The prefix “trans-” surrounds “animal” with a pluralizing effect: tranimals. This portmanteau word describes creatures at once real and imagined who traverse taxonomic categories. This essay considers two of many threads of trananimality: the transgenic and the prosthetic. Artist Jodi Clark imagines the Menagerie à Trois as a space for carnal humanimality, where sexual entanglements commingle with chimeric forms. This menagerie à tranimals extends Clark’s ever-expanding Menagerie à Trois by articulating a framework for contemplating and indexing humanimal networks of engineered (...) organisms while simultaneously attending to the agency-in-captivity experienced by prosthetic and transgenic tranimals. The results of genetic interventions, transgenic tranimals have been engineered to serve a range of roles in biomedical research. Prosthetic tranimals are not always born with their modifications, but are instead engaged by other human and non-human animals by way of mechanical devices and symbiotic systems. These physical bonds destabilize concepts of part and whole: synecdoche becomes an important way of conceptualizing the labour performed by tranimals. Tranimals signal entangled relations, framing potentially infinite configurations of cooperation and adaptation. Visitors to this menagerie are encouraged to rethink the ethical and moral space created by becoming with tranimals. (shrink)

The calamitous warnings of climate science have been latched onto by a growing roster of biotech start-up companies who propose to invent lab-generated meat alternatives to the ecologically disastrous livestock industry. They use solutionist hype to promote ‘sustainable’, ‘eco-friendly’, ‘cruelty-free’, ‘clean meat’. This moralized marketing, however, masks a continued reliance on animal agriculture. The fact remains that mammalian cells and tissues are grown in vitro using foetal calf serum, a blood-derived nutrient. Is it really possible to grow meat without banking (...) on the bodies of nonhuman others? Might there be more tasteful material? In Bioart Kitchen: Art, Feminism and Technoscience, Lindsay Kelley asks, ‘[h]‌ow do technologies taste?’ This article proposes one answer to her prompt, centred on a technofeminist contextualization of the research-creation project, Mooncalf (2019–present). Mooncalf is a series of wet lab experiments and artistic outputs that showcase the potential viability of human menstrual serum for culturing mammalian tissue. These experiments present a direct provocation that problematizes the cellular agriculture industry as it pertains to the production of ‘clean meat’ and instead works towards a proof-of-concept ‘unclean’ meat prototype. Mooncalf is a symbolic precursor or speculative promise meant to facilitate a ‘cultural taste’ for feminist biotechnologies. (shrink)

In this chapter, we explore whether agents have an epistemic duty to eradicate implicit bias. Recent research shows that implicit biases are widespread and they have a wide variety of epistemic effects on our doxastic attitudes. First, we offer some examples and features of implicit biases. Second, we clarify what it means to have an epistemic duty, and discuss the kind of epistemic duties we might have regarding implicit bias. Third, we argue that we have an epistemic duty to eradicate (...) implicit biases that have negative epistemic impact. Finally, we defend this view against the objection that we lack the relevant control over implicit bias that’s required for such a duty. We argue that we have a kind of reflective control over the implicit biases that we are duty-bound to eradicate. And since, as we show, we have this control over a wide variety of implicit biases, there are a lot of implicit biases that we have epistemic duties to eradicate. (shrink)

The decision to donate an organ is often the decision to save a loved one's life. Frequently recognized as an ultimate act of altruism, a person's choice to donate is embedded in their right to make decisions about their own body and well-being, free of coercion. To ensure donors are truly acting out of altruism, transplant professionals will not allow someone to donate if there are concerns of duress or inability to consent. Although the evaluation of potential donors is well-intentioned (...) and necessary, stigma and assumptions about young adults can sometimes lead to their being denied the opportunity to donate based on age rather than evidence, thus infringing upon their bodily autonomy. This case examines the narrative of a young man trying to save his sister through kidney donation, and the ramifications of denying him the opportunity to do so, and how the transplant community can re-envision their role in protecting young adult donors. (shrink)

Since Teuffel's Römische Literatur mentions s.v. Varius the famous entry in the Monte Cassino MS. incipit thvestes varii, but ignores its occurrence in a Benevento MS. , it may be well to give some account of the latter codex. For I read with amusement a recent article in this journal in which the writer severely censured Mr. Garrod's ignorance of the entry in Paris 7530, but revealed his own ignorance by assuming that it was the scribe of the Paris MS. (...) who had the lost tragedy of Varius before him. (shrink)

