In a recent study appearing in Neuroethics, I reported observing 11 significant correlations between the “Dark Triad” personality traits – Machiavellianism, Narcissism, and Psychopathy – and “conservative” judgments on a 17-item Moral Intuition Survey. Surprisingly, I observed no significant correlations between the Dark Triad and “liberal” judgments. In order to determine whether these results were an artifact of the particular issues I selected, I ran a follow-up study testing the Dark Triad against conservative and liberal judgments on 15 additional moral (...) issues. The new issues examined include illegal immigration, abortion, the teaching of “intelligent design” in public schools, the use of waterboarding and other “enhanced interrogation techniques” in the war on terrorism, laws defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman, and environmentalism. 1154 participants (680 male, 472 female; median age 29), recruited online through Amazon Mechanical Turk, completed three surveys: a 15-item Moral Intuition Survey (MIS), the 28-item Short Dark Triad personality inventory, and a five-item demographic survey. The results strongly reinforce my earlier findings. Twenty-two significant correlations were observed between “conservative” judgments and the Dark Triad (all of which were significant past a Bonferonni-corrected significance threshold of p = .0008), compared to seven significant correlations between Dark Triad and “liberal” judgments (only one of which was significant past p = .0008). This article concludes by developing a novel research proposal for determining whether the results of my two studies are “bad news” for conservatives or liberals. (shrink)

This book treats modal logic as a theory, with several subtheories, such as completeness theory, correspondence theory, duality theory and transfer theory and is intended as a course in modal logic for students who have had prior contact with modal logic and who wish to study it more deeply. It presupposes training in mathematical or logic. Very little specific knowledge is presupposed, most results which are needed are proved in this book.

We sought to evaluate whether health care professionals’ viewpoints differed on the role of ethics committees and hospitals in the resolution of clinical ethical dilemmas based on practice location. We conducted a survey study from December 21, 2013 to March 15, 2014 of health care professionals at six hospitals. The survey consisted of eight clinical ethics cases followed by statements on whether there was a role for the ethics committee or hospital in their resolution, what that role might be and (...) case specific queries. Respondents used a 5-point Likert scale to express their degree of agreement with the premises posed. We used the ANOVA test to evaluate whether respondent views significantly varied based on practice location. 240 health care professionals completed the survey. Only three individual queries of 32 showed any significant response variations across practice locations. Overall, viewpoints did not vary across practice locations within question categories on whether the ethics committee or hospital had a role in case resolution, what that role might be and case specific queries. In this multicenter survey study, the viewpoints of health care professionals on the role of ethics committees or hospitals in the resolution of clinical ethics cases varied little based on practice location. (shrink)

