ABSTRACT According to David Lewis, alteration is "qualitative difference between temporal parts of something." It follows that moments, since they are simple and lack temporal parts, cannot alter from future to present to past. Here then is another way to put McTaggart's paradox about change in tense. I will appeal to my theory of Aspects to rebut the thought behind this rendition of McTaggart. On my theory, it is possible that qualitatively differing things be numerically identical. I call these differing, (...) numerically identical things "aspects." I will argue that alteration can be a qualitative difference between temporal aspects of something that lacks temporal parts. So a moment can alter in tense. By rejecting Lewis's assumption my theory can solve this version of McTaggart's paradox. (shrink)

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, his main work of theoretical philosophy, frequently uses metaphors from law. In this first book-length study in English of Kant's legal metaphors and their role in the first Critique, Sofie Møller shows that they are central to Kant's account of reason. Through an analysis of the legal metaphors in their entirety, she demonstrates that Kant conceives of reason as having a structure mirroring that of a legal system in a natural right framework. Her study shows (...) that Kant's aim is to make cognisers become similar to authorized judges within such a system, by proving the legitimacy of the laws and the conditions under which valid judgments can be pronounced. These elements consolidate her conclusion that reason's systematicity is legal systematicity. (shrink)

This book critically examines the Confucian political imagination and its influence on the contemporary Chinese dream of a powerful China. It views Confucianism as the ideological supplement to a powerful state that is challenging Western hegemony, and not as a political philosophy that need not concern us. Eske Møllgaard shows that Confucians, despite their traditionalist ways, have the will to transform the existing socio-ethical order. The volume discusses the central features of the Confucian political imaginary, the nature of Confucian discourse, (...) Confucian revivals, Confucian humanism and civility, and the political ideal of the Great Unity. It concludes by considering if Confucianism can be universalized as an ideology in competition with liberal democracy. (shrink)

Special groups [M. Dickmann, F. Miraglia, Special Groups : Boolean-Theoretic Methods in the Theory of Quadratic Forms, Memoirs Amer. Math. Soc., vol. 689, Amer. Math. Soc., Providence, RI, 2000] are a first-order axiomatization of the theory of quadratic forms. In Section 2 we investigate reduced special groups which are a lattice under their natural representation partial order ; we show that this lattice property is preserved under most of the standard constructions on RSGs; in particular finite RSGs and RSGs of (...) finite chain length are lattice ordered. We prove that the lattice property fails for the RSGs of function fields of real algebraic varieties over a uniquely ordered field dense in its real closure, unless their stability index is 1 . We show that Open Problem 1 has a positive answer for the RSG of the field Q . In the final section we explore the meaning of Open Problem 1 for formally real fields, in terms of their orders and real valuations; we introduce the notion of “parameter-rank” of a positive-primitive first-order formula of the language for special groups. (shrink)

This paper argues that the new commercial and quasi-commercial activities of medicine, scientists, pharmaceutical companies and industry with regard to human tissue has given rise to a whole new way of valuing our bodies. It is argued that a property framework may be an effective and constructive method of exploring issues arising from this. The paper refers to A M Honoré’s theory of ownership and aims to show that we have full liberal ownership of our own bodies and as such (...) can be considered to be self-owners. (shrink)

Let A be an algebra. We say that the functions f 1 , . . . , f m : A n → A are algebraic on A provided there is a finite system of term-equalities $${{\bigwedge t_{k}(\overline{x}, \overline{z}) = s_{k}(\overline{x}, \overline{z})}}$$ satisfying that for each $${{\overline{a} \in A^{n}}}$$, the m -tuple $${{(f_{1}(\overline{a}), \ldots , f_{m}(\overline{a}))}}$$ is the unique solution in A m to the system $${{\bigwedge t_{k}(\overline{a}, \overline{z}) = s_{k}(\overline{a}, \overline{z})}}$$. In this work we present a collection of general (...) tools for the study of algebraic functions, and apply them to obtain characterizations for algebraic functions on distributive lattices, Stone algebras, finite abelian groups and vector spaces, among other well known algebraic structures. (shrink)