South African Military Professionalism: Some Critical Observations and Threats -- Threats to Professionalism in the United States Military -- Higher Education and the Profession of Arms: Explaining the Logic -- Military Professionalism -- An Organizational Challenge by Itself -- The Challenge of Maintaining Military Professionalism in the Face of Transformation: The Indonesian Army Experience -- Threats and Opportunities for Military Professionalism from Social Media -- The Profession of Arms and the Promotion of Ethics: The profession of Arms and the Challenge (...) of Ethics -- The New Economic Togetherness: Globalization of Economics and Some Implications for Security and the Military Profession -- Displaced Pride: Attacking Cynicism at the United States Air Force Acedemy -- Military Professionalism of the Swedish Armed Forces in the 21st Century -- The Dynamic Five-Factor Model as a Compass for Military Professionalism: A Comparison Between Switzerland and the Netherlands -- Complacency: A Threat to (Canadian) Military Professionalism. (shrink)

This article presents a critique of two arguments made by S.P. Morris in his recent piece ‘The Trouble with Mascots’. The first argument is that the wrong of mascots is rooted in the falsity of the stereotyping generalizations that they create and perpetuate. The second is that when the group provides the name to itself, it is, in light of that fact, no less morally objectionable. These two arguments are related, for the second would be correct if falsity were in (...) fact the issue. As I argue, however, if we take a different view of the problem that generalizations present, the moral relevance of who does the naming becomes clear. (shrink)

As corporations are going global, they are increasingly confronted with human rights challenges. As such, new ways to deal with human rights challenges in corporate operations must be developed as traditional governance mechanisms are not always able to tackle them. This article presents five different views on innovative solutions for the relationships between business and human rights that all build on empowerment, dialogue and constructive engagement. The different approaches highlight an emerging trend toward a more active role for corporations in (...) the protection of human rights. The first examines the need for enhanced dialogue between corporations and their stakeholders. The next three each examine a different facet of empowerment, a critical factor for the respect and protection of human rights: empowerment of the poor, of communities, and of consumers. The final one presents a case study of constructive corporate engagement in Myanmar (Burma). Altogether, these research projects provide insight into the complex relationships between corporate operations and human rights, by highlighting the importance of stakeholder dialogue and empowerment. All the five projects were presented during the Second Swiss Master Class in Corporate Social Responsibility, held in Lausanne, Switzerland on December 12, 2008. The audience for this conference, which examined business and human rights, was composed of researchers, governmental representatives, and business and non-governmental organization practitioners. (shrink)

The influence of historiography on aspects of political thought in France, Italy and Germany. In recent years the overlap between political thought and historiography has changed the boundaries of intellectual history. Donald Kelley, the longtime editor of The Journal of the History of Ideas has played a leading part in this process. These essays by his friends and former students follow in his footsteps. The collection is divided into three parts: France, England [six essays], and Italy and Germany [four (...) essays]. Anthony Grafton and John Salmon provide an introduction, and the volume concludes with a bibliography of Donald Kelley's many works. Historians and Ideologues is designed for those with an interest in the contribution of historiography to political thought, and will be a timely addition to the growing reaction against the postmodern scepticism in historiographical research in this field. Contributors include Ann Blair, Julian Franklin, Kathleen Parrow, David Harris Sacks, Sarah Hanley, Daniel Woolf, Gordon Schochet, Joseph Levine, John Pocock, Perez Zagorin, William Connell, Donald Phillip Verene, and Michael Carhart. Anthony Grafton is a Professor in the Department of History at Princeton University. John Salmon is the Marjorie Walter Goodheart Emeritus Professor of History at Bryn Mawr College. (shrink)

All five elements live within you, and experiences like heartache, anxiety, and procrastination are signs that one of them is out of balance. This beginner-friendly book introduces you to each of the elements--Water, Wood, Fire, Earth, and Metal--and shows you how to use them to improve your mental, emotional, and spiritual health. In Our Element weaves together Eastern medicine, Western psychology, Indigenous traditions, and African ancestral principles of spirituality. With a practical approach that incorporates journal prompts, flower essences, yoga poses, (...) and music, Lindsay Fauntleroy teaches you how to tap into the five elements for a balanced and empowered life that aligns with your soul's calling. (shrink)