Using Chicago as our case, this article puts forth a notion of black placemaking that privileges the creative, celebratory, playful, pleasurable, and poetic experiences of being black and being around other black people in the city. Black placemaking refers to the ways that urban black Americans create sites of endurance, belonging, and resistance through social interaction. Our framework offers a corrective to existing accounts that depict urban blacks as bounded, plagued by violence, victims and perpetrators, unproductive, and isolated from one (...) another and the city writ large. While ignoring neither the external assaults on black spaces nor the internal dangers that can make everyday life difficult, we highlight how black people make places in spite of those realities. Our four cases – the black digital commons, black public housing reunions, black lesbian and gay nightlife, and black Little League baseball – elucidate the matter of black lives across genders, sexualities, ages, classes, and politics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Thomist and the Palamite: Reflections on The Trinity:On the Nature and Mystery of the One God*Marcus PlestedIt scarcely needs repeating that Fr. Thomas Joseph White's book is a monumental achievement. It is a splendid and paradigmatic instance of Thomistic ressourcement, amply showing the power of Aquinas's thought and work to animate, shape, and inspire Christian reflection on the past, present, and future of Trinitarian theology. While not (...) conceived as a theology "on one's knees" (6), it is certainly a work oriented on the divine wisdom. Aquinas began all of his major works with the theme of wisdom and this salutary practice is emulated by Fr. Thomas Joseph in his introduction, which nicely sets up wisdom as something of a master theme of the whole volume (even though the word "wisdom," oddly, does not appear in the index). The book is a deeply revealing account of Christian Trinitarian theology through the ages. It is profoundly helpful on the question of analogy in general and the "psychological analogy" in particular. It also contains some bracing and, I think, largely merited critique of figures such as Karl Barth and Karl Rahner, on the one hand, and Hans Urs von Balthasar and Jürgen Moltmann on the other. I also found the writing not unlike that of Aquinas—limpid, painstakingly reasoned, clearly structured, and disciplined albeit with occasional notes of delicious exuberance and the odd slightly mischievous aside. It is also, of course, a huge tome—even [End Page 541] a kind of summa in itself. I would say it was un-put-down-able were it not for its considerable weight. All in all, and speaking as a mere outsider to the Catholic Thomist tradition, I would say it is a worthy tribute to the Angelic Doctor himself.The book is of course a capital-C Catholic and specifically Thomist account of the Trinity. Even so, I was a little taken aback to see Thomas, along with various modern interlocutors, take up well over five hundred pages, and the first two thousand years of biblical, patristic, and early medieval reflection on the nature and mystery of God reduced to a mere 130 pages or so. The twelve pages bridging the eight hundred years between Augustine and Aquinas were particularly disorienting in their rapid pace. It seems to me—and I shall explain why later—a good deal of highly significant Trinitarian theology is lost sight of in the process. It can, at times, read like a bit of a theological juggernaut or perhaps the hurtling troika at the end of Nikolai Gogol's Dead Souls with alternative viewpoints swatted away and other ecclesial traditions scattering before the relentless perfection and implacable progress of the Thomist machine. That said, I do want to recognize the author's expressed desire to pursue Thomistic ressourcement with "collegiality" and ecumenical sensitivity (7). While he does indeed swat away many alternative viewpoints, he does try to give those "vibrant" viewpoints their due and, in general, gives far more credence to non-Catholic writers than would have been conceivable in a Thomist work written, say, a century ago. From the Orthodox standpoint, this includes some brief discussion of Sergius Bulgakov and John Zizioulas, along with occasional references to figures such as Vladmir Lossky, Dumitru Stăniloae, and John Meyendorff. Perhaps more significantly, his patristic references expressly include some of the Greek Fathers, notably the Cappadocian Fathers—although I shall query what he means by "the Cappadocian Fathers" later in this essay. St. Maximus the Confessor receives some attention, and even later Roman (commonly if inaccurately called Byzantine) theologians such as St. Gregory of Cyprus and St. Gregory Palamas get a look-in. This appeal to the Greek patristic tradition is made, I suspect, with something of an eye on the Orthodox. As Aquinas himself recommended, when speaking with "the Greeks," one must argue not only from Latin but also from Greek patristic sources. There are, nonetheless, many important elements and insights from the Eastern Christian tradition that are simply left out and one is left wishing that the reflection on Greek patristic and modern Orthodox sources had been much expanded—for the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Jesus and Buddhism: A Christian ViewMarcus J. BorgLike several of the contributors to this collection of essays, I begin with my own vantage point. By profession a historian of Jesus and Christian origins, I am by confession a Christian of a nonliteralist and nonexclusivist kind (once Lutheran, now Episcopalian). As a Christian, I am interested in the theological implications of my work as a historian. As a student of (...) Buddhism, I am an amateur whose knowledge is limited to what I have learned from teaching world religions at the introductory undergraduate level.The essays illustrate a classic issue in interreligious dialogue: What shall we compare? Exoteric forms or esoteric core? If Buddhism (esoteric or exoteric) is compared with external forms of popular-level Christianity over the centuries, the gulf is great indeed. But if we compare the historical Jesus and the mystical stream of Christianity (its internal core) with Buddhism, then there are important points of contact.As a Jesus scholar and a Christian, I address two central subjects raised by the essays, the first more historical and the second more theological. I briefly compare the historical Jesus and the Buddha and then reflect about the exclusivist and absolutist claims made about Jesus by the most common forms of Christianity.The Historical Jesus and the BuddhaJesus was a Jewish mystic. This is radical shorthand for my fuller five-stroke sketch, as well as foundational for it. As a Jewish mystic (or Spirit person, by which I mean the same thing), Jesus became a healer, wisdom teacher, social prophet, and movement founder. 1 This sketch is the basis for comparing the historical Jesus and the Buddha.Of the contributors, José Cabezón says the most about recent historical Jesus scholarship. I agree with him about much. Both Jesus and the Buddha opened up the religious life to marginalized people, stressed the interior life, and inaugurated reformist movements. Both traditions take spirits and ‘magic’ seriously. 2 I agree that the major difference is Jesus’ much greater emphasis on social justice, which leads to a further difference: Jesus was killed, his life cut short because he was a social [End Page 93] prophet, whereas the Buddha died from food poisoning. Jesus’ public activity was thus very brief, perhaps as little as a year, compared to the forty or fifty years of the Buddha.To return to similarities, I cite two more. Both Jesus and the Buddha had transforming enlightenment experiences of a mystical kind at about age thirty. Both became teachers of a convention-subverting wisdom flowing out of their enlightenment experiences.Because Cabezón expresses uncertainty about the second claim, I summarize the reasons why I see Jesus as a teacher of an enlightenment way of wisdom similar to that taught by the Buddha. 3 ‘Seeing’ (enlightenment) is strongly emphasized not only in sayings of Jesus but also in the metaphorical ‘spin’ given to some of the stories reporting the healing of blindness. Moreover, inviting a new way of seeing is the primary rhetorical function of Jesus’ aphorisms and parables, his most common forms of teaching.Furthermore, imagery of ‘the way’ is central to Jesus and the gospels, pointing to a foundational similarity to the teaching of the Buddha. There is the broad way and there is the narrow way; those who humble (empty) themselves will be exalted; the path to a new way of being involves dying to an old way of being. This emphasis points to an internal spiritual-psychological process very similar to Buddhist ‘emptying’ and ‘letting go.’ ‘Dying’ and ‘letting go’ are metaphorical synonyms. 4Jesus’ way undermined convention and affirmed a radical recentering in that which is beyond the domestications generated by convention: the sacred. As a mystic, Jesus knew this from his own experience. 5 Like the Buddha, he taught differently because he had seen differently.Thus I have become persuaded of a foundational similarity between ‘the way’ taught by the Buddha and ‘the way’ taught by Jesus. 6 I tell my students that if Jesus and the Buddha were ever to meet, neither would try to convert the other—not because they would regard the task as hopeless, but because they would... (shrink)

This article evaluates the effects of two types of rewards (performance-contingent versus engagement-contingent) on self-regulation, intrinsic motivation and creativity. Forty-two undergraduate students were randomly assigned to three conditions; i.e. a performance-contingent reward group, an engagement-contingent reward group and a control group. Results provide little support for the negative effects of performance rewards on motivational components. However, they do indicate that participants in the engagement-contingent reward group and the control group achieved higher rated creativity than participants in the performance-contingent reward (...) group. Alternative explanations for this finding are discussed. (shrink)

