Network analysis is increasingly appreciated as a methodology in the social sciences. In recent years, it is also receiving attention among historians of science. History of economics is no exception in that researchers have begun to use network analysis to study a variety of topics, including collaborations and interactions in scientific communities, the spread of economic theories within and across fields, or the formation of new specialties in the discipline of economics. Against this backdrop, a debate is emerging about how (...) network analysis can help address questions that are pertinent to the history of economics. With this paper, we want to push this debate one step forward by offering and discussing five reasons why network analysis should have a future in the history of economics. (shrink)

The study of word meanings promises important insights into the nature of the human mind by revealing what people find to be most cognitively significant in their experience. However, as we learn more about the semantics of various languages, we are faced with an interesting problem. Different languages seem to be telling us different stories about the mind. For example, important distinctions made in one language are not necessarily made in others. What are we to make of these cross-linguistic differences? (...) How do they arise? Are they created by purely linguistic processes operating over the course of language evolution? Or do they reflect fundamental differences in thought? In this sea of differences, are there any semantic universals? Which categories might be given by the genes, which by culture, and which by language? And what might the cross-linguistic similarities and differences contribute to our understanding of conceptual and linguistic development? The kinds of mapping principles, structures, and processes that link language and non-linguistic knowledge must accommodate not just one language but the rich diversity that has been uncovered. The integration of knowledge and methodologies necessary for real progress in answering these questions has happened only recently, as experimental approaches have been applied to the cross-linguistic study of word meaning. In Words and the Mind, Barbara Malt and Phillip Wolff present evidence from the leading researchers who are carrying out this empirical work on topics as diverse as spatial relations, events, emotion terms, motion events, objects, body-part terms, causation, color categories, and relational categories. By bringing them together, Malt and Wolff highlight some of the most exciting cross-linguistic and cross-cultural work on the language-thought interface, from a broad array of fields including linguistics, anthropology, cognitive and developmental psychology, and cognitive neuropsychology. Their results provide some answers to these questions and new perspectives on the issues surrounding them. (shrink)

Robert Sugden (2018. The Community of Advantage: A Behavioural Economist’s Defence of the Market. Oxford University Press) offers an alternative account for normative economics grounded in the view that it is in each individual’s interest to have more opportunity rather than less, irrespective of whether their decisions reveal well-ordered preferences. Our paper characterizes Sugden’s proposal as a step in the right direction, but as insufficient. His opportunity criterion does not go far enough in taking insights from psychology seriously. Sugden defends (...) an idea of agency understood as a person’s subjective sense of being in control of her actions. To realize this sense of being in control, we argue that a focus on opportunity-only is problematic; people also need agentic capabilities. We use self-determination theory (SDT) to develop a subjective account of agency that is grounded in psychological science. (shrink)

This paper offers a unified semantic explanation of two observations that prove to be problematic for classical analyses of modals, conditionals, and disjunctions: the fact that disjunctions scoping under possibility modals give rise to the free choice effect and the fact that counterfactuals license simplification of disjunctive antecedents. It shows that the data are well explained by a dynamic semantic analysis of modals and conditionals that uses ideas from the inquisitive semantic tradition in its treatment of disjunction. The analysis explains (...) why embedding a disjunctive possibility under negation reverts disjunction to its classical behavior, is general enough to predict less studied simplification patterns, and also makes progress toward a unified perspective on the distinction between informative, inquisitive, and attentive content. (shrink)

A dynamic semantics for iffy oughts offers an attractive alternative to the folklore that Chisholm's paradox enforces an unhappy choice between the intuitive inference rules of factual and deontic detachment. The first part of the story told here shows how a dynamic theory about ifs and oughts gives rise to a nonmonotonic perspective on deontic discourse and reasoning that elegantly removes the air of paradox from Chisholm's puzzle without sacrificing any of the two detachment principles. The second part of the (...) story showcases two bonus applications of the framework suggested here: it offers a response to Forrester's gentle murder paradox and avoids Kolodny and MacFarlane's miners paradox about deontic reasoning under epistemic uncertainty. A comparison between the dynamic semantic proposal made in this paper and a more conservative approach combining a static semantics with a dynamic pragmatics is provided. (shrink)