Some actions we perform “just like that” without taking a means, e.g., raising your arm or wiggling your finger. Other actions—the nonbasic actions—we perform by taking a means, e.g., voting by raising your arm or illuminating a room by flipping a switch. A nearly ubiquitous view about nonbasic action is that one's means to a nonbasic action constitutes the nonbasic action, as raising your arm constitutes voting or flipping a switch constitutes illuminating a room. In this paper, I challenge this (...) view. I argue that one's means to a nonbasic action can cause rather than constitute it. In the process, we gain a clearer understanding of the scope of our agency—one that includes mental actions such as judgment and decision—and the pluralistic nature of basic features of action including control, purposefulness, and agent participation. (shrink)

I argue for an account of creativity that unifies creative achievements in the arts, sciences, and other domains and identifies its characteristic value. This account draws upon case studies of creative work in both the arts and sciences to identify creativity as a kind of successful exploration. I argue that if creativity is properly understood in this way, then it is fundamentally a property of processes, something only agents can achieve, something that comes in degrees, subjectively novel, and non-formulaic. As (...) I develop the account, I show how it avoids challenges faced by other accounts of creativity, especially concerning creativity’s value. Hills and Bird (2018, 2019) have together argued that creativity is not necessarily valuable. My account challenges this view. If I am right that creativity is a kind of successful exploration, then creativity does have a characteristic value, specifically epistemic value. (shrink)

This paper seeks to answer the question: Can contemporary forms of artificial intelligence be creative? To answer this question, I consider three conditions that are commonly taken to be necessary for creativity. These are novelty, value, and agency. I argue that while contemporary AI models may have a claim to novelty and value, they cannot satisfy the kind of agency condition required for creativity. From this discussion, a new condition for creativity emerges. Creativity requires curiosity, a motivation to pursue epistemic (...) goods. I argue that contemporary AI models do not satisfy this new condition. Because they lack both agency and curiosity, it is a mistake to attribute the same sort of creativity to AI that we prize in humans. Finally, I consider the question of whether these AI models stand to make human creativity in the arts and sciences obsolete, despite not being creative themselves. I argue, optimistically, that this is unlikely. (shrink)

There is a well-known equivalence between avoiding accuracy dominance and having probabilistically coherent credences (see, e.g., de Finetti 1974, Joyce 2009, Predd et al. 2009, Pettigrew 2016). However, this equivalence has been established only when the set of propositions on which credence functions are defined is finite. In this paper, I establish connections between accuracy dominance and coherence when credence functions are defined on an infinite set of propositions. In particular, I establish the necessary results to extend the classic accuracy (...) argument for probabilism to certain classes of infinite sets of propositions including countably infinite partitions. (shrink)