It has been a common claim that surrogacy is morally problematic since it involves harm to the child or the surrogate—the harm argument. Due to a growing body of empirical research, the harm argument has seen a decrease in popularity, as there seems to be little evidence of harmful consequences of surrogacy. In this article, two revised versions of the harm argument are developed. It is argued that the two suggested versions of the harm argument survive the current criticism (...) against the standard harm argument. The first version argues that the child is harmed by being separated from the gestational mother. The second version directs attention to the fact that surrogacy involves great incentives to keep the gestational mother’s level of maternal-fetal attachment low, which tend to increase the risk of harm to the child. While neither of the two arguments is conclusive regarding the moral status of surrogacy, both constitute important considerations that are often ignored. (shrink)

The Golden Rule has received remarkably little philosophical discussion. No book has ever been written on it, and articles devoted to it have been exceedingly few, and usually not very searching. It is usually mentioned, where it is mentioned at all, only in passing, and most of these passing remarks have either been false, trite, or misleading, though some of them, as we shall see, have certainly been interesting enough. Considering its obvious importance and its almost universal acceptance, this (...) dearth of philosophical discussion is unfortunate, and also somewhat surprising. One of the things I hope to show about it, though only incidentally, is that there are problems connected with it of the utmost subtlety, worthy of the attention of even the most minute philosophers. (shrink)

If a woman in the audience at a presentation raises her hand, we would take this as evidence that she intends to ask a question. In normal circumstances, we would be right to say that she raises her hand because she intends to ask a question. We also expect that there could, in principle, be a causal explanation of her hand’s rising in purely physiological terms. Ordinarily, we take the existence and compatibility of both kinds of causes for granted. But (...) this can come to seem strange. When we imagine tracking the physiological process that culminates in her hand’s rising, it is hard to find a purchase for her intention. The physiological process seems not to need assistance from her intention in order to get where it’s going, chugging along as it does according to principles that appear to have very little in common with ordinary psychological ones. The presumed self-sufficiency of physiological processes can, in a similar fashion, appear to muscle psychological states quite generally out of the causal picture. (shrink)

Oxidative damage to DNA appears to be a factor in cancer, yet explanations for why highly elevated levels of such lesions do not always result in cancer remain elusive. Much of the genome is non‐coding and lesions in these regions might be expected to have little biological effect, an inference supported by observations that there is preferential repair of coding sequences. RNA has an important coding function in protein synthesis, and yet the consequences of RNA oxidation are largely unknown. (...) Some non‐coding nucleic acid is functional, e.g. promoters, and damage to these sequences may well have biological consequences. Similarly, oxidative damage to DNA may promote microsatellite instability, inhibit methylation and accelerate telomere shortening. DNA repair appears pivotal to the maintenance of genome integrity, and genetic alterations in repair capacity, due to single nucleotide polymorphisms or mutation, may account for inter‐individual differences in cancer susceptibility. This review will survey these aspects of oxidative damage to nucleic acids and their implication for disease. BioEssays 26:533–542, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

The main objective of this work is to understand the daily practices of user management in post-reformist devices in the Brazilian mental health field. Through Foucault's genealogical work on government practices, understood as forms of conducting the behavior of others, it is possible to open a possible field for the study of the practices of psi knowledge, considering them as forms of management that act by through the free and natural acts of individuals. More specifically, our goal is to examine (...) day-to-day practices on some reformist devices such as CAPS through user files. Basically, two driving models have been found in the new devices: 1) Cases with frank intervention of production of commitments and agreements with users, seeking the entry of this to varied activities and political leadership ; 2) Cases with little response from the user, in which the forms of conduction are implemented by policies of inclusion of family members and close reference characters in the management of the patient's life. (shrink)

Ethics consultation is a commonly applied mechanism to address clinical ethical dilemmas. However, there is little information on the viewpoints of health care providers towards the relevance of ethics committees and appropriate application of ethics consultation in clinical practice. We sought to use qualitative methodology to evaluate free-text responses to a case-based survey to identify thematically the views of health care professionals towards the role of ethics committees in resolving clinical ethical dilemmas. Using an iterative and reflexive model we (...) identified themes that health care providers support a role for ethics committees and hospitals in resolving clinical ethical dilemmas, that the role should be one of mediation, rather than prescription, but that ultimately legal exposure was dispositive compared to ethical theory. The identified theme of legal fears suggests that the mediation role of ethics committees is viewed by health care professionals primarily as a practical means to avoid more worrisome medico-legal conflict. (shrink)

The very title of Sidgwick’s great work is fascinating: the methods of ethics. We hear much—and persons a hundred years ago heard much—of the methods of science. But we hear very little of the methods of ethics. Is ethics a science? No, and Sidgwick never thought that it was. But he did think that the methods, or something of the spirit, of scientific investigation could be imported into ethical studies, with results which, though they would not necessarily be dramatic (...) and would certainly not be edifying, would nevertheless be worthwhile. Sidgwick himself characterized his work as “essentially an attempt to introduce precision of thought into a subject usually treated in a too loose and popular way”. “I have thought that the predominance in the minds of moralists of a desire to edify has impeded the real progress of ethical science; and that this would be benefited by an application to it of the same disinterested curiosity to which we chiefly owe the great discoveries of physics”. (shrink)

In this paper we offer a critical assessment of the politics of the Christian Right and question the degree to which the religious values of the Christian Right are compatible with a democratic political culture. If religious values are equally political values making the separation of religious belief and political action a fraught exercise, then a number of issues arise. Political action inspired by religious faith should not prevent critical scrutiny of the underlying values, or more importantly, their influence in (...) shaping public debate and public policy. If religious values are indeed political values, then do protections of freedom of religious expression privilege forms of faith-based politics over secular forms? And if so, to what end? We argue that a more nuanced analysis of the intersection of religion and politics is required to ensure that public politics is not threatened by particular forms of religious political activism that exhibit totalitarian tendencies. At the very least, close attention needs to be focused on particular policy advocates and the agenda they seek to advance with little accountability or transparency despite claims to represent the public interest. It is to these ends that this paper makes a contribution. (shrink)

