Previously published: London: Methuen, 1975.

The threat to the survival of humankind posed by nuclear weapons has been a frightening and essential focus of public debate for the last four decades and must continue to be so if we are to avoid destroying ourselves and the natural world around us. One unfortunate result of preoccupation with the nuclear threat, however, has been a new kind of "respectability" accorded to conventional war. In this radical and cogent argument for pacifism, Robert Holmes asserts that all war--not (...) just nuclear war--has become morally impermissible in the modern world. Addressing a wide audience of informed and concerned readers, he raises dramatic questions about the concepts of "political realism" and nuclear deterrence, makes a number of persuasive suggestions for nonviolent alternatives to war, and presents a rich panorama of thinking about war from St. Augustine to Reinhold Niebuhr and Herman Kahn. Holmes's positions are compellingly presented and will provoke discussion both among convinced pacifists and among those whom he calls "militarists." "Militarists," we realize after reading this book, include the majority of us who live a friendly and peaceful personal life while supporting a system which, if Holmes is correct, guarantees war and risks eventual human extinction. Originally published in 1989. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

Working within the tradition of continental philosophy, this article argues in favour of a phenomenological understanding of language as a crucial component of bioethical inquiry. The authors challenge the ‘commonsense’ view of language, in which thinking appears as prior to speaking, and speech the straightforward vehicle of pre-existing thoughts. Drawing on Maurice Merleau-Ponty's (1908–1961) phenomenology of language, the authors claim that thinking takes place in and through the spoken word, in and through embodied language. This view resituates bioethics as a (...) matter of bodies that speak. It also refigures the meaning of ethical self-reflexion, and in so doing offers an alternative view on reflexivity and critique. Referring to the Kantian critical tradition and its reception by Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault, we advance a position we call ‘critical ethical reflexivity’. We contend that Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of language offers valuable insight into ethical reflexivity and subject formation. Moreover, his understanding of language may foster new qualitative empirical research in bioethics, lead to more nuanced methods for interpreting personal narratives, and promote critical self-reflexion as necessary for bioethical inquiry. (shrink)

This article considers ethnographic field research in order to analyze the violence and exploitation inherent to our transnational agro-food system and the ways in which temporality and statistics may aid in making visible and invisible certain experiences of migrant farmworker injury as well as individual and collective actions for wellbeing. Based in long-term, in-depth ethnographic research, this article utilizes theories of temporality and events in order to highlight social and health inequalities in agricultural labor and encourage agricultural, food and health (...) scholars to consider critically the effects of our methods. Juxtaposing the injury and health care experiences of one Mexican migrant farmworker with statistics on the health and health care of migrant and seasonal farmworkers more generally, the article confronts both the normalization of migrant farmworker injury and the taken-for-granted helpfulness of quantitative and qualitative research alike. In addition, the argument acknowledges the everyday, individual practices and collective actions migrant farmworkers engage into demand and build wellbeing for themselves, their families and beyond. (shrink)

This paper explores how, at the 1875 Royal Commission on Vivisection, the anaesthetised animal was construed as a boundary object around which “cooperation without consensus” Computer supported cooperative work: cooperation or conflict? Springer, London, 1993) could form, serving the interests of both scientists and animals. Advocates of anaesthesia presented it as benevolently intervening between the scientific agent and animal patient. Such articulations of ‘ethical’ vivisection through anaesthesia were then mandated in the 1876 Cruelty to Animals Act, and thus have had (...) significant downstream effects on the regulation of laboratory animals in Britain and beyond. Constructing this ‘consensus’ around the anaesthetised animal, however, required first excluding abolitionists and inhumane scientists, and secondly limiting the interests of experimental animals to the avoidance of pain through anaesthesia and euthanasia, thereby circumventing the issue of their possible interest in future life. This consensus also served to secure the interests of vivisecting scientists and to limit the influence of public opinion in the laboratory to administrative procedure and scheduled inspection. The focus on anaesthesia was connected with discussions of what supporting infrastructures were required to ensure proper ethical procedure was carried out by scientists. In contrast to the much studied polarisation in British society between pro- and antivivisectionists after 1876, we understand the 1875 Commission as a conflict amongst scientists themselves, while also being an intra-class conflict amongst the ruling class. (shrink)