Peckham claims that my "behavior" in dealing with the quotations in Natural Supernaturalism is the same, in methodology and validity, as the interpretative behavior of Booth's waiter. But the great bulk of the utterances in my quotations—and no less, of the utterances constituting Peckham's own essay—do not consist of orders, requests, or commands. Instead, they consist of assertions, descriptions, judgments, exclamations, approbations, condemnations, and many other kinds of speech-acts, the meanings of which are not related to my interpretative behavior, even (...) in the indirect way in which the meaning of Booth's order is related to the future behavior of his waiter. M. H. Abrams, author of Natural Supernaturalism and The Mirror and the Lamp and Class of 1916 Professor of English at Cornell University, responds in this essay to Morse Peckham's "The Infinitude of Pluralism" . Morse Peckham, in his Critical Response, was commenting on issues raised by the forum on "The Limits of Pluralism" , to which M. H. Abrams contributed. Previous contributions to Critical Inquiry are "Rationality and Imagination in Cultural History: A Reply to Wayne Booth" and "The Deconstructive Angel". (shrink)

In retrospect, I think I was right to compose Natural Supernaturalism by relying on taste, tact, and intuition rather than on a controlling method. A book of this kind, which deals with the history of human intellection, feeling, and imagination, employs special vocabularies, procedures, and modes of demonstration which, over many centuries of development, have shown their profitability when applied to matters of this sort. I agree with Booth that these procedures, when valid, are in a broad sense rational, and (...) subject to analysis and some degree of definition. But the rules underlying such a discourse are complex, elusive, unsystematic, and subject to innovative modification; they manifest themselves in the intuitive expertise of the historian; and the specification of these rules should not precede, but follow practice. . . . After the fact, nevertheless, a book like Natural Supernaturalism is subject to close critical inquiry about its methods and rationale. I am grateful to Booth for opening up such an inquiry, and for doing so in a way that is not only disarming, but seems to me to be the most promising of useful results. That is, instead of adopting a prosecutorial stance, demanding: "Justify the rationality and probative force of what you have done; it looks dammed suspicious to me," he has adopted the friendly tactic of saying: "Your book, in my experience of it, has yielded discoveries that I want to call knowledge, by methods, however deviant from standard rubrics of valid reasoning, that it seems irrational to call non-rational. Let's set out to clarify what these methods are, and to see what grounds we can find for the claim that they provide warranted knowledge." M.H. Abrams' contributions to Critical Inquiry are "The Deconstructive Angel" and "Behaviorism and Deconstruction: A Comment on Morse Peckham's 'The Infinitude of Pluralism'". (shrink)

David Hume was a highly original thinker. Nevertheless, he was a writer of his time and place in the history of philosophy. In this book, M. A. Stewart puts Hume’s writing in context, particularly that of his native Scotland, but also that of British and European philosophy more generally. Through meticulous research Stewart brings to life the circumstances by means of which we can get a deeper understanding of Hume’s writings on the nature and reach of human reason, the foundation (...) of morals, and, especially, on the philosophy of religion. Stewart pays particular attention to Hume’s intellectual development, beginning with his education at the College of Edinburgh, the writing of his Treatise of Human Nature, and his subsequent philosophical responses to criticisms of that book. He argues that Hume’s scepticism set him at odds with the Christian Stoicism of Scottish contemporaries including that of Francis Hutcheson - and shows that this conflict played a major role in his failure to obtain the Edinburgh Moral Philosophy Chair in 1745. Stewart’s detailed study of the physical character of Hume’s surviving manuscripts in Chapters 8 and 9 provides the best available dating of his early ‘Essay on Modern Chivalry’, his ‘Early Fragment on Evil’ and the periods of composition of his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Other chapters compare Hume’s theory of abstraction with that of Locke and Berkeley, provide the 17th and 18th century philosophical context of the central argument of his essay ‘Of miracles’, and consider the 18th and 19th century reception of his writings in England and Ireland. (shrink)

Bai Tongdong and I agree on the most important point: not everything is philosophy. With this initial agreement we can begin to discuss whether Confucian discourse is philosophy, and with determination and discipline in our proposals and replies we can clear up misunderstandings and overcome disagreements, and so hopefully come closer to the fact of the matter. I am happy that Bai has provided me this opportunity to clarify my position, and I shall first address the points where Bai misunderstands (...) my argument and then the points where we disagree and there is need for further discussion.First the misunderstandings. Bai writes that "Confucianism can be read philosophically, in spite of Møllgaard's argument," and the... (shrink)

First published in 1986. Nations have a unity often described as 'cultural'; and within them there are divergences some of which are termed 'political'. But culture and politics do not, therefore, comprise two wholly distinct zones or orders of experience, the one marked by unity, the other by plurality. Unity and plurality interpenetrate. These insights, which derive from the thinking of Herder, have been fundamental to the work of F. M. Barnard. In this volume a number of scholars contribute, in (...) Barnardian vein, reflections on the tensions between unity and plurality in the history of ideas. The central underlying question is, in essence, 'what is the context of political life?' The question remains of more importance than any single answer. (shrink)

The new historical inscription from Epidaurus has provided us with a unique piece of documentary evidence on Greek federal constitutions. In this article I propose to study the principal points of constitutional interest contained in it. I have based my text on that of Professor Wilcken and M. Kougeas; and I follow Professor Wilcken and Mr. Tarn in identifying the new document with the constitution which Demetrius Poliorcetes imposed upon his pan-Hellenic League in 303–2 B.C.