Cicero's De Finibus 3 gives in Latin, through the persona of Cato, an outline of Stoic ethical theory, and is the main continuous text on this subject extant from the ancient world. This edition with text and sub-titles, facing translation and commentary, aims to present to the modern reader the arguments in a clear and accessible form against the background of the turmoil of political events in Rome surrounding the death of Caesar, and in a presentation that will allow those (...) with only a little Latin to follow the original text. The Paradoxes give in a more popular form, and with many examples from Roman life and history, the contradictions resulting from a literal or unsympathetic application of strict Stoic theory to practice. Rosemary Wright has taught at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth and was Senior Lecturer in Classics at the University of Reading. She is currently Head of Department at University of Wales, Lampeter. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Evaluation of Implicit AnthropologiesJochen Fahrenberg (bio) and Marcus Cheetham (bio)Keywordsmind-body, philosophical assumptions, human natureThe three commentaries and the reviewer’s notes contain valuable reflections and expand on number of important points. There is general agreement that surprisingly little is known about psychologists’, psychotherapists’, clinicians’, and other professionals’ philosophical assumptions about human nature. It is conceivable that these implicit anthropologies represent a potential source of bias in research (...) and practice and that further research is therefore justified.Doctor Walach emphasizes the pluralism of world views, which is evident in the questionnaire response patterns. The findings contradict the assumption that monism, immanence, and a scientific worldview are predominant preconceptions. Instead, psychology students mostly favor ontological or methodological dualism, and con-firm that they have spiritual beliefs or indeed some belief in paranormal phenomena. From this, Dr. Walach extends his thought-provoking perspective to folk psychology, as opposed to mainstream psychology, and reflects on the influence of individual beliefs on scientific culture. It is especially from this perspective that the investigation of certain key concepts and belief systems should be given every encouragement.Doctors Wells and Rackley were particularly interested in the implicit anthropologies of clinicians. They are inclined to attribute individual differences in understanding and interaction with patients to “psychological” traits or to momentary experience rather than to philosophical beliefs. The latter view was supported by the majority of students in our investigation. With respect to psychotherapists and clinicians, our article contained only a short reference to the interviews conducted by Wider. The majority of the forty-two professionals taking part in this pilot study assumed that there may be such differential biases in their fields, but they conceded that the momentary clinical condition and pragmatic necessities would often override such biases. An empirical investigation to differentiate psychological, pragmatic–clinical, and philosophical factors and the associated bias would be an ambitious project; very careful interviews and perhaps participant observation would be necessary. But before undertaking such a study, further descriptive studies and the development of testable hypotheses are required.Doctor Brendel referred to the intricacies of the mind–body problem. We agree that many of the recent philosophical writings show nonreductive physicalism to be among the highly favored conceptions. (We do not know whether this discourse represents the majority opinion of philosophers, psychologists, clinicians, or even neuroscientists.) [End Page 213] The inclusion of this specific conception in the multiple-choice item list would require the inclusion of a specific vocabulary and some definitions that are controversial, even among the proponents of nonreductive physicalism. We decided to restrict the wide spectrum of concepts to five categories. Doctor Brendel goes on to voice explicit support for the conceptualization proposed by Horgan, who recommended a pragmatic approach and the use of double vocabularies. He suggests that context-related features in a given instance would suffice for selecting the most appropriate explanation. It is, however, conceivable that close examination of the decision process would reveal criteria containing or stemming from philosophical assumptions.Doctor Walach makes reference to the complementarity principle, which has a certain intellectual appeal when cross-category relationships are considered, and is not restricted to the domain of physics. Compared with a double-language dualism, the complementarity principle postulates that both frames of reference are fundamentally different in categories, exhaustive within their specific explanation scheme, but are essentially incomplete if, for example, brain and consciousness are viewed as a whole.Pertinent methodological aspects were already addressed in the article and endnote. However, the appropriateness of a questionnaire with which to assess philosophical standpoints will continue to be met with concern and require careful consideration. It is clear that there is no other practical method for gathering in a population like first-year students of psychology representative data about ontological beliefs, religious attitudes, or assumptions on human nature.Doctors Wells and Rackley noted discrepancies in the response to two items relating to spiritual existence after death and the cessation of consciousness with biological death. The two statements seem to be contradictory and the observed inconsistencies point to possible misunderstandings, response tendencies, context-dependent effects, or other shortcomings well-known in research using personality questionnaires. However, the assumed postmortal existence... (shrink)

By many accounts, CRISPR gene-editing technology is revolutionizing biotechnology. It has been hailed as a scientific game changer and is being adopted at a break-neck pace. This hasty adoption has left little time for ethical reflection, and so this paper aims to begin filling that gap by exploring whether CRISPR is as much an ethical game changer as it is a biological one. By focusing on the application of CRISPR to non-human animals, I argue that CRISPR has and will (...) continue to result in significant shifts in the ethical debate landscape. For instance, the fact that many CRISPR edits are non-transgenic has important implications for the ethical debate, particularly the popular objection to genetic engineering that it objectionably involves “crossing species boundaries,” as well as the regulatory debate in the United States, where currently only transgenic organisms are officially genetically modified organisms. I also explore various impacts CRISPR may have on animal welfare, suggesting that although the improved precision of CRISPR suggests fewer unintended welfare problems in comparison to past techniques, the greater versatility means that more animals than ever will be engineered. Finally, I end my discussion of animal welfare issues by exploring the possibility of using CRISPR to directly improve animal welfare, for instance through introducing disease resistance. (shrink)

