In 1932, Wolfgang Pauli was a world-renowned physicist and had already done the work that would win him the 1945 Nobel Prize. He was also in pain. His mother had poisoned herself after his father's involvement in an affair. Emerging from a brief marriage with a cabaret performer, Pauli drank heavily, quarreled frequently and sometimes publicly, and was disturbed by powerful dreams. He turned for help to C. G. Jung, setting a standing appointment for Mondays at noon. Thus bloomed an (...) extraordinary intellectual conjunction not just between a physicist and a psychologist but between physics and psychology. Eighty letters, written over twenty-six years, record that friendship. This artful translation presents them in English for the first time. Though Jung never analyzed Pauli formally, he interpreted more than 400 of his dreams--work that bore fruit later in Psychology and Alchemy and The Analysis of Dreams. As their acquaintance developed, Jung and Pauli exchanged views on the content of their work and the ideas of the day. They discussed the nature of dreams and their relation to reality, finding surprising common ground between depth psychology and quantum physics. Their collaboration resulted in the combined publication of Jung's treatise on synchronicity and Pauli's essay on archetypal ideas influencing Kepler's writings in The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche. Over time, their correspondence shaped and reshaped their understanding of the principle they called synchronicity, a term Jung had suggested earlier. Through the association of these two pioneering thinkers, developments in physics profoundly influenced the evolution of Jungian psychology. And many of Jung's abiding themes shaped how Pauli--and, through him, other physicists--understood the physical world. Of clear appeal to historians of science and anyone investigating the life and work of Pauli or Jung, this portrait of an incredible friendship will also draw readers interested in human creativity as well as those who merely like to be present when great minds meet. (shrink)

Many commentators hold that in addition to the categorical imperative of morality, Kant also posits an objective law of non-moral practical rationality, 'the' Hypothetical Imperative. On this view, the appeal to the Hypothetical Imperative increases the dialectical options that Kantians have vis-a-vis Humean skepticism about the authority of reason, and it allows for a systematic explanation of the possibility of non-moral weakness of will. I argue that despite its appeal, this interpretation cannot be sustained: for Kant the only objective, universally (...) valid a priori principle of practical reason that governs transcendentally free agents is the moral law. All non-moral practical rules are mere “precepts” that lack genuine objectivity, certainty, and intersubjective validity. I suggest that for Kant the rejection of the possibility of non-moral practical laws plays an important part in his argument for the supreme rational authority of moral norms over prudential precepts of happiness. (shrink)

It is a common intuition that at least in some cases disagreement has skeptical consequences: the participants are not justified in persisting in their beliefs. I will argue that the currently popular non-dialectical and individualistic accounts of justification, such as evidentialism and reliabilism, cannot explain this intuition and defend the dialectical conception of justification that can explain it. I will also argue that this sort of justification is a necessary condition of knowledge by relying on Craig's genealogy of the concept (...) of knowledge. I will then respond to the accusation that the dialectical conception leads to radical skepticism. My response is partly concessive. It does lead to skepticism in areas where controversy prevails, such as philosophy, politics and religion, but this sort of skepticism is quite intuitive. Finally, I deal with the objection that my defense of skepticism about philosophy is self-refuting. (shrink)

Definition of the problem: In parallel with public and philosophical discussions, there is an ongoing debate about euthanasia in theological ethics. In this situation it is helpful to provide a systematic overview of the different arguments and judgements. Arguments: A short introduction is followed by a first part dealing with the definition of terms. The second and major part concerning normative arguments is subdivided into three steps: the level of principles, the more concrete level of actions and finally the level (...) of social consequences. The third part presents some reflections following the eudaimonistic ethical tradition (the ethics of a good life and death) focusing on the central question: how to find meaning in life when faced with suffering. Conclusion: It would be fruitful to intensify the ethical reflection both on the problems concerning the foundations of social life, especially the meaning of dignity, autonomy and inviolability of human life, and social consequences of a liberal practice of euthanasia. In this context ethicists are challenged to reflect on the different approaches to what is or can be a good life and a human death. (shrink)

Exception and authority are core themes of Kierkegaard’s and Nietzsche’s works. These themes are used as points of comparison in more recent studies on the two authors which focus on structural parallels developing the figure of the single one resp. the lonely one and on concepts of power with regard to religious and philosophical authority. Methodological difficulties relevant to the popular comparison of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in general concern the interpretation of the totality, teleology and style of each works.

Die von Kierkegaard zwischen Januar und September 1850 geführten NB-Journale enthalten autobiographische Notizen, philosophisch-theologische Reflexionen (etwa zur Hermeneutik) und Kommentare zu eigenen und fremden Werken (wobei das Spektrum der Lektüren von Hugo von St. Viktor bis zu Victor Hugo reicht). Die Texte ermöglichen so den Mitvollzug eines Denk- und Schreibprozesses, der nicht zuletzt Kierkegaards ständiger Selbstprüfung dient.

Das Interesse der Arbeit gilt den skeptischen Denk- und Ausdrucksformen, mit denen Hegel und Kierkegaard den Anspruch auf absolute Wahrheit verbinden.

Religion, Metaphysik und Theologie sind durch das neuzeitliche Denken in besonderer Weise herausgefordert. Die Beiträge des Bandes befassen sich von verschiedenen Standpunkten aus mit der Spannung, die in Moderne und Postmoderne zwischen diesen Disziplinen entsteht.

Originally presented as the author's thesis--Theologische Fakultèat Paderborn, 2002.

