This paper examines the role of the generation gap in Aristophanes' construction of his persona throughout Wasps, Clouds, and Peace. It contends that in Wasps and Clouds Aristophanes defines the relationship with his audience and his rivals by presenting himself as the figure of a paternal son. The same stance shapes the comic poet's generic self-positioning in the initial scene of Peace, where the parody of Euripides' Aeolus and Bellerophon evinces a corrective attitude in relation not only to the troubled (...) images of fatherhood offered in the two tragic plays, but also to Aristophanes' unsuccessful performances as a paternal son in his earlier comedies. Euripidean intertextuality thus serves as a discursive medium through which Aristophanes dramatizes the turning points of his poetic autobiography. (shrink)

This paper considers Carson’s rewriting of Heracles’ tragic madness— through the art of collage, an assembling and disassambling of textual fragments, scraps of papers, drawings, chromatic smears, and sketches—as an imagistic site for theorizing the anti-normative materiality, physical and metaphysical, of par-a-noia. I make a case for a materiality of par-a-noia by proposing a comparison with Alain Badiou’s Marxist political formalism. The distinctive formal trait of H of H, verbal and pictorial juxtaposition, invites us to think of par-a-noia as an (...) aesthetico-political radicality located on the edge of a voiding of thought (noein), a radicality that, as I suggest at the end, can be aligned with modes of non-normate cognition, with neuroqueer countersociality. (shrink)

Considering Butler's "tragic trilogy"-a set of interventions on Sophocles' Antigone, Euripides' Bacchae, and Aeschylus's Eumenides-this book seeks to understand not just how Butler uses and interprets Greek tragedy, but also how tragedy shapes Butler's thinking, even when their gaze is directed elsewhere. Through close readings of these tragedies, this book brings to light the tragic quality of Butler's writing. It shows how Butler's mode of reading tragedy-and, crucially, reading tragically-offers a distinctive ethico-political response to the harrowing dilemmas of our current (...) moment. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Archive Feelings: A Theory of Greek Tragedy by Mario TelòSean LambertTelò, Mario. Archive Feelings: A Theory of Greek Tragedy. Ohio State University Press, 2020. 344pp.In Archive Feelings: A Theory of Greek Tragedy, Mario Telò takes aim at one of the most canonical (if also one of the most contested) features of Greek tragedy: its potential to deliver catharsis (12).1 Through careful close readings of Greek (...) tragedies informed by psychoanalytic theory and deconstruction, Telò makes a persuasive case that tragedy is anti-cathartic. “The Freudian take on catharsis is complicated, or even undercut,” he writes in the introduction, “by its own anti-cathartic latencies… We can accordingly look at tragedy as a form of dramatic poetry that finds its affective raison d’être… in these anti-cathartic feelings” (34).Telò states that the intent of Archive Feelings is mainly to intervene in the age-old debate, asking: “why do human beings enjoy tragedy?” (14). He suggests that the pleasure of tragedy is, in fact, a masochistic one: a denial of release or pleasure (such as would come from catharsis) that an audience or reader enjoys in its specifically joyless jouissance. At stake is “feeling material,” a “fantasy” of “merging into the impersonal, anorganic, universal matter of elemental life” (44) evoked in tragedy’s death-driven withdrawal from action. With this concept in mind, Telò goes beyond even his own ambitions for his project. More than merely intervening in debates about the pleasures of tragedy, he argues powerfully for the continuing relevance of Greek tragedy for critical theory today, particularly in light of the so-called “affective” and “material” turns in the humanities. Archive Feelings is thus a useful book for classicists conducting interdisciplinary and/or trans-historical research, but even more so for any scholar working within the constellation of psychoanalysis, deconstruction, queer theory, affect theory or critical race theory. Telò makes a persuasive case for tragedy as a lodestar within this firmament–a vital tool for thinking through problems within and across disciplines.In striking contradistinction to previous theorists of Greek tragedy, including Aristotle and Nietzsche, Telò locates the engine of Greek tragedy in the death drive. In so doing, he reads in ancient narratives a number of experiences such as “acceleration, hoarding, vertiginous suspension, [End Page 113] breathless looping, affective bulimia or binge-eating, serial cutting, trying to enter or fold in upon oneself, auto-immune inflammation” (14), and finds in “the orgasm as an unfinished, non-teleological pleasure,” a desire to return to a state of “inert matter” (13).2 Noting that the original meaning of the Greek word archê is “origin,” Telò connects this impulse to once again become “inert” with the desire to create archives. Thus, Telò sees Greek tragedies as both a model for projects of archival reconstruction as well as archival projects themselves: they are “anxious and debilitating” attempts to “re-create the past as it was” (13).3Telò’s study is divided into three parts: Archival Time, Archival Space, and Archival Endings, which attempt to “structurally reproduce the psychological temporalities of the archive” (49). In each of his five chapters, Telò elaborates the diverse narrative masochisms of Greek tragedy, exploring the various stakes and species of tragic anti-catharsis. In Chapter 1, Telò reads the “archive fever” of Sophocles’ Oedipus at Colonus against the “archive fatigue” of Euripides’ Phoenissae, finding in both of these plays—near the end of the epoch of ancient tragedy—an impulse toward “textual hoarding” (76) that both undermines the possibility of catharsis and “exhausts” (106) the possibilities of the genre (107). In both the “synchronic gathering of disparate fragments of experience” into the body of Oedipus before his death and the aesthetics of boredom, fatigue, and inertia that suffuse the Phoenissae, Telò locates a desire to store up, rather than purge, emotions such as pity and fear, in a flouting of the normal formula for catharsis (73).In Chapter 2, Telò looks at the figures of Heracles and Medea in their original myths and tragic incarnations, seeing in both the compulsion to recircle around scenes of their respective “primordial traumas” (145). In Euripides’s Medea, this move manifests in repeated references... (shrink)