Several disciplines within the cognitive sciences have advanced the idea that people comprehend the actions of others, including the linguistic meanings they communicate, through embodied simulations where they imaginatively recreate the actions they observe or hear about. This claim has important consequences for theories of mind and meaning, such as that people’s use and interpretation of language emerges as a kind of bodily activity that is an essential part of ordinary cognition. Daniel Weiskopf presents several arguments against the idea that (...) experiential simulations play a major role in immediate language use and meaning. We offer several rebuttals to Weiskopf, in which we critique his interpretation of simulation theory, present additional psycholinguistic evidence supportive of the simulation perspective, and suggest that a more traditional theory of linguistic meaning and processing has little psychological and empirical validity.Keywords: Language; Comprehension; Embodied cognition; Embodied simulation; Linguistic meaning, Psycholinguistics. (shrink)

School principals world-wide report high levels of strain and attrition resulting in a shortage of qualified principals. It is thus, crucial to identify psychosocial risk factors that reflect principals’ occupational wellbeing. For this purpose, we used the Copenhagen Psychosocial Questionnaire (COPSOQ-II), a widely used self-report measure covering multiple psychosocial factors identified by leading occupational stress theories. We evaluated the COPSOQ-II regarding factor structure and longitudinal, discriminant, and convergent validity using latent structural equation modeling in a large sample of Australian school (...) principals (N = 2,049). Results reveal that confirmatory factor analysis produced marginally acceptable model fit. A novel approach we call set exploratory structural equation modeling (ESEM-set), where cross-loadings were only allowed within a priori defined sets of factors, fit well, and was more parsimonious than a full ESEM. Further multitrait-multimethod models based on the set-ESEM confirm the importance of a principal’s psychosocial risk factors; Stressors and depression were related to demands and ill-being, while confidence and autonomy were related to wellbeing. We also show that working in the private sector was beneficial for showing a low psychosocial risk, while other demographics have little effects. Finally, we identify five latent risk profiles (high risk to no risk) of school principals based on all psychosocial factors. Overall the research presented here closes the theory application gap of a strong multi-dimensional measure of psychosocial risk-factors. (shrink)

Lawyers in many jurisdictions are ageing, and yet there is little information concerning the age profile of the legal profession. This paper presents the first consideration of the age profile of lawyers outside of the US, showing that Australian lawyers are ageing and delaying retirement. These findings have serious implications. Problems associated with a growing proportion of older lawyers include an increasing risk of lawyers suffering from age-related cognitive and physical impairment, and the related rise of complaints and malpractice (...) claims against older lawyers. It is also clear that the Australian legal profession is unprepared to address these problems. The legal profession has ignored important gender-specific implications of ageing, such as female lawyers experiencing menopause and the lower savings of female lawyers moving into retirement. Regulatory regimes have not considered the impact of the profession's ageing profile, and there is no mandatory reporting of lawyers suffering from age-related impairment or provisions should a lawyer die. The profession also has not provided strategies to positively transition lawyers into retirement, and there is a lack of flexible working arrangements and succession planning, especially in firms located outside urban centres. (shrink)

Although Marcuse has been lavishly praised and severely condemned, he has been almost totally neglected by academic philosophers. One would have thought that MacIntyre was the ideal philosopher to write an intelligent critique of Marcuse. MacIntyre's own interests in Freud, Marx, and social theory center about the issues that have preoccupied Marcuse. Despite the claim to present Marcuse's views and then to criticize them, MacIntyre has written a stinging polemic. Marcuse is charged with being mistaken in all his key positions. (...) He fails to understand Hegel, Marx, Freud. His account of the ills of contemporary technological society is misguided. His positive program is contemptuous and dangerous. He is guilty of furthering the corruption of our language. Typical of MacIntyre's prose is his final sentence, "The philosophy of the Young Hegelians, fragments of Marxism and revised chunks of Freud's metapsychology: out of these materials Marcuse has produced a theory that, like so many of its predecessors, invokes the great names of freedom and reason while betraying their substance at every important point." On the basis of MacIntyre's reading of Marcuse it is hard to imagine that he is anything more than a bungling idiot. There is plenty to criticize in Marcuse, but MacIntyre's polemic backfires. The best and most effective critique is based on understanding, but despite appearances there is little attempt here to take Marcuse seriously. This is a pity because both Marcuse's thought and MacIntyre's important criticisms tend to get lost in all this lively prose.--R. J. B. (shrink)

It must be admitted that there are some of us who “teach” Virginia Woolf and yet seem unable to learn from her. The secret of Virginia’s eminently readable prose style remains hidden from us. It is for this reason that I find it impossibly hard to read everything that Professor Marcus and some of her colleagues produce in such astounding abundance, and that, she may retort, is why she has found it impossible to read my biography of Virginia Woolf. (...) In a sense, she does not need to; she can imagine it and, thus, credit me with the statement that I considered my aunt “a minor British novelist, ranked somewhere below E. M. Forster as a writer of fiction” . Seeing that I made it clear from the outset of that biography that I would not attempt to assess the work of Virginia Woolf, seeing that I have been blamed for this abstention , and seeing that I have said absolutely nothing at any time that could possibly be construed in this sense, I think that we may well call this a master-stroke of the imagination.Also it is irrelevant. I accuse her of inaccuracy; she “replies” by asserting that I have bad taste. It seems a rather unconvincing form of defence. In fact, in her “reply,” which must be about as long as the article by which it was engendered, Professor Marcus can find so little in the way of evidence or argument with which to support those contentions which I have criticized that the reader must wade through page after page of completely otiose matter before coming to anything which seems to bear on the matter at hand. At last Professor Marcus tells us that she has written “two long essays in which I did at length and in detail exactly what he does here”; here, then, we come to her answer . The reader, who may be somewhat bewildered by so long a preface, may wish to be reminded what there is that needs to be answered. I maintain that Professor Marcus has neglected to notice that Margaret Llewelyn Davis was primarily Leonard Woolf’s friend rather than Virginia’s, that her relationship with Virginia was at times very uneasy, that Virginia was out of sympathy with politically minded women, and that Professor Marcus neglects to notice any of this because she fails to use the evidence of the diaries and the letters. When she does quote from a letter, she completely misunderstands it, just as she fails to understand Virginia’s use of the term “the woman’s republic” . Quentin Bell is the author of, among other works, Ruskin , Bloomsbury , Virginia Woolf: A Biography , and On Human Finery . His previous contributions to Critical Inquiry include “Art and the Elite” , “Bloomsbury and ‘the Vulgar Passions’” , and “A ‘Radiant’ Friendship”. (shrink)

