Volume 20, Issue 7, July 2020, Page 150-152.

This book deals with the concept of post-Islamism from a mainly philosophical perspective, using political liberalism as elaborated by John Rawls as the key interpretive tool. What distinguishes this book from most scholarship in Iranian studies is that it primarily deals with the projects of Iranian intellectuals from a normative perspective as the concept is understood by analytical philosophers. The volume includes analyses of the strengths and weakness of the arguments underlying each thinker's ideas, rather than looking for their historical (...) and sociological origins, genealogy, et cetera Each chapter develops a particular conjectural argument for the possibility of an overlapping consensus between Islam and political liberalism, though the arguments presented draw upon different Islamic, particularly Shia, resources. Thus, while Shabestari and Soroush primarily reason from a modernist theological or kalami perspective, M.H.Tabatabai and Mehdi Haeri Yazdi's arguments are mainly based on traditional Islamic philosophy and Quranic exegesis. While Kadivar, An-Naim and Fanaei are post-Islamist in the exact sense of the term, Malekian goes beyond typical post-Islamism by proposing a theory for spirituality that constrains religion within the boundaries of enlightenment thought. Throughout the book, specific attention is given to Ferrara and March's readings of political liberalism. Although the book's chapters constitute a whole, they can also be read independently if the reader is only curious about particular intellectuals whose political theories are discussed. (shrink)

The “Scientific Revolution” of the seventeenth century cannot adequately be assessed without an appreciation of the achievements and limitations of those, whether giants or dwarfs, on whose shoulders Galileo and his contemporaries stood. And since for many historians Galileo's main contribution lies in the mathematization of the natural world and especially of time and motion, particular interest attaches to medieval treatises dealing with these questions, above all to those which were in widespread demand early in the sixteenth century.

This paper reports on the implementation of a methodology for detailing organizational values and measuring their influence on organizational performance. The work takes a grounded approach based on a large corpus of mission statements, which have been shown to be an authentic source of organizational values. A link is made between the mesh of values through an organization and the resulting world-class performance using a methodology that comprises benchmaking and values assessment. The framework developed in the paper is an attempt (...) to map and develop the associations of individuals within the organizations. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).

As the title indicates, the purpose of this book is twofold. First it offers a brief exposition of the fundamental doctrines of the Philosophical Investigations; secondly, it attempts to use some important concepts of the Investigations to justify religious language. The emphasis in the expository part is on language games as communication media, leading directly to forms of life as agreement situations, which would make indispensable the intervention of agents here conceived as persons. The application of these ideas to belief (...) statements is made in the course of analyses distinguishing first person from third person belief statements, assimilating the former to performatives, and then relating them to "believe in" assertions different from inductively justified "believe that" propositions. This study is interesting mostly as analytic argumentation reinforcing well known ideas and distinctions. A subservient attitude towards Wittgenstein leads to an unnecessary extension of his doctrines to cover intellectual achievements of various authors and even original insights of High himself. The final critique of Barth, Tillich, and Bultmann, all grouped under the sin of fideism, is a bit excessive. Better reasons might be found to show them as exponents of the symbolic ways of expression that High has so appropriately defended.--A. M. (shrink)

A central theme of the contemporary French school of epistemology is the evolution of the philosophical basis of scientific knowledge from the rationalistic stage to the present relativistic-structural stage. This transition is also the topic of this small but rich book. The purpose of the work is neither historical nor informative, but interpretative. The author discusses one of the main tensions in the theory of knowledge, viz., that between formalistic trends with their correspondent phenomenalism, and the attempts to give a (...) unified outlook to human reason on the basis of linguistic and phenomenological descriptions.—A. M. (shrink)

Written over a period of twenty years, which saw the success of the author's more specialized contributions, the present treatise gathers together personal memories, clinical experiences, and efforts to superimpose without eclecticism the best insights offered by the various psychological and psychiatric trends of the century. A clear delineation of the subject matter and theoretical instruments of psychopathology emerges, and confirms the relative autonomy of this field as against clinical psychology and psychiatry. This method relies on qualitative profiles of the (...) most serious mental troubles, then establishes behavioral correlations. This requires careful analysis of the most objective manifestations of mental illness. Special attention is given to language, since language, in this case "metaphoric" language, is the best evidence for the unveiling of the predominant vital categories of the psychopath. The first section, a history of clinical analysis, is thorough and well documented, especially the sections on typology, and on the central figure of Pierre Janet. However it is the second and third sections that carry the most conviction. Section four restates some of the notions that will be permanently incorporated into psychopathology through the work of Minkowski. Notable examples of these are: spatial thought, morbid rationalism and geometrism, some problems of reality and irreality, and such psychopathological mechanisms as disjunctions and peculiar syntheses, schematization and fusions, confusion and vagueness, and, lastly, reification.—A. M. (shrink)

Littleton's introduction for the American reader to the eminent founder of neocomparativism in cultural anthropology remedies the unjustifiable neglect in which the contributions of this school are held, both by anthropologists and philosophers of the social sciences. Many suggestions from generative semantics and functional sociology are so pointed and so well founded that without them our analytical research efforts on human action and even our ordinary language techniques seem somewhat arbitrary and individualistic. Whether suggestions from these rich bodies of knowledge (...) will have the power to bring about wider acceptance of new and more sophisticated forms of comparativism is yet to be seen. The methodic principles applied by Dumézil throughout his extensive writings, over a forty year period, are principles which affect the very source of reason, viz., the language medium which gives life to structures and models. Dumézil argues that discourse and life obey the same logic, just as in a drama the plot provides both the form, the organization of the sense, and the sense itself. Such is for Dumézil the core of all symbolism, and the basis for the correspondence between linguistic fact and societal fact. There is an excellent bibliography.—A. M. (shrink)

