral context and thus transcends the purely functional view of the self-other relationship propagated in psychological approaches. We concretely argue that psychological approaches to leadership systematically drive managers into a catastrophic situation that Hegel describes in the Master-Slave Dialectic. Understanding Hegelian self-awareness prevents leaders becoming self-less masters. Truly self-aware leaders heed the warning of the Humanity Formulation of Kant’s Categorial Imperative, namely that they must always treat humanity, whether in their own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end. They understand their self, they understand its social and moral dimension, and they see their self-reflected in the other. (shrink)

This philosophical investigation interrogates the relationship between G.W.F. Hegel’s concept of the master-slave dialectic in The Phenomenology of Spirit and the critique and reformulation of it by Frantz Fanon in Black Skin, White Masks. As a means of contextualization and expansion of Hegel’s original textual account, I consider Susan Buck-Morss’ seminal defense through grounding the dialectic in Hegel’s possible historical knowledge of the Haitian Revolution. I maintain that despite a compelling picture, Buck-Morss’ insights are unable to (...) fully vindicate Hegel from the rebukes of Fanon, and as a result, Hegel’s phenomenology necessitates a concrete analysis of the actual conscious experiences of the racialized and colonized subject in order to realize its aims. In pursuit of this critical methodology, I develop the upshot and positive movement of Fanon’s critique through what I describe as a “phenomenology of flesh” in conversation with Maurice Merleau Ponty’s The Visible and the Invisible. (shrink)

Something is wrong with the desire to dominate nature. In this paper, I explain both the causes and solution to anti-environmental attitudes within the framework of Hegel's master–slave dialectic. I argue that the master–slave dialectic (interpreted as a metaphor, rather than literally) can provide reasons against taking an attitude of domination, and instead gives reasons to seek to be worthy of respect from nature, though nature cannot, of course, respect us. I then discuss what (...) the social and economic conditions of moving to a post-domination philosophy appear to be. (shrink)

This article sets out from an analysis of the pioneering work of Susan Buck-Morss to rethink, not only Hegel and Haiti, but broader questions surrounding dialectics and the universal brought to light by the Haitian Revolution. Reading through the lens of C.L.R. James’ The Black Jacobins , I seek to correct a series of ironic silences in her account, re-centering the importance of Toussaint’s successor, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, and underlining the dialectical importance of identitarian struggles in forging the universal. Finally, I (...) offer Frantz Fanon’s reformulation of the Hegelian master-slave dialectic—overlooked in Buck-Morss’ account—as a corrective that allows us to truly rethink progress toward the universal in decolonized dialectical terms. (shrink)

My starting point in the exploration of the two subjects’ dialectics would be something what is perceived by Luce Irigaray, namely, that the humane nature is two, but the two is not represented in the philosophical discourse and the woman has always been symbolised as the other or lack. In Irigaray philosophy the crucial otherness is the other belonging to the other gender. The dialectical process now is in the service of intersubjectivity. Luce Irigaray argues that the recognition of the (...) other as sexuate other offers the possibility to overcome the master – slave dialectics, because between woman and man, man and woman, recognitionrequires the labour of the negative. Irigaray sees in the recognition process the moment of acceptance of one’s own limits and of the limits of the other. Renouncement of the opposition activity / passivity is crucial for Luce Irigaray concept of the two subject’s dialectics. Luce Irigaray’s contribution to the contemporary discussions of the role of passivity and activity in subject’s relationship to the other (Paul Ricoeur, Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel Levinas) is crucial. (shrink)

The article presents a conception of the end of history, developed on the basis of Giorgio Agamben’s critical engagement with Alexandre Kojève’s reading of Hegel. Departing from Agamben’s concept of inoperosity as an originary feature of the human condition, we argue that the proper or ‘second’ end of history consists not in the fulfilment of its dialectical process but rather in the radical interruption of the dialectic that terminates the teleological dimension of social praxis. Introducing the figure of the (...) ‘workless slave’ into the scenario of the Master—Slave dialectic, the article demonstrates how the dialectic of history may be ended in a non-dialectical fashion through inoperative praxis that subtracts itself from the struggle for recognition. In the conclusion, the implication of this reading of the end of history for the understanding of Agamben’s ‘coming politics’ is addressed. (shrink)

