Many commentators hold that in addition to the categorical imperative of morality, Kant also posits an objective law of non-moral practical rationality, 'the' Hypothetical Imperative. On this view, the appeal to the Hypothetical Imperative increases the dialectical options that Kantians have vis-a-vis Humean skepticism about the authority of reason, and it allows for a systematic explanation of the possibility of non-moral weakness of will. I argue that despite its appeal, this interpretation cannot be sustained: for Kant the only objective, universally (...) valid a priori principle of practical reason that governs transcendentally free agents is the moral law. All non-moral practical rules are mere “precepts” that lack genuine objectivity, certainty, and intersubjective validity. I suggest that for Kant the rejection of the possibility of non-moral practical laws plays an important part in his argument for the supreme rational authority of moral norms over prudential precepts of happiness. (shrink)

If we think of recognition as the practical relation consciously enacted by concerned individual subjects as social actors, which allows them to fulfil their intersubjectively valid social roles, this by no means exhausts the significance that recognition is accorded by Hegel. In fact the problem of recognition is central to the understanding and evaluation of Hegel’s metaphysical system. Thus a close scrutiny of the presentation of self-consciousness in Phenomenology of Spirit and the interpretative difficulties it poses leads on to the (...) question of the subject and Hegel’s distinction between finite, accidental individuals and the true subject in his system: the concept of Spirit, understood not as a separate entity but as a system of relations, objectified in the historical forms of the Absolute Spirit. But what is the price of Hegel’s metaphysics of subjectivity? Hegelian recognition signifies the recognition by individuals of recognition in its truth, that is, the self-recognition by finite individuals that they participate in Spirit as the true universal subject to the degree that they recognize their shared world of actions as the world of their own making. Modernity is therefore defined for Hegel as the recognition and realization of ‘conscious freedom’, whose telos lies in the actualization of universal reciprocal recognition that brings the unfreedom of history to an end. The idea of freedom and the thesis of the ‘end of history’ remain, however, the preserve of the thinking few. Hegelian recognition and with it Hegel’s whole metaphysical system founders on the rock of finitude, on the unfreedom of finite human beings. (shrink)

Pioneering molecular work on chelicerate visual system development in the horseshoe crabLimulus polyphemussurprised with the possibility that this process may not depend on the deeply conserved retinal determination function ofPax6transcription factors. Genomic, transcriptomic, and developmental studies in spiders now reveal that the arthropodPax6homologseyelessandtwin of eyelessact as ancestral determinants of the ocular head segment in chelicerates, which clarifies deep gene regulatory and structural homologies and recommends more unified terminologies in the comparison of arthropod visual systems. Following this phylotypic stage, chelicerate visual (...) system development differs fundamentally from other arthropods during the compartmentalization of the ocular segment in that eye and optic neuropil primordia originate independently from each other. Comparative analyses of this phase identified further gene regulatory homologies but also major differences, most notably the possibly compensatory replacement ofPax6byPax2in lateral eye specification. Also see the video abstract here:https://youtu.be/Hdfr3z5kEXU. (shrink)

Hegel's Philosophy of Right represents a unique theory type in the history of political philosophy. It is a normative theory that departs in its construction from an empirical facticity without reducing norms to facts. It unifies teleological and deontic considerations. It is a theory of the normatively requisite institutional structures able to realize the demands of a historically particular form of individuality, and simultaneously it presents the phenomenology of modern subjectivity committed to the ultimate value of true freedom. In this (...) way it aims to transform into genuine self-knowledge the illusory social-political self-image of its addressees. The paper discusses the connection between this phenomenological method and Hegel's conception of freedom - his critique of unconditional, abstract normativity, his solution to the problem of collision between equally valid norms and the possible relevance of his methodological principles to contemporary political philosophy. (shrink)

" ... the political situation into which Poland has been brought is a thoroughly revolutionary one, and it leaves Poland with no other choice but to be revolutionary or perish.".