The ontological argument continues to draw the attention of philosophers of different persuasions. This is one of the latest works on the subject. In it the Anselmian proof as developed in the Proslogion is submitted to careful analysis and placed in relation to Anselm’s approach to God in the Monologion. Thus the title of the book seems to be justified, inasmuch as it is Anselm’s notion of God that is investigated from a rational viewpoint rather than the ontological argument alone. (...) Vuillemin divides his work into four parts, which are followed by a conclusion and seven appendices. In the first two parts he contends that the ontological argument as stated in the Proslogion is a rational proof based on rational data, even though faith may support those data, and that the proof therefore involves an illegitimate transition from the concept of God in our mind to his actual existence, a criticism that the author shares with Kant. The third and fourth parts of the book are Vuillemin’s personal contribution to the understanding of the argument and purport to show the epistemological and mathematical antinomies that result from the "negative" concept of a being than which nothing greater can be thought which is at the basis of the Anselmian proof. It is the author’s contention that reason can prove both the impossibility of conceiving the being in question and the inability of the human mind to argue to the existence of a transcendent being from concepts derived by abstraction from the beings of our experience. Thus Vuillemin would rule out not only the so-called argument a priori of the Proslogion but also the arguments a posteriori presented in the Monologion. To understand Anselm’s ontological argument correctly, it is necessary to view it in the light of Anselm’s belief and in the context of the ideological realism which he shared with the entire Augustinian school. By neglecting such considerations, Vuillemin, like many other interpreters before him, does not seem to have done justice to what has been called "one of the boldest creations of man’s reason and a credit not only to his inventor, but to human reason itself.".—B. M. B. (shrink)

In this revised and expanded edition of his well-known study of Denis Diderot's life and works, Crocker combines solid scholarship with a vivid portrayal of his subjects. Leaving firm ground only occasionally, Crocker masterfully reconstructs Diderot's life by weaving into his narrative the testimony of Diderot's contemporaries and the philosopher's own anecdotes of the more picturesque episodes of his life. The author never departs from firm ground, however, in his presentation of Diderot's works. With a rare blend of erudition and (...) a lively critical sense, he sets them forth in the light of eighteenth-century currents of thought, highlighting Diderot's most significant contributions to materialism, sensualism, and experimentalism, while at the same time preserving, in quite readable summaries, the integrity of individual writings. His extensive consideration of the twenty years Diderot devoted to the Encyclopedia is particularly stimulating. By contrast, his summary presentation of Diderot's novels is somewhat disappointing, especially since he gives all too brief mention to Diderot's innovations in that genre. A needed index is lacking, but in spite of this and other minor shortcomings, Crocker's efforts have resulted in what is clearly the best complete English biography of one of the eighteenth century's most colorful geniuses.—C. M. M. (shrink)

With the publication of three significant books in 1967, La voix et le phénomène, L'écriture et la différence, and De la grammatologie, Derrida is proving himself a noteworthy figure in French philosophy, and a diversified one as well. La voix et le phénomène is a scholarly reinterpretation of Husserl centered around his theory of the sign, which Derrida sees as playing a secret but decisive role in his phenomenology. Derrida attacks chiefly two Husserlian prejudices: his theory of language as the (...) dimension of absolute proximity-to-self, and his privileging of the "expression" meaning of the sign over the "index" meaning. These mesh with Husserl's notion of the transcendent voice present-to-itself, a central idea of his intuitionism. Thus, according to Derrida, Husserl's phenomenology really rejoins a traditional metaphysics--philosophy of presence--it had set out to criticize. This book will be valuable not only as an original interpretation of Husserl, but as a springboard into Derrida's philosophy as well.--C. M. R. (shrink)

In this scholarly, well-planned, and well-documented number in the series "Seminar in the History of Ideas," Professor Boas, in these days of the People's Revolution, shows himself an unrepentant elitist. Illustrative of this attitude is his statement in the fourth essay: "Hideous as such a view seems to a modern reader softened by humanitarianism, it would be well if we could tell in advance whom God has chosen to be lettered. There is certainly little sense in wasting a college education (...) on anyone predestined to be an ass or an ox." Boas' wish to avoid the people as much as possible determines the orientation of many of the eight essays in this book about the history of the people in art, literature, music, and politics. In the second essay, "Who are the People?" he explores the various religious, social, and political contexts in which the term "People" has been used, and concludes that its reality is only nominalistic, since the term has had so many diverse meanings. In "The People as Poet," he creates a multi-faceted study of the rural muse, of national traits expressed in poetry, and of folk forms. But in doing so, he argues against the collectivist theory of creation and dismisses the poetic products of country-folk as strictly derivative. Boas barely alludes to the phenomenon of oral composition. He is evidently unaware that this tradition was as alive in twentieth-century Yugoslavia as in Homer's Greece. Consideration of such evidence might have caused him to modify his unqualified attribution of a monopoly on poetic creation to the individual poet. A good part of the penultimate essay, "The People as Musician," is devoted to a survey of nineteenth-century movements of cultural and political internationalism. The other half explores the possibility of artistic expression of the "national soul," an idea which the author particularly disparages in the case of music because of the limits of symbolism of the medium. In "Egalitarianism," Boas surveys the condition of the working man and pronounces that all is well; the lucky fellow works in modern, clean factories--no noisier than his TV-dominated home--and stands on the verge of full participation with management in the benefits of production. Despite its ideological naÏvetés, the book remains a model of scholarly talent and discipline, as well as a mine of standard and esoteric information on the history of the "People" in many fields. An index, bibliography, and fourteen plates depicting the "People" in art are included.--C. M. R. (shrink)