Algorithms have developed into somewhat of a modern myth. On the one hand, they have been depicted as powerful entities that rule, sort, govern, shape, or otherwise control our lives. On the other hand, their alleged obscurity and inscrutability make it difficult to understand what exactly is at stake. What sustains their image as powerful yet inscrutable entities? And how to think about the politics and governance of something that is so difficult to grasp? This editorial essay provides a critical (...) backdrop for the special issue, treating algorithms not only as computational artifacts but also as sensitizing devices that can help us rethink some entrenched assumptions about agency, transparency, and normativity. (shrink)

The received wisdom on ability modals is that they differ from their epistemic and deontic cousins in what inferences they license and better receive a universal or conditional analysis instead of an existential one. The goal of this paper is to sharpen the empirical picture about the semantics of ability modals, and to propose an analysis that explains what makes the can of ability so special but that also preserves the crucial idea that all uses of can share a common (...) lexical semantics. The resulting framework combines tools and techniques from dynamic and inquisitive semantics with insights from the literature of the role of agency in deontic logic. It explains not only why the can of ability, while essentially being an existential modal operator, sometimes resists distribution over disjunction and interacts with its duals in particular and hitherto unnoticed ways, but also has a tendency to license free choice inferences. (shrink)

"Das Rechtssystem geht davon aus, dass der Mensch – und nur der Mensch – eine natürliche Person ist. Das sei ein Irrtum, argumentiert Malte-Christian Gruber, denn die Rechtssubjektivität wird keineswegs alleine mit dem bloßen Menschsein begründet. Es ist die sittliche Autonomie, die den Menschen zu einem »Subjekt, dessen Handlungen einer Zurechnung fähig sind« (Kant) und mithin zur Person macht. Personen werden nicht mit dem Menschsein als solchem identifiziert, sondern durch die Zuschreibung von Handlungs- und Rechtsträgerschaft. Eine solche funktionale Vorstellung (...) von Rechtssubjektivität ist prinzipiell auch dazu imstande, neben Menschen noch weitere autonome Agenten als Träger von Rechten und Pflichten ein- zusetzen, z.B. technische Artefakte und andere nicht-menschliche Agenten. Christoph Menke macht dagegen darauf aufmerksam, dass die Erfindung neuer Rechte das eigentliche Bewegungsgesetz der politischen Emanzipation in der Moderne war. Das begann mit den bürgerlichen Revolutionen und ist immer noch das generelle Modell, mit dem Politik und Theorie operieren, die neue Rechte für nicht-menschliche Lebewesen und Artefakte einfordern. So wie im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert die rechtliche Emanzipation zunächst über die Grenzen bürgerlicher Subjektivität hinausgeführt hat und soziale und kulturelle Rechte erfand, so sollen wir nun den weiteren, konsequenten Schritt tun und auch noch die Bindung der juridischen Anerkennung an die Kategorie menschlicher Subjektivität aufbrechen. Auch Bio- und Artefakte sollen als eigenständige Rechtssubjekte rekonstruiert werden. Es fehlt ihnen allerdings etwas, das in den emanzipatorischen Kämpfen der Vergangenheit schlechthin grundlegend war: Ein Träger von Rechten zu sein, hieß, ein Fordernder von Rechten, ja, ein Kämpfer für Rechte gewesen zu sein. Man konnte keine rechtliche Person als Träger von Rechten sein, ohne ein politisches Subjekt als Kämpfer und Denker von Rechten gewesen zu sein. Wenn die Bindung der rechtlichen Personalität an die menschliche Subjektivität aufgelöst wird, damit es Bio- und Artefakt-Rechte geben kann, löst sich zugleich auch diese Einheit von rechtlicher Personalität und politischer Subjektivität auf, die die moderne Idee der Rechte definiert hatte. The legal system assumes that human beings – and only human beings – are natural persons. That is erroneous, argues Malte-Christian Gruber, because legal subjectivity isn’t founded in humanity alone. It is moral autonomy that makes man into a “subject whose actions are capable of attribution” (Kant) and thus into a person. Personhood is not identified with being human as such, but by the attribution of actions and legal ownership. Besides human beings, such a functional concept of legal subjectivity can in principle also be applied to other autonomous agents as holder of rights and obligations, e.g. techno- logical artifacts and other non-human agents. Christoph Menke in turn points out that the invention of new rights was the actual law of motion of political emancipation in modern times. This began with the bourgeois revolutions and is still the general model with which politics and theory operate to claim new rights for non-human creatures and artifacts. Just as in the 19th and 20th centuries, the legal emancipation initially led beyond the limits of bourgeois subjectivity and in- vented social and cultural rights, so should we make a further consequent step and break with the dependence of juridical recognition on the category of human subjectivity. Also bio- and artifacts are to be reconstructed as independent legal entities. However, they lack something that was absolutely fundamental in the emancipatory struggles of the past: to be a subject of rights meant to have demanded rights, indeed, to have been a fighter for rights. One could not be a legal person and holder of rights without having been a political subject as fighter and thinker of rights. To suspend the dependence of legal personhood on human subjectivity so that there may be bio- and artifact-rights also means to dissolve the unity between legal personality and political subjectivity that once defined the modern idea of rights. ". (shrink)