The fact diat die first formal recognition of die crime of genocide (crimen lesae humanitatis) took place at Nuremberg in 1945 is extremely significant. Those who, to quote Adorno, record the extermination camps as “working incidents” in the victorious advance of civilization, or see “the martyrdom of die Jews as an irrelevant episode in the context of universal history,” fail to grasp die dominating trait of twentieth century atrocities: the perverse secularization of die religious motivations of genocide in modern totalitarian (...) political ideologies. The Nazi regime, with its dystopian vision of a hierarchy of races and societies under German hegemony, represented the most complete expression of diis process of total conditioning of the existence of individuals, with all its genocidal potentials. (shrink)

At the beginning of the third section of Book II of Capital, Marx distinguishes between the direct process of the production of capital and the total process of its reproduction. The former includes both the work process as well as the value-creating process. As we shall see, the latter includes both the process of consumption mediated by circulation, as well as the process of reproduction of capital itself. In the different forms assumed by capital within its cycle, and even more (...) in the different forms assumed by this cycle, the movement of individual capital turns out to be a part of the total movement of social capital. (shrink)

In Aristotle's ethics and anthropology the concept of normality or regularity, nature and norm subtly imply each other reciprocally. The ethical criterium, explored throughout Nicomachean Ethics is that illustrated in detail by the "normal" conduct of the so called spoudaios. The point of contact between normality and naturalness is on the other side offered by the concept of physis, analysed both in Physics and in the biological works. Nature is what happens for the most, i.e. within the field of regularity (...) and legality which characterises its processes. But nature at the same time means telos, i.e. the finality and completion of these processes. What is normal is therefore also natural, and what is natural represents the normative level of phenomena. As for the ethical and anthropological field, the normal-natural human condition, and therefore the law which defines man's perfection, can be traced in the human political nature, i.e. in man's complete adjustment to the model given by the spoudaios. What falls outside this virtuous circle of normality, naturalness and legality is considered a moral deviation, which at the same time constitutes a teratology for and of mankind. Accordingly, conformity to the naturalized public ethos excludes in Aristotle any recourse to the transcendental norm of the "ought to be" which had been one of the fundamental characteristics of Plato's ethics. (shrink)

