In Republican Guard , Nicholas Xenos describes the Straussian network and its nature, focusing upon delineating what in Leo Strauss’ writings has influenced and can tell us about the ‘character of American power today and the rhetoric through which it is enhanced and sustained.’ In the end he argues and demonstrates that Strauss’ political theory provides the means by which an imperial project can be camouflaged under the cloak of an appeal to liberal democracy. This book will be of (...) interest to students and scholars of politics and international relations. (shrink)

The meaning of ‘moderate enlightenment’ has been monopolised by Jonathan Israel. In this guise, ‘moderate enlightenment’ is built atop a compromise between authority and innovation, between reason and revelation, and amounts to an intellectually subordinate counterpart to the Radical Enlightenment. This ‘negative’ definition obstructs serious interpretation of what ‘moderate enlightenment’ can mean. This essay progresses instead an enquiry into a ‘positive’ definition of ‘moderate enlightenment’ – an enlightenment defined by moderation. It does so by surveying key lineaments within a century (...) of historiography on the enlightenment, from the 1920s to the present. It focuses on the contributions to that historiography by two titanic figures of twentieth-century scholarship and political thought: Leo Strauss and J.G.A. Pocock. Strauss and Pocock are shown to have advanced equally substantive, if fundamentally distinct, concepts of ‘moderate enlightenment’. Searching for ‘moderate enlightenment’, aided by Strauss and Pocock, raises new vistas in both eighteenth century intellectual history and twentieth century historiography – and the pertinence of both for the history of political thought. It also brings into question the political-philosophical substance of the ‘moderation’ which underpins a positively defined ‘moderate enlightenment’. (shrink)

According to the standard account of Nicholas' views,his scepticism is constrained by his commitment to the law of non-contradiction as a basis for certain truth. Such an account fails to distinguish the views found in the "Leters to Bernard" and the "Exigit Ordo" the latter clear rejects the law of non-contradiction and propounds a full fledged scepticism.

Many years ago, professors used to teach their students that Locke wrote the Two Treatises of Government to refute Hobbes. The demolition of this thesis by Peter Laslett and others had one curious result: scholars ceased to pay much attention to the relationship between the two greatest English philosophers of the seventeenth century. This trend was perhaps reinforced by an understandable suspicion of Leo Strauss’s thesis that Locke was really a closet Hobbesian. It thus came to be accepted that it (...) was somehow intellectually disreputable to suppose that there was any meaningful dialogue between Locke and the author of Leviathan.A serious reassessment of the relationship between the two philosophers is long overdue... (shrink)

The distinction between top-down and bottom-up effects is widely relied on in experimental psychology. However, there is an important problem with the way it is normally defined. Top-down effects are effects of previously-stored information on processing the current input. But on the face of it that includes the information that is implicit in the operation of any psychological process – in its dispositions to transition from some types of representational state to others. This paper suggests a way to distinguish information (...) stored in that way from the kind of influence of prior information that psychologists are concerned to classify as a top-down effect. So-drawn, the distinction is not just of service to theoretical psychology. Asking about the extent of top-down processing is one way to pose some of the questions at issue in philosophical debates about cognitive penetrability – about the extent of the influence of cognitive states on perception. The existence of a theoretically-useful perception-cognition distinction has come under pressure, but even if it has to be abandoned, some of the concerns addressed in the cognitive penetrability literature can be recaptured by asking about the extent of top-down influences on any given psychological process. That formulation is more general, since it can be applied to any psychological process, not just those that are paradigmatically perceptual. (shrink)

Presents a synoptic, compact, and accessible exposition of this influential and interesting sector of twentieth-century American philosophy.

Not only does this book reflect the clarity and acuity of thought that characterize Wolterstorff's work, it also reflects the humane sensibilities of someone who has thought and felt deeply about these matters for a long time.

The mind-body problem is widely seen as the great remaining challenge to science and philosophy. Why and how did matter evolve to take on the quality of mind? The author takes the reader to the edges of current knowledge and back to the beginning of time, before mind existed, and in doing so constructs a history of consciousness.

My focus will be on two questions about Moore’s justification to believe the premises and the conclusion of the argument above. At stake is what makes it possible for our experiences to justify our beliefs, and what makes it possible for us to be justified in disbelieving skeptical..