Ancient Egypt in 101 Questions and Answers. By Thomas SchneIder, translated by David Lorton. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013. Pp. xiv + 282, illus. $26.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:How Policies and Practices in Medical Settings Impact Communication Access with Deaf Patients and CaregiversKelley Cooper, Maggie Russell, Debra Chaiken, Michael W. Mazzaroppi, and Gretchen RomanIntroductionWe are a group of Deaf community members, sign language interpreters, organizational leaders, and academic partners. We have a collective point of view about how policies and practices in medical settings impact communication access with Deaf patients and caregivers. Here, we account multiple stories (...) from our respective experiences in an effort to improve healthcare institutions' awareness of the recommended modalities when communicating with Deaf patients accessing care. Our stories clarify any misunderstandings about communication with Deaf patients who expressively use spoken language and receptively use sign language. We convey that it is imperative to use visual language when explaining discharge paperwork and emphasize that it is critical for a Deaf caregiver to be fully aware of the plan of care when offering support to their loved one. We illustrate the importance of honoring the requests for in-person sign language interpreting versus video remote interpreting (VRI) as well as requests for Deaf-Hearing sign language interpreter teams. Deaf interpreters bring formative cultural, linguistic, and life experiences and work in partnership with a hearing interpreter to provide a more nuanced communication exchange across a wide range of visual languages.Maggie Russell: Anecdote 1The hospital recidivism rate for a Deaf Nepali male patient continues to increase. As the Interpreter Referral Service Director, I am aware of this patient because he receives care management services from our organization. He has several life-threatening conditions, attends dialysis, is on multiple medications, and is frequently in and out of the local hospital. The hospital considers him as someone who identifies as an oral Deaf person, as he has severe to profound hearing loss with little or no residual hearing and visually receives signed language but expressively uses spoken language. Three interpreters, a spoken Nepalese interpreter, a Deaf Nepali Sign Language (NSL) interpreter, and a hearing American Sign Language (ASL) interpreter, working together as a team are recommended for effective communication with this patient and the medical team of providers. However, interpreting services at the hospital provide only one interpreter, a spoken Nepalese interpreter, which [End Page E3] does not satisfy the necessary accommodations for access. A plethora of prescriptions were added to his regimen to counter the condition that caused a recent inpatient stay. The patient's wife is his primary caregiver. She communicates receptively and expressively using NSL. A Deaf NSL and hearing ASL interpreter team creates effective communication with his wife and the medical team of providers. Since she is expected to follow the doctor's recommendations as explained in the discharge instructions, she also requires accommodations for communication access. Neither the patient nor his wife received a formal education, and they do not read or write English or the language of their country of origin. Therefore, information in English or Nepalese conveyed in the printed discharge paperwork is inaccessible. The new medications were not incorporated into his already established monthly "pill pack," and the couple was unable to read the information on the pill bottles that were delivered to their home. Subsequently, incorrect use of the newly prescribed medications significantly delayed the patient's course of recovery. This couple also had minimal exposure to medical information and medical processes prior to living in the United States; the medical services in the refugee camps in Nepal were typically non-existent. Utilizing a hearing ASL interpreter alone does not constitute barrier-free access for either of these individuals. Interpreting medical documents in a visual format is so critical for providing access, but it doesn't necessarily guarantee comprehension because of their limited health literacy. In addition to employing the recommended interpreting team, using teach-back methods during an encounter is a good way for medical providers to ensure the patient and caregiver's understanding of the plan of care.Maggie Russell: Anecdote 2As the Interpreter Referral Service Director at our organization, I served as the hearing interpreter on a Deaf-Hearing ASL interpreter team at a follow-up gastrointestinal appointment from a gall bladder biopsy for a Deaf male patient, along with his Deaf... (shrink)

Each of us has written about the importance of reframing the debate over public health paternalism. Our individual explorations of the many and varied paths forward from libertarian “nanny state” objections to the “new public health” have been intimately informed by collaboration. This article represents a summary of our current thinking — reflecting the ground gained through many fruitful exchanges and charting future collaborative efforts.Our starting point is that law is a vitally important determinant of population health, and the interplay (...) among law, social norms, cultural beliefs, health behaviors, and healthy living conditions is complex. Anti-paternalists’ efforts to limit the scope of public health law to controlling only the proximal determinants of infectious diseases are utterly unjustifiable in the face of so much preventable death, disability, and disparity. Equally important, the anti-paternalism push is deeply counter-majoritarian and undemocratic, threatening to disable communities from undertaking measures to improve their own well-being. (shrink)

Health justice is both a community-led movement for power building and transformational change and a community-oriented framework for health law scholarship. Health justice is distinguished by a distinctively social ethic of care that reframes the relationship between health care, public health, and the social determinants of health, and names subordination as the root cause of health inequities.

Intentional action is often accompanied by knowledge of what one is doing—knowledge which appears non-observational and non-inferential. G.E.M. Anscombe defends the stronger claim that intentional action always comes with such knowledge. Among those who follow Anscombe, some have altered the features, content, or species of the knowledge claimed to necessarily accompany intentional action. In this paper, I argue that there is no knowledge condition on intentional action, no matter the assumed features, content, or species of the knowledge. Further, rather than (...) follow the usual methodology in this debate of arguing by counterexample, I present an argument that explains why we continue to find counterexamples: intentional action and knowledge are regulated by thresholds under distinct pressures; in particular, the threshold of control regulating intentional action is disparately influenced by the role of intentional action in practical normativity. (shrink)

One of the central problems in the philosophy of action is to spell out the distinction between action and what merely happens, e.g., a wink versus an eye twitch. This essay proposes a theory of action offering an account of this distinction. The central claim of the theory is that action is movement that is controlled by the mover, where movement is understood capaciously and control is characterized by a trio of conditions consisting of an aim condition, a modal condition, (...) and an explanatory condition. Importantly, being controlled is shown to be a determinable property of movements, and its determination dimensions are isolated. Paired with the claim that action is movement that is controlled by the mover, this account of control as a determinable illuminates the diversity within the category of action. (shrink)

This is a review essay of Lagasnerie, Judge and Punish and Fassin, The Will to Punish. It explores the way that these two books challenge conventional thinking about the relationship between crime and punishment.

