ome Remarks on the Crisis of Capitalism What are the causes and consequences of the crisis of capitalism ? What are the plausible scenarios forthe outcome of the crisis ? To what extent is the current crisis comparable to that of 1929, and to whatextent does it differ from the crisis of the 1970s ? To what extent can one speak of a crisis of neoliberalism ? These are some of the questions which the authors of The Crisis of Neoliberalism (...) address here. (shrink)

This paper discusses one important component of the analysis of the decline of the profit rate in recent decades in Robert Brenner's Economics of Global Turbulence. Our single focus in this paper is Brenner's implicit theory of distribution.

The central issue in this paper is the overtaking of neoliberalism by a possible new “social order”, a new phase in the history of capitalism. In contemporary capitalism, the “upper classes”—capitalist classes, the classes of managers and officials—jointly ensure the control of the means of production. Their common hegemony in neoliberalism is supported by the alliance at the top of the social hierarchies, under the leadership of capitalist classes. This hegemony could be continued beyond neoliberalism, though under new forms. A (...) first such potential social order is similar to neoliberalism, which it prolongs, a “third financial hegemony”. (Neoliberalism represented the “second financial hegemony”; the first prevailed before the Great Depression of the 1930s). The other social order can be described as a “neomanagerialism”. While the same alliance would prevail at the top, the leadership would here be that of the managerial class, and would involve much stronger state intervention. (Another opportunity, albeit one which we unfortunately deem unlikely, would be the alliance between popular classes and managers, a “social-managerialism”). A comparison between the United states and China highlights the relevance of neomanagerialism. The strong neomanagerial features of China show the potential efficiency of this social configuration. A turn to neomanagerialism would probably be the only way of preserving what can be saved of U.S. international hegemony. (shrink)

Dans cet entretien consacré à leur livre Managerial Capitalism : Ownership, management and the coming new mode of production (Pluto Press, 2018), G. Duménil et D. Lévy reviennent sur les implications de leur analyse du capitalisme managérial pour l’étude du capitalisme historique, de ses structures de classes fondamentales, et de ses alliances de pouvoirs variables. La thèse du marxisme traditionnel identifiant les managers à une fraction de classe capitaliste s’en trouve critiquée, de même que les présupposés véhiculés par le (...) concept de « capitalisme d’État ». Invités à revenir plus précisément sur leur distinction entre modes de production et « ordres sociaux », comme configurations variables de hiérarchies de pouvoirs et d’alliances de classe, les auteurs clarifient les raisons pour lesquelles ils introduisent une nouvelle catégorie de mode de production managérial qui impose de repenser le mode de production capitaliste lui-même suivant une logique de « l’hybridité ». Celle-ci permet de complexifier les tendances du capitalisme historique sur la longue durée, d’approfondir l’analyse de classe du capitalisme managérial, et d’y spécifier différentiellement, par rapport au « compromis » d’après-guerre (caractérisé par une alliance entre managers et classes populaires sous la direction des premiers), le dernier ordre social en date caractérisé par une alliance « au sommet » entre managers et capitalistes (au détriment des classes populaires) : le néolibéralisme. (shrink)

This the first part of a study (in two parts) devoted to Piketty’s theses on the history of capitalism. A summary of Pikety’s analysis is first presented, concerning the dynamics of total wealth (measured as a ratio to national income) and its components, and the tendency of wealth and income inequalities within major capitalist countries. The amplitude of the fall of total wealth in the United-Kingdom and France during World War I is questioned. Piketty explains the profile of these variables (...) concerning wealth and wealth inequalities in reference to historical mechanisms in which the rate of growth of output, the rate of savings, and the return on wealth are considered. The relevance of these mechanisms is basically questioned. We interpret the third component of wealth, other domestic capital, as a form of the capital of enterprises and substitute an alternative, more performing, model to account for the profile of this variable. (shrink)

Marx’s conceptualization of history emphasizes the succession of modes of production. However the dynamics of productive forces and relations of production are continuous. Central to this analysis is the “socialization of production” and the rise of the managerial class. These trends require the adjustment of institutions, notably those in which the ownership of the means of production is expressed, an adjustment that is often implemented under the pressure of structural crises. The article illustrates these dynamics in the United States since (...) the late 19th century, in particular in relation to the tripolar class patterns, capitalists, popular classes and managerial class. What is involved is the gradual emergence of a new mode of production whose dominant class is intended to be the managerial class. A “social order” is a shorter period marked by the configuration of class dominations and alliances: the hegemony of capitalist classes during the first third of the 20th century, the alliance between managers and popular classes after the Great Depression and World War II, and neoliberalism as a new hegemony of capitalists in alliance with managers. The approach in terms of social orders allows for the interpretation of the state as the institutional “locus” in which social orders are formed, rather than as the exclusive domination of a ruling class. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialtheorie und Philosophie Jahrgang: 2 Heft: 2 Seiten: 219-252.