Este trabajo aborda la visión arendtiana de la política, entendida como mundo humano común y mantenido en común a través del discurso. La sociedad como lenguaje se aparta de la peligrosa posibilidad de la unicidad discursiva en la vida política. La abolición de la pluralidad se encuentra en las antípodas del pensamiento de Arendt. Su telos es, más bien, contra toda figura totalitaria, la reivindicación de una política ceñida a la esencial relatividad de la doxa. El �nosotros� de la política (...) se produce así en la confluencia de perspectivas particulares. Habermas se opone par- cialmente a Arendt, pues asume que su perspectiva carece de un canon ideal que permita distinguir un falso acuerdo de un acuerdo genuino. (shrink)

En este artículo se exploran las relaciones entre finito-infinito y los límites del lenguaje posible, del lenguaje finito, para hablar de su callado fundamento. En este sentido, el mismo vaciamiento del lenguaje, expresión de una imposibilidad a la cual empero no se hurta, la de hablar de Dios, conduce a ponderar la importancia que tiene la teología negativa en el sentido de permitir al mundo humano barruntar las dimensiones del misterio que lo funda. Se tocan, de esta manera, las concepciones (...) de Maimónides y de santo Tomás acerca de la vía negativa como mecanismo parcial que afronta eso que, precisamente, desborda las fronteras del entendimiento humano. No porque Dios, en sí mismo, no sea, por decirlo con Erígena, plus quam esse, hiperesencial, sino porque en la noche cognoscitiva del lenguaje a éste no le queda sino su propia abdicación en relación al telos que lo mueve. En la desproporción existente entre el lenguaje y aquello que lo anima, aquél, el lenguaje, celebrará su propio silencio y la lejanía abismal en relación a su fundamento. Palabras clave : teología negativa; vía negativa; teología apofática; teología catafática; vía de la eminencia. Maimonides and Thomas: The Triumph of NegationIn this article I explore the finite-infinite relations and the limits of the possible language, of the finite language, in order to speak of its silent foundation. In this regard, the very emptying of language, expression of an impossibility from which it nevertheless does not hide, that of speaking of God, leads to think over the importance that negative theology has, in the sense of allowing the human world to conjecture the dimensions of the mystery on which it is founded. Thus, the conceptions of Maimonides and Saint Thomas are found to be very akin as to their regarding the negative way as a partial mechanism to deal with that which, precisely, surpasses the bounds of human understanding. Not because God in himself is not, to say it with Erigena, plus quam esse, hyperessential, but because in the cognitive night of language the latter has no choice but its own abdication with respect to the telos that animates it. In the disproportion existing between language and that which animates it, the former, language, will celebrate its own silence and the abysmal distance in relation to its foundation. Keywords: Negative theology; Negative way; Apophatic theology; Cataphatic theology; Way of eminence. (shrink)

Eupolis’ fragmentary Demes has traditionally been placed in 412 bc, after the failure of the Sicilian Expedition but before the oligarchic coup of 411. Ian Storey has recently argued that the play belongs instead in 417 or perhaps 416 bc, while Mario Telò and Leone Porciani put it in 410 bc. This article demonstrates that both alternative dates face decisive objections, and suggests that Demes is better kept in 412 bc. I then briefly consider the role of late 5th-century (...) Athenian “political” comedy generally, and in particular the sort of popular sentiment that Eupolis’ comedy must have been exploiting or echoing when it was conceived in the first half of 413. (shrink)

