In sport, perceptual skill training software is intended to assist tactical training in the field. The aim of this field study was to test whether ‘laboratory-based’ pattern recall training would augment tactical skill training performed on the field. Twenty-six soccer players between 14-16 years of age from a single team participated in this study and were divided into three groups. The first received field training on a specific tactical skill plus cognitive training sessions on the pattern recall task. The second (...) performed only the field training while the third group served as a control group and had field training on other topics. The task on the pre-, post- and retention tests was to recall specific soccer patterns displayed on a computer screen. Results showed significant changes between pre- to post-test performance. There was no significant interaction between groups and tests but the effect size was large. From pre- to retention-test, there was a significant difference between tests and an interaction between groups and tests, but no main effect difference between groups. On the basis of significance testing only retention was affected by the additional training, however, descriptive results and effect sizes from pre- to post-test were as expected and suggested there were learning benefits. Together these results indicate that augmented perceptual-cognitive training might be beneficial, but some limitations in our study design (e.g., missing field test, missing placebo group, etc.) need to be improved in future work. (shrink)

Introduction : death, metaphysics, and morality / John Martin Fischer Death knocks / Woody Allen Rationality and the fear of death / Jeffrie G. Murphy Death / Thomas Nagel The Makropulos case : reflections on the tedium of immortality / Bernard Williams The evil of death / Harry S. Silverstein How to be dead and not care : a defense of Epicurus / Stephen E. Rosenbaum The dead / Palle Yourgrau The misfortunes of the dead / George Pitcher Harm (...) to others / Joel Feinberg Reasons and persons / Derek Parfit Why is death bad? / Anthony L. Brueckner and John Martin Fischer Death and the value of life / Jeff McMahan Annihilation / Steven Luper-Foy Epicurus and annihilation / Stephen E. Rosenbaum Some puzzles about the evil of death / Fred Feldman Well-being and time / J. David Velleman. (shrink)

In philosophical thought experiments, as in ordinary discourse, our understanding of verbal case descriptions is enriched by automatic comprehension inferences. Such inferences have us routinely infer what else is also true of the cases described. We consider how such routine inferences from polysemous words can generate zombie intuitions: intuitions that are ‘killed’ (defeated) by contextual information but kept cognitively alive by the psycholinguistic phenomenon of linguistic salience bias. Extending ‘evidentiary’ experimental philosophy, this paper examines whether the ‘zombie argument’ against materialism (...) is built on zombie intuitions. We examine the hypothesis that contextually defeated stereotypical inferences from the noun ‘zombie’ influence intuitions about ‘philosophical zombies’. We document framing effects (‘zombie’ vs ‘duplicate’) predicted by the hypothesis. Findings undermine intuitions about the conceivability of ‘philosophical zombies’ and address the philosophical ‘hard problem of consciousness’. Findings support a deflationary response: The impression that principled obstacles prevent scientific explanation of how physical processes give rise to conscious experience is generated by philosophical arguments that rely on epistemically deficient intuitions. (shrink)

I argue that we need to distinguish between three concepts of actual causation: total, path-changing, and contributing actual causation. I provide two lines of argument in support of this account. First, I address three thought experiments that have been troublesome for unified accounts of actual causation, and I show that my account provides a better explanation of corresponding causal intuitions. Second, I provide a functional argument: if we assume that a key purpose of causal concepts is to guide agency, we (...) are better off making a distinction between three concepts of actual causation. (shrink)

We offer a functional perspective on hate, showing that hate has a unique pattern of appraisals and action tendencies. Hate is based on perceptions of a stable, negative disposition of persons or groups. We hate persons and groups more because of who they are, than because of what they do. Hate has the goal to eliminate its target. Hate is especially significant at the intergroup level, where it turns already devalued groups into victims of hate. When shared among group members, (...) hate can spread fast in conflict zones where people are exposed to hate-based violence, which further feeds their hate. Hate can be reassuring and self-protective, because its message is simple and helps confirming people’s belief in a just world. (shrink)