In the analysis of contemporary capitalism, it is important to combine neoliberalism (the strengthening of the power of the capitalist class, in a new phase) and imperialism (the exploitation of peripherical countries). The contradictions of this newsocial order are numerous: first, the resistances that it fosters, then the desquilibria evident, in particular, in the United States. But imperialism at the age of neoliberalism also manifests itself in a new configuration particularly favorable to this country: the export of capitals and the (...) financing of the US economy by the rest of the world. In the United States, this era can also be characterized by the new configuration of class alliances at the top of the social hierarchy : big capitalist owners and top managers. This consolidation manifests itself in the ongoing drift to the right, when the necessity of a compromise uniting managers and popular classes, as in the Keynesian compromise, is urgent. (shrink)

The main purpose of this second article devoted to T. Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century (the first was published in the previous issue of Actuel Marx) is to introduce our alternative reading of history. The tendencies manifest during the last decades of the 20th century and the early 21st century are not, it is argued, the replication of the tendencies which prevailed prior to World War I. The starting-point for our analysis is the beginning of the 20th century, a (...) moment characterized by the dynamics of a “managerial capitalism” built around the “tripolar” class pattern of capitalists, managers, and popular classes. The main quantitative manifestation of these trends was the steady rise in the share accounted for by wages (compared to capital income) in the income of upper classes (notably the top 1 percent). In place of Piketty’s impact of shocks, we focus on the chain of successive configurations of class domination and alliances, in a succession of “social orders” marking the historical advance of managerial capitalism : the first financial hegemony, in the years leading up to the Great Depression ; the postwar social-democratic compromise ; and its successor, neoliberalism, involving a new alliance to the right, between the managerial and popular classes. (shrink)

The new military strategy of the US responds to political motivations, but it must also be understood in relation to the economic situation. The US economy is not in a permanent crisis since the 1970, although growth rates remain comparatively low and a threat of financial crisis exists, due to domestic factors and risks of contagion from the periphery. The share of military spending in GDP is low, and the US has the capability to finance new wars. The military course (...) must be understood as part of the overall framework of global US hegemony, given the importance of its interest abroad. (shrink)

Cet article constitue la réponse à une note critique publiée dans le n° 71 d’ Actuel Marx, dans laquelle Fabien Foureault discutait les travaux de G. Duménil et D. Lévy concernant l’actuelle transition entre le capitalisme et un nouveau mode de production, le managérialisme. Le premier argument est le fait que les hauts managers sont rétribués par la distribution de stock-options, considérés comme des revenus du capital par Foureault bien que ces options n’aient pas de rapport avec la détention (...) antérieure d’actions par les bénéficiaires. La forme de la rémunération l’emporte sur les pratiques qui la motivent. Foureault utilise, par ailleurs, les calculs réalisés au sein des Distributional National Accounts qui montrent que la part des revenus du capital au sein du revenu total du 1 % supérieur de la hiérarchie des revenus n’a pas décru. Ces nouvelles estimations sont, pour GD et DL, inutilisables hors des finalités comparatives pour lesquelles elles ont été conçues. Enfin, les auteurs considèrent que Foureault se méprend radicalement quant à la nature de leurs interprétations politiques. (shrink)

ome Remarks on the Crisis of Capitalism What are the causes and consequences of the crisis of capitalism ? What are the plausible scenarios forthe outcome of the crisis ? To what extent is the current crisis comparable to that of 1929, and to whatextent does it differ from the crisis of the 1970s ? To what extent can one speak of a crisis of neoliberalism ? These are some of the questions which the authors of The Crisis of Neoliberalism (...) address here. (shrink)

In an age of cloning, virtual reality and artificial intelligence what sort of future is in store for human beings? If it is a "posthuman" future as some predict, will it also be inhuman? On the Human Condition is a thought-provoking and profound reflection on where the idea of the human stands today. Dominique Janicaud argues that while we need to avoid apocalyptic talk of a posthuman condition, as embodied in technology such as cloning, we should neither fall back (...) on a conservative humanism nor become technophobic. Drawing on topical examples such as genetic engineering, the mythology around the Frankenstein myth and the ideas of Pascal and Primo Levi, Dominique Janicaud urges us to acknowledge the fragile and provisional nature of being human. Above all, he argues that even if we do live in a world that is already posthuman, it is not a predicament we can confront alone and heroically, but must share with others. (shrink)