This book is a collection of essays in honor of Radoslav A. Tsanoff, Chairman of the Department of Philosophy at Rice University for forty years. Besides a tribute to Tsanoff written by J. S. Fulton, there are ten essays written by distinguished philosophers, each considering a topic in his field of interest. Virgil Aldrich discusses the importance of language in an essay entitled "Self-Consciousness." An examination of the new in art and an attempt to explicate its value and rationale is (...) presented by Van Meter Ames; illustrative material is drawn from such sources as contemporary film, pop art and chance music. In "Social Science and Social Norms" Clifford Barrett discusses the relevance of facts and norms in systematic considerations of social scientists. C. P. Snow's concept of two cultures is examined by A. Cornelius Benjamin in "Philosophy and the Cultures." Other essays presented are "Philosophy and Common Sense" by George Boas, "Conscience and Conscientiousness" by A. Campbell Garnett, "Criteria for Ideas of God" by C. Hartshorne, and "Sovereignty and the Idea of Republic" by C. W. Hendel. Charles Morris examines the common themes of the pragmatic movement, discussing such fields as epistemology, axiology and cosmology, and such philosophers as Peirce, Dewey, Mead and Lewis. In the concluding essay G. R. Morrow discusses Plato's views about a God and the many gods of the Greek pantheon. This book is a loose collection of papers, lacking any single theme or determinate relation between the essays presented; each essay, however, is competently handled and is interesting in its own right.—E. M. (shrink)

In his preface, Hunter explains that this volume is intended to provide for non-mathematicians an introduction to the most important results of modern mathematical logic. The reader will find here the work of Post, Skolem, Gödel, Church, Henkin, and others, presented in a terse and closely-knit style. Though acknowledging the trend toward natural deduction systems, Hunter sticks to more classical axiomatic systems on the grounds that the proofs of metatheorems are simplified by that choice. He begins with a formal system (...) of propositional logic, for which he develops proofs of completeness, consistency, and decidability. Systems of first order predicate logic are then dealt with, and Church's and Gödel's results on undecidability and incompleteness are presented. There is a brief, useful discussion indicating what parts of first order predicate logic are decidable. It is assumed that the reader has some familiarity with elementary formal logic: Hunter develops the set-theoretical results he requires. The compactness of the presentation is facilitated by the use of earlier results for propositional logic to obtain certain results for predicate logic. Especially helpful is Hunter's technique of prefacing each of the longer and more difficult proofs with a section explaining the key ideas and the general method of proof; summaries are also often provided in conclusion. Because of the orientation of the book, a more extensive discussion of the significance of the results obtained and the philosophical issues which have been raised concerning some of them, would have been welcome. Nonetheless, this is a good, concise introduction for those who are not yet prepared to tackle the more technical literature. A bibliography is provided for those interested in pursuing the subject in greater detail.--E. M. F. (shrink)

The author, a physicist as well as a philosopher, uses the thought of Werner Heisenberg as a focus for examining the epistemological foundations of quantum theory. Though Heisenberg's earliest original insights were stimulated by Plato's Timaeus he soon swung over to Bohr's empiricism in developing and supporting the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. His later philosophical reflections are markedly Kantian with irreducible physical invariants playing the role of Kant's necessary and universal laws. As Heelan sees it, an examination of the (...) intentionality-structure of the scientist supplies the critical basis for judging the reality of the objects known through science. Though Heisenberg rejected the naive "empirical objectivity" of pre-quantum interpretations of science, his reflective evaluation of his own achievements is inadequate in explaining the formal objectivity of the objects known. By distinguishing the criterion of reality, rational affirmation, from the meaning of "reality," whatever is defined by the object in its formal sense, Heelan is able to develop a critical realism that assigns an ontological status to fundamental particles. "Main-line" philosophers of science may feel ill at ease with Heelan's phenomenological terminology of "intentionality-structure," "noema," and "horizon" and may object to his treatment of "meaning" and "language." But if they "bracket" these reservations they will find this book an unusually well-informed and penetrating study of the philosophical implications of modern physics.—E. M. M. (shrink)

Berkson maintains that the "progressive" distortions of Dewey were not entirely unfounded and criticizes Dewey for his individualism, for a biologicism which cannot ground his own intentions except by a tour de force, and for his failure to recognize the necessity of clearly formulated ideal ends. Emphasizes the Hegelian side of Dewey.--F. M. S.