In his recent essay in the Philosophical Review, “Truth and Freedom,” Trenton Merricks contends (among other things) that the basic argument for the incompatibility of God's foreknowledge and human freedom is question-begging. He relies on a “truism” to the effect that truth depends on the world and not the other way around. The present essay argues that mere invocation of this truism does not establish that the basic argument for incompatibilism is question-begging. Further, it seeks to clarify important elements of (...) the debate, including the fixity-of-the-past premise in the incompatibilist's argument and the Ockhamist response. It sketches some potential links between the issues here and recent work on ontological dependence, and it connects the issues raised by Merricks to important work that has appeared in (among other places) the Philosophical Review. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The Frankfurt-style Counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities have been controversial. I sketch some of the major moves in the debates surrounding the FSCs, and I seek to provide an answer to a big challenge: the indeterministic horn of the ‘dilemma defense’. Given indeterminism, it is unclear how Black can know with certainty what Jones will choose and do in the future; this leaves at least some open alternatives for Jones. I adopt the strategy of positing God in (...) Black’s place. The challenge now is to explain how God can have knowledge with certainty of future free human behavior in an indeterministic context, insofar as there is no entailing evidence in available in advance in such a situation. I present the Bootstrapping View of God’s knowledge to solve this problem. If we replace Black with God, we have an indeterministic case in which an agent acts freely, and yet cannot do otherwise. My account of God’s knowledge provides an interpretation of Luis de Molina’s notoriously obscure notion of Supercomprehension. (shrink)

On a view most secularists accept, the deceased individual goes out of existence. How, then, can death be a bad thing for, or harm, the deceased? I consider the doctrine of subsequentism, according to which the bad thing for the deceased, or the harm of death to the deceased, takes place after he or she has died. The main puzzle for this view is to explain how we can predicate a property at a time (such as having a misfortune or (...) being harmed) to an individual who does not exist at that time. This is the Problem of Predication. I consider alternative attempts to solve this puzzle, including one suggested by Ben Bradley, and I argue that they do not succeed. I go on to provide a new way of addressing the Problem of Predication and thus defending subsequentism against this specific threat, contrasting my approach with others currently on offer. (shrink)

There is a surprising consensus among vegan philosophers that freeganism—eating animal-based foods going to waste—is permissible. Some ethicists even argue that vegans should be freegans. In this paper, we offer a novel challenge to freeganism drawing upon Donaldson and Kymlicka’s ‘zoopolitical’ approach, which supports ‘restricted freeganism’. On this position, it’s prima facie wrong to eat the corpses of domesticated animals, as they are members of a mixed human-animal community, ruling out many freegan practices. This exploration reveals how the ‘political turn’ (...) in animal ethics can offer fertile lenses through which to consider ethical puzzles about eating animals. (shrink)

We have argued that it is rational to have asymmetric attitudes toward prenatal and posthumous non-existence insofar as this asymmetry is a special case of a more general asymmetry in our attitudes toward past and future pleasures. Here we respond to an interesting critique of our view by Jens Johansson. We contend that his critique involves an inappropriate conflation of the time from which the relevant asymmetry emerges and the time of the badness of death.

Accounts of modal knowledge are many and varied. How should we choose between them? I propose that we employ inference to the best explanation, and I suggest that there are three desiderata that we should use to rank hypotheses: conservatism, simplicity, and the ability to handle disagreement. After examining these desiderata, I contend that they can’t be used to justify belief in the modal epistemology that fares best, but that they can justify our accepting it in an epistemically significant sense. (...) Finally, I outline a modal epistemology that seems to do well by the standards I’ve recommended. (shrink)

There are two perspectives from which formal theories can be viewed. On the one hand, one can take a theory to be about some privileged models. On the other hand, one can take all models of a theory to be on a par. In contrast with what is usually done in philosophical debates, we adopt the latter viewpoint. Suppose that from this perspective we want to add an adequate truth predicate to a background theory. Then on the one hand the (...) truth theory ought to be semantically conservative over the background theory. At the same time, it is generally recognised that the central function of a truth predicate is an expressive one. A truth predicate ought to allow us to express propositions that we could not express before. In this article we argue that there are indeed natural truth theories which satisfy both the demand of semantical conservativeness and the demand of adequately extending the expressive power of our language. (shrink)

As its title suggests, this anthology is a collection of papers presented at a conference on feelings and emotions held in Amsterdam in 2001. One of the symposium’s main goals was to draw some of the most prominent researchers in emotion research together and provide a multi-disciplinary ‘snap shot’ of the state of the art at the turn of the century. In that respect it is truly a cognitive science success story. There are articles from a wide range of fields, (...) encompassing, e.g., philosophy, neuroscience, anthropology, sociology, and psychology. Another.. (shrink)

In this paper we apply proof theoretic methods used for classical systems in order to obtain upper bounds for systems in partial logic. We focus on a truth predicate interpreted in a Kripke style way via strong Kleene; whereas the aim is to connect harmoniously the partial version of Kripke–Feferman with its intended semantics. The method we apply is based on infinitary proof systems containing an ω-rule.