Mishel Fuco not only influenced the consciousness of modern West, but changed the modus of thinking, the way of perception of many traditional notions, transformed the opinions about the reality, history, person. Philosopher’s principle research programme which attaches the entirety to his works is “archeology of knowledge” programme, the search of human knowledge’s original layers. Let us mark that all Fuco’s works in 1960s are devoted to main aim: to clear up the conditions of historical origin of different mental aims (...) and social institutions in the culture of the Modern Time. Though in the whole this common aim remained for Fuco invariable, but the level on which he realizes his research search is changing constantly and rather logically. Relations of power, and to be more exact,accumulations of power and knowledge, social and cognitive which define all the aggregate of specific possibilities of culture in each given historical period. More than that the philosopher offers the particular prospects of sight of modern society and precisely totality of power relations, its ubiquitous nature and specific productivity which produces itself in each moment in any point or rather in any attitude from one point to another. From Fuco’s point of view the power is everywhere and not because it involves everything but because it comes from everywhere. The power is productive in that degree in which it is not associated with one definite imperious instance but pierces all kinds of activity in society, putting on its indelible stamp, developing under definite angle and due to this factit causes products, produced by them. The power induces and at the same time determines the fact which appears as a result of its inducement. The thirst of supremacy, which surrounds the individual and is focused on it as on the center of its use of force, comes out as a defining sign. It should be noticed that Fuco’s conception of power is not reduced to the understanding it as anonymous impersonal net of relations, piercing all society. It is supplemented by power treatment,coming out in “designed” look of definite imperious structure or imperious institute. (shrink)

A severe critique of contemporary society as one in which there remains no significant class or group capable of radically opposing things as they are. Marcuse works on the assumption that advanced industrial society is indeed sick, much as some recent sociologists have depicted it to be. He sees evidence of alienation in political and cultural life, in the technical jargon of the bureaucracy, in the technological cult of "operationalism," and especially in contemporary analytic philosophy, which he sees as the (...) triumph of "one-dimensional thought." His conclusion is not optimistic: at this juncture in history, he believes, the only possible task for "critical philosophy" is to be negative.--W. L. M. (shrink)

Russell tries to give an account of influences that have shaped his philosophy, though there is no mention of the development of his ethical or social views. The last chapter is devoted to the replies to criticisms. As might be expected, a most readable book.--M. G.

The philosophy of Max Scheler is hardly of the type that can stand compendious presentation. Obsessed by such clear distinctions as the analytic vs. the synthetic, mind vs. matter, and metaphysics vs. science, Scheler proposed still further ontological distinctions which often presented more problems than the distinctions they were designed to replace. Moreover, having renounced any diagnostic use of scientific materials, Scheler had to resort to tedious descriptions that would allow him to bridge the gap between common sense and rational (...) consistency. When the presentation of his doctrine is simply outlined, as it is in this book, the play with alternative ontological distinctions becomes conspicuously irrelevant. The rich insight so frequently hiding in descriptive detail and suggesting a myriad of fertile directions, cannot be reduced to the outline's topic headings. One wonders if any critical examination of Scheler in these terms can be fair, or even if it is worthwhile to know only that much about Scheler.--A. M. (shrink)

Written over a period of twenty years, which saw the success of the author's more specialized contributions, the present treatise gathers together personal memories, clinical experiences, and efforts to superimpose without eclecticism the best insights offered by the various psychological and psychiatric trends of the century. A clear delineation of the subject matter and theoretical instruments of psychopathology emerges, and confirms the relative autonomy of this field as against clinical psychology and psychiatry. This method relies on qualitative profiles of the (...) most serious mental troubles, then establishes behavioral correlations. This requires careful analysis of the most objective manifestations of mental illness. Special attention is given to language, since language, in this case "metaphoric" language, is the best evidence for the unveiling of the predominant vital categories of the psychopath. The first section, a history of clinical analysis, is thorough and well documented, especially the sections on typology, and on the central figure of Pierre Janet. However it is the second and third sections that carry the most conviction. Section four restates some of the notions that will be permanently incorporated into psychopathology through the work of Minkowski. Notable examples of these are: spatial thought, morbid rationalism and geometrism, some problems of reality and irreality, and such psychopathological mechanisms as disjunctions and peculiar syntheses, schematization and fusions, confusion and vagueness, and, lastly, reification.—A. M. (shrink)