COVID-19 has necessitated inquiry into the capacity of technology to build learning communities to solve problems beyond proximal boundaries. Platforms like Zoom offer pathways for communication and content-delivery, but little stimulus for collective online outcomes (projects/learning-objects/discussion forums). We aim to examine how monetized platforms fit within Marcuse’s technological rationality and its capacity to exercise social control. This owes to dominance of aspects of technology related to providing content rather than how we direct agency towards using it. Such control is (...) reminiscent of influence exercised by portals like television and radio in the mid-1900’s. We suggest Habermas’ communicative rationality using technology can foster critical thinking in online education. We often assume technology is the basis for change in classrooms. As Marcuse says, this enables technology to exact control upon us, and fragment outcomes obtained from using it to learn, warranting creation of new tools. Integrating bottom-up ways of using technology into existing frameworks can mitigate fragmentation of the public sphere resulting from industrialized online education. Fragmentation becomes pervasive with migrating classes online. We provide a framework/design to better encourage critical reflection in online learning communities during unprecedented times such as the era of COVID-19. (shrink)

In this paper, I work within Ruth Marcus’s account of the source of moral dilemmas and articulate the implications of her theory for collective responsibility. As an extension to Marcus’s work, I explore what her account means for the moral emotions and responsibilities of those complicit in perpetuating unjust systems of a non-ideal world from which moral dilemmas arise. This move necessitates shifting away from the primacy of control. That one is born into unjust systems one had no (...) hand in establishing does not excuse one from responsibility to mend them. Similarly, even if one’s personal contribution in the perpetuation of unjust systems is negligible – the injustices would continue whether one participated or not, and one’s resistance would do little-to-nothing – one nevertheless retains responsibility. This expanded sense of responsibility necessitates a specialized sort of moral emotion – one that, like agent-regret or tragic-remorse, transcends the criterion of agentic control, but nevertheless can be classified neither as agent-regret nor tragic-remorse. (shrink)

In the de Officiis we have, save for the latter Philippics, the great orator's last contribution to literature. The last, sad, troubled years of his busy life could not be given to his profession; and he turned his never-resting thoughts to the second love of his student days and made Greek philosophy a possibility for Roman readers. The senate had been abolished; the courts had been closed. His occupation was gone; but Cicero could not surrender himself to idleness. In those (...) days of distraction (46-43 b.c.) he produced for publication almost as much as in all his years of active life.The liberators had been able to remove the tyrant, but they could not restore the republic. Cicero's own life was in danger from the fury of mad Antony and he left Rome about the end of March, 44 b.c. He dared not even stop permanently in any one of his various country estates, but, wretched, wandered from one of his villas to another nearly all the summer and autumn through. He would not suffer himself to become a prey to his overwhelming sorrow at the death of the republic and the final crushing of the hopes that had risen with Caesar's downfall, but worked at the highest tension on his philosophical studies. (shrink)

This paper uses famous problems from philosophy of science and philosophical psychology—underdetermination of theory by evidence, Nelson Goodman’s new riddle of induction, theory-ladenness of observation, and “Kripkenstein’s” rule-following paradox—to show that it is empirically impossible to reliably interpret which functions a large language model (LLM) AI has learned, and thus, that reliably aligning LLM behavior with human values is provably impossible. Sections 2 and 3 show that because of how complex LLMs are, researchers must interpret their learned functions largely in (...) terms of empirical observations of their outputs and network behavior. Sections 4–7 then show that for every “aligned” function that might appear to be confirmed by empirical observation, there is always an infinitely larger number of “misaligned”, arbitrarily time-limited functions equally consistent with the same data. Section 8 shows that, from an empirical perspective, we can thus never reliably infer that an LLM or subcomponent of one has learned any particular function at all before any of an uncountably large number of unpredictable future conditions obtain. Finally, Section 9 concludes that the probability of LLM “misalignment” is—at every point in time, given any arbitrarily large body of empirical evidence—always vastly greater than the probability of “alignment.”. (shrink)

The effect of violent video games is among the most widely discussed topics in media studies, and for good reason. These games are immensely popular, but many seem morally objectionable. Critics attack them for a number of reasons ranging from their capacity to teach players weapons skills to their ability to directly cause violent actions. This essay shows that many of these criticisms are misguided. Theoretical and empirical arguments against violent video games often suffer from a number of significant shortcomings (...) that make them ineffective. This essay argues that video games are defensible from the perspective of Kantian, Aristotelian, and utilitarian moral theories. (shrink)

