Although critical reception of discourse markers (DMs) such as like and you know has often been noted, surprisingly little research has actually investigated this attitudinal perspective on usage. Moreover, a recent, rapidly expanding body of research on non-L1 speakers’ use of discourse markers in English has suggested that their more or less frequent use of specific markers may be due to familiarity with these markers and positive or negative marker perceptions. The present study presents the results of a survey measuring (...) British English L1 speakers’, English as Foreign Language (EFL) learners’, and English as a Lingua Franca (ELF) speakers’ perceptions of the discourse markers so, like, well and you know and their reactions to either abundance or lack of DMs. The survey measured speaker attitudes by asking participants to evaluate the usage of other DMs. We found that L1, EFL, and ELF have varying attitudes about certain markers, and these markers are perceived differently for traits like politeness and friendliness. Generally speaking, L1 speakers were more positively disposed towards markers than either of the other groups, who in their turn rated the propositional functions of the markers as more acceptable than interactional functions. (shrink)

In a famous critique, Goodman dismissed similarity as a slippery and both philosophically and scientifically useless notion. We revisit his critique in the light of important recent work on similarity in psychology and cognitive science. Specifically, we use Tversky’s influential set-theoretic account of similarity as well as Gärdenfors’s more recent resuscitation of the geometrical account to show that, while Goodman’s critique contained valuable insights, it does not warrant a dismissal of similarity.

It has seemed natural to model phenomena related to vagueness in terms of graded membership. However, so far no satisfactory answer has been given to the question of what graded membership is nor has any attempt been made to describe in detail a procedure for determining degrees of membership. We seek to remedy these lacunae by building on recent work on typicality and graded membership in cognitive science and combining some of the results obtained there with a version of the (...) conceptual spaces framework. (shrink)

In this theoretical contribution, we interpret the notion of professional development in the light of concepts coming from cognitive development. This brings us to consider teacher training as not only having to allow the elaboration of skills, but also as having to encourage the development of new cognitive structures. We explore the theoretical concepts in relation with certain processes revealed by the reflexive texts of the students. Finally, we propose ways that could foster certain dimensions of global professional development in (...) learners, among which self-regulated learning, the focus on certain concerns and taking into account certain types of information. (shrink)

I want to analyse the Quine-Carnap discussion on analyticity with regard to logical, mathematical and set-theoretical statements. In recent years, the renewed interest in Carnap’s work has shed a new light on the analytic-synthetic debate. If one fully appreciates Carnap’s conventionalism, one sees that there was not a metaphysical debate on whether there is an analytic-synthetic distinction, but rather a controversy on the expedience of drawing such a distinction. However, on this view, there can be no longer a single analytic-synthetic (...) distinction, because several kinds of statements could be regarded as analytic (L-determinate). L-equivalence between extra-logical linguistic predicates has already been heavily debated. The recent consensus states that Quine’s rejection of this analytic-synthetic is pragmatically grounded in his linguistic behaviorism. However, Carnap’s logical frameworks also contain other kinds of statements, and it is worthwhile to compare both Quine and Carnap’s grounds for considering these statements as analytic or not analytic. First, I will discuss logical statements. I will argue that Quine draws a very sharp distinction between first order logic and set theory, which should be regarded as a (pragmatic) analytic-synthetic distinction (as Quine admits in an interview, see Theoria, 40, 1994, p. 199). In fact, Quine’s major worry is whether identity statements are analytic. Second, I will discuss mathematical statements. In Carnap’s Foundations of Logic and Mathematics, it is clear that mathematical statements are analytic. For Quine, all mathematical statements are reducible to set-theoretical statements. Third, I discuss the analyticity of set-theoretical statements. For Quine, the membership predicate should be regarded as an interpreted extra-logical predicate. Quine’s work in set theory and his later philosophy of set theory naturally lead to the view that set-theoretical statements cannot be analytic. A major complication for the Quine-Carnap comparison is that Carnap has no elaborate reflections on set theory, while the influence of set theory on Quine’s views can hardly be underestimated. I conclude with some lessons for the contemporary debate on analyticity. (shrink)

The Interplay of Logic, Set Theory and Semantics in Quine's Philosophy L. Decock. In philosophy of science Quine's name is linked to the so-called Quine- Duhem thesis. The discussion of this thesis still continues even after several decades.9 ...

