Introduction to Engineering Ethics provides the background for discussion of the basic issues in engineering ethics. Emphasis is given to the moral problems engineers face in the corporate setting. It places those issues within a philosophical framework, and it seems to exhibit both their social importance and their intellectual challenge. The primary goal is to stimulate critical and responsible reflection on moral issues surrounding engineering practice and to provide the conceptual tools necessary for pursuing those issues. As per new ABET (...) 2000 guidelines, more and more introductory engineering courses cover engineering ethics as part of their instruction. Students preparing to function within the engineering profession need to be introduced to the basic issues in engineering ethics. This book places those issues within a wider philosophical framework than has been customary in the past and aims to stimulate critical and responsible reflection on the moral issues surrounding engineering practice and to provide the conceptual tools necessary for pursuing those issues. (shrink)

Le statut des corps dans la metaphysique de Leibniz continue de resister a tout effort de reconstitution. Qu'il n'y ait au monde que les substances simples et leurs modifications ne presente plus l'evidence d'une position philosophique achevee. Dans le meilleur des mondes possibles, les ames ne sont jamais sans corps et la moindre portion de matiere renferme un univers de creatures vivantes. Au moment meme ou Leibniz semble embrasser une position idealiste en peuplant le monde d'une infinite d'entites psychiques, ne (...) developpe-t-il pas le concept d'organisme comme en marge de cette metaphysique? Deja, dans les annees ou la celebre theorie de la notion complete servait a penser la substance individuelle, la realite du corps organique imposait l'idee d'une substantialite proprement corporelle. Composition infinie irreductible aux modalites de l'etendue, le corps organique, machine de la nature, force a repenser les conditions d'existence de l'individualite vivante, dont l'ego cartesien n'est plus qu'une problematique modele. La question n'est plus tant de savoir si Leibniz a admis l'existence de substances corporelles en sus des monades, que de comprendre en quoi la realite organique devient le modele pour penser la connexion de toutes les substances, des simples aux composees, des brutes aux raisonnables. Du moi a la monade, comment la necessaire inscription corporelle de l'individualite s'opere-t-elle? De quelles modifications du concept de substance cette exigence s'accompagne-t-elle? (shrink)

The contribution describes the differences between modernism and postmodernism as historical periods of the twentieth century and establishes comparable differences between structuralism and post-structuralism as semiotic approaches. Like modernism, structuralism rejects traditional modes of thought, attempts to reconstruct academic disciplines on the basis of a few fundamental principles and strives to work with reconstructed terminologies and axioms. Like post-modernism, post-structuralism is characterized by the necessity of finding ways to continue research based on the fragmentary results left by structuralist projects. In (...) the beginning of the twentieth century, structuralism itself had responded to materialism, atomism, historicism, and naturalism by introducing its own methodology built around the dichotomies of signified and signifier, paradigm and syntagm, synchrony and diachrony, langue and parole. Rather than rejecting this apparatus, post-structuralism explicated the paradoxes behind these dichotomies and tried to overcome them by under-mining the first concept of each pair. This change of perspective foregrounded the material, processual, and intertextual character of signs as well as the sense-producing function of interpretation. Rejecting rigidly fixed methods as well as general theories, and waiving the distinction between object-signs and meta-signs in favor of their joint reflection, post-structuralist semiotics became an alternative to conventional practices of academic sign analysis and now approaches the status of an art. (shrink)

. The new global history: History in a global age. Cultural Values: Vol. 2, No. 2-3, pp. 368-384.

Let A be an infinite Δ₂⁰ set and let K be creative: we show that K≤Q A if and only if K≤Q₁ A. (Here ≤Q denotes Q-reducibility, and ≤Q₁ is the subreducibility of ≤Q obtained by requesting that Q-reducibility be provided by a computable function f such that Wf(x)∩ Wf(y)=∅, if x \not= y.) Using this result we prove that A is hyperhyperimmune if and only if no Δ⁰₂ subset B of A is s-complete, i.e., there is no Δ⁰₂ subset (...) B of A such that \overline{K}≤s B, where ≤s denotes s-reducibility, and \overline{K} denotes the complement of K. (shrink)