This study examined correlations between moral value judgments on a 17-item Moral Intuition Survey (MIS), and participant scores on the Short-D3 “Dark Triad” Personality Inventory—a measure of three related “dark and socially destructive” personality traits: Machiavellianism, Narcissism, and Psychopathy. Five hundred sixty-seven participants (302 male, 257 female, 2 transgendered; median age 28) were recruited online through Amazon Mechanical Turk and Yale Experiment Month web advertisements. Different responses to MIS items were initially hypothesized to be “conservative” or “liberal” in line with (...) traditional public divides. Our demographic data confirmed all of these hypothesized categorizations. We then tested two broad, exploratory hypotheses: (H1) the hypothesis that there would be “many” significant correlations between conservative MIS judgments and the Dark Triad, and (H2) the hypothesis that there would be no significant correlations between liberal MIS judgments and Machiavellianism or Psychopathy, but “some” significant correlations between liberal MIS judgments and Narcissism. Because our hypotheses were exploratory and we ran a large number of statistical tests (62 total), we utilized a Bonferroni Correction to set a very high threshold for significance (p = .0008). Our results broadly supported our two hypotheses. We found eleven significant correlations between conservative MIS judgments and the Dark Triad—all at significance level of p < .00001—but no significant correlations between the Dark Triad and liberal MIS judgments. We believe that these results raise provocative moral questions about the personality bases of moral judgments. In particular, we propose that because the Short-D3 measures three “dark and antisocial” personality traits, our results raise some prima facie worries about the moral justification of some conservative moral judgments. (shrink)

This book challenges the conventional wisdom that improving democratic politics requires keeping emotion out of it. Marcus advances the provocative claim that the tradition in democratic theory of treating emotion and reason as hostile opposites is misguided and leads contemporary theorists to misdiagnose the current state of American democracy. Instead of viewing the presence of emotion in politics as a failure of rationality and therefore as a failure of citizenship, Marcus argues, democratic theorists need to understand that emotions (...) are in fact a prerequisite for the exercise of reason and thus essential for rational democratic deliberation and political judgment. Attempts to purge emotion from public life not only are destined to fail, but ultimately would rob democracies of a key source of revitalization and change. Drawing on recent research in neuroscience, Marcus shows how emotion functions generally and what role it plays in politics. In contrast to the traditional view of emotion as a form of agitation associated with belief, neuroscience reveals it to be generated by brain systems that operate largely outside of awareness. Two of these systems, "disposition" and "surveillance," are especially important in enabling emotions to produce habits, which often serve a positive function in democratic societies. But anxiety, also a preconscious emotion, is crucial to democratic politics as well because it can inhibit or disable habits and thus clear a space for the conscious use of reason and deliberation. If we acknowledge how emotion facilitates reason and is "cooperatively entangled" with it, Marcus concludes, then we should recognize sentimental citizens as the only citizens really capable of exercising political judgment and of putting their decisions into action. (shrink)

It is often hard to articulate a thought. Why should this be, if not that to have a thought is one thing, and to know it something else? In fact the gap between thought and its articulation is not epistemic. While it’s true that we come to know our thoughts better through articulation, it's not because a thought is already perfectly determinate despite my ignorance of it. Rather, we make the thought determinate through articulation. This connection between the determinacy of (...) the thinker’s knowledge of their thought and the determinacy of the thought itself is a mark of thought’s fundamentally first-personal character: what’s beyond the reach of my current powers of articulation cannot be an object of any attitude of mine. (shrink)

Presenting the first step-by-step commentary on Husserl’s Ideas I, Marcus Brainard’s Belief and Its Neutralization provides an introduction not only to this central work, but also to the whole of transcendental phenomenology. Brainard offers a clear and lively account of each key element in Ideas I, along with a novel reading of Husserl, one which may well cause scholars to reconsider many long-standing views on his thought, especially on the role of belief, the effect and scope of the epoché, (...) and the significance of the universal neutrality modification. (shrink)

This paper demonstrates something that Kant notoriously claimed to be possible, but which Kant scholars today widely believe to be impossible: unification of all three formulations of the Categorical Imperative. Part 1 of this paper tells a broad-brush story of how I understand Kant’s theory of practical reason and morality, showing how the three formulations of the Categorical Imperative appear to be unified. Part 2 then provides clear textual support for each premise in the argument for my interpretation.

Unlike some other reproductions of classic texts (1) We have not used OCR(Optical Character Recognition), as this leads to bad quality books with introduced typos. (2) In books where there are images such as portraits, maps, sketches etc We have endeavoured to keep the quality of these images, so they represent accurately the original artefact. Although occasionally there may be certain imperfections with these old texts, we feel they deserve to be made available for future generations to enjoy.

Der Einsatz empirischer Forschungsmethoden in der Medizinethik hat zu Forderungen nach einem gewandelten Selbstverständnis der Medizinethik geführt, die sich mehr als eine integrierte Disziplin aus Sozialwissenschaften und Ethik verstehen solle. Dagegen wird hier die These vertreten, dass über Sinn und Unsinn des Einsatzes empirischer Methoden zunächst eine moralphilosophische Diskussion erforderlich ist. Medizinethiker müssen ausweisen können, welche empirischen Forschungsresultate zur Beantwortung normativer Fragen erforderlich sind. Ein solcher Ausweis beruht seinerseits jedoch auf normativen Annahmen, die ihrerseits moralphilosophischer Legitimation bedürfen. Der Beitrag untersucht (...) daher den Einsatz empirischer Methoden in der Medizinethik im Hinblick auf Verhältnis von ethischem Grundlagendiskurs und Methodologie der angewandten Ethik. Abschließend wird gefragt, ob nicht ein Großteil von empirischen Studien in der Medizinethik aus forschungsethischen Gründen problematisch ist. (shrink)

In reasoning, we draw conclusions from multiple premises. But thinkers can be fragmented. And if there is no single fragment of the agent that thinks all of the premises, then the agent cannot draw any conclusions from them. It follows that reasoning from multiple premises depends on their being thought together. But what is it to think premises together? What is the condition that contrasts with fragmentation? This paper provides an answer to this question that is simple but compelling: to (...) think premises together is to attribute those very thoughts to one and the same self. The ability to reason depends on the ability to attribute the thoughts from which one reasons to oneself. Reasoning—at least the sort of reasoning that we do—requires de se thought. (shrink)