This paper contributes to those analyses that have discussed Hegel'sinfluence on Freire, and Freire's rethinking of Hegel. Yet, my narrative of the dialectic of conscientizacion, which I presenthere, is a novel attempt to read both thinkers simultaneously.Thus, in this paper I am exploring, and not didactically proving Gadotti's (1994) important, yet unqualified,claim that Hegel's dialectic ``can be considered the principaltheoretical framework of (Freire's) Pedagogy of the Oppressed.It could be said that the whole of his theory of conscientization has (...) its roots in Hegel'' (p. 74). And in thisexploration, I am not demonstrating Freire's ``expansion'' ofHegel's dialectic (Schutte, 1990), nor taking a positionon whether or not the dialectic of Freire's Pedagogy of theOppressed supersedes the Hegelian dialectic (Torres, 1976). Nor am I offering a ``comparison'' of the two dialectics(Torres, 1994). (Of course, having made these claims,I am, as it were, taunting the reader to deconstruct mypiece.) My aim here is to immerse, or insert, myself intothe Freirean/Hegelian dialectic itself. I attempt to situatemyself within that peculiar position of the dialecticianwho ``braids'' ideas through synthetic textual analysis.I use a third person descriptive perspective thatincorporates the ``voices'' of Freire and Hegel, and, thereby, weave a ``new'' synthesized account of theemergence of critical consciousness within the formaleducational setting. (shrink)

This work, using the case study of the Haitian Revolution, positions Paul C. Mocombe’s theory of antidialectic within Hegel’s dialectical reasoning. Mocombe posits that the antidialectical position in Hegel’s dialectic is the position of each selfconsciousness when they initially encounter each other at the onset of the master/slave dialectic. Whereas, the master seeks to move to the dialectical position in order to dominate and eliminate the original (antidialectical) position of the slave, the slave (...) remains in this antidialectical position so long as they accept death and seek to fight against their enslavement for the purpose of maintaining and reproducing their original, antidialectical, position, which is social, political, economic, and ideological. In any other instances, they (the slaves) are either in the dialectical, seeking to maintain the status quo, or negative dialectical, seeking to integrate the status quo on equal footing with the master, positions. (shrink)

Reading the Phenomenology onto-grammatically means interpreting its constitutive forms of consciousness as grammatical iterations of the speculative proposition, where the subject-object relations can be read as dialogical encounters between subject and predicate, where the predicate “talks back”, creating a discursive space of hermeneutical ambiguity and openness, at play in the copula. The article begins with a brief presentation of Hegel’s general theory of language, as it pertains to the distinction between the linguistic sign (Zeichen) and the word (Wort), drawn from (...) his later writings, before applying these grammatical terms to the ontological reading of the speculative sentence, as presented in the Preface to the Phenomenology and discussed by Jere Surber. Then, the article puts its dialogical insights into practice, examining how the onto-grammatical reading of the speculative sentence plays out in the Phenomenology’s famous "lordship and bondage" (aka "master/slave") dialectic. (shrink)

Sartrean ontological intersubjectivity is often understood to be hostile and conflictive, and Sartrean dialectics is repeatedly interpreted through the lenses of the Hegelian master-slave dyad, translating into a conflictive theory of practical ensembles. Building on this, critics in the aftermath of 9/11 argued that 'terror' and 'revolutionary violence' introduced in Critique of Dialectical Reason as the anti-thesis of oppression underscored his anti-colonial writings and this gives us justification to think that Sartre might consider terrorism a form of revolutionary (...) violence.With this in mind, this paper does not deal with the bigger issue of Sartre's political position, but only aims to question the basis of reading Hegelian dialectics in Sartre's ontology of intersubjectivity and social ensembles. Revisiting the role of dialectics in his Search for a Method and Critique of Dialectical Reason, it reveals a Sartre who is critical of Hegelian dialectics, and establishes his intersubjectivity as more compatible with Heidegger's being-with-others rather than Hegel's being-for-others. (shrink)

This article aims to take under consideration the relationship between identity and political obedience. First, it explains the famous encouragement of De la Bo?tie: it is sufficient to decide to quit serving to be instantly free. Nevertheless, man often renounces his freedom in favor of obeying authority. Why does it happen? At the bottom of this surrender there is an?animal? factor: as Alexandre Koj?ve has shown, in the master-slave dialectic the first is able to dominate the animal (...) within himself, while the servant has not the same capability and doesn?t want to accept the risk of death. Finally, it is with respect to the latter that everyone decides for himself, which opens the possibility for a full and actual identity through the appropriation of his own mortality. nema. (shrink)