This is a book for reflective laypersons and health professionals who wish to better understand what the problem of healthcare rationing is all about. Ubel says clearly in the Introduction that it is unlikely that professional economists or philosophers are going to be very satisfied with this effort. For him it is more important (p. xix). This is a reasonable aim made achievable by Ubel's clear and engaging writing style. Probably the people who most need to be drawn into these (...) debates are physicians and medical students, this because one of Ubel's central claims is that the need for is both inescapable and sometimes morally permissible. What he wants to reject is the view of many physicians that bedside rationing by physicians is never morally permissible and that healthcare costs can be contained without having to resort to rationing of any kind. Before I explore this point any further, it is necessary to summarize the larger argument of this book. (shrink)

Since the introduction of the computer in the early 1950's, the investigation of artificial intelligence has followed three chief avenues: the discovery of self-organizing systems; the building of working models of human behavior, incorporating specific psychological theories; and the building of "heuristic" machines, without bias in favor of humanoid characteristics. While this work has used philosophical logic and its results may illustrate philosophical problems, the artificial intelligence program is by now an intricate, organized specialty. This book, therefore, has a quite (...) specialized audience of its own although it can be very valuable to those philosophers who are interested and competent in using this pioneering material. Five scientific papers report attempts to solve five different kinds of problems. Bertram Raphael describes an attempt to build a memory structure that converts the information input into a systematic model by "understanding" the informational statements as they are made. Daniel Bobrow's machine can set up algebraic equations from informal verbal statements. M. Ross Quillan asks: "What sort of representational format can permit the 'meanings' of words to be stored?" Thomas Evans' machine, Analogy, serves as a model for "pattern-recognition" rather than the "common-property" method of semantic memory. Fischer Black has developed a logical deduction mechanism for question-answering which keeps track of where we are and avoids endless deduction. The editor and John McCarthy contribute more general chapters, providing the historical background of cybernetics, and dealing with the problem of formalizing a concept of causality. Minsky ends the volume with his view that our convictions on dualism, consciousness, free will, and the like are used in the attempt to explain the complicated interactions between parts of our model of ourselves.--M. B. M. (shrink)

The true devotional nature of this loosely structured romance is obscured by an all-pervading mawkishness.--S. M. F.

A tough-minded, controversial autobiography by a disillusioned Viennese Catholic turned Hindu monk. Swami Agehananda Bharati is not the usual ethnophile. Indeed, his view that one must regard one's cultural heritage critically continues long after his conversion and provokes many an angry rebuke from his less questioning Hindu brothers. For Bharati, nothing is sacred a priori. Neither Ramakrishna, the nineteenth-century Bengali saint, nor Swami Vivekananda, his best known disciple, nor, for that matter, the Mahatma himself escapes critical re-evaluation. Yet Bharati's knowledge (...) of the Sanskrit texts, his familiarity with half a dozen modern Indian languages, and his years of itinerant teaching on the Indian sub-continent make his voice one to be reckoned with on the topic of contemporary Hindu life. One can no doubt imagine a more sympathetic passage to India, but there could hardly be one more stimulating.--S. M. F. (shrink)

The author's first-hand knowledge of phenomenology enables him to select advisedly from the vast stores of available material, and to present the thought of the major figures in the movement so that neither the differences nor dependencies are obscured. The history deals with both the French and German branches of phenomenology. There are also helpful examinations of contacts and affinities between the European phenomenologists and American philosophers such as James and Royce. Altogether a thorough and first rate piece of scholarship.--S. (...) M. W. (shrink)

A massive series of meticulous clarifications and arguments is marshalled to attempt to refute, first, the doctrine that all relations are "internal", next, the claims that coherence is the sole criterion of the nature of truth, and finally, the theory of degrees of truth and falsity. The author's great familiarity with the literature of the coherence theorists proves almost a drawback: he prefers to cite texts extensively, but must then acknowledge important differences among them. There is little in the way (...) of a constructive alternative theory of truth, but the criticism is formidable.--W. L. M. (shrink)