Drawing upon recent contributions to an already developed literature of diverse speculation on Bayle and his milieu, the author attempts to assess the historical significance of Bayle's writings by means of a chronological treatment of the French Calvinist's changing understanding of the relation of faith and reason. One may find here the main lines of Bayle criticism judiciously set forth, together with a careful investigation of some biographical material and the exposition of Bayle's principal ideas on the role and limits (...) of reason as a speculative and moral guide, the function of grace, the grounds of faith and morality, the problem of error, and, the centrality of Providence. The author argues convincingly for the thesis that Bayle remained consistently loyal to the traditions of the Reform. On the other hand, the closely related attempt to illuminate the logic of Bayle's ambiguous statements of the dualism of reason, as an instrument for yielding clarity and evidence, and as the agent of man's struggle with the unknowable, lacks critical vigor. Nonetheless, this work is a very readable summary of the intellectual contribution of a crucial figure in the evolution of French philosophical and religious thought. A valuable bibliography is included.--J. M. S. (shrink)

F. H. George is Professor of Cybernetics at Brunel University in England. His book comprises eight chapters originally developed as lectures for a non-specialist audience. He points out the position of computer science among the sciences, explains its aims, procedures, and achievements to date, and speculates on its long-term implications for science in particular and society in general. Among the topics discussed are biological simulation and organ replacement, automated education, and the new philosophy of science. Each chapter concludes with a (...) brief summary. George's treatment of the technical details of his speciality is both illuminating and readable, thus serving as an excellent primer on one of the new technology's most important components. His wider forays into philosophy, economics, sociology, and religion are less happy, however; and unfortunately they take up a large part of the text. In general, they reveal that George identifies the methods of human advancement with the methods of the natural sciences in an equation whose rigidity would make even B. F. Skinner blush. Yet, the reader cannot claim that he was not forewarned; for in the introduction, D. J. Stewart, Chairman of the Rationalist Press Association, suggests that the current "swing of interest among young people away from the physical and biological sciences and towards the behavioural and social sciences... represents a symptom of disillusionment with science and technology and an attempted escape into irrationality."--J. M. V. (shrink)

Dicke discusses the metamorphosis of Hegelianism in Feuerbach and Marx through an examination of the concept of identity in the three philosophers. He demonstrates the persistence of this concept as a decisive theme in both Feuerbach and Marx, and shows how Hegel's doctrine of identity is transformed and adulterated in the process of adaptation. A primary consequence of Marx's modification of this doctrine is the philosophical sacrifice of the individual to the collective, which has its practical consequences in contemporary communist (...) states.--J. M. W. (shrink)

The author regards faith as a restless quest for that which can save man from his self-destructive tendencies and allow him to actualize most completely his constructive potentialities. Wieman critically examines several answers to this quest of faith, including those of Dewey, Tillich, and Barth. In contrast he develops the view of "liberal religion," which finds the answer in a divine creativity fostered by communication, and is productive of fresh insights which transform human ideals.--J. M. W.

The subtitle of this essay can be misleading; the author devotes only one preliminary chapter and a brief part of another chapter to discussing issues of scientific language and method. The book is primarily an essay in the philosophy of mind. Rosenblueth is a well-known neurophysiologist who has considerable background in the philosophy of science. His purpose is to articulate a general philosophical position that is consistent with the results of science as well as with the attitudes and activities of (...) experimental scientists; and to develop from this basis an answer to the question of how mind and brain are related. He spends four chapters summarizing the biological and neurophysiological research that shows the nature of the correlation between mental and neurophysiological events. He concludes from this that our knowledge of the material world is limited to those structures that can be coded by the afferent fibers. He then articulates four unprovable "postulates" which scientists must assume. One of these is a probabilistic statement of causal determinism. This postulate is the basis for his rejecting the idea that the mind can causally influence the brain through volitions. Moreover, he argues for the converse statement as well; the brain cannot cause conscious events since the latter are mental and not material. But this denial of causal interaction does not lead Rosenblueth to conclude that mind/body dualism must be rejected. He considers and rejects the monist views of Feigl, Russell and Eddington, and thus comes up with a dualist view that denies causal interaction. Although the scientific material cited by Rosenblueth is up to date, he does not consider the current philosophical discussions on the mind/body problem.--J. M. B. (shrink)

This second volume of the critical edition of William of Ockham’s commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard maintains the same standard of excellence as did the first. All the major manuscripts are collated in the text, the notes and critical apparatus are complete, and the type is large and clear. This volume contains the second and third distinctions of Book I of Ockham’s commentary, material of particular interest to philosophers. Here Ockham launches his attack on Scotistic realism in answer (...) to such questions as "whether the universal is real outside the mind, but not really distinct from the individual." Now that the work of one of the founding fathers of nominalism is available in a reliable edition, philosophers have fertile territory for re-exploring past solutions to these still present logical and epistemological problems. The introduction to this volume is only a supplement to that of the first volume, but it does add some important material. Another manuscript has been located which was almost certainly the basis for the early printed edition of Ockham’s work. The importance of this text, together with its reasonable price and easy availability, make it practically a necessary addition to any university library.—K. M. (shrink)

This booklet contains Marx's review of the writings of Dr. Bruno Bauer, a contemporary theologian and social philosopher, on "the Jewish question." Marx identifies Judaism with usury and exploitation of the masses, as do those who, according to Runes in his introduction, "find in Jew-hatred a compensative way of living out the envies of their drab existences."--M. G.

