First published in 1961. Foreword by Arthur Kemp. Includes bibliographical references.

This book demonstrates how the pedagogical decision making of university academics can be shaped by engagement with an educational philosophy known as "relationship-centred education". Beginning with critical analysis of concepts such as student engagement, student satisfaction, and student-centred learning, the author goes on to investigate how literature relating to social justice challenges educators to consider these terms in particular ways. From this basis, the book explores the factors featuring in inclusive, respectful, diverse and student-centred environments. In analysing these factors, the (...) author illuminates the perspectives of university teachers who struggle with the unique challenges of working in the academy; including an increasingly broad set of employment demands and narrower criteria for determining 'impact', all while retaining focus on the transformative potential of higher education. This book will be of interest to students and scholars of transformative learning, as well as social justice within higher education. Leonie Rowan is Associate Professor in the School of Education and Professional Studies at Griffith University, Australia. (shrink)

Disinformation poses a significant threat to democratic societies, particularly in the context of the Covid-19 health crisis. This study delves into the prevalence and nature of disinformation in social media by analyzing Facebook accounts of political actors and alternative media within the unique Swiss landscape during the first wave of the pandemic. Using standardized quantitative content analysis, we categorize posts as either accurate, reconfigured, or fabricated. Our findings reveal a disconcerting pattern: Disinformation was shared more frequently than accurate information. Notably, (...) right-wing politicians and parties, alongside alternative media sources, emerged as the most prolific disseminators of disinformation. Digging deeper, we discovered that the predominant form of disinformation shared on social media was reconfigured disinformation, signifying manipulated or contextually distorted information. This prevalence of reconfigured disinformation on social media platforms raises pressing concerns about the public’s ability to discern fact from fiction. Moreover, our study shines a spotlight on the inadvertent or perhaps deliberate contributions of right-wing politicians and parties and alternative media sources to the propagation of disinformation. By examining this phenomenon within the Swiss context during the initial wave of the pandemic, we provide valuable insights into the dynamics of disinformation and its implications for society during crisis situations. (shrink)

Algorithmic predictions are promising for insurance companies to develop personalized risk models for determining premiums. In this context, issues of fairness, discrimination, and social injustice might arise: Algorithms for estimating the risk based on personal data may be biased towards specific social groups, leading to systematic disadvantages for those groups. Personalized premiums may thus lead to discrimination and social injustice. It is well known from many application fields that such biases occur frequently and naturally when prediction models are applied to (...) people unless special efforts are made to avoid them. Insurance is no exception. In this paper, we provide a thorough analysis of algorithmic fairness in the case of insurance premiums. We ask what “fairness” might mean in this context and how the fairness of a premium system can be measured. For this, we apply the established fairness frameworks of the fair machine learning literature to the case of insurance premiums and show which of the existing fairness criteria can be applied to assess the fairness of insurance premiums. We argue that two of the often-discussed group fairness criteria, independence (also called statistical parity or demographic parity) and separation (also known as equalized odds), are not normatively appropriate for insurance premiums. Instead, we propose the sufficiency criterion (also known as well-calibration) as a morally defensible alternative that allows us to test for systematic biases in premiums towards certain groups based on the risk they bring to the pool. In addition, we clarify the connection between group fairness and different degrees of personalization. Our findings enable insurers to assess the fairness properties of their risk models, helping them avoid reputation damage resulting from potentially unfair and discriminatory premium systems. (shrink)

In his recent book Moral Skepticisms Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues in great detail for contrastivism with respect to justified moral belief and moral knowledge. I raise three questions concerning this view. First, how would Sinnott-Armstrong account for constraints on admissible contrast classes? Secondly, how would he deal with notorious problems concerning relevant reference classes? Finally, how can he account for basic features of moral agency? It turns out that the last problem is the most serious one for his account.

How is violence conventionally portrayed and where does violence lie in representation? How does photography mediate the relationships between different forms and ideas, moments and experiences of violence? These were some of the questions addressed in a conversation between artist Harri Pälviranta and philosopher Stefanie Baumann organized by Alexandra Athanasiadou, founder and director of the online platform Philosophy & Photography Lab (PHLSPH), during the international Photography Festival, Imago Lisboa, in Lisbon during October 2022. The discussion presented here is edited (...) from a transcript by Athanasiadou. It took place at Lusófona University in Lisbon on the occasion of Pälviranta’s exhibition at the Museu Nacional de Arte Contemporânea (MNAC) (6 October 2021–8 January 2023) and focuses on two series of works in the exhibition, News Portraits and Choreography of Violence. (shrink)

This paper argues that Kripke's claim that there are contingent a priori truths would be vitiated by a seemingly unorthodox understanding of the term "a priori".