Markovic draws upon the Zagreb school of Marx-interpretation, as well as on the data of the historical development of socialism in Yugoslavia in his attempt to develop a critical social theory. He constantly opposes the use of Marxian theory as an ideological orthodoxy simply legitimating political practice. And he points out how Marxian social thought may be a means of critically comprehending social processes, as well as a self-critical theory developing in relation to the historical data at whose evaluation it (...) is directed. Markovic insists that critical social theory must take as its subject matter a range of data comprised of contemporary phenomena, the history of such phenomena, and the human evaluations and aspirations which the historical situation engenders. This points up the importance of a theory of man for a critical social theory. Only an adequate theory of man enables social theory to comprehend and evaluate the goals arising from specific social processes. Markovic outlines elements of such a theory of man, as discoverable in Marx. With these guiding ideas, he examines specific themes such as economics and human values, technology, politics as a professional institution, and revolution. Markovic’s examinations valuably illustrate a balanced Marxian approach to social questions. It is argued, for example, that technological innovations must be analyzed in relation both to the concrete economic processes of given societies, and to the human needs operative in those societies. Markovic draws upon the Yugoslav experience to show the concrete nature of such an analysis. The viability of the professional political institution is discussed, with reference to specific productive relations in societies, and the political possibilities thereof. And in the context of a distinction between political and social revolution, he writes with sensitivity and discernment on the concept of revolution in Marx. Problematically, the precise status of a theory of man in a social theory of the Marxian variety remains unanswered herein. But the work stands as highly useful to those interested in non-ideological developments of Marxian social theory.—M.J.D. (shrink)

Freedom and unity are the values James most wanted to protect and to extend. Roth agrees with this choice, and recommends James to his readers as the moral philosopher who can best show us how. James is presented as combining a principled morality with the responsiveness to particular cases characteristic of existentialism and situational ethics, and his ethics is found to yield what John Wild would call a "primary existential norm": Act so as to maximize freedom and unity. While the (...) philosophical foundations of James' theory are generally secondary to Roth's advocacy of it, the author shows how the norm is based on the following Jamesian concepts: human consciousness is selective and efficacious; the universe is unfinished; value is rooted in consciousness and choice; and the goal of ethics is to achieve unity or harmony among personal and communal choices. Roth mentions problems for James--for example, pointing out that the principle of satisfying as many value demands as possible while frustrating a few as necessary does not handle qualitative differences in demands, and showing how James' later work emends this principle. He also touches on the tough problem, developed by others following James, of "unity" as an ideal in a system in which both meaning and value are rooted in feeling, and feelings are "owned" by individual selves. The book is simply written and should present no difficulty for the reader with little background in philosophy.--M. B. M. (shrink)

Olthuis makes a singular contribution in bringing the "Philosophy of the Law-Idea" to the attention of philosophers who lack other access to this development in contemporary Dutch thought. His presentation concentrates on applications to ethics. He begins with a thorough exposition of G. E. Moore's ethical theory, to which he applies "history's critique"--a resumé of Ayer and Stevenson, of Oxford meta-ethics, and of the "new wave" of naturalism set in motion by Anscombe and Foot in 1958. Olthuis finds that neither (...) Moore nor the subsequent philosophers could long stave off the irreconcilable extreme of absolute value or absolute relativism. "... the main source of difficulty in the constrictive nature of the... ontological schema," and, underlying that, in the claim that theoretical thought is neutral. In a valuable final chapter, he presents a "perspective for a way out" based on work by H. Dooyeweerd and D. H. Th. Vollenhoven. One key to their Philosophy of the Law-Idea lies in "norm-laws." Like "natural" laws, what is subject to them cannot withdraw. Unlike "natural" laws, they demand human acknowledgment to be fulfilled. He rejects both "ought" and "goodness" as adequate primitive concepts for ethics in favor of stress upon its irreducible "sphere-sovereignty." The cosmos stands under a structural law-order, made up of many modal laws determining the many modalities of reality. Within the normative, ethics is only one special modal science. Its job is to investigate the ethical norm-law, that which is subject to it, and the correlations between these two.--M. B. M. (shrink)

Goethe said that he had a high opinion of Franz von Baader, but unfortunately he could not understand what the Bavarian thinker wrote. Despite the efforts of Franz Hoffmann in the last century and of Eugene Susini in our days, Baader remained a closed book, even though his complete works have been recently reprinted. The extraordinary interest of Baader's oeuvre lies in his complex historical position: though he belongs to the world of speculative idealism, this Catholic thinker fundamentally rejects its (...) monistic inspiration. The present author treats Baader's conception of transcendence as rooted in an existential metaphysics of the will, through a very contemporary philosophical language which does not always successfully blend with Baader's own complicated parlance.—M. J. V. (shrink)