At the beginning of the first version of the Ages of the World Schelling invoked Plato's protection against the criticism he was expecting from his contemporaries. More than forty years later, in his last system, Aristotle had become the most quoted of his predecessors. The way from Plato to Aristotle and the parallels drawn between "the philosopher" and Kant are among the best parts of the book. Hegel is almost as much studied by Oeser as Schelling. After all, the subtitle (...) announces a contribution to the critique of the Hegelian system. Unlike most scholars of the German idealism the author does not try to play out Hegel against Schelling or Schelling against Hegel. He is more interested in showing their similarities. However, in spite of this, Oeser's sympathies obviously lie with Schelling and in the last chapter he attempts to show how the final system of Schelling, that of the "purely rational philosophy" was not written only to give a new platform to the positive philosophy but also to lay the groundwork for a reconciliation between metaphysics and dialectical idealism in terms of transcendence and transcendentality.--M. J. V. (shrink)

This interesting commentary on the Book of Job, following upon the author's earlier and shorter English-language studies in different U.S. periodicals, renews the now almost forgotten tradition of philosophical commentaries on Biblical books. Biblical scholarship is missing from this study. Instead we have the German text of Job printed along with a profusion of notes. Sometimes these are only a few words to explain a sentence, sometimes they amount to a longer philosophical digression. Most contemporary scholars consider such commentaries amateurish (...) and outmoded; yet a non-theological reflection on a text of universal, almost supra-Biblical, content such as the book of Job is certainly justified.—M. J. V. (shrink)

It was bound to happen that Hegel's thought, like that of so many other great philosophers, would be studied from the viewpoint of the question of language. The title is innocent and modest and it seems to promise a monograph on a particular topic. Instead, however, we are led through a number of major Hegelian themes, taken from the totality of his opus. There are chapters on transcendence and infiniteness, on praxis, on the figures of self-consciousness, on religion and the (...) state, and finally on language and system and language and thought. And there is, underlying the whole work, an apparent preoccupation to "situate" Hegel with regard to other great thinkers of modern times: Kant, Marx, Kierkegaard and Heidegger.--M. J. V. (shrink)

Popular essays and letters by the President of Yeshiva University. The author stresses the relevance of education in the orthodox Jewish tradition to the spiritual and social problems which face contemporary American Jewry. --M. B.

Though Joseph Nadler published the definitive, critical edition of Hamanns' complete works, the hermetic character of these texts warrants only too strongly a publication of at least the major texts with commentaries. The annotated edition is planned to comprise eight volumes. From the viewpoint of the history of ideas, Vol. IV is undoubtedly the most interesting, since it contains the important texts on the origin of language. These were directly provoked by Herder's famous Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache; "the (...) Magician of the North" fights the spirit of the Aufklärung even when it is clothed in the more attractive, pre-romantic setting of Herder's prose. Besides a fantastic amount of notes and commentary, Miss Büchsel, the editor of Vol. IV, offers a comprehensive and penetrating introductory study. Especially important are the chapters on the "pre-history" of Hamanns' Herder-interpretation and its influence on the later development of German intellectual life from the early Goethe to the old Schelling Vol. V contains the so-called mystery-writings directly pertinent to the Christian doctrine of the revelation of the Incarnated Son of God. These texts are truly esoteric, and even the multitude of notes accompanying them cannot always fully overcome their terrible obscurity. And here arises the only objection against this edition. The notes and commentaries are a mine of detailed information, and they "unconceal" the meaning of every word. Yet perhaps their very abundance impedes their stated purpose. They do help in understanding the words, but they make sustained reading of the texts themselves impossible. The encyclopedical character of the notes is cause for both exasperation and for growth in knowledge and inspiration.—M. J. V. (shrink)

Finally—a full length treatment of the Phenomenology of Mind in English. Its strengths and weaknesses stem from its not being a commentary. The author has set himself to the task of "capturing without its letter the spirit of the humanism pervading the Phenomenology." Avoiding the letter involves 1) the attempt to get free from Hegel's terminology, 2) the attempt to see the argument at the level of chapters rather than paragraphs or sentences, and 3) the complete abstraction from historical questions, (...) i.e., from questions about Hegel's life and times relevant to understanding the text. While the first two attempts are ably carried out and extremely instructive, the reader is often left with the frustrating need for the historical treatment of a commentary. The assumption "that the heart of Hegel's thought is to be found more in the method than in the results achieved by it..." is dubious, but it fortunately remains for the most part in the preface. The use of dialogue form in a quasi-commentary is as refreshing as it is unusual. The price of the book is unfortunate.—M. W. (shrink)