This paper discusses a sequence of extensions ofNFU, Jensen's improvement of Quine's set theory “New Foundations” (NF) of [16].The original theoryNFof Quine continues to present difficulties. After 60 years of intermittent investigation, it is still not known to be consistent relative to any set theory in which we have confidence. Specker showed in [20] thatNFdisproves Choice (and so proves Infinity). Even if one assumes the consistency ofNF, one is hampered by the lack of powerful methods for proofs of consistency and (...) independence such as are available for use withZFC; very clever work has been done with permutation methods, starting with [18] and [5], and exemplified more recently by [14], but permutation methods can only be applied to show the consistency or independence of unstratified sentences (see the definition ofNFUbelow for a definition of stratification). For example, there is no method available to determine whether the assertion “the continuum can be well-ordered” is consistent with or independent ofNF. There is one substantial independence result for an assertion with nontrivial stratified consequences, using metamathematical methods: this is Orey's proof of the independence of the Axiom of Counting fromNF(see below for a statement of this axiom).We mention these difficulties only to reassure the reader of their irrelevance to the present work. Jensen's modification of “New Foundations” (in [13]), which was to restrict extensionality to sets, allowing many non-sets (urelements) with no elements, has almost magical effects. (shrink)

An ω-model (a model in which all natural numbers are standard) of the predicative fragment of Quine's set theory "New Foundations" (NF) is constructed. Marcel Crabbe has shown that a theory NFI extending predicative NF is consistent, and the model constructed is actually a model of NFI as well. The construction follows the construction of ω-models of NFU (NF with urelements) by R. B. Jensen, and, like the construction of Jensen for NFU, it can be used to construct α-models for (...) any ordinal α. The construction proceeds via a model of a type theory of a peculiar kind; we first discuss such "tangled type theories" in general, exhibiting a "tangled type theory" (and also an extension of Zermelo set theory with Δ 0 comprehension) which is equiconsistent with NF (for which the consistency problem seems no easier than the corresponding problem for NF (still open)), and pointing out that "tangled type theory with urelements" has a quite natural interpretation, which seems to provide an explanation for the more natural behaviour of NFU relative to the other set theories of this kind, and can be seen anachronistically as underlying Jensen's consistency proof for NFU. (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to compare working memory (WM), executive function, academic ability and problem classroom behaviors in children aged 8 to 11 years who were either identified via routine screening as having low WM, or had been diagnosed with ADHD. Standardised assessments of WM, executive function and reading and mathematics were administered to 83 children with ADHD, 50 children with low WM and 50 typically developing children. Teachers rated problem behaviors on checklists measuring attention, hyperactivity/impulsivity, oppositional behavior, (...) and difficulties associated with executive function in the classroom. The ADHD and low WM groups had highly similar WM and executive function profiles, but were distinguished in two key respects: children with ADHD had higher levels of rated and observed impulsive behavior, and children low WM had slower response times. Possible mechanisms for these common and distinct deficits are discussed. (shrink)

Explores the ethical issues faced by GPs in their everyday practice, addressing two central themes; the uncertainty of outcomes and effectiveness in general practice and the changing pattern of general practitioners' responsibilities.

Stakeholder participation is an increasingly popular ingredient within environmental management and decision-making. While much has been written about its purported benefits, a question that has been largely neglected is whether decision-making informed through stakeholder participation is actually likely to yield decisions that are morally justified in their own right. Using moral methodology as a starting point, we argue that stakeholder participation in environmental decision-making may indeed be an appropriate means to produce morally justified decisions, the reason being that such participation (...) may constitute an efficient way to satisfy the standard requirements on moral reasoning and moral justification. This finding also emphasizes the importance of identifying those settings most conducive to allowing different stakeholders to both challenge each other’s arguments and to adopt each other’s perspectives in order to make effective use of participation in environmenta... (shrink)

Under the influence of neoliberalism, academic work faces mounting pressure to align with imperatives of visibility and perceptibility. Traditionally criticised for working in isolated ‘ivory towers’, academics are now compelled to showcase the societal value of their work through performance metrics and evaluations. Paradoxically, these efforts have unintentionally led to the rigidification and commodification of academic work, stifling the production of knowledge beyond predefined parameters. In this paper, we contend that academics should resist the imposition of this neoliberal ‘grid’ and (...) instead seek a path of ‘becoming‐imperceptible’, drawing inspiration from the insights of Deleuze and Guattari. Becoming‐imperceptible does not entail silent disengagement; rather, it represents a creative form of resistance challenging prevailing modes of assessment rooted in visibility and perceptibility. By incorporating the concept of ‘fast feminism’ to subvert Paul Virilio's hypermasculine speed theory, we uncover the transformative potential of temporary absences. Leveraging these moments of absence, academics can intensify their affective connections with both their peers and their work, making them undiscernible to the confines of the academic establishment. We argue that these instances of imperceptibility create fertile ground for creative and inventive academic endeavours on the margins of established boundaries, where original scholarship can flourish. Such a subversive approach is particularly relevant in fields like nursing and the health sciences, where it can challenge the dominant discourses that typify neoliberal academia. (shrink)