The dating of the beginning of the Third Sacred War. The interpretation of the Delphic accounts revisited. The chronology proposed by CID II for the Third Sacred War is not as assured as may appear at first sight. One must keep in mind that the reconstructions proposed there constitute no more than one possibility among others. The numbering of the pylées provides an excellent example : J. Bousquet connects it to the levying of the phocidian fine in the period after (...) the Peace of Philokrates, but other readings remain possible, even preferable. Moreover, the dating of the occupation of the sanctuary to the end of the archonship of Herakleios is based on the testimony of Pausanias, on this point very much subject to caution, as well as a very slanted reading of CID II 10 and CID II 31. Only the absence of a reunion of the college under Aristoxenos in the autumn appears to constitute a certain indicator of the phocidian occupation of the sanctuary. (shrink)

Neil Levy presents a new theory of freedom and responsibility. He defends a particular account of consciousness--the global workspace view--and argues that consciousness plays an especially important role in action. There are good reasons to think that the naïve assumption, that consciousness is needed for moral responsibility, is in fact true.

The paper aims to defend the standard view of what it dubs ‘Self-understanding’ — i.e. (very roughly) our knowledge of why we behave as we do — from the threat posed to it by Neo-Ryleanism. While the standard, entrenched view regards self-understanding as special in kind and status, the Neo-Rylean agrees with Gilbert Ryle that our method of understanding ourselves is much the same as our method of understanding others, involving self-interpretation on the basis of the available evidence. Neo-Ryleanism has (...) been gaining ground in recent decades, fuelled by a wide range of empirical results which allegedly demonstrate that subjects confabulate items of self-understanding. The paper rejects this attack on the received view. After critically examining one extant response to the Neo-Rylean, which gratuitously accuses her of equivocation, the paper proceeds to offer its own response, casting doubt over the suggestion that the experimental results actually demonstrate widespread confabulation. (shrink)

The accusation of virtue signalling is typically understood as a serious charge. Those accused usually respond by attempting to show that they are doing no such thing. In this paper, I argue that we ought to embrace the charge, rather than angrily reject it. I argue that this response can draw support from cognitive science, on the one hand, and from social epistemology on the other. I claim that we may appropriately concede that what we are doing is virtue signalling, (...) because virtue signalling is morally appropriate. It neither expresses vices, nor is hypocritical, nor does it degrade the quality of public moral discourse. Signalling our commitment to norms is a central and justifiable function of moral discourse, and the same signals provide evidence that is appropriately taken into account in forming moral beliefs. (shrink)

The widespread conviction that we are living in a post-truth era rests on two claims: that a large number of people believe things that are clearly false, and that their believing these things reflects a lack of respect for truth. In reality, however, fewer people believe clearly false things than surveys or social media suggest. In particular, relatively few people believe things that are widely held to be bizarre. Moreover, accepting false beliefs does not reflect a lack of respect for (...) truth. Almost everyone’s beliefs are explained by rationally warranted trust in some sources rather than others. This allows us to explain why people have false beliefs. (shrink)

It is universally accepted in bioethics that doctors and other medical professionals have an obligation to procure the informed consent of their patients. Informed consent is required because patients have the moral right to autonomy in furthering the pursuit of their most important goals. In the present work, it is argued that evidence from psychology shows that human beings are subject to a number of biases and limitations as reasoners, which can be expected to lower the quality of their decisions (...) and which therefore make it more difficult for them to pursue their most important goals by giving informed consent. It is further argued that patient autonomy is best promoted by constraining the informed consent procedure. By limiting the degree of freedom patients have to choose, the good that informed consent is supposed to protect can be promoted. (shrink)

Some philosophers have criticized the use of psychopharmaceuticals on the grounds that even if these drugs enhance the person using them, they threaten their authenticity. Others have replied by pointing out that the conception of authenticity upon which this argument rests is contestable; on a rival conception, psychopharmaceuticals might be used to enhance our authenticity. Since, however, it is difficult to decide between these competing conceptions of authenticity, the debate seems to end in a stalemate. I suggest that we need (...) not resolve this debate to end the stalemate. New technologies which alter the self can be understood within the framework of the first conception of authenticity, I suggest, not as threatening the authentic self, but rather as bringing the outward appearance of the self into line with its deepest essence. Since psychopharmaceutical use can plausibly be understood on this model, it can be seen as enhancing our authenticity on either conception. (shrink)