We discuss the rational role of highly inattentive experiences, and argue that they can provide rational support for beliefs.

The New Thinking contained in this volume rejects an Evolutionary Psychology that is committed to innate domain-specific psychological mechanisms: gene-based adaptations that are unlearnt, developmentally fixed and culturally universal. But the New Thinking does not simply deny the importance of innate psychological traits. The problem runs deeper: the concept of innateness is not suited to distinguishing between the two positions. That points to a more serious problem with the concept of innateness as it is applied to human psychological phenotypes. This (...) paper argues that the features of recent human evolution highlighted by the New Thinking imply that the concept of inherited representation, set out here, is a better tool for theorising about human cognitive evolution. (shrink)

In this paper I address a structurally similar tension between phenomenalism and realism about matter in Leibniz and Kant. In both philosophers, some texts suggest a starkly phenomenalist view of the ontological status of matter, while other texts suggest a more robust realism. In the first part of the paper I address a recent paper by Don Rutherford that argues that Leibniz is more of a realist than previous commentators have allowed. I argue that Rutherford fails to show that Leibniz (...) is any less an idealist than his main target, Robert Merrihew Adams, does. I distinguish various kinds of idealism about bodies that Leibniz might have held, and attempt to determine which package of views represents his considered view. In the second part of the paper I situate Kant’s idealism within the same coordinates. I argue that, abstracting from deep differences in their metaphysics and epistemology, Kant and Leibniz have structurally very similar views on the ontological status of matter and bodies. I conclude that the key to understanding the realist strand in their ontology of matter is understanding the way in which, for both thinkers, the forces in bodies are appearances of forces of more fundamental entities, either monads or things in themselves. (shrink)

AS SOME PHILOSOPHERS KNOW, the paradox about inquiry at 80d-e of Plato’s Meno is more than a tedious sophism. Plato is one such philosopher. The puzzle is an obstacle to his project of discovering definitions, and is introduced as such. And it is met with an elaborate response: the theory of recollection, explicitly presented as an answer to the obstacle. But then what of the famous conversation in which Socrates coaxes a geometrical theorem from a slave boy Is the theory (...) not designed to explain the boy’s ability to respond to the coaxing? It is, certainly, but that is not its only purpose. The structure of the passage is this: the theory is there to disarm the paradox, and the conversation is there to support the theory. To see this structure is to understand a notorious and otherwise troubling fact, that Plato is so very quick to take the slave’s behavior—which he might have tried to explain in some other way-to be clear evidence for recollection. The reason why he so takes it is that the paradox has led him to think that only if recollection occurs is fruitful inquiry possible—and he is very anxious indeed to be assured that it is possible. He would not have been so enticed by explanations of the boy’s behavior which did not also seem to him to dispose of the puzzle. Here now is Plato’s setting of the paradox. (shrink)

What is the evolutionary significance of the various mechanisms of imitation, emulation and social learning found in humans and other animals? This paper presents an advance in the theoretical resources for addressing that question, in the light of which standard approaches from the cultural evolution literature should be refocused. The central question is whether humans have an imitationbased inheritance system—a mechanism that has the evolutionary function of transmitting behavioural phenotypes reliably down the generations. To have the evolutionary power of an (...) inheritance system, an imitiation-based mechanism must meet a range of demanding requirements. The paper goes on to review the evidence for and against the hypothesis that there is indeed an imitation-based inheritance system in humans. (shrink)

A comprehensive introduction to the theory of knowledge.

Draws on a broad range of scientific evidence to theorize an evolutionary basis for religion, considering how religion may have served as an essential component of early society survival and that the brain may be inherently inclined toward religious behavior.