Research in the philosophy of addiction commonly explores how agency is impacted in addiction by focusing on moments of apparent loss of control over addictive behavior and seeking to explain how such moments result from the effects of psychoactive substance use on cognition and volition. Recently, Glackin et al. (2021) have suggested that agency in addiction can be helpfully analyzed using the concept of affordances. They argue that addicted agents experience addiction-related affordances, such as action possibilities relating to drugs, drug (...) paraphernalia, and drug-related activities, as aberrantly salient motivations for action. Building on this approach, we present a novel two-tiered affordance model of addiction. In doing so, we suggest that what is significant about the addicted person’s world is not simply what affordances are experienced as salient, but also the way in which the addicted person’s world is shaped by a dominant concern. It is not only that addiction-related affordances become more prominent as addiction progresses but that one’s plurality of concerns become monopolized by and funneled through addiction. Our model endorses Glackin et al.’s idea that addiction-related affordances become aberrantly salient, while proposing why they become and remain so. This way of viewing agency in addiction also brings to light important implications for recovery and treatment. For, if an addicted person adopts a new, even “socially approved,” dominant concern, there is a risk that the shape of addiction is preserved, even though the content changes, leaving an individual at the risk of addiction substitution or relapse. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to articulate further what may be called an agency theory of self-knowledge. Many theorists have stressed how important agency is to self- knowledge, and much work has been done drawing connections between the two notions.² However, it has not always been clear what _epistemic_ advantage agency gives us in this area and why it does so. I take it as a constraint on an adequate account of how a subject knows her own mental states (...) and acts, that it construe the known mental states and acts realistically and as independent of their self-ascription, and that it deliver genuine epistemic standing to the knower. The main task of the paper will, then, be to explore how our having rational agency with respect to our mental states may be able to secure genuine epistemic warrant for our self-ascriptions of states or acts independent of the ascriptions. This task will be carried out by focussing on the question of what account we should give of our knowledge of what I call our acts of judging. In the remainder of this section, I will do a little to clarify what is meant by that question. Section 2 will attempt to introduce us to elements of the best way to approach the question by considering some alternative strategies. Section 3 is devoted to forming some idea of what _kind_ of warrant we are looking for when considering how agency might give us self-knowledge. Section 4 aims to present a suggestion as to how agency gives us the kind of warrant identified over our acts of judging. Section 5 deals with some objections. (shrink)

This paper argues that Gareth Evans' treatment of first person reference based on the myriad ways we have of receiving information about our bodies and location, cannot secure the guaranteed reference exhibited by first person reference. It faces a problem both when a subject fails to receive such information about herself, and when she receives misinformation.

Philosophical ethics comprises metaethics, normative ethics and applied ethics. These have characteristically received analytic treatment by twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy. But there has been disagreement over their interrelationship to one another and the relationship of analytical ethics to substantive morality – the making of moral judgments. I contend that the expertise philosophers have in either theoretical or applied ethics does not equip them to make sounder moral judgments on the problems of bioethics than nonphilosophers. One cannot "apply" theories like Kantianism or (...) consequentialism to get solutions to practical moral problems unless one knows which theory is correct, and that is a metaethical question over which there is no consensus. On the other hand, to presume to be able to reach solutions through neutral analysis of problems is unavoidably to beg controversial theoretical issues in the process. Thus, while analytical ethics can play an important clarificatory role in bioethics, it can neither provide, nor substitute for, moral wisdom. Keywords: abortion, applied ethics, bioethics, metaethics, normative ethics CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

SummaryThis article examines the disputes amongst Irish Presbyterians about the teaching of moral philosophy by Professor John Ferrie in the college department of the Royal Belfast Academical Institution in the early nineteenth century and the substantive philosophical and theological issues that were raised. These issues have largely been ignored by Irish historians, but a discussion of them is of general relevance to historians of ideas as they illuminate a series of broader questions about the definition and development of Scottish philosophy. (...) These are represented in the move from two philosophers who had strong connections with Irish Presbyterianism—Francis Hutcheson, the early eighteenth-century moral sense philosopher and theological moderate from County Down, and James McCosh, nineteenth-century exponent of modified Common Sense philosophy at Queen's College Belfast and a committed evangelical. In particular, this article addresses three important themes—the definition and character of ‘the Scottish philosophy’, the relationship between evangelicalism and Common Sense philosophy, and the process of development and adaptation that occurred in eighteenth-century Scottish thought during the first half of the nineteenth century. (shrink)