This paper investigates the effects of (surface) DP-internal quantifying expressions on semantic interpretation. In particular, I investigate two syntactic constructions in which an adjective takes scope out of its embedding DP, thus raising an interesting question for strict compositionality. Regarding the first construction, I follow Larson (1999) and assume that the adjective incorporates into the determiner of its DP, forming a complex quantifier [D+A]. I present new evidence in favor of this analysis. Since Larson's semantic analysis of complex quantifiers [D+A] (...) makes a wrong prediction, I propose an alternative, empirically more adequate analysis that treats D+A compounds as pluractional quantifiers in the sense of Lasersohn (1995). Finally, I turn to the second construction, arguing that – despite superficial similarities to the first construction - it should not be analyzed in terms of complex quantifier formation, but in terms of LF-movement of the adjective to Spec,DP. The discussion suggests that there is more than one way for DP-internal modifiers to take DP-external scope in natural language. (shrink)

What should be the ‘informational base’ of welfare economics if one takes the insights from behavioral economics seriously? Sugden proposes individuals’ sets of opportunities. This paper discusses...

A dynamic semantics for epistemically modalized sentences is an attractive alternative to the orthodox view that our best theory of meaning ascribes to such sentences truth-conditions relative to what is known. This essay demonstrates that a dynamic theory about might and must offers elegant explanations of a range of puzzling observations about epistemic modals. The first part of the story offers a unifying treatment of disputes about epistemic modality and disputes about matters of fact while at the same time avoiding (...) the complexities of alternative theories. The second part of the story extends the basic framework to cover some complicated data about retraction and the interaction between epistemic modality and tense. A comparison between the suggestion made in this essay and current versions of the orthodoxy is provided. (shrink)

English summary: As a functioning part of the human body and mind, our internal information technology systems belong to our physical makeup just as much as body parts and substances do to the realm of reproductive medicine, genetic information does to gene technology and brain scans do to neurological technology. Bio-information law concerns itself with the rights of these roving human components. German description: Bio- und Informationstechnologien generieren standig neue, bislang kaum fur moglich gehaltene Verhaltnisse, Verknupfungen und Anschlusse zwischen Technischem (...) und Lebendigem. Im Recht werfen diese technisch-lebendigen Assoziationen grundsatzliche Fragen auf, wenn es beispielsweise darum geht, welche Personlichkeits- oder Eigentumsrechte an extrakorporal gelagerten Korpersubstanzen oder auch an genetischer Information bestehen. Ebenso hat das Recht eine Antwort darauf zu finden, welche Bedeutung neuronalen Daten und Abbildungen von Hirnaktivitaten, etwa fur den Beweis psychischer Schadigungen im Schmerzensgeldprozess, zukommt. Und nicht zuletzt erhebt sich die keineswegs mehr abwegige Rechtsfrage, ob der Eingriff in ein informationstechnisches System als personlichkeitsverletzend gelten darf, weil dieses womoglich wie ein ausgelagerter Teil des Korpers zu behandeln ist. Malte Gruber untersucht, wie sich diese Problemstellungen auf die privatrechtlichen Deutungen von Person, Sache und Rechtsverhaltnis auswirken und dabei ein technologieubergreifendes Recht formieren: Bioinformationsrecht handelt von der engen, untrennbaren Verbindung informationstechnisch-artifizieller und korperlich-lebendiger, gewissermassen kunstlicher und naturlicher Prozesse, von Expansionstechnologien und bioartifiziellen Rechtsverhaltnissen, in denen sich die Personlichkeit des Menschen in technisierter Verfassung entfaltet. (shrink)