The pro tanto duty not to harm is arguably the most widely accepted basis for moral demand. However, in the case of global poverty, even if we accept that individual members of wealthier nations are responsible for harming the global poor (through their constitution of, or participation in or with, global institutions that harm), it remains difficult to claim that individuals violate a negative duty in doing so. For an agent to hold a duty, that duty must be at least (...) (a) recognizable to a reasonably competent observer, and (b) fulfillable, two criteria which do not appear to be met. This paper argues that we have misunderstood the way in which the global community harms the global poor. As a result, there are a range of acts—the provision of financial aid—which the global community largely fails to undertake and which form a part of violating the negative duty not to harm. In relation to these global acts, it is straightforward for individuals both to recognize what they would need to do to avoid participating in the harm of global poverty and to achieve that avoidance: individuals simply need to provide financial aid. As such, assuming that individuals are culpable for the harms committed by intersecting global institutions, then their participation in harm also violates a negative duty not to inflict such harm. This opens up a further remedial duty to provide financial aid for past harms committed. (shrink)

Challenging the assumption that that the capitalist transformation includes a radical break with the past, this edited volume traces how historically older forms of social inequality are transformed but persist in the present to shape the social structure of contemporary societies in the global South. Each society comprises an interpretation of itself - including the meaning of life, the concept of a human being and the notion of a collective. This volume studies the interpretation that various societies have of themselves. (...) This interpretation is referred to as social ontology. All chapters of the edited volume focus on the relation between social ontology and structures of inequality. They argue that each society comprises several historical layers of social ontology that correspond to layers of inequality, which are referred to as sociocultures. Thereby, the volume explains why and how structures of inequality differ between contemporary collectives in the global South, even though all of them seem to have similar structures, institutions, and economies. The volume is aimed at academics, students and the interested public looking for a novel theorization of social inequality pertaining to collectives in the global South. (shrink)

Contemporary animal ethics mainly developed due to the human treatment of farmed animals. Thereby, the following questions were neglected: If nonhuman animals are part of the moral community, what does this mean for human obligations towards wild animals? Must these be the same as towards domesticated animals? Could an unequal treatment be justified or would it be arbitrarily? Recent animal ethicists are dealing more and more with these questions. The work at hand discusses this topic intensively. It examines how 'classical' (...) theories of animal ethics can be applied to the question of how a proper treatment of wild animals should look like. It especially focusses on the approach of Clare Palmer and its implications on wild animals and so called followers of culture. Subsequently, the compiled results are applied to the topic of 'invasive species'. (shrink)

Transgender and gender diverse (TGD) youth are currently being targeted by global anti-trans legislation that would prevent their access to gender-affirming care even by healthcare providers willing to deliver it and who understand the importance of this support. It has been suggested in some studies that transness in young people is a result of peer contagion. As such their free will, authenticity and autonomy could be brought into question when accessing gender-affirming care. It is important to explore the relevance of (...) these concepts concerning the provision of gender-affirming care to TGD youth by nurses and other healthcare professionals. Nurses should challenge the notion held by some that these young people are not capable of knowing themselves or the level of treatment they require. They can do this by practising gender-affirming care determined by aspirational ethical values of beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy and justice. (shrink)

Christoph Jäger (2004) argues that Dretske's information theory of knowledge raises a serious problem for his denial of closure of knowledge under known entailment: Information is closed under known entailment (even under entailment simpliciter); given that Dretske explains the concept of knowledge in terms of "information", it is hard to stick with his denial of closure for knowledge. Thus, one of the two basic claims of Dretske would have to go. Since giving up the denial of closure would commit Dretske (...) to skepticism, it would most probably be better to rather give up the information-theoretic account of knowledge. But that means that one of the best externalist views of knowledge has to be given up. I argue here that Jäger is mistaken and that there is no problem for Dretske. There is a rather easy way out of Jäger’s problem. (shrink)

AI technologies affect not only humans in many ways but also sentient animals. When investigating the impact of AI on other animals, it is important to consider how these technologies can harm them. However, it is equally important to explore how they can be used to enable animals to live good lives and improve their wellbeing. In this article, I present the rationale for this claim (Section 1), highlight applications through which AI systems are or can be used to benefit (...) nonhuman animals, and show how these benefits can be classified in terms of the harm framework proposed by Coghlan and Parker (Philosophy & Technology 36:25, 2023; Section 2). Finally, I identify open research questions that need to be addressed next (Section 3). (shrink)

Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of History are notorious for their racist portrayal of Africa. Few scholars, however, have considered their racism to be significant for Hegel's practical philosophy. This is largely because colonialism and Black enslavement appear to conflict with the idea of universal freedom at the heart of Hegel's practical philosophy. In my paper, I argue against this view and defend the claim that Hegel's idea of freedom is linked to white identity. It therefore grounds his racist comments (...) in the Philosophy of History rather than opposing them. In order to show that Hegel's idea of freedom is linked to white identity, I trace its connections with the Western idea of property. My suggestion is that Hegel conceptualizes freedom as appropriation, thereby linking freedom to property and white identity. I conclude that Hegel's idea of freedom is an idea of white freedom and thus not an ‘impartial criterion’ for social critique. (shrink)