In a world riven with conflict, violence and war, this book proposes a philosophical defense of pacifism. It argues that there is a moral presumption against war and unless that presumption is defeated, war is unjustified. Leading philosopher of non-violence Robert Holmes contends that neither just war theory nor the rationales for recent wars defeat that presumption, hence that war in the modern world is morally unjustified. A detailed, comprehensive and elegantly argued text which guides both students and scholars (...) through the main debates clearly but without oversimplifying the complexities of the issues or historical examples. (shrink)

The object of this article is to ascertain as nearly as possible the dates of the conference at Luca and of Cicero's speech on the consular provinces; to identify the composition which he called his ‘palinode’; and to fix the chronological order of certain letters which relate to these points. Writing on April 8, 698 , Cicero tells his brother that on the 5th there was a debate in the Senate on the Campanian land; that on the 7th he visited (...) Pompey, who intended to start on the IIth for Sardinia and to embark at Labro or Pisa; and that he himself is on the point of leaving Rome, but intends, after staying successively at Anagnia, Arpinum, Pompeii, and Cumae, to return on May 6. Two years later he wrote to Lentulus Spinther that in the debate of April 5, 56, it had been resolved ‘that the question of the Campanian land should be referred to a full meeting of the Senate on the 15th of May.’ ‘After this decree,’ he continued, had passed in accordance with my motion, Pompey, without showing the least sign of being offended with me, started for Sardinia and Africa, and on the way visited Caesar at Luca. Caesar complained a great deal about my motion, for he had already seen Crassus at Ravenna, and had been irritated by him against me. Everyone knew that Pompey was much annoyed about it—so I heard from others and afterwards learned definitely from my brother. When Pompey met him in Sardinia a few days after he left Luca, he said, “You are the very man I want to see… You went bail for your brother Marcus; unless you speak strongly to him, you'll have to pay up”… He spoke of his own services to me; recalled what he had often said to my brother about Caesar's measures [in his consulship] and the pledge which my brother had given for my conduct; called my brother to witness that what he had done to secure my recall [from exile] he had done with the consent of Caesar; and asked him to commend to me Caesar's policy and aims and persuade me not to attack, even if I would not or could not support them. (shrink)

Whitehead’s rejection of a coercive divine lawgiver is well known, but the underlying ethic which led him in that direction needs to be examined. Arguing that he is an ethical naturalist with an aesthetic theory of value, and an act utilitarian, I find that this gives priority to eros over agape, limits moral responsibility, and obscures the depth of moral evil.

Despite its centrality for ethical theory, and the near-axiomatic status it enjoyed for years, the thesis that an Ought cannot be derived from an Is has not until fairly recently come in for close scrutiny. During this time, however, there has been a swing of the pendulum from the view of G. E. Moore, that no one in his right mind could deny the thesis, to that of some contemporary philosophers who speak as though no one in his right mind (...) could affirm it. Predictably, the fact that traditional defenders of the thesis were not always clear about what they meant by it has meant that it has not always been clear what contemporary critics have been asserting when they deny it. Also predictably, this has meant that there has been no conclusive resolution of the issue. (shrink)

Octogesa.—Those who have read the First Commentary of Caesar's Civil War will remember that the theatre of the campaign which he conducted against Afranius and Petreius extended from a point on the Segre twenty-two Roman miles above Ilerda to the mountains which close on the north the valley of the Ebro. The earlier operations took place in the neighbourhood of Ilerda and on either side of the upper reaches of the Segre; the later in the country between Ilerda and the (...) mountains. Thanks to Stoffel, the topography of the earlier operations is determined fairly well: that of the later, especially the position of Octogesa, is still uncertain. Caesar's camp was about five furlongs west of Ilerda; the Pompeian camp was on a ridge half a mile south of his. (shrink)