The essay explores the connections between the abolition of legalized prostitution and the processes of democratization in Germany and Italy, starting from the history of human rights and its interaction with the political system. The main sources are the parliamentary debates and the laws that brought about the closedown of brothels and the abolition of the surveillance system in Germany in 1927 and in Italy in 1958. The debates on prostitution also pose a question of equality and gender justice. In (...) particular, the problem of the regulation of prostitution, whose efficiency has been verified by an ever growing number of researchers during the XX century, deploys factors of sanitary policy, human rights and morals, aspects of social policy and security, questioning not only the gender hierarchy, but also the social one. (shrink)

One of the reasons for this is that Schelling's most significant work on this subject, Urfassung der Philosophie der Offenbarung, was not published until 1992.

Prior research has shown a pronounced self-orientation in students of business and economics. This article examines if self-orientation can be alleviated by a focus on prosocial values in business education. In a cross-sectional design, we test the prosocial behavior and values of bachelor students at the beginning and the end of a traditional 3-year business administration program. We compare their behavior with the behavior of two different groups: students from an ethically-oriented international management school and students from a social work (...) program of equal length. The results showed that students of business administration show less prosocial behavior in a dictator game than students in the other two groups. This difference is larger between final-year students than between first-year students. According to the results of the Schwartz Value Survey, the Inglehart Index, and a scale for preferences for distributive justice, students in the three disciplines differ substantially in prosocial values, but there is no significant difference between first and last semester students of the same discipline. We conclude that there is no transmission of self-oriented behavior through self-oriented values emended in traditional business education curricula. Instead, students seem to select academic programs according to their personal and preexisting social orientations. (shrink)

Metaethical noncognitivists have trouble arriving at a respectable semantic theory for moral language. The goal of this article is to make substantial progress toward demonstrating that these problems may be overcome. Replacing the predominant expressivist semantic agenda in metaethics with a dynamic perspective on meaning and communication allows noncognitivists to provide a satisfying analysis of negation and other constructions that have been argued to be problematic for metaethical noncognitivism, including disjunctions. The resulting proposal preserves some of the key insights from (...) recent work on the semantics of expressivism while highlighting the widely neglected early noncognitivists' sympathies to the kind of dynamic story I intend to tell here. A comparison between the advertised dynamic semantic story and current proposals that treat expressivism as a pragmatic rather than semantic theory about moral language is provided. (shrink)

Comparative biology is afield that deals with morphology. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe recognised comparative biology, not as a passive science obsessed with counting similarities as it is today, but as an active field wherein he sought to perceive the inter-relationships of individual organisms to the organic whole, which he termed the archetype. I submit that Goethe's archetype and his application of a technique termed the Anschauung are rigorous and significant ways to conduct delicate empiricism in comparative biology. The future of (...) comparative biology lies in the use of the Anschauung to communicate the archetype as a set of inter-relationships of homologues that we perceive intuitively. In this essay I present how the extension of our own intuitive perception forms the foundations of a method for seeing and discovering the archetype in comparative biology. (shrink)

In der 1970 gegründeten Reihe erscheinen Arbeiten, die philosophiehistorische Studien mit einem systematischen Ansatz oder systematische Studien mit philosophiehistorischen Rekonstruktionen verbinden. Neben deutschsprachigen werden auch englischsprachige Monographien veröffentlicht. Gründungsherausgeber sind: Erhard Scheibe (Herausgeber bis 1991), Günther Patzig (bis 1999) und Wolfgang Wieland (bis 2003). Von 1990 bis 2007 wurde die Reihe von Jürgen Mittelstraß mitherausgegeben.