Erikson is Professor of Human Development at Harvard, a psychoanalyst, and the author of the widely influential books, Young Man Luther, and Childhood and Society. What is the relevance of his latest book to philosophy? One answer is that Erikson deals with several concepts of personal identity which philosophers will recognize as corresponding to historical philosophic positions. He does not choose between these disparate views, but correlates them, treating each as partial, and learning about his complex subject from the habits (...) of syntax appropriate to each. Erikson divides personal identity into the "I," the "selves," and the "ego," on the grounds that these terms provide a way to distinguish roles and "counterplayers" of various functionings of human personality. We need these various terms to designate identity as viewed from without and from within. Erikson's "selves" are what the "I" reflects on when it views the body, the personality, or the social roles to which it is attached. The counterplayers of the "selves" are the "others" of Existentialism. Erikson's reflective "I," like the subject of Descartes' cogito, is "the center of awareness in a universe of experience in which I have a coherent identity... am in possession of my wits and able to say what I see and think." With Descartes, Erikson finds the unique counterplayer to the "I" in the Deity; the repository of the vitality which is being affirmed of itself in each awareness of the "I." Erikson's "ego" corresponds to the Self of Hume's Treatise, undiscoverable beneath its particular perceptions. The "ego" is necessarily unconscious; we are aware of its work but never of it. As of Hume's self, we can say of it that it has the task of turning passive into active, screening and organizing the impositions of the internal and external environment in such a way that they bring about volitions. Like Hume, Erikson feels philosophers and psychologists have "created nouns such as the 'I' or the 'self', making imaginary entities out of a manner of speaking" and that we would be mistaken to give ontological status to these particles. Perhaps Erikson would accept a statement of the contemporary philosophical form: "The several designations of 'selves', etc., are instrumental in explaining complex personal identity feelings or events." In other parts of the book Erikson uses William James as an example of creative identity, discusses the concept of "negative identity", and in the last three chapters discusses aspects of personal identity in the disequilibrium of the young, the races, and women. The book contains Erikson's writings on identity over a twenty-year period. However, in areas of common interest to psychoanalytic theory and philosophy, the requirements of Erikson's clinical work have suggested relationships between concepts different from the relationships often assumed by philosophers. Thus, on personal identity, criteria of ideological soundness of a society, and the determinants of empirical perception, the addition of Erikson's insights may give the philosopher a multidimensional glimpse of the field wherein he labors.--M. B. M. (shrink)

This volume collects fifteen essays written for popular readership during a span of thirty-five years. The title essay, two on mysticism, and one on the status of belief in the survival of the soul are basically metaphysical. There are three on values, and four essays on philosophy and science. Two themes, the purposeless universe and the problems of moral materialism, recur in various relations throughout most of the essays. The reader may be puzzled by what appears as an explicit denial (...) of connection between the essays. In "Man Against Darkness," the scientific revolution is described as a change of beliefs: in exchange for belief in a cosmic plan, the belief-setting of the ancient religions of East and West and of the Christian religion which superseded them in European civilization, science substitutes the belief that the universe is meaningless. In other essays Stace urges his readers to come to grips with life in the post-religious world. He asks what the role of the philosopher can be when "not moral self-control but the doctor, the psychiatrist, the educationalist must save us from doing evil." In "Why Do We Fail?", considering the charge of materialism leveled at America, he agrees with Plato that the love of luxury leads to war. It is taking "materialism" as the notion that everything, even our thoughts, is really composed of atoms, that permits Stace to say: "putting things of the body higher on the list than things of the spirit has nothing to do with any such scientific or metaphysical hypothesis." Drawing on his familiarity with Eastern culture as well as philosophical sources, he shows that men's plans are efficacious, and thus, that scientific explanation in materialistic terms, rather than teleological ones, does not logically require moral materialism. Man can still create value and purpose in the post-religious world. The other four essays include one on poetry, one on "The Snobbishness of the Learned" and two on political subjects.--M. B. M. (shrink)

This is the first really comprehensive treatment to appear in modern times of the great Alexandrian theologian's life and doctrine. Like his better known contemporaries, Fr. Chr. Baur, J. Müller, and Dorner, Redepenning also united the great heritage of intense speculative interest with the full armor of nineteenth century historical scholarship. In spite of his many footnotes he has a clear and rich style, focusing on major theological and historical questions. He has sense enough to leave some highly specialized issues (...) to a number of appendices. The first volume is devoted to Origen's early doctrines in their historical context. The second volume has two major sections: one deals in the fashion of the first volume with the development of Origen's later doctrines. The other treats in a systematic manner the whole of Origen's doctrines in terms of God, the fallen world, and the redemption. These are the most important chapters of the book but they must be read as Redepenning intended: only after the historical sections. This beautifully printed book is an indispensable instrument to any further study of the history of Patristic thought.--M. J. V. (shrink)

This is an ambitious venture into the thicket of medieval philosophy: what is the true object of metaphysics? The book begins with a number of texts, printed after various manuscripts through which the author hopes to illustrate the development of a certain chain of ideas. After a short introduction on the Aristotelian and Arabic sources of the whole problematics, there are three fundamental solutions of the question: God is one of the many subjects of metaphysics, God is the cause of (...) the subject of metaphysics, God is a part of the subject of metaphysics. These major alternatives are followed by their respective development in the works of later authors. Besides the more usual writers like St. Thomas, Scotus, R. Bacon, Siger of Brabant, Henry of Ghent, we are given interesting and penetrating accounts of the ideas of men like Augustinus Triumphus of Ancona, Petrus of Alvernia, John Quidort of Paris, etc. Despite the first impression provoked by the table of contents this book is not a herbarium of rarities or curiosities but a highly concentrated and often fascinating study of the real topics of all metaphysics and through this perhaps of the very possibility of metaphysics as such.--M. J. V. (shrink)

A collection of articles centering around the analysis of the category of possibility. Most have been previously published; an English translation of one, "Scienza e Liberta," appeared in this Review V, p. 361. The treatment is in the contemporary existentialist manner, freedom being presented as based upon possibility, as existentially relevant, as finite and conditioned, yet effective in human affairs. Possibility and freedom, and their interrelation, are discussed from the point of view of their function and value within the philosophical, (...) scientific, artistic, historical and linguistic disciplines. The last three articles deal with the problem in relation to Dewey, Wittgenstein and Croce respectively. --M. B. (shrink)