Cet article prend pour point de départ les généalogies de l’enfance de Michel Foucault disséminées dans son œuvre et complexifiées par les études foucaldiennes contemporaines, en particulier les recherches féministes de Silvia Federici (et ses généalogies des femmes) et les études postcoloniales d’Ann Laura Stoler (et ses généalogies des colonisés). Foucault passant sous silences l’histoire des femmes et des colonies, ce détour par des généalogies féministes et postcoloniales nous permettra de nous inscrire dans les débats sur l’intersectionnalité. En effet, depuis (...) les années 1990, cette perspective méthodologique a été pensée de multiples manières (comme articulation, matrice, assemblage etc.), il s’agira donc de voir comment penser l’intersectionnalité en référence aux cadres d’analyse foucaldiens et à leurs critiques. Plus précisément, en réunissant ces auteurs et leurs généalogies, cet article tentera de se situer dans les débats contemporains sur l’intersection du Childism et du mouvement décolonial. Alors que certains auteurs considèrent que la production de l’enfance/de l’âge précède la production de la colonialité/de la race, d’autres voient le contraire. Pour entrer dans ces débats, nous reprendrons à Bacchetta (2015) l’idée de co-formations et de co-productions des rapports coloniaux et âgistes dans l’histoire longue des métropoles et des colonies. Ce faisant, nous tenterons de décrire et d’analyser les relations d’assujettissement (de genre, de classe, de race ou d’âge) d’une part, comme un effet de multiplicité selon des conjonctures spécifiques, et d’autre part, comme la cristallisation de relations de pouvoir qui s’étendent sur de larges espace-temps. (shrink)

Pour résoudre les paradoxes bien connus de la mécanique quantique, on propose une interprétation par ramification (ou univers parallèles) analogue à celle d?Everett, mais avec des différences: (i) on propose une infinité continue de branches, dont les poids (o[ugrave] probabilités) se calculent par intégrale; (ii) les branches sont séparées par des ramifieurs qui se propagent à la vitesse de la lumière. Lorsqu?est négligeable la composante d?énergie négative de la fonction d?onde, le poids de chaque branche en un point donné u (...) est égal au flux du quadrivecteur (courant-densité de présence), soit à travers l'élément d?écran antérieur à u sur lequel l'impact est perçu, soit à travers le cône passé de u si aucun impact n?est perçu. In order to solve well-known paradoxes in quantum mechanics, we propose a reworking of Everett's interpretation with ramified branches (or many worlds), yet somewhat different: (i) branches form an infinity continuum and each weight (probability) is defined by an integral; (ii) branches are separated by ramifiers which propagate themselves with the velocity of light. Assuming we can neglect the negative-energy component in the wave function, then the weight of each branch at a given point u is equal to the flux of the quadrivector (current-presence density), either through the screen element where the impact occurs, or through the past light-cone of u if no impact occurs. (shrink)

THE ARTICLE TRIES TO SHOW THAT AUGUSTINE’S CLAIM THAT THERE ARE NO ACCIDENTS IN GOD IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE CLAIM THAT GOD HAS CONTINGENT PROPERTIES. HIS DISTINCTION BETWEEN SPEECH ABOUT GOD, THOUGHT ABOUT GOD, AND THE BEING OF GOD ALLOWS HIM TO HOLD THAT GOD IS SIMPLE THOUGH A MULTIPLICITY OF TERMS WITH DIFFERENT MEANINGS ARE PREDICATED OF HIM. AUGUSTINE PROVIDES, IT IS ARGUED, A BASIS FOR A RULE TO ALLOW FOR A COHERENT DISTINCTION BETWEEN RELATIVE AND NON-RELATIVE PROPERTIES OF (...) GOD. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Spiritual Experience and Psychopathology”Roland Littlewood (bio)Keywordsreligion, innovation, psychosis, culture, diagnosisThis is an ambiguous though clinically valuable paper. Jackson and Fulford suggest that the distinction between their two categories, spiritual experience and mental illness, is conventional, yet their emphasis on issues of correct practice from the medical perspective threatens to return both into distinct ontological categories, albeit with a shared phenomenology. I do not understand why any (...) single instance must either be pathological or spiritual, except through clinical and clerical demands for clarity and order.Mental illness and spirituality are not two distinct natural phenomena “out there,” existing independently of human volition. They are both social—cultural if one prefers—ascriptions. Neither has some substantive core whose elucidation through psychophysiological, phenomenological or ultrahuman procedures could enable us to define its essence and thus differentiate it from the other. Neither experience is a self-evident datum. Both are easily susceptible to critiques, either that they do not exist as natural categories, or else that they should more properly be described as something else—as the workings out of social exclusion in the case of mental illness, as cosmological understanding or mass hysteria in the case of spirituality. Neither, I would suggest, can be specified by physiology or ultrahuman interventions respectively, but rather through shared cultural meanings which in turn are experientially validated by the biosocial phenomena themselves. It is not that we need to exclude the possibility of concurrences in brain states, but rather that these cannot specify the meaning and experience of the phenomena.Note that I emphasize “experienced through cultural meanings,” not “influenced by” culture: I do not accept that psychophysiology can have any existence independent of the social world through which it occurs. The psychiatrists’ form/content distinction, an optimistic proxy for nature/culture (Birnbaum 1923; Schneider 1928) may remain a convenient heuristic device, but it has a curious, perhaps doubtful, intellectual history (see the Endnote following).Cross-cultural comparisons argue that local idioms which we might approximate to current Western notions of mental illness and religion are quite varied. And the validity of particular instances of both “spiritual experience” and “psychopathology” may be contested in any society. While the social consequences of a pattern may determine the approbation accorded to a pattern such that patterns recalling chronic schizophrenia [End Page 67] are regarded as a deficit (and here I agree with James [1902] and the two authors), they are not necessarily aligned to categories of physical illness, but may be seen as a spiritual failure or obstruction. Unsuccessful or inappropriate shamanic practice among Amerindian and circumpolar societies is the classic instance (Eliade 1964). Within Western societies, demonic possession may be read by doctors as mental illness. (It is just as much a “spiritual experience”: why introduce the religionist’s distinctions between different types of ultrahuman agency? Compare Maslow on “peak” experiences. The terms “spiritual” and “religious world view” are naturalized idioms of late Christianity rather than cross-culturally valid terms [Tambiah 1990].) But also the converse (Koch 1972). And this depends on our professional interests. Clearly, psychiatrists prefer to perceive the world in a psychopathological idiom, while religious enthusiasts and clergy may favor divine intercession or demonic possession; and a Christian psychiatry not surprisingly may claim to act as arbiter (Sims 1991). Any specific instance may be perceived differently by individuals in accordance with their interests and affiliations.The paper’s terminology—“spiritual psychotic experience,” “genuine spiritual experience”—is confusing in that it does imply realist, not conventional claims (cf. Endnote 1, Jackson and Fulford). It is not necessary. A less laden idiom—such as “statistically or normatively unusual brain states and their experiential correlates” (Littlewood 1993, 257)—may be just too unwieldy for repetition, but I would propose that at this level of detail we need rather four categories depending or not on concordance with (i) something close to psychiatry’s recognition of a major mental illness, and (ii) something like an anthropological notion of religious or spiritual experience (cf. Littlewood 1991):[Table 1]PsychosisReligious ExperiencePresentAbsentPresentABAbsentCDSo Jackson and Fulford’s three cases fall into group “A” if the PSE was scored... (shrink)