What can literary interfaith dialogues teach us about real interfaith dialogue? Some would say: Nothing, they are only texts and they omit central elements of a real dialogue like the corporal presence of the speakers, their gestures and facial expressions, the orality of the discourses, the inter-subjectivity. Even if this argument is to a certain extent justifiable, it would be interesting to try another kind of reading of the texts, a phenomenological reading which tries to let appear the persons in (...) dialogue, and perhaps even more: the appearance of the divine reality beyond the human concepts which are used in the controversy and bound to a certain theological system. By this phenomenological reading the reader himself becomes involved in the dialogue and bears a responsibility for his development. Keywords: Theory of dialogue, Interfaith dialogue, Christian-Muslim Encounter, Phenomenology, Inter-subjectivity, Otherness, Transcendence, Ethics, Theology. (shrink)

Some major figures of early (1977-1984) Post-Punk, such as Joy Divison’s Ian Curtis or The Fall’s Mark E. Smith, were strongly influenced by existentialist themes they encountered in the writings of philosophers such as Camus or Nietzsche. Central among these themes is the modern struggle with nihilism. Nietzsche (at times) felt hopeful that some of us still possess the strength to see our modern disorientation as a creative opportunity and to (eventually) overcome the threat of nihilism: in this vein he (...) declares that when "we hear the news that ‘the old god is dead’” it is “as if a new dawn shone on us." By contrast, I argue that foundational Post-Punk artists express a post-Nietzschean, 20th century stance of succumbing to nihilism, an overwhelming experience of defeat and self-disgust. They write and sing from a profound sense that the modern degeneration diagnosed by Nietzsche has now reached unprecedented lows so that our “disgust at life”, our “exhaustion and… wish for the ‘end’…for being otherwise, being elsewhere” has become wholly inescapable. Nietzsche's new dawn has faded. (shrink)

How can we ever find out whether our psychological processes are reliable? According to many reliabilists—e.g. Alston, Goldman, Papineau, and Van Cleve —there is no problem: We just use our psychological processes and then arrive at the belief that these very same processes are reliable. If our psychological processes are actually reliable, we can arrive in this way at a justified belief. And, indeed, we can even come to know that they are reliable.

This essay is an attempt to interpret the behaviour of K. in Kafka's novel "Das Schloß". The focus is on three episodes that stand, respectively, at the beginning, the middle, and the end of the novel. In all of these episodes, the concepts of 'struggle' and 'victory' play a crucial role. By paying attention to the usage of these concepts, the passages under investigation can be shown to be interrelated in a significant way. Making these connections explicit allows one to (...) draw some far-reaching conclusions about K.'s personality. (shrink)

Citizen Science in the Empire. The System Place “Wertlose Einsendungen aus der Bevölkerung” (Worthless Entries from the Population) in the Archives of the Berlin‐Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities. Between 1871 and 1946, the Berlin‐Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities maintained a special collection in its archives, which, under the simple name “Entries from the Population”, kept correspondences, projects and proposals, for which a negative expert opinion was issued after thorough examination. The collection offers surprising insights into the pathologies and (...) fantasies of mostly pseudo‐scientific researchers, inventors and discoverers, while at the same time revealing a glimpse of the topics of this epoch that moved the history of science. Using a selection of examples, this essay examines the economic cycles and archive practices of a largely forgotten source of what is now called Citizen Science. (shrink)

To solve the ancient Pyrrhonian problematic, it is not enough to show that knowledge and justified belief are possible. They must be shown to be actual. It is argued that the attempts by the main advocates of reliabilism, William Alston, Alvin Goldman, and Ernest Sosa, fail to solve the problematic because they fall under the Agrippan modes of circularity and hypothesis. There is also another sort of response implicit in their discussion. It is not to try to solve the problematic, (...) but to accept the Pyrrhonian moral and to settle for appearances. Finally, a version of Pyrrhonism is given, and it is suggested that reliabilism be understood as a case of this sort of Pyrrhonism. (shrink)

Fogelin’s neo-Pyrrhonism is skepticism about epistemology and philosophy more generally. Philosophical reflection on ordinary epistemic practices leads us to deny the possibility of knowledge and justified belief. However, instead of accepting the dogma that knowledge and justified beliefs are impossible, a neo-Pyrrhonist rejects the philosophical premises that lead to this conclusion. Fogelin argues in particular that contemporary theories of justification cannot avoid dogmatic skepticism, because they are committed to the premises of the skeptical argument deriving from the modes of Agrippa. (...) It is argued against Fogelin that those theories can and typically do deny one or another of the premises and thus can avoid the skeptical conclusion. Neo-Pyrrhonism should rather be defended by arguing that the premises of the Agrippan argument are intuitively plausible and that neo-Pyrrhonism provides the best resolution of the resulting paradox. Only neo-Pyrrhonism both explains the intuitive plausibility of the premises and avoids dogmatic skepticism. (shrink)

The paper defends Cartesian skepticism by an argument relying on internalism and infallibilism. It argues that this sort of skepticism gives the best explanation of our intuitions and ordinary epistemic practices.

In this article we focus on Sally Haslanger’s theoretical project of distinguishing between different ways to understand social constructionist theses in general. The goal of this article is to better understand Haslanger’s distinction between different forms of social constructionism. In trying to get a better grasp of Haslanger’s distinctions we will encounter some difficulties that will hinder us getting a coherent picture of these distinctions. For some of these difficulties we will present some possible solutions but, in the end, we (...) will ask for further commentary from Haslanger herself to improve on our understanding of her distinction between different forms of social constructionism. (shrink)

Naturalistic epistemology is accused of ruling out the normative element of epistemology. Different naturalistic responses are considered. It is argued that the content of attributions of knowledge is best understood in purely descriptive terms. So their normative force is merely hypothetical. Attributions of justified belief, on the other hand, do have intrinsic normativity. This derives from their role in our first-person deliberation of what to believe. It is suggested that the content of them is best captured in naturalistic terms by (...) accepting a dispositional analysis of justification that is a species of the generic dispositional conception of value. (shrink)