This volume consists of several contributions to a refined understanding of religious experience in view of contemporary theological epistemology.

I analyze Quine’s later writings on analyticity from a linguistic point of view. In Word and Object Quine made room for a “strictly vegetarian” notion of analyticity. In later years, he developed this notion into two more precise notions, which I have coined “stimulus analyticity” and “behaviorist analyticity.” The latter characterization is in many respects similar to Carnap’s characterization of analyticity based on semantic rules and can be seamlessly incorporated in a Carnapian project of explication. I explain why Quine failed (...) to see the importance of analyticity thus defined. I argue that Quine’s views on language are deeply rooted in the American structuralist tradition in linguistics and that the resulting strict descriptivism and the strong emphasis on language change bring down the usefulness of analyticity. (shrink)

In two papers in the mid-seventies, Quine has discussed an ontological deba-cle, the reduction of ontology to an ontology of pure sets only. This debacle, which weakened Quine’s interest in ontology, is the natural outcome of on-tological relativity, or, more precisely, the proxy-function argument. It is ex-plained how Quine unavoidably came to this conclusion. Moreover, it is ar-gued that the result is even more damaging for Quine’s philosophy than has hitherto been assumed. It is shown that in addition to an (...) ontological debacle, there is an ideological debacle, reducing the ideology (lexicon) of science to the ideology of set theory. The ideological debacle results from applying ex-tensional substitution of predicates within a scientific theory that is reinter-preted by means of proxy-functions to a theory with a set-theoretic ontology. Though Quine has recognized the possibility of an ideological debacle, his rebuttal is unconvincing. As a result, his tenet of extensionalism is under heavy pressure. (shrink)

Contents: Introduction. NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY. Ton DERKSEN: Naturalistic Epistemology, Murder and Suicide? But what about the Promises! Christopher HOOKWAY: Naturalism and Rationality. Mia GOSSELIN: Quine's Hypothetical Theory of Language Learning. A Comparison of Different Conceptual Schemes of Their Logic. THE NATURE OF PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE. Jaap van BRAKEL: Quine and Innate Similarity Spaces. Dirk KOPPELBERG: Quine and Davidson on the Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Eva PICARDI: Empathy and Charity. ONTOLOGY. Sandra LAUGIER: Quine: Indeterminacy, ‘Robust Realism', and Truth. Roger VERGAUWEN: Quine and Putnam (...) on Conceptual Relativity and Reference: Theft or Honest Toil? Igor DOUVEN: Empiricist Semantics and Indeterminism of Reference. Lieven DECOCK: Domestic Ontology and Ideology. Paul GOCHET: Canonical Notation, Predication and Ontology. About the Authors. (shrink)

We consider the implications of analyzing teaching as a sociocultural form. We suggest that the internalization of mediations includes not only concepts but a complex of dimensions of mediations. These dimensions enable us to define a form. Each students, building on previously subjectivated microforms, tries to give a personal meaning to the transmitted knowledge and to his experiences. The theoretical and professional training enables however the elaboration of a subjectivated sociocultural form. Regarding teacher training, the process is even more complex (...) due to the different origin of the transmitted knowledge. We conclude by outlining some consequences resulting from taking into account this notion of form in teacher training. (shrink)

The conceptual spaces approach has recently emerged as a novel account of concepts. Its guiding idea is that concepts can be represented geometrically, by means of metrical spaces. While it is generally recognized that many of our concepts are vague, the question of how to model vagueness in the conceptual spaces approach has not been addressed so far, even though the answer is far from straightforward. The present paper aims to fill this lacuna.

Traditionally, epistemologists have held that only truth-related factors matter in the question of whether a subject can be said to know a proposition. Various philosophers have recently departed from this doctrine by claiming that the answer to this question also depends on practical concerns. They take this move to be warranted by the fact that people’s knowledge attributions appear sensitive to contextual variation, in particular variation due to differing stakes. This paper proposes an alternative explanation of the aforementioned fact, one (...) that allows us to stick to the orthodoxy. The alternative applies the conceptual spaces approach to the concept of knowledge. With knowledge conceived of spatially, the variability in knowledge attributions follows from recent work on identity, according to which our standards for judging things (including concepts) to be identical are context-dependent. On the proposal to be made, it depends on what is at stake in a context whether it is worth distinguishing between knowing and being at least close to knowing. (shrink)

. reh S.ni a Paul Rieoeur. hfFerem ï penenee i in ree PEE TERS.LEI \ IN PEETERS.

