Unlike explanation in science, explanation in mathematics has received relatively scant attention from philosophers. Whereas there are canonical examples of scientific explanations, there are few examples that have become widely accepted as exhibiting the distinction between mathematical proofs that explain why some mathematical theorem holds and proofs that merely prove that the theorem holds without revealing the reason why it holds. This essay offers some examples of proofs that mathematicians have considered explanatory, and it argues that these examples suggest a (...) particular account of explanation in mathematics. The essay compares its account to Steiner's and Kitcher's. Among the topics that arise are proofs that exploit symmetries, mathematical coincidences, brute-force proofs, simplicity in mathematics, merely clever proofs, and proofs that unify what other proofs treat as separate cases. (shrink)

Ethological theories usually attribute semantic content to animal signals. To account for this fact, many biologists and philosophers appeal to some version of teleosemantics. However, this picture has recently came under attack: while mainstream teleosemantics assumes that representational systems must cooperate, some biologists and philosophers argue that in certain cases signaling can evolve within systems lacking common interest. In this paper I defend the standard view from this objection.

This paper argues that in at least some cases, one proof of a given theorem is deeper than another by virtue of supplying a deeper explanation of the theorem — that is, a deeper account of why the theorem holds. There are cases of scientific depth that also involve a common abstract structure explaining a similarity between two otherwise unrelated phenomena, making their similarity no coincidence and purchasing depth by answering why questions that separate, dissimilar explanations of the two phenomena (...) cannot correctly answer. The connections between explanation, depth, unification, power, and coincidence in mathematics and science are compared. (shrink)

This paper clarifies the historical nature of species by showing that species are path-dependent entities. A species’ identity is not determined by its intrinsic properties or its origin, but by its unique evolutionary path. Seeing that species are path-dependent entities has three implications: it shows that origin essentialism is mistaken, it rebuts two challenges to the species-are-historical-entities thesis, and it demonstrates that the identity of a species during speciation depends on future events.

In a series of papers, Bence Nanay has recently put forward and defended a new theory of function, which he calls the ‘Modal Theory of Function’. In this article, I critically address this theory and argue that it fails to fulfill some key desiderata that a satisfactory theory of function must comply with. As a result, I conclude that, whatever property Nanay’s notion of function refers to, it is not the property having the function that is standardly attributed in science.

Résumé Jacques Serrano conçoit un système d’échange économique structurellement de même nature que sa production artistique non-matérialisée, qui permet de repenser la fonction et le statut de collectionneur. Cette réflexion s’accompagne d’un exemple de mise en application. Marc Halévy éclaire les enjeux économiques de cette proposition, et Ghislain Mollet-Viéville en analyse l’originalité en termes de collection.

A prominent version of mathematical structuralism holds that mathematical objects are at bottom nothing but "positions in structures," purely relational entities without any sort of nature independent of the structure to which they belong. Such an ontology is often presented as a response to Benacerraf's "multiple reductions" problem, or motivated on hermeneutic grounds, as a faithful representation of the discourse and practice of mathematics. In this paper I argue that there are serious difficulties with this kind of view: its proponents (...) rely on a distinction between "essential" and "nonessential" features of mathematical objects, and there's no good way to articulate this distinction which is compatible with basic structuralist commitments. But all is not lost. For I further argue that the insights motivating structuralism (or at least those worth preserving) can be preserved without formulating the view in ontologically committal terms. (shrink)

In recent years, a number of cultural theorists have made important contributions to the study of the body’s surface. Despite their importance, however, none of these contributions provides us with a systematic framework for understanding why the body’s surface — its skin — matters to the extent that it does. In this article, I seek to provide such a framework and, in doing so, to shed light on why the skin and the self seem to share a special and sometimes (...) strained relationship. To this end, I will present a critical introduction to the work of two contemporary Anglo-American psychoanalysts: Esther Bick and Thomas Ogden. Throughout this introduction, I will show how both Bick and Ogden — despite the fact that they are almost completely unknown outside clinical circles — offer up a host of conceptual tools that could prove useful to cultural theorists interested in making sense of the relationship between the skin and the self. (shrink)