Many suggest that professionalism as traditionally understood is all but dead in today's legal marketplace. Some scholars believe that 'professional' orientations based on managerialism and influenced by profitability have seen the demise of the lawyer's traditional professional identity. This paper argues otherwise. A pilot qualitative study of new Australian lawyers indicates that professional ideals can still flourish. Participants both understood the traditional ideals and sought to incorporate them in their own developing sense of professionalism. This paper reviews the experiences of (...) 11 early-career Australian lawyers in their first year of practice. Preliminary results suggest that certain experiences are crucial to developing and retaining a broad sense of professionalism: finding a balance between autonomous/independent work and close mentoring and supervision; realizing that legal practice is not merely a rational and rule-based activity, but one that involves ongoing uncertainty, including the uncertainly of dealing with 'real' people displaying 'real' emotions; and reaching a comfortable 'value convergence' between one's own values and those modelled by colleagues. (shrink)

The credibility of Caesar's account of his campaigns against the Helvetii and Ariovistus has recently been attacked anew by Signor Ferrero, whose fame, rapidly acquired, is not only European but Transatlantic, and who has conducted his case with more ability than his predecessors and on entirely new lines. I do not think that it will be a waste of time to analyse the article in which he has set it forth.

I AM glad that Dr. Fotheringham in the interesting paper which appeared in the Classical Quarterly adhered to the view that ‘Caesar calculated the new moon for January 1 [45 B.C]…and that this calculation determined the inaugural day of the Julian calendar.’ As the object of my brief note, on which he commented, was merely to show that Groebe had failed to prove that the day in question was January 2, I have only a few questions to ask. But first, (...) in justice to Judeich, I ought to say that his calculations, which Dr. Fotheringham notices, were made with the help of the assistant-astronomer attached to the observatory of the University of Strassburg. While Dr. Fotheringham admits that I was right in maintaining that the new moon of January 2, 45 B.C. was not visible on the evening of that day, he holds that Groebe was ‘fairly entitled to say’ that the new moon of March 24, 58 B.C. , was visible on March 25. Dr. Fotheringham may be justified in saying that it ought ‘in normal [or abnormally fine ?] weather to have been visible that evening’; but, as I observed in my note, Groebe affirmed that in calculating the time of visibility of the crescent we should accept the mean of the Babylonian estimates, 36 hours—less, I should have added, in the early spring and the winter, more in the summer and autumn. Was he entitled to deduct 9 hours from the mean for an observation made not in the clear atmosphere of the East, but in Switzerland? Dr. Fotheringham tells us that ‘the shortest interval between a new moon and the observation of the moon by Schmidt's naked eye comes’ not, as Groebe said, to 29, but ‘to 25.7 hours.’ But forty-eight of Schmidt's forty-nine observations were made at Athens, where the atmosphere is clearer than in Switzerland. The great difference in visibility which a clear atmosphere makes must strike everyone who goes from this country or from Switzerland to the East or to Northern Africa. I realized it for the first time when I was exploring in Tunisia before the war. Has Dr. Fotheringham or any other trustworthy observer ever seen with the naked eye in an atmosphere no clearer than that of Geneva a moon not more than 27 hours old? If so, is it not remarkable that, as Dr. Fotheringham has said, ‘Hitherto it has been the practice to assume that [in the early spring or the winter and in favourable weather ?] the moon becomes visible on the first evening when she is more than 30 hours old at sunset’? (shrink)

Recently, focus groups and qualitative interviews with nurses who provide frontline care for persons living with HIV highlighted the contentiousness surrounding the seemingly innocuous activity of counselling clients about HIV‐status disclosure, hereafter disclosure counselling. These empirical studies highlighted that while some nurses felt they should instruct clients to disclose their HIV‐positive status if HIV transmission were possible, other nurses were equally adamant that such counselling was outside the nursing scope of practice. A review of these opposing perceptions about disclosure counselling, (...) including an examination of the empirical evidence which supports each point, revealed that the dichotomous arguments needed to be nuanced. The empirical evidence about serostatus disclosure neither supported nor refuted either of these assertions; rather, it substantiated parts of each. To create this understanding, both empirical and theoretical works are used. First, the results of empirical studies about serostatus disclosure, or lack thereof and HIV transmission is presented; as part of this, Marks and Crepaz's HIV disclosure and exposure framework is examined. Second, the work of Michel Foucault on disciplinary and pastoral power is drawn from. The outcome is a nuanced understanding about the interrelationships between disclosure counselling and nursing practice and a final interpretation about what this understanding means for public health practice. (shrink)

This paper uses narrative from the social centre movement in the UK to argue that social centres are examples of the MacIntyrean small communities that can virtuously resist the overbearing market influence. Looking at the contrast between rented and squatted centres, the paper argues that those that are squatted are practice-based communities, and those that are rented, are institutions. This therefore highlights the interrupting role of the market and argues that the rented centres are incompatible with MacIntyre’s ideal.