Machery (2009) has proposed that the notion of ‘concept’ ought to be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology. I raise three questions about his argument: (1) Is there a meaningful distinction between concepts and background knowledge? (2) Do we need to discard the hybrid view? (3) Are there really categories of things in the world that are the basis for concepts? Although I argue that the answer to all three is ‘no’, I agree with Machery's conclusion that seeking a (...) single characterization of concepts will not be fruitful for understanding cognitive representations and processes. (shrink)

Mindfulness meditation describes a set of different mental techniques to train attention and awareness. Trait mindfulness and extended mindfulness interventions can benefit self-control. The present study investigated the short-term consequences of mindfulness meditation under conditions of limited self-control resources. Specifically, we hypothesized that a brief period of mindfulness meditation would counteract the deleterious effect that the exertion of self-control has on subsequent self-control performance. Participants who had been depleted of self-control resources by an emotion suppression task showed decrements in self-control (...) performance as compared to participants who had not suppressed emotions. However, participants who had meditated after emotion suppression performed equally well on the subsequent self-control task as participants who had not exerted self-control previously. This finding suggests that a brief period of mindfulness meditation may serve as a quick and efficient strategy to foster self-control under conditions of low resources. (shrink)

Mere capacity views hold that agents who can intervene in an unfolding movement are performing an agentially controlled action, regardless of whether they do intervene. I introduce a simple argument to show that the noncausal explanation offered by mere capacity views fails to explain both control and action. In cases where bodily subsystems, rather than the agent, generate control over a movement, agents can often intervene to override non-agential control. Yet, contrary to what capacity views suggest, in these cases, this (...) capacity to intervene does not amount to agential control or action. I illustrate this with a case study of how passive breathing, a mere behavior, is misclassified by mere capacity views. I end by revisiting the central alternative to mere capacity views: causal control views. Advances in our understanding of how agents exert control over unfolding movements indicate that the nature of control is characterized by ubiquitous, small-scale causal interventions. (shrink)

Every adequate semantics for conditionals and deontic ought must offer a solution to the miners paradox about conditional obligations. Kolodny and MacFarlane have recently argued that such a semantics must reject the validity of modus ponens. I demonstrate that rejecting the validity of modus ponens is inessential for an adequate solution to the paradox.

Folklore has it that Sobel sequences favor a variably strict analysis of conditionals over its plainly strict alternative. While recent discussions for or against the lore have focussed on Sobel sequences involving counterfactuals, this paper draws attention to the fact that indicative Sobel sequences are just as felicitous as are their counterfactual cousins. The fact, or so I shall argue here, disrupts the folklore: given minimal assumptions about the semantics and pragmatics of indicative conditionals, a textbook variably strict analysis fails (...) to predict that indicative Sobel sequences are felicitous. The correct lesson to draw from Sobel sequences is that their felicity challenges classical implementations of the variably strict and of the plainly strict analysis alike. In response to this challenge I develop a dynamic strict analysis of conditionals that handles indicative Sobel sequences with grace while preserving intuitive constraints on the semantics and pragmatics of their members. A discussion of how such an analysis may handle the challenge from reverse Sobel sequences is provided. (shrink)

Evoked potentials in the amplitude-time spectrum of the electroencephalogram are commonly used to assess the extent of brain responses to stimulation with noxious contact heat. The magnitude of the N- and P-waves are used as a semi-objective measure of the response to the painful stimulus: the higher the magnitude, the more painful the stimulus has been perceived. The strength of the N-P-wave response is also largely dependent on the chosen reference electrode site. The goal of this study was to examine (...) which reference technique excels both in practical and theoretical terms when analyzing noxious contact heat evoked potentials in the amplitude-time spectrum. We recruited 21 subjects. We applied seven noxious contact heat stimuli using two temperatures, 51°C, and 54°C, to each subject. During EEG analysis, we aimed to identify the referencing technique which produces the highest N-wave and P-wave amplitudes with as little artifactual influence as possible. For this purpose, we applied the following six referencing techniques: mathematically linked A1/A2, average reference, REST, AFz, Pz, and mathematically linked PO7/PO8. We evaluated how these techniques impact the N-P amplitudes of CHEPS based on our data from healthy subjects. Considering all factors, we found that mathematically linked earlobes to be the ideal referencing site to use when displaying and evaluating CHEPS in the amplitude-time spectrum. (shrink)

Die phänomenologische Erziehungswissenschaft stellt sowohl theoretisch als auch empirisch pädagogische Erfahrungen in den Mittelpunkt. Im Eröffnungsband der Reihe „Phänomenologische Erziehungswissenschaft“ werden bildungs- und erziehungstheoretische, methodologische sowie (fach)didaktische Ansätze internationaler Vertreterinnen und Vertreter vorgestellt. Anhand des phänomenologischen Forschungs- und Erkenntnisstils wird aufgezeigt, wie pädagogische Erfahrungen reflektiert, zum Sprechen gebracht und vermittelt werden können.