Since Mueller’s 1958 article calling Hegelian dialectics a “legend,” it has been fashionable to deny that Hegel used thesis-antithesis-synthesis dialectics. But in truth, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit has 28 dialectics hidden on four outline levels, and The Philosophy of History has 10 more on three outline levels. In Phenomenology’s macrodialectic, Hegel’s nonsupernatural Spirit–all reality, everything in the universe, including man and artificial objects–advances from unconscious + union (thesis) to conscious + separation (antithesis) to a synthesis of conscious (from the antithesis) (...) + union (from the thesis). Previous interpretations of Phenomenology have missed this dialectic: they have assumed that Spirit’s journey begins with consciousness, whereas the journey actually begins in the primordial state of nature, before man arrives and provides Spirit with its Mind (the collective mind of man). Mind then misperceives itself as a multitude of separate alien “objects”–things other than itself. The macrodialectic and all other dialectics are based on Christianity’s Johannine separation-and-return mythology; all Hegelian dialectics separate from a concept in the thesis, going to that something’s opposite (antithesis), and then return to the thesis concept. Thus, in Hegel’s master-and-slave dialectic (God = master, man = slave), man advances from potential + freedom to actual + bondage (religiosity) to actual + freedom (atheism). Only Marx and Tillich understood Hegelian dialectics. Marx’s basic dialectic (one of four) saw history separating from and returning to Communism, going from communal ownership + poverty (primitive communism, or gens) to private ownership + wealth (slavery, feudalism, capitalism) to communal ownership + wealth (final communism). Tillich’s basic dialectic (one of many) separates from and returns to God, advancing from Yes to God + Yes to supernaturalism (theism) to No to God + No to supernaturalism (atheism) to Yes to God + No to supernaturalism (humanism: humanity is the nonsupernatural “God above the God of theism”). (shrink)

This book provides a clear and nuanced appraisal of Hegel's treatment of Africa, India, and Islam, and of the implications of this treatment for postcolonial and global studies. Analyzing Hegel's master-slave dialectic and his views on Africa, India, and Islam, it situates these views not only within Hegel's historical scheme but also within a broader European philosophical context and the debates they have provoked within Hegel scholarship. Each chapter explores various in depth readings of Hegel by postcolonial (...) critics, investigating both the Eurocentric and potentially global nature of his dialectic. Ultimately, the book shows both where this profoundly influential thinker archetypally embodies certain Eurocentric traits that have characterized modernity and how, ironically, he himself gives us the tools for working towards a more global vision. Offering a concise introduction not only to an important dimension of Hegel's thought - his orientation towards "empire" - but also to the various issues raised by postcolonial theory and global studies, this book will be of use to philosophers as well as advanced students of literary and cultural theory alike. (shrink)

Both Hegel's philosophy and psychoanalytic theory have profoundly influenced contemporary thought, but they are traditionally seen to work in separate rather than intersecting universes. This book offers a new interpretation of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit and brings it into conversation the work of two of the best-known contemporary psychoanalysts, Christopher Bollas and André Green. Hegel and Psychoanalysis centers a consideration of the Phenomenology on the figure of the Unhappy Consciousness and the concept of Force, two areas that are often overlooked (...) by studies which focus on the master/slave dialectic. This book offers reasons for why now, more than ever, we need to recognize how concepts of intersubjectivity, Force, the Third, and binding are essential to an understanding of our modern world. Such concepts can allow for an interrogation of what can be seen as the profoundly false and constructed senses of community and friendship created by social networking sites, and further an idea of a "global community," which thrives at the expense of authentic intersubjective relations. (shrink)

Of all the memorable, and influential, passages of the Phänomenologie des Geistes none are more famous or enjoyed greater attention than those sections devoted to the master-slave dialectic. It would seem almost inconceivable then that anything would be left to say concerning Hegel's martial struggle, the sheer number of illustrious scholars who have commented on this text bearing ample testimony to the probable redundancy of further comment. However, in actual fact, this is not the case. Indeed, it (...) is probable that Hegel is addressing and utilising not a theory of recognition but rather two quite distinct concepts of recognition. The appropriate passages are of course the master-slave section itself and the rather oblique references to the »confession« of one consciousness to another at the end of chapter six. Commentators have generally been in agreement that the master-slave section marks the beginning of Hegel's theory of recognition; that is, that the continuation of the treatment of recognition in chapter six marks a further development of the concept formulated in chapter four - a further development seemingly promised by Hegel himself - »With this, we already have before us the notion of spirit. What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what spirit is«. However the preceding is interpreted, the reader is surely right to recognize that something has been »won«, the triumphalist language being repeated in the following »[it is] in the Notion of Spirit, that consciousness first finds its turning-point, where it leaves behind the colourful show of the sensuous here-and-now and the nightlike void of the supersensible beyond, and steps out into the spiritual daylight of the present«. However, this triumph may have been misunderstood. The theory of recognition referred to in the master-slave dialectic may have been a »turning-point«, a new beginning, but it was a new beginning that was soon realised to be a dead-end. The following will attempt to demonstrate that there is a quite radical discontinuity at the heart of the concept of recognition itself, a discontinuity that can be traced to its origins in the Fichtean system itself. For the master-slave dialectic is »Fichte's wake« - it is at once a celebration and a mourning for the first concept of recognition, the unworkability of which heralded a truly new beginning. That is, the concept of recognition outlined in the Einige Vorlesungen uber die Bestimmung des Gelehrten. The second concept of recognition, that of the Grundlage des Naturrechts cannot be reckoned a further development or emendation of the first concept, its quite peculiar status, and philosophical importance as a »spiritual concept«, precluding any such treatment. The latter concept may mark the birth of Hegelian or speculative idealism itself. It is the contention of the following that understanding this quite radical discontinuity will fashion a better understanding of the connection between transcendental and speculative philosophy, the point of transition or sublation. (shrink)