Reflectance physicalism only provides a partial picture of the ontology of color. Byrne & Hilbert’ account is unsatisfactory because the replacement of reflectance functions by productance functions is ad hoc, unclear, and only leads to new problems. Furthermore, the effects of color contrast and differences in illumination are not really taken seriously: Too many “real” colors are tacitly dismissed as illusory, and this for arbitrary reasons. We claim that there cannot be an all-embracing ontology for color.

Contra Shepard we argue, first, that his presentation of a three-dimensional representational (psychological or phenomenal) colour space is at odds with many results in colour science, and, second, that there is insufficient evidence for Shepard's stronger claim that the three-dimensionality of colour perception has resulted from natural selection, moulded by the particulars of the solar spectrum and its variations. [Shepard].

Traditionally, Thomas S. Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) is largely identified with his analysis of the structure of scientific revolutions. Here, we contribute to a minority tradition in the Kuhn literature by interpreting the history of evolutionary biology through the prism of the entire historical developmental model of sciences that he elaborates in The Structure. This research not only reveals a certain match between this model and the history of evolutionary biology but, more importantly, also sheds new light (...) on several episodes in that history, and particularly on the publication of Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859), the construction of the modern evolutionary synthesis, the chronic discontent with it, and the latest expression of that discontent, called the extended evolutionary synthesis. Lastly, we also explain why this kind of analysis hasn’t been done before. (shrink)

In this volume we present the proceedings from the fourth international Leuven Encounters in Systematic Theology (LEST IV, November 5-8, 2003), which focussed ...

To act or think like a thing is a theme that runs as a red thread through Sartre’s oeuvre, but it is only in his Critique of Dialectical Reason that he would come to a coherent account of reifcation, which underpins what is perhaps his most seminal achievement in this book, the theory of the series. In contrast to Lukács’ account of reification, which has roots in Marx’s notion of social form, Sartre’s theory draws on diferent theoretical resources, such as (...) the notion of inertia and the exteriorisation of internal relations. It underpins his notion of the mass, which he understands as fundamentally ambivalent: the mass is the product of seriality and reification, it is the subject of steering and manipulation, but it can never be fully controlled. In specifc circumstances its internal dynamic can lead to forms of dereification through the interiorisation of number, which underpins the formation of a group, the agent of collective action. (shrink)

Following a usage-based approach to language acquisition, lexically specific patterns are considered to be important building blocks for language productivity and feature heavily both in child-directed speech and in the early speech of children (Arnon, Inbal & Morten H. Christiansen. 2017. The role of multiword building blocks in explaining L1-L2 differences. Topics in Cognitive Science 9(3). 621–636; Tomasello, Michael. 2003. Constructing a language: A usage-based theory of language acquisition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press). In order to account for patterns, the traceback (...) method has been widely applied in research on first language acquisition to test the hypothesis that children’s utterances can be accounted for on the basis of a limited inventory of chunks and partially schematic units (Lieven, Elena, Dorothé Salomo & Michael Tomasello. 2009. Two-year-old children’s production of multiword utterances: A usage-based analysis. Cognitive Linguistics 20(3). 481–508). In the current study, we applied the method to code-mixed utterances (n = 1,506) of three German-English bilingual children between 2 and 4 years of age to investigate individual differences in each child’s own inventory of patterns in relation to their input settings. It was shown that units such as I see X as in I see a Kelle ‘I see a trowel’ could be traced back to the child’s own previous productions. More importantly, we see that each child’s inventory of constructions draws heavily on multiword chunks that are strongly dependent on the children’s language input situations. (shrink)

The development and changes in Quine's ideas on universais are analysed, and especially the interplay of the notions of attribute, set and predicate is highlighted. In a first logico-mathematical part it is shown how Quine banned attributes as a result of extensionalism, and how set-theoretic solutions for Russell's paradox disturbed the easy view of each predicate determining a class. Quine even tried to formulate nominalistic theories without universais (sets). It is further shown how linguistic considerations played a role in Quine's (...) ideas on universais. The role of predicates is scrutinised, and it is shown how they are torn between logical and linguistic demands. It is suggested that the role of attributes has been taken over by predicates. This semantic role of predicates is quite unstable. I conclude with the suggestion that Quine should separate set theory and linguistics more radically. (shrink)