Nicolas de Cues, dans le De pace fidei, écrit l’année de la chute de Constantinople en 1453, avait souligné le danger de faire un usage politique de la religion. Une telle confusion du spirituel et du temporel, du religieux et du politique, se retourne et contre la religion et contre la politique, la religion en se donnant une mission temporelle et la politique en sombrant dans la mystique. La Cribratio Alchorani est rédigé en 1461. Le contexte est politique plus que (...) religieux. Le danger d’une invasion de l’Europe par les Musulmans était d’autant plus grand que l’Occident était divisé contre lui-même. Les Etats nationaux naissant étaient plus intéressés à renforcer leur pouvoir qu’à penser à la menace turque. Les européens optèrent ainsi en faveur de Mohamed II, plutôt que de suivre le Pape. Le philosophe mosellan comprit qu’il s’agissait d’un problème de civilisation et non de société. Au lieu de prendre les armes, il prit la plume. Il lut et étudia le Coran et toutes les oeuvres qu’il put se procurer sur le sujet, et que Pie II lui avait demandé de rassembler en vue de sa lettre au Sultan. Il en sortit la Cribratio Alchorani. Dans cette oeuvre, le Cusain se situe d’emblée sur le plan spirituel et théologique. Il déplace le problème : allant à l’essentiel, il prend le parti de faire une « pia interpretatio » du Coran, qu’il lit à la lumière de la Bible et de la raison. Sa lecture est religieuse et philosophico-théologique. Elle s’appuie sur la « recherche de Dieu » propre à tous les hommes et seule capable d’unir chrétiens et musulmans. (shrink)

What if we looked at the notion of the end of literature as a truism, only lacking in plurality and logical rigor? Nicholas Brown explains that one of these “ends” can be regarded as internal to the functioning of literature itself, and as such, the point of departure for a more complete formulation of a Marxist literary criticism. For Brown, this formulation reveals that both literary criticism and Marxism are to be regarded as what he calls “formal materialisms,” a (...) mode of analysis that must be completed and revised every time in light of an object it cannot posit beforehand. What this means for a Marxist literary-critical project subsequently becomes all the more apparent in Brown’s reading of another end of literature – postmodernism. (shrink)

I suggest that the post-Hegelian tradition presents us with three contrasting normative models of work. According to the first model, the core norms of work are those of means-ends rationality. In this model, the modern world of work is constitutively a matter of deploying the most effective means to bring about given ends. The rational kernel of modern work, the core norm that has shaped its development, is on this view instrumental reason, and this very same normative core, in the (...) shape of advanced technology and more efficient, time-saving production, can help to liberate it. The second model, by contrast, takes the core norms of work to be internal to working activity. Rather than work gaining its normativity from something external to it, from ends to which the work is a contingent means, on this second view the core norms of work are expressions of values or meanings that are immanent to working practices themselves. The expressive model of work regards the actual world of work to be constituted historically by work-specific norms, norms which working subjects themselves have invoked and mobilised around in the course of their struggles for emancipation. According to the third model, the core norms of work have to do neither with instrumental rationality nor authentic self-expression. Rather they concern norms that relate either to individual achievement or contribution through work (in the form of esteem) or to the conditions that must in place for individuals to participate in the exchange of services by which market societies reproduce themselves (in the form of mutual respect). (shrink)

Leibniz' Metaphysik sieht sich mit folgender Aporie konfrontiert: (1) Notwendigerweise gilt: Gott verwirklicht die beste mögliche Wahl. (2) Notwendigerweise gilt: die mögliche Welt, die auf die Beschreibung der tatsächlichen Welt antwortet, ist die beste aller möglichen Welten. (3) Die Existenz der tatsächlichen Welt (als die von Gott erschaffene) ist nicht notwendig, sondern möglich. Diese drei Sätze - die alle von Leibniz anerkannt worden sind - sind gemeinsam allem Anschein nach inkonsistent. Um diese Inkonsistenz zu vermeiden, entwickelt Leibniz eine komplexe Strategie, (...) welche die beiden Unterscheidungen zwischen moralischer und metaphysischer Notwendigkeit einerseits und zwischen der Notwendigkeit der Folgerung (necessitas consequentiae) und der Notwendigkeit des Gefolgerten (necessitas consequentis) andererseits einbezieht. In dem er dieses herausarbeitet, entwickelt Leibniz eine komplexe Theorie, welche die Teilmöglichkeiten in den Zusammenhang eines unendlichen Analyseprozesses stellt. (shrink)