The well known Monty Hall-problem has a clear solution if one deals with a long enough series of individual games. However, the situation is different if one switches to probabilities in a single case. This paper presents an argument for Monty Hall situations with two players (not just one, as is usual). It leads to a quite general conclusion: One cannot apply probabilistic considerations (for or against any of the strategies) to isolated single cases. If one does that, one cannot (...) but violate a very plausible non-arbitrariness condition and is led into a Moore-paradoxical incoherence. Even though arguments for switching are correct as applied to series of games, they don’t say anything useful about what rationality demands in a single case. (shrink)

There is a sceptical puzzle according to which knowledge appears to license an unacceptable kind of dogmatism. Here is a version of the corresponding sceptical argument: (1) If a subject S knows a proposition p, then it is OK for S to ignore all evidence against p as misleading; (2) It is never OK for any subject to ignore any evidence against their beliefs as misleading; (3) Hence, nobody knows anything.I distinguish between different versions of the puzzle (mainly a ‘permissibility’ (...) version and a ‘closure’ version) and offer a solution for one version (the permissibility version) of the problem. No matter how much a subject knows, knowledge never gives one a license to ignore evidence against a proposition. Premise (1) of the argument is false and the puzzle can thus be resolved. (shrink)

In a recent work, we introduced a theoretical model for fulfillment in life that covers cognitive and affective components and distinguishes different time frames. The present study evaluates this model and describes the construction of the Fulfilled Life Scale to assess fulfillment regarding the whole lived life retrospectively. We investigated the scale in two samples. The model of the cognitive component combines three sources of fulfillment with three criteria, yielding nine facets. Employing hierarchical factor analysis, we inspected all solutions between (...) one and nine. We identified three optimal factors, which we labeled unfolded self and life, the worthwhile life, and positive impact and legacy. Next, we selected marker items and replicated the factor structure in Sample 2. The three scales were positively intercorrelated and showed good internal consistency in both samples. For the affective component, exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses established a one-factor structure in both samples, and high internal consistency was obtained. Across a range of related constructs, we demonstrated construct and criterion validity. Notably, cognitive and affective fulfillment incrementally predicted a global rating of a fulfilled life and mental well-being, even after controlling for subjective and eudaimonic well-being. Overall, the study proves that the FLS is necessary to capture people’s experience of a fulfilled life, which could not be assessed sufficiently with previous well-being measures. Both cognitive and affective fulfillment were able to predict additional variance in mental well-being. Moreover, the study reveals psychometric support for the FLS and presents the first evidence on its validity. Lastly, applications in research and practice are discussed, especially in the context of living and aging well in the second half of life. (shrink)

This paper deals with the core version of the Trolley Problem. In one case many people favor an act which will bring about the death of one person but save five other persons. In another case most people would refuse to “sacrifice” one person in order to save five other lives. Since the two cases seem similar in all relevant respects, we have to explain and justify the diverging verdicts. Since I don’t find current proposals of a solution convincing, I (...) propose an alternative one according to which —but not —violates two forms of equality. I also test the underlying egalitarian principle against other cases. I argue that it offers a good explanation and also a normative justification of our intuitive verdicts about the cases. (shrink)

This article draws on interviews with “foodies”—people with a passion for eating and learning about food—to explore questions of gender and foodie culture. The analysis suggests that while this culture is by no means gender-neutral, foodies are enacting gender in ways that warrant closer inspection. This article puts forward new empirical findings about gender and food and employs the concept of “doing gender” to explore how masculinities and femininities are negotiated in foodie culture. Our focus on doing gender generates two (...) insights into gender and food work. First, we find that doing gender has different implications for men and women within foodie culture. Alongside evidence that foodies are contesting particular gendered relations within the food world, we explore how broader gender inequities persist. Second, we contend that opportunities for doing gender in foodie culture cannot be considered apart from class privilege. (shrink)

Suppose someone hears a loud noise and at the same time sees a yellow flash. It seems hard to deny that the person can experience loudness and yellowness together. However, since loudness is experienced by the auditory sense whereas yellowness is experienced by the visual sense it also seems hard to explain how.

1. Artificial Intelligence is an ambiguous umbrella term. Until today there is no uniform definition of AI and the term carries several meanings. As exemplary, I will give two definitions of AI tha...