This dissertation has three parts. Part I, comprising chapters 1 and 2, addresses some basic commitments which must be presupposed in theorizing about concepts. Concepts, to a first approximation, are mental representations that are constituents of thoughts. Chapter 1 attempts to clarify the notion of representing. Chapter 2 reconstructs arguments in the work of Frege against the mental nature of thoughts and (by the same token) of concepts, arguing that they are confused and leave the notion of concepts as mental (...) representations unscathed. Part II, comprising chapters 3 to 5, pursues the aim of closing in on concepts in light of the widely shared understanding that concepts form a more specific class than just any kind of subpropositional mental representations. This part, if successful, should also help clarify the interrelations among a certain cluster of ideas which are customarily connected to the property of being a concept. Chapter 3 advocates storage in long-term memory as a basic, explanatorily principled criterion of delimiting concepts from nonconceptual mental representations. In leading up to this criterion, the chapter subjects to methodological critique the typical manner in which philosophers justify their assumption of a conceptual/nonconceptual-distinction. Chapter 4 investigates the idea that concepts are, in some sense, mental representations under which we categorize things in the world. Two versions of this idea of categorizing mental representations are distinguished, one metaphysical, the other psychological in kind. Both of these ideas, it is claimed, are inadequate to capture concepthood as such. Chapter 5 continues on the positive side, reconnecting to an earlier introduced idea which places concepts, other than sensory-perceptual events, in the realm of so-called high-level cognition. Concepts are not only stored in long-term memory, they are also capable of entering into cognitive processes that are “flexible”, rather than “hardwired”. Subdistinctions and explanations are provided that hopefully make the relevant notions workably precise. Part III of the dissertation moves on to engage in more specific debates in the theory of concepts. In one way or another, all three chapters in this part take as their points of departure the influential compositionality arguments against prototype theory often reiterated by Fodor, until recently the agenda-setting concept theorist in the philosophy of psychology. The chapters jointly aim to identify and correct a number of errors committed in the context of this debate: in the basic, generally accepted, presuppositions of these arguments (chapter 6); in the topography of concept-theoretical positions assumed by Fodor and adopted by subsequent commentators (chapter 7); and in the followup comments with which Fodor has intended to support and supplement these arguments (chapter 8). (shrink)

Die andauernde Faszination des Films liegt nicht zuletzt in seinem Vermögen, Zuschauer_innen zu einer empathischen Reaktion zu bewegen – Filme rufen Gefühle hervor. Der Band betrachtet verschiedene Aspekte dieser Affekte und Emotionen. Neben dem Spielfilm wird dabei auch das bisher in der Diskussion wenig beachtete Genre der Dokumentarfilme analysiert. Die Beiträge aus Philosophie und Filmwissenschaft berufen sich sowohl auf die Tradition der analytischen Philosophie, die bislang eher kognitivistisch orientiert war, als auch auf aktuelle Entwicklungen in der ästhetischen Theorie, die in (...) der phänomenologischen Tradition steht. (shrink)