Guidelines for submitting commentsPolicy: Comments that contribute to the discussion of the article will be posted within approximately three business days. We do not accept anonymous comments. Please include your email address; the address will not be displayed in the posted comment. Cell Press Editors will screen the comments to ensure that they are relevant and appropriate but comments will not be edited. The ultimate decision on publication of an online comment is at the Editors' discretion. Formatting: Please include a (...) title for the comment and your affiliation. Note that symbols may not transmit properly in this form due to potential software compatibility issues. Please spell out the words in place of the symbols. Comments should be no more than 8,000 characters in length. References may be included when necessary but should be kept to a minimum. Be careful if copying and pasting from a Word document. Smart quotes can cause problems in the form. If you experience difficulties, please convert to a plain text file and then copy and paste into the form. (shrink)

The singular term theory maintains that that-clauses are complex singular terms which designate propositions. Though extremely well-supported, the theory is endangered by the existence of oblique that-clauses; that is, that-clauses occurring in what appear to be nonargument positions (e.g., ‘Lola was upset that Slick Willy had all the fun’). In this paper I argue that the best solution to the problem consistent with the singular term theory, invokes a construction-based grammatical theory. Such an approach challenges traditional views of semantic compositionality (...) by rejecting a central dogma of semantics, namely, that linguistic constructions contribute only trivial logical or quasi-logical information to semantic interpretation (e.g., function-application relations). (shrink)

In recent years, the concept of social capital has become quite fashionable in social science research. Especially Robert Putnam’s ‘Making Democracy Work’ has provoked an enormous amount of research on this societal resource. It has become customary to make a distinction between network and attitudinal approaches of social capital, focusing on individual network positions and the role of civic attitudes respectively.We argue that these two approaches do not exclude one another: it is just as legitimate to study the larger societal (...) benefits of social capital as it is to study the individual benefits of networks positions . The question on how social capital can be generated seems more promising for future research, and here we can distinguish society-based approaches and institutional approaches . The available research demonstrates that day-to-day interaction can have significant effects on democratic attitudes, e.g., by a process of value convergence. There is, however, also considerable evidence to show the effect of institutions, boosting social capital levels by ensuring impartiality and transparency and by promoting income inequality.Both from a political science, as from a social perspective, we urge the scientific community to pay more attention to the question how social capital might be generated by the political system. (shrink)

Collaborative practices and patient -as- partner approaches are expanding in healthcare. The involvement of patients in the training of healthcare professionals appears as an opportunity for the development of such training and contributes to the practical experience of working with patients alongside the theoretical and scientific aspects of training. However, although the theories underpinning patient involvement in training are well developed, to date theire have been few practical applications to contextual situations, and there is a need to reflect on the (...) partnership development process. Based on the theories of patient -as- partner within interprofessional collaboration in healthcare, we will present the pedagogical engineering of a co-constructed course involving patient as partners for pharmacy students. We performed a cross-analysis of patients' and students' perceptions of the session. (shrink)

Although convergence in emotion expressions within small groups is well documented, the motives that explain why members converge are rarely explicated. We approach expressive convergence from a conformity perspective and introduce the Emotional Conformity Framework, in which we posit that members match their groupmates’ emotion expressions because they are motivated to gain an accurate understanding of reality (informational conformity motive) or to form and maintain social relationships (normative conformity motive). These motives determine members’ standards for correctness, social responses, and plausible (...) convergence mechanisms, while members’ personalities and situational properties shape the relative strength of the two motives. By explicating these motivational underpinnings, the Framework improves our capacity to understand, predict, and regulate expressive convergence and emphasizes its functionality. (shrink)

This is the first chapter of Ways of Seeing co-authored with Marc Jeannerod. We ague for a representational approach to the puzzles of both visual perception and visually-guided actions.

Sussman and colleagues provide no evidence supporting their claim that the human vocal production system is specialized to produce locus equations with high correlations and linearity. We propose the alternative null hypothesis that these features result from physical and physiological factors common to all mammalian vocal tracts and we recommend caution in assuming that human speech production mechanisms are unique.

Redish et al. present a compelling, interdisciplinary, unified framework of addiction. The effort to integrate pathological gambling is especially important, but only the vulnerability of misclassifying situations is described in detail as being linked directly to this disorder. This commentary focuses on further developing the comprehensiveness of this framework for pathological gambling using over-fast discounting as an illustrative example.