Os anos egípcios eram de 365 dias contados a partir da subida ao trono de cada rei. Esta contagem era independente das três estações em que se subdividia o ano solar, marcadas pelas necessidades agrícolas. As semanas iniciais de sete e oito dias, motivadas pelas fases lunares, cedo foram ultrapassadas por um sistema muito mais regular de meses de três décadas, cada uma marcada pelo aparecimento de um decano. Os decanos eram 36 estrelas visíveis por períodos de dez dias, completando-se (...) o ano com os cinco dias epagómenos. Sírio, a primeira, marcava outro início do ano. Em vez de utilizarem dois calendários, um baseado no Sol e na Lua, e outro na elevação helíaca de Sírio, reuniram os ciclos do Sol, da Lua e de Sírio num sistema único, um «grande ano», um sistema que anulava o atraso que o calendário tinha em relação ao tempo astral de um dia de quatro em quatro anos, ao fim dos 1461 anos do período sotíaco. (shrink)

This article studies an aspect of the relation between emotions and ethics that is usually neglected in the recent debate on moral emotions. By focusing on the contributions of common or everyday emotions to the development of moral behaviours and attitudes, the debate loses sight of the emotional side of the ethical attitude and the way it involves different, specifically ethical emotions. In contrast, such emotions play an important role in Aristotle’s and Heidegger’s thought. As will be shown, both authors (...) identify emotions that are intrinsically tied to ethics in a broad sense and are structurally different from everyday emotions. Moreover, both characterize the two kinds of emotion in a similar fashion: whereas everyday emotions involve a limited form of activity and refer to a more immediate objective domain, the properly ethical emotions result from a superior form of activity and open up to a vaster domain or even to the entire reality, thus having a metaphysical character. The study of this distinction and what it involves will allow for a better understanding not only of emotions in general, but also of the emotional dimension of ethical life. (shrink)

In this paper we will demonstrate that a computational system can meet the criteria for autonomy laid down by classical enactivism. The two criteria that we will focus on are operational closure and structural determinism, and we will show that both can be applied to a basic example of a physically instantiated Turing machine. We will also address the question of precariousness, and briefly suggest that a precarious Turing machine could be designed. Our aim in this paper is to challenge (...) the assumption that computational systems are necessarily heteronomous systems, to try and motivate in enactivism a more nuanced and less rigid conception of computational systems, and to demonstrate to computational theorists that they might find some interesting material within the enactivist tradition, despite its historical hostility towards computationalism. (shrink)

Dehumanization by algorithms raises important issues for business and society. Yet, these issues remain poorly understood due to the fragmented nature of the evolving dehumanization literature across disciplines, originating from colonialism, industrialization, post-colonialism studies, contemporary ethics, and technology studies. This article systematically reviews the literature on algorithms and dehumanization (n = 180 articles) and maps existing knowledge across several clusters that reveal its underlying characteristics. Based on the review, we find that algorithmic dehumanization is particularly problematic for human resource management (...) and the future of work, managerial decision-making, consumer ethics, hard- and soft-law regulation, and basic values, including privacy and consumer rights. From the literature synthesis, we also derive the following definition of algorithmic dehumanization: the act of using algorithms and data in a way that results in the intentional or unintentional treatment of individuals and/or groups as less than fully human, thereby violating human rights, including liberty, equality, and dignity. Ultimately, we present a dehumanization avoidance model that serves as a structured research agenda and practical guide to address the challenges raised by algorithmic dehumanization. Thus, the model indicates promising pathways for future research at the intersection of AI and society and facilitates reflection on organizational processes that support improving corporate capabilities and managerial decision-making to avoid algorithmic dehumanization. (shrink)

A powerful critique of nudge theory and the paternalist policies of behavioral economics, and an argument for a more inclusive form of rationality.

En la medida en la que Spinoza no nombra explícitamente el mecanismo de la identificación éste suele ser confundido con la imitación de los afectos. Mientras que la imitación de los afectos, definida en la tercera parte de la Ética, es un mecanismo por el que los hombres sientes los afectos de los demás, sin por ello alienarse, la identificación es una forma de alienación voluntaria que consiste en apropiarse de las costumbres ajenas en detrimento de las propias. Este artículo (...) se propone delimitar el mecanismo de la identificación frente a la imitación y definir su funcionamiento. (shrink)