Interpreters of Machiavelli easily agree that his political writings have profoundly influenced our fundamental ideas of state and society, yet these interpreters rarely agree on what Machiavelli really thought. Did Machiavelli seek to recover classical republicanism in the Aristotelian tradition, or did he aspire to usher in modernity? Was he a cynic who assumed human beings to be inescapably wicked and offered technical advice to tyrants, or did he aim at some version of "the good life"? Did he create a (...) general theory of politics, or did he teach us that political issues should be approached in a particular contextual, dialectical, or rhetorical manner? Through systematic analysis, Markus Fischer's cogent and articulate study succeeds in resolving these questions. Well-Ordered License will appeal both to new students of Machiavelli and to scholars who have long sought to reconcile the seeming incoherence of his work. (shrink)

An important strand of current experimental philosophy promotes a new kind of methodological naturalism. This chapter argues that this new ‘metaphilosophical naturalism’ is fundamentally consistent with key tenets of Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy, and can provide empirical foundations for therapeutic conceptions of philosophy. Metaphilosophical naturalism invites us to contribute to the resolution of philosophical problems about X by turning to scientific findings about the way we think about X – in general or when doing philosophy. This new naturalism encourages us to use (...) resources from psychology that can empirically vindicate precisely some of the most controversial aspects of Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy: They can establish the need, and provide key tools, for something worth calling ‘therapy’, in philosophy. As ‘pudding proof’ this chapter shows how methods and findings from psycholinguistics motivate and facilitate a therapeutic approach to a characteristically philosophical problem: ‘the problem of perception’. (shrink)

Previous research on sustainable entrepreneurship has mainly aimed to understand the antecedents of entrepreneurs’ sustainability-oriented behavior. Yet the literature lacks a more nuanced understanding of how entrepreneurs implement sustainability strategies when creating a new venture. Drawing on sustainability concepts, we first examine how entrepreneurs balance the economic, environmental, and social dimensions as part of their ventures’ strategic ambitions. We show that sustainable entrepreneurs prioritize the three sustainability dimensions and possibly reprioritize them in response to stakeholder interests. Applying a stakeholder theory (...) perspective, we theorize that how entrepreneurs balance their sustainability dimensions and goals depends on the degree of stakeholder involvement and of external expectations. Our contributions refine the growing sustainable entrepreneurship literature and call attention to the importance of including weightings and time when examining the dimensions of sustainability. (shrink)

This essay develops a framework for understanding what I call the ethics of reflexivity, that is, the norms that govern attitudes and actions with respect to one’s own worth. I distinguish five central aspects of the reflexive commitment to living in accordance with one’s personal ideals: the extent to which and manner in which one regards oneself from an evaluative point of view, the extent to which one cares about receiving the respect of others, the degree to which one interprets (...) one’s personal ideals in an individualistic or collective manner, the degree to which one’s commitment to living in accordance with one’s personal ideals is rigid or flexible, and the worthiness of one’s personal ideals. This framework, I argue, illuminates the nature and moral significance of virtuous and vicious forms of the character trait of pride. (shrink)

Cognitivism about the emotions is the view that emotions involve judgments (or quasi-judgmental cognitive states) that we could, in principle, articulate without reference to the emotions themselves. D’Arms and Jacobson (2003) argue that no such articulation is available in the case of “possessive” emotions, such as pride and guilt, and, so, cognitivism (in regard to such emotions, at least) is false. This article proposes and defends a cognitivist account of our partiality to the objects of our pride. I argue that (...) taking pride in something requires judging that your relation to that thing indicates that your life accords with some of your personal ideals. This cognitivist account eschews glossing pride in terms of one’s “possession” of what one is proud of and, so, escapes D’Arms and Jacobson’s critique. I motivate this account by critically assessing the most sophisticated possession-based account of pride in the literature, found in Gabriele Taylor (1985). (shrink)

The paper clarifies therapeutic ideas about philosophical method which Wittgenstein puts forward in his "Big Typescript". It does so by analysing how Wittgenstein treats the question 'What is meaning?', in that part of the same work from which the opening sections of his "Philosophical Investigations" derive. On this basis, the paper explains why Wittgenstein set himself a therapeutic goal, why this is reasonable, and how he sought to attain that goal without 'pronouncing new truths about the subject of the investigation', (...) viz. meaning. (shrink)