The essay delves into the masochistic poetry found in the poetry collection ›Confirmo te chrysmate‹ by Maria Eichhorn, who, writing under the pseudonym Dolorosa, showed significant public activity within the Berlin Bohemian circles between 1900 and 1910. Alongside her artistic endeavors she contributed to the psychoanalytic discourse on masochism. Her poems unveil the myth of a bourgeois model of desire, predicated on the notion that femininely coded desire finds its fulfillment in physical and psychological submission. Eichhorn’s poetry reveals that masochistic (...) tendencies are not inherently feminine but rather the result of a ritualized initiation of young girls into bourgeois desire practices, wherein acts of suffering sacralize sexualized violence. Christian iconography ennobles this violence by stylizing suffering as an ›imitatio‹ of the Mater Dolorosa. The radical consequence, as Eichhorn’s poetry demonstrates, is that these practices of suffering culminate directly in a death wish for the girl. (shrink)

By unravelling the complexities and dynamics of a collaboration between scientists in India and West Germany to establish a cryogenic network, this paper intends to contribute to our understanding of the transnational movement of research technologies during the Cold War. In 1971, a cryogenic laboratory including a helium and a nitrogen liquefier was set up at the physics department of the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Madras as part of the Indo-German partnership at IIT Madras between 1959 and 1974. As (...) a generic research technology with many applications, cryogenics became crucial for a solid state research agenda for semiconductor development. After initial difficulties, Ramaswami Srinivasan at IIT Madras and Gustav Klipping of the Fritz Haber Institute in Berlin built a successful collaboration based on mutual trust and on Indian and German scientists travelling and working in each other's laboratories. If the initial motivation of the Indo-German partnership was informed by the logic of Cold War development policy, Klipping and Srinivasan developed their collaboration into a vibrant cryogenic research network around different actors, instruments, and skills moving between India and the Federal Republic of Germany. (shrink)

In this chapter, I consider some problems with naturalizing mathematics. More specifically, I consider how the two leading kinds of approach to naturalizing mathematics, to wit, Quinean indispensability‐based approaches and Maddy's Second Philosophical approach, seem to run afoul of constraints that any satisfactory naturalistic mathematics must meet. I then suggest that the failure of these kinds of approach to meet the relevant constraints indicates a general problem with naturalistic mathematics meeting these constraints, and thus with the project of naturalizing mathematics (...) itself. (shrink)