There is more to belief than Van Leeuwen believes

Mind and Language 39 (4):584-589 (2024)
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Abstract

Neil Van Leeuwen argues that many religious people do not act and infer as we would expect believers to act and infer, and on this basis argues that they are not genuine believers. They take some other, nondoxastic, attitude to the claims they profess to believe. In this short commentary, I argue that in many (but far from all) such cases, the content, and not the attitude, explains the departures from the inferential and behavioral stereotype we associate with belief.

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Neil Levy
Macquarie University

References found in this work

Intuitive and Reflective Beliefs.Dan Sperber - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (1):67-83.
The Factual Belief Fallacy.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2018 - Contemporary Pragmatism (eds. T. Coleman & J. Jong):319-343.
How Lay Cognition Constrains Scientific Cognition.Andrew Shtulman - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (11):785-798.

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