Causation is extrinsic. What an event causes depends not just on its own nature and the laws, but on the environment in which it occurs. Had an event occurred under different conditions, it may have had different effects. Yet we often want to say that causation, in at least some respect, is not extrinsic. Events exert an influence on the world themselves, independently of what other events do or do not occur in their surroundings. This paper develops an account of (...) such influence and argues that it provides a solution to the causal exclusion problem. By locating that solution largely within the metaphysics of causation, we can solve the exclusion problem without taking on a commitment to a theory of mind. (shrink)

We address the issue of fairly rewarding contributors to a crowdfunded project. We develop a theoretical non-strategic model, and introduce a new reward rule: a contributor’s reward depends both on her financial contribution and on the timing of her contribution. Following the axiomatic method used in models of resource sharing, we characterize this new reward rule by a pair of natural axioms. The resulting rewards coincide with the Shapley value of a suitable cooperative game built from the crowdfunding project. This (...) allocation rule conveys a signaling effect: if two contributors make the same financial contribution, the earlier obtains a greater reward. (shrink)

Un nombre considérable d'études ont été consacrées ces dernières années à la cognition musicale. Elles ont trop souvent occulté la réflexion que la philosophie, l'esthétique, la psychologie ou la psychanalyse avaient déjà consacré à la question du rapport à l'oeuvre, à la manière dont nous prenons conscience d'elle, dont nous la pensons ou dont nous sommes pensés par elle. Cet ouvrage se propose d'instaurer un dialogue entre les différents aspects de la réflexion sur la réception de l'art. Ceci est d'autant (...) plus important que les créateurs eux-mêmes, après une phase de concentration sur l'objet et la structure, s'intéressent à nouveau à la théorisation du sujet percevant. Comment s'articulent sensation et connaissance, objectivité et subjectivité, actuel et mémoriel, mais aussi création et perception, expérience du sujet et théorie de l'art? Autant de questions et de clivages, réels ou apparents, qui interrogent à la fois les scientifiques, les philosophes et les artistes. (shrink)

L’objectif de cette article est de comprendre la neutralité axiologique non pas comme une exigence épistémologique, mais plutôt comme un idéal éducationnel. Max Weber propose une science basée sur la description factuelle, de laquelle on exclut la formulation de jugements de valeur. Or, il faut démontrer pourquoi il est préférable de séparer les jugements descriptifs des jugements évaluatifs. L’objectif de Weber est de préserver l'autonomie intellectuelle des étudiants. Pour Weber, la classe et l'académie en général sont des lieux politiques. Ces (...) rapports au sein de la classe sont nécessaires pour transmettre des connaissances, des méthodes et le goût de l'autonomie intellectuelle. Or, il serait contraire au principe d'autonomie de laisser le professeur influencer et convaincre ses étudiants, de façon partisane, d'adhérer à certaines thèses normatives. Weber propose ainsi un mécanisme pour éviter que le professeur n'ixnfluence ses étudiants de manière illégitime. (shrink)

Quand on a renoncé à démontrer l'existence de Dieu ou l'immortalité de l'âme, est-il encore rationnel de postuler que Dieu existe ou que l'âme est immortelle? Peut-on croire rationnellement dans l'incertitude la plus totale? Jean-Marc Ferry montre précisément en quoi la religion réflexive le permet. Celui qui s'y engage ne se prévaut d'aucun accès privilégié à la vérité. Au départ, cet engagement procède moins d'une croyance que d'une résolution. Il s'agit, en effet, d'un acte de pure liberté, dépourvu d'assise, (...) acte risqué qui fait que l'on accorde ou non sa confiance au réel. Ensuite seulement, entre l'athée et le croyant, les expériences pourront être confrontées ; et c'est quand l'un et l'autre assument pleinement leur absolue ignorance métaphysique que raison et religion peuvent enfin être conciliées. (shrink)

Elga : 1–10, 2010) has argued that, even when no particular subjective probability is required by one’s evidence, perfectly rational people will have sharp subjective probabilities. Otherwise, they would be rationally permitted to knowingly turn down some sure gains. I argue that it is likewise true that, even when we do not possess enough practical reasons for a sharp evaluation, perfectly rational people will have sharp subjective values. Those who would be most inclined to reject this argument are those who (...) claim that we are rationally required by either our beliefs that objective values are unsharp or by our own ‘real’ values to have unsharp subjective values. Regarding the former claim, I show that we need not believe that all objective values are sharp to rationally have unsharp subjective values. Regarding the latter claim, I conclude that sharpened subjective values must be ‘real’ because otherwise perfect rationality would be impossible in principle. (shrink)

Maimonides affirmed, not the superiority of the "moderns" (the scholars of his and subsequent generations) over the "ancients" (the Tannaim and Amoraim, the Rabbis of the Mishnah and Talmud) but the inherent equality of the two. The equality presented here is not equality of halakhic authority, but equality of ability, of essential human characteristics.