Recently, various philosophers have argued that we can obtain knowledge via the imagination. In particular, it has been suggested that we can come to know concrete, empirical matters of everyday significance by appropriately imagining relevant scenarios. Arguments for this thesis come in two main varieties: black box reliability arguments and constraints-based arguments. We suggest that both strategies are unsuccessful. Against black-box arguments, we point to evidence from empirical psychology, question a central case-study, and raise concerns about a (claimed) evolutionary rationale (...) for the imagination's reliability. Against the constraints-based account, we argue that to the extent that it works, this does not give rise to knowledge that is distinctively from the imagination. We conclude by suggesting that the imagination's role in raising possibilities, traditionally seen as part of the context of discovery, can in fact play a role in justification, including as a bulwark against certain sorts of skepticism. (shrink)

Aspects of human life history and cognition, such as our long childhoods and extensive use of teaching, theoretically evolved to facilitate the acquisition of complex tasks. The present paper empirically examines the relationship between subsistence task difficulty and age of acquisition, rates of teaching, and rates of oblique transmission among Hadza and BaYaka foragers from Tanzania and the Republic of Congo. We further examine cross-cultural variation in how and from whom learning occurred. Learning patterns and community perceptions of task difficulty (...) were assessed through interviews. We found no relationship between task difficulty, age of acquisition, and oblique transmission, and a weak but positive relationship between task difficulty and rates of teaching. While same-sex transmission was normative in both societies, tasks ranked as more difficult were more likely to be transmitted by men among the BaYaka, but not among the Hadza, potentially reflecting cross-cultural differences in the sexual division of subsistence and teaching labor. Further, the BaYaka were more likely to report learning via teaching, and less likely to report learning via observation, than the Hadza, possibly owing to differences in socialization practices. (shrink)

In this article we survey six recent developments in the philosophical literature on free will and moral responsibility: (1) Harry Frankfurt's argument that moral responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise; (2) the heightened focus upon the source of free actions; (3) the debate over whether moral responsibility is an essentially historical concept; (4) recent compatibilist attempts to resurrect the thesis that moral responsibility requires the freedom to do otherwise; (5) the role of the control condition in free (...) will and moral responsibility, and finally (6) the debate centering on luck. (shrink)

This chapter contributes to the ongoing debate over how to understand attention. It spells out and defends a novel account according to which attending is the most general type of mental act, that which one performs on some object if one performs any mental act on it at all. On this view, all mental acts are (to a first, rough approximation) species of attending. The view is novel in going against the grain of virtually all extant accounts, which work by (...) identifying the purported unique functional role of attention. It is inspired by Timothy Williamson’s account of knowledge as the most general factive mental state (Williamson, 2001: ch. 1). -/- Beyond the Williamsonian thin explanation of knowledge, the account of attention as the most general mental act is animated by two striking pre-theoretical features of attention, dubbed ubiquity and heterogeneity. The hope of accommodating these twin features seems to drive at least two other extant accounts of attention, very different from the one proposed here, offered by Mole and Wu, respectively. However, as the chapter explains, both Mole’s and Wu’s accounts fall short, leaving room for the novel account defended here, which does adequately capture both features. (shrink)

Proposals for regulating or nudging healthy choices are controversial. Opponents often argue that individuals should take responsibility for their own health, rather than be paternalistically manipulated for their own good. In this paper, I argue that people can take responsibility for their own health only if they satisfy certain epistemic conditions, but we live in an epistemic environment in which these conditions are not satisfied. Satisfying the epistemic conditions for taking responsibility, I argue, requires regulation of this environment. I describe (...) some proposals for such regulation and show that we cannot reject all regulation in the name of individual responsibility. We must either regulate individuals’ healthy choices or regulate the epistemic environment. (shrink)

According to one influential view, advanced by Jonathan Adler, David Owens and Susan Hurley, epistemic akrasia is impossible because when we form a full belief, any apparent evidence against that belief loses its power over us. Thus theoretical reasoning is quite unlike practical reasoning, in that in the latter our desires continue to exert a pull, even when they are outweighed by countervailing considerations. I call this argument against the possibility of epistemic akrasia the subsumption view. The subsumption view accurately (...) reflects the nature of reasoning in a range of everyday cases. But, as I show, it is quite false with regard to controversial questions, like philosophical disputes. In these, evidence against our best judgments continues to exert a hold on us. Thus, the claimed disanalogy between practical and theoretical reasoning fails. (shrink)