If David Lewis's modal realism is true, then there are many, many people. According to Mark Heller, this is bad news. He takes modal realism (MR) to imply that "there are at least some cases in which it is permissible to let drowning children drown when it would be easy to save them." But since he holds the reasonable view that this is never permissible, he thinks that MR is false. Here, I argue that Lewis needn't be troubled by this (...) objection, and that it provides no reason to reject MR for those who share Lewis's moral outlook. Moreover, I argue that disagreement with common sense needn't be severe if we can show both (a) that there's a sense in which common sense is correct and (b) we have little reason to care about the sense in which common sense is mistaken. (shrink)

This article reports on the development of an instrument to measure the perceived stress that results from the use and ubiquity of digital technology in the workplace. Based upon a contemporary understanding of stress and a set of stressors that is a substantial update to existing scales, the Digital Stressors Scale (DSS) advances the measurement of digital stress. Initially, 138 items were constructed for the instrument and grouped into a set of 15 digital stressors. Based on a sample ofN= 1,998 (...) online questionnaires completed by individuals representative of the US employed population, the scale was refined using exploratory factor analyses (EFA) and PLS-SEM. The resulting and final scale consists of ten stressor categories reflective of one higher-order construct and a total of 50 items. Through a nomological network that includes important outcome variables of digital stress (emotional exhaustion, innovation climate, job satisfaction, user satisfaction) it was then demonstrated that the DSS provides substantial explanatory power, particularly related to emotional exhaustion and user satisfaction. Thus, the DSS constitutes a state-of-the-art self-report instrument to measure the extent of distress appraisal related to digital technologies in the workplace and helps to explain further how and why information and communication technologies can lead to adverse outcomes in individuals, thereby providing the starting point for job related organizational interventions. (shrink)

I revisit my article, “Why Immortality Is Not So Bad,” in which I argued that Bernard Williams’s thesis that immortality would necessarily be boring for any human being is false. Here I point out various ways in which Williams’s treatment of the issues has tilted and distorted the subsequent debates.

The Poet as Phenomenologist: Rilke and the New Poems opens up new perspectives on the relation between Rilke's poetry and phenomenological philosophy, illustrating the ways in which poetry can offer an exceptional response to the philosophical problem of dualism. Drawing on the work of Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Luke Fischer makes a new contribution to the tradition of phenomenological poetics and expands the debate among Germanists concerning the phenomenological status of Rilke's poetry, which has been severely limited to comparisons (...) of Rilke and Husserl. Fischer explicates an implicit phenomenology of perception in Rilke's writings from his middle period (1902-1910). He argues that Rilke cultivated an artistic perception that, in a philosophically significant manner, overcomes the opposition between the sensuous and the intelligible while simultaneously transcending the boundaries of philosophy. Fischer offers novel interpretations of central poems from Rilke's Neue Gedichte (1907) and Der neuen Gedichte anderer Teil (1908) and frames them as the ultimate articulation of Rilke's non-dualistic vision. He thus demonstrates the continuity between Rilke and phenomenology while arguing that poetry, in this case, provides the most adequate response to a philosophical problem. (shrink)

In seiner theoriegeschichtlichen Untersuchung rekonstruiert Karsten Fischer Entwicklungslinien zivilisationstheoretischer Kulturkritik von Nietzsche, Freud und Max Weber zu Adorno. Dies dient ihm zur Klärung der systematischen Frage nach einem möglichen Zusammenhang zwischen menschlicher Naturbeherrschung und sozialer Mutmaßung, dass ein ursprünglicher, zivilisationspsychologischer Zusammenhang zwischen der ideologischen Selbstermächtigung des Menschen zu gewaltsamer Unterwerfung der Natur und seiner Gewaltbereitschaft gegenüber seinen Artgenossen besteht, lässt sich weniger auf hegelianisch-marxistische Motive zurückführen als vielmehr auf Nietzsche, bei dem Horkheimers und Adornos These von der dialektisch in (...) Barbarei zurückschlagenden Aufklärung bereits angelegt ist. Von Nietzsche führt eine direkte Verbindung zu Sigmund Freud, dessen These, dass die zivilisatorische Tabuisierung zwischenmenschlicher Gewalt aus deren ursprünglicher Ausübung resultiert, von Adorno variiert wird. Statt der 'Tabuisierung' zwischenmenschlicher Gewalt problematisiert er die 'Legitimierung" gewaltsamer menschlicher Naturbeherrschung, was ein Interesse an Webers Rationalisierungstheorem begründet, das untergründige Verbindungen mit Freuds Zivilisationspsychologie aufweist. Auf der Basis dieser theoriegeschichtlichen Verortung, mit der eine grundlegend neue Lesart Adornos vorgeschlagen wir, lässt sich sein Theorem schließlich als Erklärungsangebot für die auch ins Abendland zurückgekehrten barbarischen Gewaltexzesse wie auch für das Problem fortschreitender Naturzerstörung diskutieren. (shrink)