How to Win an Election is an ancient Roman guide for campaigning that is as up-to-date as tomorrow's headlines. In 64 BC when idealist Marcus Cicero, Rome's greatest orator, ran for consul, his practical brother Quintus decided he needed some no-nonsense advice on running a successful campaign. What follows in his short letter are timeless bits of political wisdom, from the importance of promising everything to everybody and reminding voters about the sexual scandals of your opponents to being a (...) chameleon, putting on a good show for the masses, and constantly surrounding yourself with rabid supporters. Presented here in a lively and colorful new translation, with the Latin text on facing pages, this unashamedly pragmatic primer on the humble art of personal politicking is dead-on --and as relevant today as when it was written.A little-known classic in the spirit of Machiavelli's Prince, How to Win an Election is required reading for politicians and everyone who enjoys watching them try to manipulate their way into office. (shrink)

Excerpt from De Finibus Bonorum Et Malorum: Libri Quinque About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We (...) do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

In 1885, Georg Cantor published his review of Gottlob Frege's Grundlagen der Arithmetik . In this essay, we provide its first English translation together with an introductory note. We also provide a translation of a note by Ernst Zermelo on Cantor's review, and a new translation of Frege's brief response to Cantor. In recent years, it has become philosophical folklore that Cantor's 1885 review of Frege's Grundlagen already contained a warning to Frege. This warning is said to concern the defectiveness (...) of Frege's notion of extension. The exact scope of such speculations varies and sometimes extends as far as crediting Cantor with an early hunch of the paradoxical nature of Frege's notion of extension. William Tait goes even further and deems Frege 'reckless' for having missed Cantor's explicit warning regarding the notion of extension. As such, Cantor's purported inkling would have predated the discovery of the Russell-Zermelo paradox by almost two decades. In our introductory essay, we discuss this alleged implicit (or even explicit) warning, separating two issues: first, whether the most natural reading of Cantor's criticism provides an indication that the notion of extension is defective; second, whether there are other ways of understanding Cantor that support such an interpretation and can serve as a precisification of Cantor's presumed warning. (shrink)

Paraconsistent and dialetheist approaches to a theory of truth are faced with a problem: the expressive resources of the logic do not suffice to express that a sentence is just true—i.e., true and not also false—or to express that a sentence is consistent. In his recent book, Spandrels of Truth, Jc Beall proposes a ‘just true’-operator to identify sentences that are true and not also false. Beall suggests seven principles that a ‘just true’-operator must fulfill, and proves that his operator (...) indeed fulfills all of them. He concludes that just true has been expressed in the language. I argue that, while the seven conditions may be necessary for an operator to express just true, they are not jointly sufficient. Specifically, first, I prove that a further plausible desideratum for necessary conditions on ‘just true’ is not fulfilled by Beall's proposal, namely that ‘just true’ ascriptions should themselves be just true, and not also false (or equivalently, that the ‘just true’-operator iterates). Second, I show that Beall's operator does not adequately express just true, but that it merely captures an arbitrary proper subset of the just true sentences. Further, there is no prospect of extending the proposal in order to encompass a more reasonable subset of the just true sentences without presupposing that we have antecedent means to characterize the class of just true sentences. (shrink)

The theory of mind (ToM) deficit associated with autism has been a central topic in the debate about the modularity of the mind. Most involved in the debate about the explanation of the ToM deficit have failed to notice that autism’s status as a spectrum disorder has implications about which explanation is more plausible. In this paper, I argue that the shift from viewing autism as a unified syndrome to a spectrum disorder increases the plausibility of the explanation of the (...) ToM deficit that appeals to a domain-specific, higher-level ToM module. First, I discuss what it means to consider autism as a spectrum rather than as a unified disorder. Second, I argue for the plausibility of the modular explanation on the basis that autism is better considered as a spectrum disorder. Third, I respond to a potential challenge to my account from Philip Gerrans and Valerie Stone’s recent work (Gerrans, Biol Philos 17:305–321, 2002; Stone and Gerrans, Trends Cogn Sci 10:3–4, 2006a; Soc Neurosci 1:309–319, 2006b; Gerrans and Stone, Br J Philos Sci 59:121–141, 2008). (shrink)

Originally published in 1984, this book broke new ground in assessing Freud as both an exemplary late-Victorian and as a pivotal figure in the creation of modern thought and culture. In his close reading of various of Freud’s theoretical and clinical texts, including two of the most famous case histories, Steven Marcus uncovers the steps in the development of Freud’s thought, the dynamics and contradictions and ‘the intellectual and emotional urgings, forces and conflicts that were at work… as the (...) first original insights and discoveries that constituted the inception of psychoanalysis as a theory, discipline of inquiry, and new kind of therapy, came suddenly, often unexpectedly and without being bidden, upon Freud’. Central to Professor Marcus’ inquiry is the relationship of Freud’s work to cultural change and to the very process of disclosure, formation and construction in the transition to modernity. Freud’s writings, and the psychoanalytic discipline of which they are the foundations, are placed in the context of their contribution to modern modes of thought, and of their influence on our notions of the centres of significance of each existence as a whole. Freud and the Culture of Psychoanalysis is a major contribution to our understanding of how ideas and theories become internalized into the intellectual framework of our lives and affect the way we think about the world. By moving backward and forward from pre-Freudian to post-Freudian thinkers, Professor Marcus takes us on a journey through cultural transition that is also an exploration of how the individual interacts with his own moment in history to forge new modes of consciousness. (shrink)