Exactitude. The Genesis of an Epistemic Virtue in the ‘Long Nineteenth Century’. The article examines the genesis of exactitude as an epistemic virtue in both scholarly and scientific contexts in the 19th century, mainly in Prussia. Starting with an influential historiographic work on ancient metrology three semantic fields of accuracy, exactitude and precision are differentiated and pursued in their etymologies as well as applications. The historic situation between 1790 and 1860 is identified as the crucial period when the exactness of (...) the exact sciences as well as the notion of accuracy in the humanities start to diverge from one another in order to develop an epistemic virtue each on its own. (shrink)

Speaking of truth inescapably confronts us with paradoxes, i.e., correct deductive propositions like a Cretan claiming that all Cretans lie which (due to negative systemic self-reference) end up as circular contradictions, indeterminable questions, or dilemmas. Faced with the numerous paradoxical statements (apparently 82) found in the Bible, the German Protestant reformer Sebastian Franck (14991542), for example, conceded that any truth of God cannot be found in language but only in the immediate silent experience of God. Likewise, believers in an uncompromising (...) search for true facts about this world would certainly agree with (though arguably misappropriate) Wittgenstein in claiming that Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. Paradoxes this article claims must neither be feared, nor avoided, nor become subject to hopeless attempts in searching for logic solutions. Paradoxes lead the way to truth in demonstrating that questions of truth, or truth claims, cannot be adequately addressed within the same system of communication (ortho-system) in which they are raised. The encounter with paradoxes (e.g., a God who creates but is uncreated) elevates language and communication onto a meta-level (or system) of communication in which new means (like for instance Gdel's numbering) are needed to speak of what is real but apparently cannot be true. These means, however, will turn out to be likewise paradoxes that furthermore call for new and creative ways of speaking of such truths that previously could not be communicated. The creative admission of paradoxes into communication philosophy will not solve age-old problems or dilemmas; however, it will playfully open up the conversation of science with religion to the creative means of the arts were truth is not argued but performed in paradoxes. (shrink)

T. 1. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Nachahmungsästhetik und Affektenlehre sowie der idealistischen Musikästhetik in Deutschland.--T. 2. Die Romantik und der Kampf ästhetische Richtungen.

This study in the philosophy of psychiatrydeals with the concept `psychosis'. Methodologicallyit follows Wittgenstein's proposal to `dissolve'philosophical problems by studying the actual use ofthe relevant concepts. Philosophical problemsconcerning both identification of psychosis and themeaning of this concept are pointed out. The logicaldependencies between `psychosis' and `understanding'and between `understanding' and the concept ofperson are demonstrated. Studying theinterdependence of these concepts in the light ofthe actual uses of `madness' shows how the use of`psychosis' implies a radical loss of understanding.The status and legitimacy (...) of `psychosis' as a psychiatric concept is then demonstrated. (shrink)

Cramer et al. present a thoughtful application of network analysis to symptoms, but certain questions remain open. These questions involve the intended causal interpretation, the critique of latent variables, individual variation in causal networks, Borsboom's idea of networks as measurement models, and how well the data support the stability of the network results.

Exception and authority are core themes of Kierkegaard’s and Nietzsche’s works. These themes are used as points of comparison in more recent studies on the two authors which focus on structural parallels developing the figure of the single one resp. the lonely one and on concepts of power with regard to religious and philosophical authority. Methodological difficulties relevant to the popular comparison of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in general concern the interpretation of the totality, teleology and style of each works.

Die von Kierkegaard zwischen Januar und September 1850 geführten NB-Journale enthalten autobiographische Notizen, philosophisch-theologische Reflexionen (etwa zur Hermeneutik) und Kommentare zu eigenen und fremden Werken (wobei das Spektrum der Lektüren von Hugo von St. Viktor bis zu Victor Hugo reicht). Die Texte ermöglichen so den Mitvollzug eines Denk- und Schreibprozesses, der nicht zuletzt Kierkegaards ständiger Selbstprüfung dient.

Das Interesse der Arbeit gilt den skeptischen Denk- und Ausdrucksformen, mit denen Hegel und Kierkegaard den Anspruch auf absolute Wahrheit verbinden.