Fodor’s radical concept nativism flowed from his view that hypothesis testing is the only route to concept acquisition. Many have successfully objected to the overly-narrow restriction to learning by hypothesis testing. Existing representations can be connected to a new representational vehicle so as to constitute a sustaining mechanism for a new representation, without the new representation thereby being constituted by or structured out of the old. This paper argues that there is also a deeper objection. Connectionism shows that a more (...) fundamental assumption underpinning the debate can also be rejected: the assumption that the development of a new representation must be explained in content-involving terms if innateness is to be avoided. -/- Fodor has argued that connectionism offers no new resources to explain concept acquisition: unless it is merely an uninteresting claim about neural implementation, connectionism’s defining commitment to distributed representations reduces to the claim that some representations are structured out of others (which is the old, problematic research programme). Examination of examples of representational development in connectionist networks shows, however, that some such models explain the development of new representational capacities in non-representational terms. They illustrate the possibility of representational development that is not explicable-by-content. Connectionist representations can be distributed in an important sense, which is incompatible with the assumption of explanation-by-content: they can be distributed over non-representational resources that account for their development. Rejecting the assumption of explanation-by-content thereby opens up a more radical way of rejecting Fodor’s argument for radical concept nativism. (shrink)

A many-valued (aka multiple- or multi-valued) semantics, in the strict sense, is one which employs more than two truth values; in the loose sense it is one which countenances more than two truth statuses. So if, for example, we say that there are only two truth values—True and False—but allow that as well as possessing the value True and possessing the value False, propositions may also have a third truth status—possessing neither truth value—then we have a many-valued semantics in the (...) loose but not the strict sense. A many-valued logic is one which arises from a many-valued semantics and does not also arise from any two-valued semantics [Malinowski, 1993, 30]. By a ‘logic’ here we mean either a set of tautologies, or a consequence relation. We can best explain these ideas by considering the case of classical propositional logic. The language contains the usual basic symbols (propositional constants p, q, r, . . .; connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, →, ↔; and parentheses) and well-formed formulas are defined in the standard way. With the language thus specified—as a set of well-formed formulas—its semantics is then given in three parts. (i) A model of a logical language consists in a free assignment of semantic values to basic items of the non-logical vocabulary. Here the basic items of the non-logical vocabulary are the propositional constants. The appropriate kind of semantic value for a proposition is a truth value, and so a model of the language consists in a free assignment of truth values to basic propositions. Two truth values are countenanced: 1 (representing truth) and 0 (representing falsity). (ii) Rules are presented which determine a truth value for every proposition of the language, given a model. The most common way of presenting these rules is via truth tables (Figure 1). Another way of stating such rules—which will be useful below—is first to introduce functions on the truth values themselves: a unary function ¬ and four binary functions ∧, ∨, → and ↔ (Figure 2).. (shrink)

Each volume of this series of companions to major philosophers contains specially commissioned essays by an international team of scholars, together with a substantial bibliography, and will serve as a reference work for students and nonspecialists. One aim of the series is to dispel the intimidation such readers often feel when faced with the work of a difficult and challenging thinker. Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) occupies a position of pivotal importance in many domains: philosophy, mathematics, physics, religious polemics and apologetics. In (...) this volume a team of leading scholars presents the full range of Pascal's achievement and surveys the intellectual background of his thought and the reception of his work. New readers and nonspecialists will find this the most convenient and accessible guide to Pascal currently available. Advanced students and specialists will find a conspectus of recent developments in the interpretation of Pascal. (shrink)

I begin by picking up on Brandom’s suggestion that expressivism follows American pragmatism in seeking to advance the cause of the Enlightenment. This provides us with a first point of contrast with Taylor’s understanding of expressivism, since Taylor takes expressivism to be inseparably bound up with the Romantic critique of the Enlightenment and as fundamentally opposed to Enlightenment naturalism. I then distinguish two features of what we ordinarily mean by the term ‘expression’, one of which provides an intuitive basis for (...) understanding Brandom’s expressivist program, the other of which provides an interpretive key for understanding Taylor’s version of expressivism. After looking briefly at the main tenets of Taylor’s expressivism, I conclude by considering its relation to Romanticism on the one hand, and to Brandom’s expressivist renewal of the Enlightenment project on the other. (shrink)

This volume collects Wolterstorff's essays on the philosophy of religion written over the last thirty-five years.