This reply to Gunkel and Zwart further reflects on, and responds to, the following main points: the Heideggerian character of my view and the potential link to Kafka, the suggestion that we should become hackers, the interpretation of my approach in terms of the Hegelian Master–Slave dialectic, the lack of an empirical dimension, and the claim that I think that modern heroism entails overcoming vulnerability. I acknowledge Heideggerian influence, reflect on what it could mean to think about (...) living with ICTs as a kind of hacking, comment on the Hegelian interpretation of my approach and its application to human–technology relations, bring novels and films into the discussion, and clarify that contemporary works of fiction are not necessarily entirely modern and that it has been a central claim here and in my book that although modern thinking and practice attempts to overcome vulnerability with the help of technologies, this is not successful, or it is illusory. (shrink)

Hegel's _Phenomenology of Spirit_, his first major work, is one of the classics of Western philosophy. Although previous translations, in whole or in part, have made the text available in English, they are for various reasons not fully adequate, especially for use in teaching undergraduates. Howard Kainz has therefore undertaken to provide his own translation of major selections from the work, which are tied together by summaries of the parts not translated so as to provide the reader with a sense (...) of the whole. The translated selections include the Introduction, Chapter I on Sensory-Certainty, the sections from Chapter IV on Self-Consciousness, the Master-Slave dialectic, and the Unhappy Consciousness, the introductory section to Chapter V on Reason, the sections in Chapter VI on Ethical Action, Absolute Liberty, and Shiftiness and the central argument of Chapter VIII on Absolute Knowledge. The translation is based on the 1980 "Akademie" edition of the _Phänomenologie des Geistes_, edited by Wolfgang Bonsiepen and Reinhard Heede, and the German original is printed alongside the English translation in parallel columns. This edition includes some of the editorial devices used by De Negri in his Italian translation and Hippolyte in his French translation—namely, the use of editorial subdivisions and subtitles to indicate major transitions in the text, plus commentary and cross-references by way of footnotes. (shrink)

A deep dive into the influences of Hegelian thought on the work of revolutionary and postcolonial theorist Frantz Fanon Hegel is most often mentioned – and not without good reason – as one of the paradigmatic exponents of Eurocentrism and racism in Western philosophy. But his thought also played a crucial and formative role in the work of one of the iconic thinkers of the ‘decolonial turn’, Frantz Fanon. This would be inexplicable if it were not for the much-quoted ‘lord-bondsman’ (...) dialectic – frequently referred to as the ‘master-slave dialectic’ – described in Hegel's The Phenomenology of Spirit. Fanon takes up this dialectic negatively in contexts of violence-riven (post-)slavery and colonialism; yet in works such as Black Skin, White Masks and The Wretched of the Earth he upholds a Hegelian-inspired vision of freedom. The essays in this collection offer close readings of Hegel’s text, and of responses to it in the work of twentieth-century philosophers, that highlight the entangled history of the translations, transpositions and transformations of Hegel in the work of Fanon, and more generally in colonial, postcolonial and decolonial contexts. (shrink)

For at least the last twenty years, philosophers have attempted various strategies for reviving the Hegelian notion of recognition and redeploying it in discourses centered around social justice, including multiculturalism, feminism, race theory, and queer theory. Hegel’s master-slave dialectic may seem like an obvious place to start to analyze the oppression of one group by another. Given that Hegel is not literally talking about slaves, however, but a stage of consciousness, indeed the onset of self-consciousness, we might (...) wonder why his notion of recognition has become so important to these contemporary discourses on oppression. One reason is that the Hegelian model of recognition proposes that.. (shrink)