Peter Baumann develops and defends a distinctive version of epistemic contextualism, the view that the truth conditions or the meaning of knowledge attributions of the form "S knows that p" can vary with the context of the attributor. The first part of the book examines arguments for contextualism and develops Baumann's version. It begins by dealing with the argument from cases and ordinary usage, and then addresses "theoretical" arguments, from reliability and from luck. The second part of the (...) book discusses the problems contextualism faces, to which it must respond, and provides an extension of contextualism beyond epistemology. The third part of the book is focused on some major objections to contextualism and alternative views, namely subject-sensitive invariantism, contrastivism and relativism. (shrink)

Practical conflicts pervade human life. Agents have many different desires, goals, and commitments, all of which can come into conflict with each other. How can practical reasoning help to resolve these practical conflicts? In this collection of essays a distinguished roster of philosophers analyse the diverse forms of practical conflict. Their aim is to establish an understanding of the sources of these conflicts, to investigate the challenge they pose to an adequate conception of practical reasoning, and to assess the degree (...) to which that challenge can be met. These essays will serve as a major resource for students of philosophy but will also interest students and professionals in related fields of the social sciences such as psychology, political science, sociology and economics. (shrink)

Although film for Adorno is first and foremost the principal agent of culture industry, he takes on an equivocal stance towards the medium and its aesthetic potentials for reasons inherent to the medium itself. Indeed, its disinterested recording of the empirical world leads to both, a semblance of immediacy easy to instrumentalize for propaganda or advertising purposes, and a non-subjective access to the world of objects, which disclose their societal imprint. Despite (or because of) its technological basis, film is inherently (...) concerned with the society it both mediates and addresses, and has to be understood as a collective medium in either of its formats: commercial productions, because they address the masses (which they manipulate and distract from reality’s inherent antagonisms by reproducing pseudo-realistic, stereotypical representations in a totalitarian manner), independent films, because they unearth something non-identical nestled in the folds of the ideological totality, through a montage “which does not interfere with things but rather arranges them in a constellation akin to that of writing”. This article aims to deploy the complex constellation through which Adorno approaches film, its embedding in the capitalist world, its inherent aesthetic force and its complicated relation with the reality it mediates. (shrink)

Las ideas de Michel Foucault han tenido una gran influencia en las ciencias de la educación. Los estudios acerca de la sociedad disciplinaria se han convertido en una referencia ineludible para pensar las dinámicas de la institución escolar. Sin embargo, esa influencia a menudo se reduce a su enfoque crítico y deconstructivo, sin elaborar adecuadamente los aspectos propositivos y la influencia constructiva que su teoría puede ofrecer. Estetrabajo parte de la hipótesis de que los últimos estudios del filósofo brindan un (...) marco conceptual sólido que va más allá la mera crítica hacia las relaciones de poder, aportando intuiciones relevantes para aplicar al campo educativo. Siguiendo esta lógica, en la presente propuesta se explorarán algunos conceptos claves del pensamientotardío de Foucault: régimen de verdad, prácticas de sí, psicagogia y parresía. Estos conceptos permitirán rastrear la importancia de los últimos trabajos de Foucault para pensar la tarea educativa. Dichos trabajos invitan a considerar la potencia de la filosofía, ya no solo para cuestionar las estructuras sedimentadas, sino también como una fuerza motivadora de procesos de transformación ética y posibilidades de invención para la trama vital delos individuos. En síntesis, la argumentación permitirá mostrar que la interpretación que el filósofo realiza tanto de la filosofía estoica como del cinismo a —través de la noción de parresía— proporciona pautas claras para aplicar al trabajo pedagógico y a la relación docente-alumno. (shrink)

In Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics Catherine Lu argues that structural reconciliation, rather than interactional reconciliation, ought to be the primary normative goal for political reconciliation efforts. I suggest that we might have good reason to want to retain relational approaches – such as that of Linda Radzik – as the primary focus of reconciliatory efforts, but that Lu’s approach is invaluable for identifying the parties who ought to bear responsibility for those efforts in cases of structural injustice. First, (...) I outline Lu’s analysis of reconciliation, where she argues for the normative priority of structural approaches within the global political sphere, and propose that it will be useful to identify whether or not a relational account could instead identify underlying structural injustices. Second, I examine one particular relational account of reconciliation (based on Radzik’s account of atonement) and argue that this type of account brings to light underlying structural injustices of the kind Lu is concerned with. Finally, I identify an issue for relational accounts in identifying relevant responsible parties for reconciliation before returning to Lu’s structural account to address this gap. (shrink)

Current epistemological orthodoxy has it that knowledge is incompatible with luck. More precisely: Knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck . This is often treated as a truism which is not even in need of argumentative support. In this paper, I argue that there is lucky knowledge. In the first part, I use an intuitive and not very developed notion of luck to show that there are cases of knowledge which are “lucky” in that sense. In the second part, I look (...) at philosophical conceptions of luck and come to the conclusion that knowledge can be lucky in those senses, too. I also turns out that a probabilistic notion of luck can help us see in what ways a particular piece of knowledge or belief can be lucky or not lucky. (shrink)