The aim of the present paper is to list the usual and some possible meanings--or at least those the writer found the most interesting--of the word 'level,' to specify them briefly, to illustrate them, and to propose some problems in which those concepts are involved. Should this semantical clarification prove useful in clearing the ground for ontological speculation, the thesis would be confirmed that there is no conflict between semantics and ontology as long as the former does not deny the (...) legitimacy of inquiries into the denotata of certain universal words, and as long as metaphysics is not reluctant to linguistic hygiene. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In Einstein’s physical geometry, the geometry of space and the uniformity of time are taken to be non-conventional. However, due to the stipulation of the isotropy of the one-way speed of light in the synchronization of clocks, as it stands, Einstein’s views do not seem to apply to the whole of the Minkowski space-time. In this work we will see how Einstein’s views can be applied to the Minkowski space-time. In this way, when adopting Einstein’s views, chronogeometry is a (...) physical chronogeometry. (shrink)

The author examines Heidegger's conception of the history of Philosophy as “the history of Being.” An authentic philosopher does not look at the history of philosophy as a more or less accurate description of philosophers' thoughts, chronologically ordered. The thoughts of the great philosophers are not “products” in a process of thinking; in fact, what is most original in each of the great philosopher's thinking is Being's “property.” Philosophers or, rather, “thinkers,” ask questions in order to open the way for (...) questioning. They do not think many thoughts, but just one which is constantly “repeated.” Repetition is here “recollection” and “re-sumption” of the ways in which Being has made itself patent. Heidegger's original plan for the “destruction of the history of ontology” has been carried on in his later works by means of a recollection of what had been forgotten. A softening of the crust of the history of philosophy in order to discover Being “within” characterizes Heidegger's “dialogue” with the great thinkers of the past. Thus, the history of philosophy is to be interpreted in the light of the experience of the oblivion of Being. Thinkers, as well as poets, are concerned with Being in their attempt to fathom the original essence of speech, but whereas the former are trying to find the unique word to speak about Being, the latter lay down Being in their poetic words. Yet, in the last resort, thinking is the same as “proto-poetizing”; thought precedes poetry in so far as through the “poetizing essence of thinking” the thinker becomes the custodian of the truth of Being. (shrink)

1 Orestano e l’anagrafe di un significato Chi si avvicina alla crescente letteratura sull’ontologia sociale provenendo da studi di filosofia del diritto ha spesso la sensazione di avere a che fare con qualcosa di familiare. Ciò dipende in parte dal fatto che la riflessione sul diritto ha da sempre una dimensione ontologica. Andando molto indietro nel tempo si trovano diverse testimonianze della consapevolezza che postulare l’esistenza di qualcosa non sia un’operazione intellettuale innocente....

El presente artículo busca presentar el proyecto institucional Árbol de la Memoria, el cual consistió en la recuperación de la memoria de 13 trabajadores forestales y agrarios de la Corporación Nacional Forestal Región de La Araucanía, Chile, que fueron asesinados entre los días 6 y 7 de octubre de 1973 en los fundos “Carmen, Maitenes y Pemehue”, en lo que es actualmente la Reserva Nacional Malleco, sector los Guindos, comuna de Collipulli y de Mulchén. A lo largo del artículo se (...) realiza un análisis cualitativo y estudio de caso, presentando extractos de entrevistas realizadas a los familiares directos de las víctimas, como así también una problematización teórica mediante la utilización de bibliografía especializada que otorga una explicación de los sucesos acaecidos y los peligros actuales que enfrenta el sitio. (shrink)

Resumen: El presente ar:tículo quiere criticar el tradicional enfoque histórico-biográfico en la exégesis de la obra de Francesco Petrarca, para proponer, en cambio, la aplicación de unas herramientas de análisis propiamente poéticas, enfatizando así la exigencia de una lectura que atienda más a este tipo de función, en lugar de la referencial, causa de muchos malentendidos y de una importante pérdida de significado que afecta todo el mensaje petrarquesco. Para ello, el artículo se centrará en los nombres propios, elemento constitutivo (...) muy frecuente en las obras del poeta de Arezzo y nudos de un entramado semántico que es connotativo, más que denotativo. Un planteamiento, esto es, que discrepa de la gran mayoría de las interpretaciones, siempre orientadas hacia la consideración de ellos como meros referentes de identidades históricas. Entre estos nombres toma especial valor, como es debido, el propio nombre del poeta, que lejos de ser la simple identificación referencial entre escritor, autor, narrador y protagonista, resulta ser más bien la semilla de una construcción mitopoética vasta y articulada, vehículo preciso de una parte importante del mensaje poético que el autor legó a la posteridad y que atiene a la virtud y a la mejora ética y moral. Abstract: This article aims to criticize the traditional historical-biographical approach in the exegesis of the work of Francesco Petrarca, to propose, instead, the application of some properly poetic analysis tools, thus emphasizing the need for a reading that pays more attention to this type of function, rather than to the referential one, cause of many misunderstandings and an important loss of meaning that affects the entire Petrarchan message. To do this, the article will focus on proper names, a very common constituent element in the works of the poet of Arezzo, and knots of a semantic structure that is connotative, rather than denotative. An approach, that is, that disagrees with most interpretations, always oriented towards the consideration of them as mere referents of historical identities. Among these names, the poet's own name takes a special value, as it should, which far from being the simple referential identification between writer, author, narrator, and protagonist, turns out to be rather the seed of a vast and articulated mythopoetic construction, precise vehicle of an important part of the poetic message that the author bequeaths to posterity and that holds to virtue and ethical and moral improvement. (shrink)

Among the influential contributions of Alfred Tarski to logic and philosophy, and close in importance to his widely applied and discussed definition of truth, one finds his definition of logical consequence for formal languages. Like his definition of truth, Tarski's definition of logical consequence has been widely and fruitfully applied. Unlike the definition of truth, that of logical consequence has been rarely discussed philosophically. The main aim of this dissertation is to offer a thorough discussion of some philosophical issues arising (...) from the neglected definition. ;The point of departure is an interpretative reading of the relevant writings by Tarski. This reading yields historically interesting data that refute other recent readings. It also provides philosophical illumination, by clarifying how Tarski thought that his definition satisfied some pretheoretic desiderata. ;Next it is discussed whether Tarski's definition satisfies other pretheoretic desiderata, not stated by Tarski and in some cases not endorsed by him, but which are desiderata nonetheless from reasonable standpoints. These include the desiderata that all instances of logical consequence in Tarski's defined sense be instances of analytical implication, and that they be instances of valid implication. The conclusion of this part of the dissertation is that, under reasonable assumptions regarding the field of applicability of the definition and the concepts used in it, there are reasons to believe that these desiderata are met, and none to believe they are not. ;Finally, the problem of logical constants is examined. The concept of a "logical constant" is the only concept not taken from logic and mathematics that appears in Tarski's definition. The problem of logical constants is that of replacing the primitive 'logical constant' with a defined, better understood concept, and in a such a way that the resulting defined concept of logical consequence meets the previously discussed desiderata. The main conclusion of this part is that some attempts to do this replace the obscure with the more obscure, while other attempts that seem to be in the right spirit have shortcomings of their own. (shrink)