This book can be useful in a number of ways to teachers and students in social philosophy and allied fields despite the frustrating brevity of the selections, most of which average five pages. Purchased with this severe economy is the advantage of a wide span of selections, starting with Plato and Aristotle, and including those as recent as the 1960s. The selections are comprehensive in viewpoints presented. In addition to professional philosophers we are given the work of theologians, jurists, political (...) theorists, even excerpts from Dante and Camus. Beck follows six problems: man and society, values, authority, law, obligation, and justice, through nine major philosophical "perspectives," an attempt to show the interconnection of philosophic concepts both with each other, and with the methods and presuppositions whereby they were reached. Each section begins with a page or two of introduction in which the editor gives historical background, and perspicuous definitions and analysis of the central ideas. The sections are: Classical Realism, Positivism, Liberalism, Utilitarianism, Idealism, Communism, Pragmatism, Existentialism, and Analytic Philosophy. There is a bibliographical essay which covers secondary material, primary sources not excerpted in the text, and references on special topics. Taken together with fuller use of the sources represented in the editor's selections, this book could be a text for a course in social philosophy, taken alone it is an attractively presented introduction or good browsing for the professional.—M. B. M. (shrink)

This is certainly one of the most beautiful books in philosophy published in the last couple of years. It comprises eighty-four essays, carefully selected, well-translated, covering almost the full range of Croce's immense literary production. Croce is certainly one of the most important and influential thinkers of this century and in this huge anthology the English-speaking reader is given an incomparable instrument to get acquainted with him. The list of the headings which classify the eighty-four essays are: The Logic of (...) Philosophy; Philosophical Criticism; Aesthetics; The Philosophy of Art and Language; The Theory of History; Economics and Ethics; Essays in Criticism and Literary History; Moral and Political History. But first one should read the late Cecil Sprigge's excellent introduction.—M. J. V. (shrink)

Religion in the generic sense is presented as an irreducible mode of human judgment. By emphasizing the generic character of religion Arnett sets himself against the "sectarians," those who would claim unique worth for a particular tradition. By arguing for the irreducible nature of religious judgment he opposes himself to the "secularists," those who would reduce religion to some other mode of judgment, or to a non-cognitive status. The strongest chapters are the third and fourth, which deal with the relation (...) of religion to morality and art, respectively. While vigorous arguments are presented against those who tend to identify religion with one or the other, e.g., Dewey and Santayana, the problems are not oversimplified, and careful attention is given to the affinities as well as the discontinuities involved. The discussion of religion and truth deals more with the generic value of religious judgment than with the question of the truth of particular religious judgments.—M. W. (shrink)

Christian secularism is here the equivalent of theistic naturalism. It is sharply distinguished both from the more radical secularism of Van Buren and the death of God theologians, and from the supernaturalism of traditional Christian views of history, which deny its autonomy by affirming special divine breakthroughs into it and a mode of human existence transcending it. The book is less a case for Christian secularism than an account of what it is, or rather, what it is not. Its three (...) divisions are entitled "Faith," "History," and "Secularism."—M. W. (shrink)

Today Shaftesbury is studied chiefly because he was a pivotal figure in English ethics; the publication of his Characteristics marked the turn from the primacy of abstract rational principles, in Cambridge Platonism, to the psychologically-based ethics of the "moral sense" school. Grean presents Shaftesbury more broadly, as expressing the basic faith of the Enlightenment, which still underlies the liberal democratic culture of the West. Shaftesbury maintains "that society, right and wrong was founded in Nature, and that Nature had a meaning (...) and was herself, that is to say in her wits, well governed and administered by one simple and perfect intelligence." According to Grean, the motif of "enthusiasm" distinguishes Shaftesbury from his contemporaries; thus the main goal of this study is to understand all the ramifications of the doctrine. In the early chapter entitled "Enthusiasm," we are given Shaftesbury's description of it as a psychological phenomenon, a powerful experience "which occurs when the mind receives or creates ideas or images too big for it to contain." Windelband generalizes the phenomenon into an "enthusiasm" for the true, good, and beautiful which lives out all the peculiar power of man by the elevation of his soul above itself to more universal values. Grean tells us that "enthusiasm" is central to Shaftesbury's account of how we respond to beauty, how we make and are made by the good, how we know the truths of morals which are "patterns of meaningful possibilities... intended not merely to describe but to transform reality." In the early pages of Part I, the historical detail and comments on secondary literature, although very readable, are tangential to the philosophic argument and delay our coming to grips with the author's thesis. Soon, however, in chapters on religion, virtue, and creative form, Grean's mastery of Shaftesbury's holistic philosophy forcefully comes across. We are shown that it is dynamic, unified, and not antirational, and here the reader can derive a characterization of "enthusiasm" sufficiently broad for Grean's purposes. The doctrine means that human nature is capable of ultimate commitment, creative intuition, spontaneity, and disinterested love; further, "enthusiasm" is involved in the method of philosophy and the method of writing. Like Plato, Shaftesbury believed that external beauty can lead us to inner beauty. His philosophy is gracefully written, and Grean points out the relation of style and substance in his subject, while writing readably himself. As a study of Shaftesbury, for whom true philosophy could not be restricted to abstract theory but must form a whole with its practical application, this book is sympathetic in manner as well as in its conclusions. Notes, index, selected bibliography and historical preface provide aids to further study.--M. B. M. (shrink)