The law of the future faces fundamental challenges that it cannot overcome by means of ‘tried and trusted’ dogmatics alone. Nor can it, from a methodological standpoint, take refuge in a purportedly apolitical hermeneutics or a one-sided application of empirical methods. Its responsibilities are not exhausted in mere steering, innovation or stimulating operations, but also encompass critical-emancipatory functions. Methodological reflection and legal critique - understood as social theory in the ‘interior’ of law - enable legal doctrine to meet the particular (...) demands that arise from the simultaneous affiliation of jurisprudence to the systems of law and science. The future development of legal studies thus requires a foundational research approach that preserves the interdisciplinary connection to neighbouring disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, and provides impetus for enlightened self-critique and self-reflection. Only in this way - through the emergence of jurisprudence from its self-incurred ignorance regarding its social function - might legal practice assert itself in everyday legal life and confront the injustices of the legal world with its own thinking. Such critical legal thinking demands more than just the perpetuation of traditions based on the history of ideas. Nor can it be satisfied through the mere cultivation of empirical approaches to reality. It must aim to develop and unfold a normative concept of law, and write this forward into the future. It derives its essential reflective potential from social-theoretical modelling and methodological development. In the process, the reciprocal confrontation and translation of rival theoretical models opens new learning possibilities not to solve legal conflicts, but to treat them more judiciously. Here, it is above all the foundational legal subjects that, through their discrete approaches and perspectives, open diverse and flexible entryways to the potentialities and actualities of law and, particularly in light of new cases, ensure the necessary variance of options for perception and action. The future of law resides in experimental testing and innovative discovery, in the creative quest for alternative possibilities and possible realities, in the critical and constructive struggle for the law of the future - as the ecological law of future life in the next bio-digital society. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungMit Schellings Spätphilosophie verabschiedet sich im Deutschen Idealismus die Vernunft vom Versuch ihrer Letztbegründung. Die Vernunft kann sich nicht in der Wirklichkeit eines absoluten Grundes ihrer eigenen Wirklichkeit versichern. Zwar realisiert die Vernunft, auf ein Absolutes bezogen zu sein, aber dessen Wirklichkeit als schöpferische Freiheit entzieht sich dem konzipierenden Ausgriff der Vernunft . Allerdings befreit die von der Vernunft eingesehene Möglichkeit dieser rational uneinholbaren Wirklichkeit zu einem – theoretisch nicht erzwingbaren, aber auch nicht als irrational denunzierbaren – Perspektivenwechsel . Danach (...) ist der »entsicherten« Vernunft eine Diagnose der Welt im Horizont der schöpferischen Freiheit des Absoluten möglich .So zeigt Schellings Spätphilosophie: Gerade eine Theorie des Absoluten kann der Unbestimmtheit, die sich in Phänomenen wie Ambivalenz, Zufall und Unausdeutbarkeit ausdrückt, Raum verschaffen. Damit nimmt Schelling vorweg, was die Moderne in ihrer Selbstcharakterisierung, und zwar gegen die theologischen und absolutheitstheoretischen Überlegungen des Deutschen Idealismus, gerne für sich beansprucht. Anders jedoch als manche Vertreter des Postidealismus loziert Schelling das Andere der Vernunft nicht strikt jenseits der Vernunft , sondern verbindet die Einsicht in das Andere der Vernunft mit der Selbstaufklärung der Vernunft. Das Andere der Vernunft ist ihr absoluter Grund. Und dieser Grund ist ursprüngliche Kreativität, schöpferische Freiheit: die Freiheit, aus der und durch die alles ist.SummaryWith Schelling's later philosophy, the rationality in German idealism bids a farewell to the attempt of its last justification. In the reality of an absolute reason, rationality cannot affirm its own reality. Rationality indeed achieves the aim of being linked to an absolute, but whose reality as a creative freedom eludes the conceptualising reaching out of the rationality . However, the possibility of this rationally ungraspable reality, as understood by rationality, liberates to create a theoretically non-enforceable change of perspective , which is nonetheless not to be denounced as irrational. Afterwards, the “unlocked” rationality is able to diagnose the world in the view of the creative freedom of the absolute .This is what Schelling's later philosophy demonstrates: a theory of the absolute can create scope for uncertainty, which is expressed in phenomena such as ambivalence, coincidence and indecipherability. In so doing, Schelling anticipates what the ‘modern’ likes to lay claim to in its self-characterisation, which is, indeed, contrary to the theological and absolutist theoretical considerations of German idealism. Different, however, from other representatives of post-idealism, Schelling locates ‘the other’ of rationality not strictly as being on the other side of rationality but links the insight into the other of rationality with the self-enlightenment of rationality. The other of rationality is its absolute reason. This reason is original creativity and creative freedom: the freedom from and through which everything is. (shrink)

Through an examination of Proust's ‘magic lantern’ scene from the opening of A la recherche du temps perdu, alongside the work of the contemporary installation artist Tony Oursler, this article takes projection as a means of exploring the relationship between subjectivity and embodiment. Reading them in conjunction with Deleuze and Guattari's concept of ‘faciality’, I argue that Oursler's installations, combining performance, sculpture and video art, explore the fate of the body subjected to signification and can be described as ‘tragedies of (...) faciality’. At the same time, anchored as they are in material relations, they are unable to detach the subject from the limits of the body in the radical way Proust can, via a literary account of projection which is, I argue, doubly virtual. (shrink)