This is the second volume of the author's ambitious attempt at outlining the history of the dogma of original sin from its beginning to our days. The reader of the first volume witnessed a concerted attack against the dogma and especially against its Augustinian formulation. The second volume deals with perhaps the most obscure period of this dogma's development: the one between the fifth and the eleventh centuries. In the West—thanks to Augustine's undisputed authority—the dogma became accepted as an integral (...) part of Christian theology, even though those theologians of the Dark Ages tried to "humanize" its original, savage formulation. The Christian East, however, would never have accepted it, and took a rather ambiguous position towards the meaning of the "curse of Adam." This is, briefly, the author's thesis, and to prove it he marshals an impressive array of quotes and references, fruits of a wide and often really impressive scholarship. Yet, the whole book is written in the same spirit of crusading, shallow rationalism as was the preceding volume. The speculative issues are not really treated and the whole work lacks that synthetical approach which is so indispensable for an enterprise of such magnitude.—M. J. V. (shrink)

Though Joseph Nadler published the definitive, critical edition of Hamanns' complete works, the hermetic character of these texts warrants only too strongly a publication of at least the major texts with commentaries. The annotated edition is planned to comprise eight volumes. From the viewpoint of the history of ideas, Vol. IV is undoubtedly the most interesting, since it contains the important texts on the origin of language. These were directly provoked by Herder's famous Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache; "the (...) Magician of the North" fights the spirit of the Aufklärung even when it is clothed in the more attractive, pre-romantic setting of Herder's prose. Besides a fantastic amount of notes and commentary, Miss Büchsel, the editor of Vol. IV, offers a comprehensive and penetrating introductory study. Especially important are the chapters on the "pre-history" of Hamanns' Herder-interpretation and its influence on the later development of German intellectual life from the early Goethe to the old Schelling Vol. V contains the so-called mystery-writings directly pertinent to the Christian doctrine of the revelation of the Incarnated Son of God. These texts are truly esoteric, and even the multitude of notes accompanying them cannot always fully overcome their terrible obscurity. And here arises the only objection against this edition. The notes and commentaries are a mine of detailed information, and they "unconceal" the meaning of every word. Yet perhaps their very abundance impedes their stated purpose. They do help in understanding the words, but they make sustained reading of the texts themselves impossible. The encyclopedical character of the notes is cause for both exasperation and for growth in knowledge and inspiration.—M. J. V. (shrink)

Finally—a full length treatment of the Phenomenology of Mind in English. Its strengths and weaknesses stem from its not being a commentary. The author has set himself to the task of "capturing without its letter the spirit of the humanism pervading the Phenomenology." Avoiding the letter involves 1) the attempt to get free from Hegel's terminology, 2) the attempt to see the argument at the level of chapters rather than paragraphs or sentences, and 3) the complete abstraction from historical questions, (...) i.e., from questions about Hegel's life and times relevant to understanding the text. While the first two attempts are ably carried out and extremely instructive, the reader is often left with the frustrating need for the historical treatment of a commentary. The assumption "that the heart of Hegel's thought is to be found more in the method than in the results achieved by it..." is dubious, but it fortunately remains for the most part in the preface. The use of dialogue form in a quasi-commentary is as refreshing as it is unusual. The price of the book is unfortunate.—M. W. (shrink)

Sr. Garcia wants to bring readers the image of Marx they might draw from his 1844 economic-philosophical manuscripts which were not published until 1932, on the initiative of the Marx-Engels Institute of Moscow, under the title Zur Kritik der Nationaloeconomie mit einem Schlusskapitel über die Hegelsche Philosophie. He feels the tardy discovery of this work is as significant for the understanding of Marx as the belated discovery of the epistles of Saint John would have been to an understanding of Jesus. (...) Garcia sees his task to be that of "cleaning the coin" of Marxism in order for both of its true faces to be seen. Marx used the word "transubstantiation" to refer to the transformation of the substance of the history of philosophy by the socialist revolution. This is much more than reinterpretation. He likens the socialist transubstantiation of philosophy and Catholicism to the absorption of primitive explanations in science into modern theoretical physics. As the transformation of the son of man into the Son of God was the task of Christianity, the transformation of natural man into the creator and creature of society is the task of socialism. The author is thus trying to show that the atheism attributed to Marx is not inimical to the true values of the Christian myth, but absorbs and transforms them into Humanism, which is the "very theme of our time."—M.B.M. (shrink)