We argue that subjective Bayesians face a dilemma: they must offend against the spirit of their permissivism about rational credence or reject the principle that one should avoid accuracy dominance.

In this highly original of realism, David Kelley argues that perception is the discrimination of objects as entities, that the awareness of these objects is direct, and that perception is a reliable foundation for empirical knowledge. His argument relies on the basic principle of the 'primacy of existence, ' in opposition to Cartesian representationalism and Kantian idealism.

Both proponents and critics of the desire theory of welfare have narrowly focused on the positive side of the theory while virtually ignoring its negative side. On the positive side, the desire theorist says that getting what you want is good for you. But what should the desire theorist say is bad for you? A common and plausible-sounding answer is that if getting what you want is good for you, then surely not getting what you want is bad for you. (...) I argue that this answer is a mistake that would commit desire theorists to a claim that is implausible by their own lights, namely that a state of affairs could be bad for you even if you were not at all bothered by it. The desire theorist should instead say that getting what you are averse to is bad for you. If desire satisfaction is good for you, then aversion satisfaction, not desire frustration, is bad for you. (shrink)

According to internalism about prudential value, the token states of affairs that are basically good for you must be suitably connected, under the proper conditions, to your positive attitudes. It is commonly thought that any theory of welfare that implies internalism is guaranteed to respect the alienation constraint, the doctrine that you cannot be alienated from that which is basically good for you. The assumption is that because internalism requires a necessary connection between a subject’s positive attitudes and each state (...) of basic benefit to that subject, theories that imply internalism will only postulate goods that resonate with the subject. In this paper, I show that extant formulations of internalism do not have this desirable feature. The central defect of traditional formulations is that they do not respect an important but overlooked truth about alienation: namely, that even if a state of affairs is suitably connected to your positive attitudes, your negative attitudes can nonetheless render you alienated from it. By taking into account the relevance of the negative attitudes, I propose the new internalism—the view that x is basically good for you only if you have a net positive attitude towards it—as a way to advance our thinking about what is required to avoid alienating theories of welfare. (shrink)

In this paper I articulate a view of doxastic control that helps defend the legitimacy of our practice of blaming people for their beliefs. I distinguish between three types of doxastic control: intention-based, reason-based, and influence-based. First I argue that, although we lack direct intention-based control over our beliefs, such control is not necessary for legitimate doxastic blame. Second, I suggest that we distinguish two types of reason-responsiveness: sensitivity to reasons and appreciation of reasons. I argue that while both capacities (...) are necessary for satisfying the control condition, neither is sufficient. Finally, I defend an influence-based view of doxastic control according to which we have the capacity to execute intentions to engage in reflection that causally influences our beliefs in positive epistemic ways. This capacity is both necessary and sufficient for satisfying the control condition for legitimate doxastic blame. I end by defending the view from two objections: that reflection is not necessary for meeting the control condition, and that it is not sufficient. (shrink)

What is it to suspend judgment about whether p? Much of the recent work on the nature and normative profile of suspending judgment aims to analyze it as a kind of doxastic attitude. On some of these accounts, suspending judgment about whether p partly consists in taking up a certain higher-order belief about one's deficient epistemic position with respect to whether p. On others, suspending judgment about whether p consists in taking up a sui generis attitude, one that takes the (...) question of whether p? as its content. In this paper, I defend an account on which suspending judgment about whether p is not a matter of taking up a doxastic attitude, but rather a way of intentionally omitting to judge whether p. I then close with a discussion of how an account like mine, which sees suspending judgment as fundamentally practical, rather than doxastic, can accommodate what appear to be distinctively epistemic reasons to suspend judgment. (shrink)

This paper argues that the discussion in which Aristotle engages in Metaphysics ΖΗ has the same starting-point as natural science: the principles of changing substances. These inquiries are nonetheless distinct because natural science uses these principles in its detailed investigations into natural substances, whereas ΖΗ reflect on the principles themselves. ΖΗ are an integral part of Aristotle’s inquiry into the principles of all substances, changing and unchanging: they are not merely preliminary to an inquiry into the latter kind. They are (...) also an integral part of Aristotle’s ‘first philosophy’, alongside theology’s study of the nature and activity of unchanging substances. (shrink)