"Verstehen" ist im Umgang mit Musik sowohl in der Alltagssprache als auch in historischen, asthetischen und padagogischen Konzeptionen ein zentraler, zugleich aber ein problematischer Begriff. NAch einer einfuhrenden Klarung und Systematisierung theoretischer Positionen zwischen einem "existenzialen" und einem "identifizierenden" Verstehensbegriff werden Konturen eines "posthermeneutischen" Begriffs von "Musikverstehen" skizziert, der den Anspruch auf Universalitat, Intentionalitat und Koharenz sowie die diskursive Verfasstheit des Hermeneutischen problematisiert und stattdessen auf "Alteritat", "Differenz" und "Prozessualitat" setzt. Die Auseinandersetzung mit historisch und stilistisch sehr unterschiedlichen Beispielen konkretisiert (...) die Frage nach einer "posthermeneutischen" musikalischen Analyse: In Klavierkonzerten John Cages, Klaviersonaten Ludwig v. Beethovens, Klavierliedern Robert Schumanns sowie aktuellen Kompositionen von Kanye West und Akufen erweist sich in je anderer Weise der Anspruch eines umfassenden Verstehens, insbesondere an formale Koharenz und eine Kongruenz von Wort und Ton, als problematisch. Ein veranderter Begriff von "Musikverstehen" hat auch Konsequenzen fur didaktische Zielsetzungen und padagogische Inszenierungen, die die Dynamik von Interpretationsprozessen erfahrbar machen konnen und als "asthetische Operationen" nicht auf ein diskursives Verstehen angewiesen sein mussen. (shrink)

This article presents a study that investigates how anonymity influences user participation in an online question-and-answer platform [Quora ]. The study is one step in identifying hypotheses that can be used to address a research and design issue concerning the role of anonymity in online participation, particularly in sensitive situations where people are seeking social support. Based on the literature, we present a model that describes the factors that influence participation. These factors were used when analyzing the answers to questions (...) in the health category on Quora. The results of this study were completed by a survey asking Quora users about their use of the anonymity feature. The main result is that the only significant difference between anonymous and non-anonymous answers is that: with anonymous answers, social appreciation correlated with the answer’s length. (shrink)

Berichte über Schlachten wurden bislang fast immer mit der Absicht betrachtet, aus ihnen das tatsächliche Geschehen zu rekonstruieren. In diesem Aufsatz geht es hingegen um die Frage, wie mittelalterliche Menschen selbst das Kampfgeschehen deuteten und beschrieben, und vor allem darum zu ermitteln, welche Rolle dabei den topographischen Eigenarten des Schlachtfeldes zukam. Es zeigt sich, dass die Verfasser der Quellen keineswegs den Ablauf des Kampfes nüchtern protokollieren wollten, sondern stets ihre spezifische Erzählabsicht verfolgten. Insbesondere versuchten sie, jene Partei, der sie selbst (...) anhingen, möglichst günstig darzustellen. Dieser Erzählabsicht ordneten sie die Erwähnung topographischer Details klar unter. Außerdem flossen in die Schilderung auch scheinbar banaler topographischer Einzelheiten häufig Motive und Erzählmuster ein, die den Autoren und den zeitgenössischen Lesern schon bekannt waren und die daher Wahrnehmung, Erinnerung und Darstellung prägten. Aus dieser Analyse folgt, dass Rückschlüsse auf die örtlichen Gegebenheiten und den tatsächlichen Ablauf des Kampfes den Worten der Chronisten allenfalls mit größter Vorsicht zu entnehmen sind. Zugleich erweist sich, dass die sprachlichen Visualisierungsstrategien aufschlussreiche Erkenntnisse darüber bieten, wie die Autoren kriegerische Handlungen wahrnahmen. (shrink)

We propose that a principled understanding of meta-learning, as aimed for by the authors, benefits from linking the focus on learning with an equally strong focus on structure, which means to address the question: What are the meta-structures that can guide meta-learning?

Schulz has shown that the suppositional view of indicative conditionals leads to a corresponding view of epistemic modals. But his case backfires: the resulting theory of epistemic modals gets the facts wrong, and so we end up with a good argument against the suppositional view. I show how and why a dynamic view of indicative conditionals leads to a better theory of epistemic modals.