Hegel's philosophy of history used to be interpreted mainly in terms of what it is supposed to say about the direction and the end of history, yet the central historical category is, after all, the present, "the spiritual midday." True historicity is in the concrete moment--and this is the thesis that so many commentators of the Phenomenology of the Spirit neglect to emphasize. Hence, after a dutiful examination of the concept of history in this first major work of the philosopher, (...) the author engages in a detailed and interesting history of the interpretations of the Phenomenology. From Feuerbach to Rohrmoser, via Marx, Kierkegaard, and Heidegger we see the radiation of this great work; then comes a discussion with Kojève. In this Auseinandersetzung one definitely senses a sort of aversion toward the brilliant French interpreter but even here the historian's objectivity and expository purpose prevail.--M. J. V. (shrink)

The present book is a reprint of a classical study of Hegel, the first important work marking the renewal of interest in Hegel initiated by Dilthey's Hegels Jugendgeschichte. Rosenzweig's monograph is a still unsurpassed treatment of Hegel's political and social philosophy: a monument of scholarship, of broad vision and patient analysis. Proceeding in chronological order, the first volume concludes with the Phenomenology of the Spirit. Especially interesting are the two long chapters dealing with the less-known yet quite voluminous literary production (...) of the Jena-period. The second volume treats Hegel's "reconciliation" with his time and his unceasing effort to "cover" or better, to "ground" the legal system, the family, society, state, and constitution. The author manages to do justice to the historico-political conditioning of Hegel's metaphysics of the state without allowing himself to fall into the simplistic "sociology of knowledge" practiced with so much zeal by more modern, especially Marxist, authors. The book is written in the characteristically beautiful German prose of Rosenzweig, untouched by the sorry obscurities of so many "learned" interpretations of Hegel's system.--M. J. V. (shrink)

Although most contemporary utilitarians believe that their theory can be held only in a modified form, Sartorius contends that the traditional position, act-utilitarianism, is defensible. He explains the traditional position and defends it against the often made objection that it does not require sufficiently strict adherence to socially valuable legal and moral rules. Act-utilitarianism makes every useful act right, but utility sometimes is maximized if rules are adopted which disallow individually useful violations. If all useful acts are right regardless of (...) any rule they violate, then general rules become nothing more than summary rules or rules of thumb which, in appropriate circumstances, need not be followed. Act-utilitarians need not, according to Sartorius, consider general rules to be only summary ones. Once a rule is seen to be most productive of utility if no exceptions are allowed, the adoption of sanctions to enforce the rule would be justified; when enforced by sanctions, summary rules become genuine social norms because they are capable of directing behavior into desired channels. Besides his account of social norms, Sartorius discusses many other issues related to the utilitarian theory; he criticizes Rawls’ account of distributive justice, provides utilitarian analyses of the obligations to keep promises and obey the law, supports Narveson’s well-known solution to the population problem and discusses how the principle of utility can be vindicated. Because this book deals so clearly with many important issues, it should be read by all those interested in normative ethical theories.—M.G. (shrink)

An enlargement of the 1950 volume under the same title. Ten new essays are divided under the original sections dealing with operational analysis, specific scientific problems, and social science.--M. F.

In many Catholic colleges the first exposure to philosophy is a course in the philosophy of man. The text-anthology is specifically designed for use in such courses and forms one third of a series with further volumes on metaphysics and ethics. Views on man's knowledge, freedom, unity, and immortality, are presented in short selections from five philosophical traditions. Each section has an introductory essay, a glossary, topics for student discussion and term papers, and a short bibliography. A contributing editor is (...) responsible for each section. The general editors coordinated the study aids, including a list of films related to the teaching of philosophy. Elizabeth Salmon edited Classical and Scholastic Thought: Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas. Robert Kreyche edited American Pragmatic-Naturalist Thought: Peirce, James, Dewey, and Santayana. The section on Dialectical Thought, edited by R. T. DeGeorge contains, in addition to Hegel, Marx, and Engels, a selection from a book by Adam Schaff. Margaret Gorman edited Analytic-Positivist Thought. This section includes Hume, Russell, Ayer, Carnap, Ryle, Strawson, Hampshire, and Wittgenstein. Although pointing out to students that the interests of this tradition preclude discussion of the reality behind the four core problems, the introductory section is appreciative of the analytic method. The final part, Existentialist-Phenomenological Thought, is edited by R. Sokolowski. A passage from a forthcoming translation of Husserl's Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften, sets the problem; readings from Sartre, Marcel, Merleau-Ponty, and August Brunner treat the themes of temporality, corporeal space, intersubjectivity, decisions, the emotions, and speech. Finally, short passages from Heidegger tell the reader that the above factors "open man to being." In this way the Phenomenological-Existentialist school is shown to provide a philosophy of man which can serve as a first step in metaphysics, and thus as a bridge to the next book in the series.--M. B. M. (shrink)