These posthumously published lectures are designed to sponsor a new root metaphor for reflection on Christian ethics. The familiar models of teleological ethics and deontological ethics are not abandoned, but a new one is added to meet their inadequacies. It is man-the-answerer, homo dialogicus, and in terms of the symbol the notion of a responsible self is delineated. That the new model lends itself more readily to phenomenology than to casuistry is wholly within the author's intention. A lengthy, but useful, (...) introduction by James Gustafson places these lectures in the broader context of Niebuhr's thought.--M. W. (shrink)

In the mushrooming literature on the late Heidegger, Pugliese's book stands with the distinction of an immense and sometimes almost exasperating amount of learned notes and excurses [[sic]]. On the other hand, the speculative core of the work is a highly original one. It treats the famous "Kehre" in the continuity of Heidegger's thought and proves quite convincingly that it can be organically developed from the original thesis of "historicity" as it stands in Sein und Zeit. Making use of the (...) earliest texts as well as of a number of unpublished lecture-notes, Pugliese tries to back those interpretations which claim that the "Kehre" is indeed a turning-point in the history of metaphysics--even though it represents no break or revolution in Heidegger's own thought. This is a difficult book but fortunately devoid of the affected mannerism of so many Heidegger admirers, and a telling example of the frequent success of French and Spanish "translations" of German speculation.--M. J. V. (shrink)

Authentic existentialism turns out to be Thomism interpreted in the tradition of Maritain. The primacy of existence over essence is affirmed, but in such a way as to preserve essences and intelligibility. Philosophical positions outside the Thomist family are brought in only where they support the author's argument, never as serious alternative analyses of existence. Plato is distilled down to the idea that there are some relatively permanent aspects of reality after all, and Sartre appears simply as a modern Heraclitean (...) who sees that change permeates reality. The presentation and elaboration of the basic Thomist categories is clear; and the frequent summarization of the argument is helpful, making the book a good introduction to Thomist thinking if not to metaphysics or existentialism more broadly conceived.—P. M. (shrink)

Although ostensibly defending speculative philosophy, Reck is doubtful that any unprejudiced speculative philosophy can exist: "No matter how much a philosopher may strive for neutrality, his test for the true philosophy is always predicated on the assumptions that his conception of being presents being as it is and that the conceptions of being his rivals uphold are partial or false." In the pursuit of neutrality, Reck attempts a mere chronicle of the distinctive conceptions of being which he feels have animated (...) the various metaphysical traditions: "Realism holds that whatever is in any sense is real; idealism that mind and its content alone are real; materialism that matter and its patterns alone are real; and process philosophy that process and the factors in process are real." The historical development of each of the four types is presented in masterly fashion. This book truly stands head and shoulders over its nearest rival in the Metaphilosophical literature for the depth of historical comprehension, the brilliant but controlled use made of a wealth of scholarship. A graduate student reviewing for comprehensive exams could do worse than to use Reck’s book. Those systems motivated at least in part by the drive-to-synthesis are disqualified a priori of being viable alternatives, motivated by distinctive intuitions. Realism, further, is found to have an inherent difficulty: "The task for the realist is to explain how the different levels or kinds of being can be related in a hierarchically ordered cosmos. The task is nothing short of explicating the bond of being." When Leibniz tries to relate finite particulars through a "Supreme Monad," he is faulted for "veering dangerously" close to Monism. Sympathetic toward Realism, Reck suggests a modification of Leibniz’s theory: not a rendering of the relations between man and God less mechanical, but a reduction of the "first Monad" from being supreme to a finite particular, struggling, like us, to overcome the hindrances posed by his environment. Reck concedes that the cognitive use of speculative philosophy, even when it redefines its project as Metaphilosophy, may be "futile"; however, he underscores the aesthetic value of the various systems, as Santayana would, when we can "bracket" the question of existence or truth and simply contemplate these cultural masterpieces as pure "essences." "Happy are those students who can suspend their critical search for truth sufficiently to savor the aesthetic values the systems of philosophy contain!" Reck refrains from judging between rival theories because such a judgment is always delivered from a view of what one takes to exist; and the impulse to go beyond "essence" to "existence" is, as Santayana teaches, prompted by fear, pain, instinct, or necessity. Rather than being a disinterested wonder at what "is," this passion is an "irrational agency of animal faith." "Needless to add," writes Reck, "animal faith is no more trustworthy than God’s existence to guarantee the truth of knowledge." This view can raise problems for Reck’s "finite" god. The finite god he prefers is perhaps "strong" enough to provide enough interconnection between existing particulars to justify a "Metaphilosophical" science, if not a properly "Philosophical" one, in the traditional sense; Reck could point to his own successful Metaphilosophy as evidence that his "god" is at least this strong. But isn't even this finite god an existential belief which, as the basis for a criticism, compromises one’s neutrality and thus constitutes a flaw in one’s Metaphilosophical theory? Is it possible that a totally adequate Metaphilosophical theory, on Reck’s canons, could not save enough interconnection between particulars to justify even a Metaphilosophy, as well as a Philosophy?—P. M. (shrink)

Fifteen concise, clearly written essays on the major concepts of Judaism, followed by a series of short "reflections" on such topics as True-Conscience, Conformity, and Hero-Worship. Rabbi Umen's viewpoint is patently that of Reform Judaism, and the more traditional positions receive short shrift at his hands. His chapters on the Jewish concepts of the Messiah and of Jesus are especially good and should prove of interest to Jew and non-Jew alike.--S. M. F.