In 'What Luck Is Not', Lackey presents counterexamples to the two most prominent accounts of luck: the absence of control account and the modal account. I offer an account of luck that conjoins absence of control to a modal condition. I then show that Lackey's counterexamples mislocate the luck: the agents in her cases are lucky, but the luck precedes the event upon which Lackey focuses, and that event is itself only fortunate, not lucky. Finally I offer an account of (...) fortune. Fortune is luck-involving, and therefore easily confused with luck, but it is not itself lucky. (shrink)

Ce troisième numéro des Cahiers de philosophie de Paris XII Val-de-Marne comporte deux parties bien distinctes qui correspondent aux activités du Centre de recherches sur la philosophie hellénistique et romaine que dirige Carlos Lévy et du Centre d'études phénoménologiques que dirige Françoise Dastur. La partie antique est consacrée à la philosophie hellénistique (épicurisme et scepticisme néopyrrhonien) ainsi qu'au moyen et néo-platonisme. L'association de ces périodes que l'histoire de la philosophie ancienne a trop tendance à étudier séparément permet une perception (...) diachronique qui met mieux en valeur les éléments de continuité et les différences entre ces textes. La partie phénoménologique rassemble les actes d'un séminaire et d'un colloque auquel ont collaboré de nombreux chercheurs. Elle atteste avec éclat la très grande vigueur et l'extraordinaire diversité des recherches actuelles dans ce domaine, en France comme dans la plupart des pays européens. (shrink)

McKenna’s critique (rather than criticisms) of idealized approaches to epistemology is an important contribution to the literature. In this brief discussion, I set out his main concerns about more idealized approaches, within and beyond social epistemology, before turning to some issues I think he neglects. I suggest that it’s important to pay attention to the prestige hierarchy in philosophy, and to how that hierarchy can serve ideological purposes. The greater prestige of more abstract approaches plays a role in determining what (...) issues and what voices we attend to. (shrink)

The claim that addiction is a brain disease is almost universally accepted among scientists who work on addiction. The claim’s attraction rests on two grounds: the fact that addiction seems to be characterized by dysfunction in specific neural pathways and the fact that the claim seems to the compassionate response to people who are suffering. I argue that neural dysfunction is not sufficient for disease: something is a brain disease only when neural dysfunction is sufficient for impairment. I claim that (...) the neural dysfunction that is characteristic of addiction is not sufficient for impairment, because people who suffer from that dysfunction are impaired, sufficiently to count as diseased, only given certain features of their context. Hence addiction is not a brain disease (though it is often a disease, and it may always involve brain dysfunction). I argue that accepting that addiction is not a brain disease does not entail a moralizing attitude toward people who suffer as a result of addiction; if anything, it allows for a more compassionate, and more effective, response to addiction. (shrink)

Neil Van Leeuwen argues that many religious people do not act and infer as we would expect believers to act and infer, and on this basis argues that they are not genuine believers. They take some other, nondoxastic, attitude to the claims they profess to believe. In this short commentary, I argue that in many (but far from all) such cases, the content, and not the attitude, explains the departures from the inferential and behavioral stereotype we associate with belief.

This brief paper sketches the main theses of my recent book Bad Beliefs. The book defends the view that human cognition is more evidence responsive than most psychologists and naturalistic philosophers think. In particular, we are responsive to the abundant higher-order evidence that we encounter in experiments and in everyday life.

We should react to deaf parents who choose to have a deaf child with compassion not condemnationThere has been a great deal of discussion during the past few years of the potential biotechnology offers to us to choose to have only perfect babies, and of the implications that might have, for instance for the disabled. What few people foresaw is that these same technologies could be deliberately used to ensure that children would be born with disabilities. That this is a (...) real possibility, and not merely the thought experiment of a philosopher, is brought home to us by the decision of an American lesbian couple to select a deaf sperm donor in order to maximise the chances that their children, Jehanne and Gauvin, would be deaf like them.1 Their choice has sparked controversy, not only among medical ethicists, but in the opinion pages of newspapers across the world. Ought parents be permitted to make such choices?If the parents of Jehanne and Gauvin have done anything wrong, it must consist in violating their child’s right to an open future—limiting its future potential for choice.2 But what does it mean to respect this right?From the moment a child is born, her parents are making choices for her, which will powerfully shape her future. They will decide what kind of education she will have, what religious experiences, from among what group she can select friends. Thereby, they profoundly mould the person she will be and the life she will have.When this activity is carried out within certain, ill-defined, limits, it is in no way objectionable. It is not merely a …. (shrink)