The author is one of the greatest contemporary authorities on Classical Jewish philosophy. He applies his vast scholarship to probe into the inter-relationship between medieval Jewish philosophy and the cabala. The profound and daring speculation of the theosophists of the early cabala did not fail to provoke a violent reaction on the part of Jewish scholasticism, and the two long studies in the present volume try to analyze two cases of such antagonistic relationships. The first of the studies is a (...) comparison of the philosophico-theological treatise of Samuel Judah Ibn Tibbon, "The Reconciliation of Philosophy and the Religious Law," with a treatise on the Spanish cabalist Jacob ben Seset. While in this study we see the confrontation of the spirit of Averroes with the cabalistic inspiration, the second essay is devoted to a treatise from the fourteenth century, written by Joseph ben Abraham Ibn Waquar, in which philosophical and cabalistic elements are intimately interwoven in one and the same work. To the two major studies are added ten highly interesting short treatises on cabalistic notions and texts, making the present books together with the writings of Gershon Scholem the most important monument to cabalistic scholarship available in a Western language.—M. J. V. (shrink)

After the post-war insistence on Schelling's middle philosophy, his late speculation is becoming again the focus of Schelling-studies--but now from a genuinely transcendental viewpoint. The origin of this shift in perspective can be traced back to W. Schulz's celebrated work on Schelling's late philosophy as the culmination of German idealism. The present study unmistakably displays the mark of Schulz's influence. Its thesis is that the early and late philosophies, are similar in that both have a double structure. In Schelling's Early (...) philosophy because the ego must represent itself at a certain stage of its development as matter, transcendental philosophy necessarily refers to the philosophy of nature. In his Late philosophy because finite knowledge has as its principle absolute freedom which manifests itself in history, negative philosophy necessarily refers to positive philosophy. Philosophy of nature and positive philosophy are privileged realms for the thinker to show the active presence of experience in reflection, i.e. to insist on the role of facticity in reason's self-founding and self-mediating enterprise. All this is presented in a clear, correct and competent way; however the style and expression are too abstract, and the reader is left with a feeling of narrow precision.--M. J. V. (shrink)

Christian secularism is here the equivalent of theistic naturalism. It is sharply distinguished both from the more radical secularism of Van Buren and the death of God theologians, and from the supernaturalism of traditional Christian views of history, which deny its autonomy by affirming special divine breakthroughs into it and a mode of human existence transcending it. The book is less a case for Christian secularism than an account of what it is, or rather, what it is not. Its three (...) divisions are entitled "Faith," "History," and "Secularism."—M. W. (shrink)

This confrontation of analytical psychology with ethics is intended as a philosophical examination of the justification of Jung's and Erich Neumann's claim to have offered in their so-called individuation process the new ethics demanded by the discovery of the psychic reality of the collective unconscious. As a standard of evaluation the author first tries to establish the idea of self-realization as a moral imperative. Aware of the difficulty of finding agreement in matters of ethics, he turns to self-awareness as the (...) source of his ethical principle. Beginning with a discussion of Kant's understanding of moral life, the author recognizes the categorical imperative as an expression of an absolute and universal law of practical reason to be an unsatisfactory representation of subjective morality, and rediscovers in the awareness of the individual law of G. Simmel the evidence of the immediate givenness of our self as a strict moral obligation. The awareness of the self as a moral ideal pre supposes freedom, which, following Sartre's existentialistic [[sic]] understanding, is identified with human reality as such and is found not to allow any kind of determination of human existence; consciousness of impulses implies "original choice," and unconsciousness means abdicated freedom. Compared with the ideal reality of the self and with the conditions of its realization as experienced in immediate awareness, the psychic reality of the individuation process as described in complex psychology lacks every moral qualification. Jung's individuation process does not represent a realization or even a recognition of the self, as the second part of the book attempts to show. A natural process enforced by an archetype of the self, demanding as moral obligations only a conscious awareness of alleged unconscious contents of a collective and personal unconscious in a confrontation of archetypes of the process, and an integration or combination of opposing conscious and unconscious psychic elements, is essentially different from a free and responsible realization of one's individual law in active confrontation with one's own historical situation and reality, and with the moral demands of the physical and social world. Confusing subjective interpretations with objective psychic facts in its doctrine of the archetypes, and morality with mental health in its understanding of the individuation process, analytic psychology is rightly found to ignore decisive aspects of human existence and especially to disregard moral reality as an essential phenomenon of human life.--M. S. (shrink)