Some recent conservation proposals – including the Zoological Society of London’s (ZSL) EDGE of Existence programme – have focused on the value of protecting species with high evolutionary distinctiveness, a dimension of biodiversity conservation that’s not been much emphasized in conservation practice. In this paper we critically examine this strategy, investigating whether there are good reasons for prioritizing evolutionarily distinctive species, and the phylogenetic diversity to which they contribute, over other forms of biodiversity. We first discuss evolutionary distinctiveness, its relationship (...) to phylogenetic diversity, how phylogenetic diversity can be measured, and intuitive thoughts about its value. Then we consider five kinds of arguments about the value of phylogenetic diversity that might be made to support prioritizing it, given its current lack of emphasis in conservation practice. These are: arguments based on protecting biodiversity, arguments based on option value, arguments based on ecological resilience, arguments based on historical value, and arguments based on aesthetic value. We maintain that these arguments, taken individually, offer varying degrees of fairly weak support for valuing species with high evolutionary distinctiveness. Taken together, however, these arguments seem sufficiently strong to justify programs such as EDGE, insofar as such programs are framed as correctives to a past lack of emphasis on the protection of phylogenetic diversity. We suggest, however, that these arguments are not sufficiently strong to support an absolute prioritization of phylogenetic diversity over protecting other forms of biodiversity. (shrink)

Examining those risk and benefit perceptions utilised in the formation of attitudes and opinions about emerging technologies such as nanotechnology can be useful for both industry and policy makers involved in their development, implementation and regulation. A broad range of different socio-psychological and affective factors may influence consumer responses to different applications of nanotechnology, including ethical concerns. A useful approach to identifying relevant consumer concerns and innovation priorities is to develop predictive constructs which can be used to differentiate applications of (...) nanotechnology in a way which is meaningful to consumers. This requires elicitation of attitudinal constructs from consumers, rather than measuring attitudes assumed to be important by the researcher. Psychological factors influencing societal responses to 15 applications of nanotechnology drawn from different application areas were identified using repertory grid method in conjunction with generalised Procrustes analysis. The results suggested that people differentiate nanotechnology applications based on the extent to which they perceive them to be beneficial, useful, necessary and important. The benefits may be offset by perceived risks focusing on fear and ethical concerns. Compared to an earlier expert study on societal acceptance of nanotechnology, consumers emphasised ethical issues compared to experts but had less concern regarding potential physical contact with the product and time to market introduction. Consumers envisaged fewer issues with several applications compared to experts, in particular food applications. (shrink)

I will demonstrate that conductive arguments are found in the inference to the best explana-tion as it is used in science. Conductive arguments, I argue, operate on two levels: the first is in the con-struction of hypotheses; the second is through the competition of hypotheses. By constructing arguments based on observations of facts, all possible factors are taken into account and a judgment is made based on our weighing of considerations: conductive argumentation.

In our paper, "Omniscience, Freedom, and Dependence" (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88: 346-367), we argued that recent attempts (by Merricks, McCall, and Westphal) to resolve the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge fail because they are question-begging. Westphal replied to our paper in an earlier issue of Analysis, and this article is our rejoinder to his reply.

It is common for conservationists to refer to non-native species that have undesirable impacts on humans as “invasive”. We argue that the classification of any species as “invasive” constitutes wrongful discrimination. Moreover, we argue that its being wrong to categorize a species as invasive is perfectly compatible with it being morally permissible to kill animals—assuming that conservationists “kill equally”. It simply is not compatible with the double standard that conservationists tend to employ in their decisions about who lives and who (...) dies. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to show the importance of transferring metaphors from our aesthetic experiences to social praxis. I will therefore focus on reverberation, a phenomenon in the perceptual field of sound, to argue that it offers a deep understanding of social experiences. Reverberation is a secondary concept in Paul Ricœur's hermeneutic phenomenology, but it plays a crucial role in his analysis of imagination. Firstly, I will examine Ricœur's analysis of the phenomenon of reverberation within the framework of his (...) phenomenology of imagination. Secondly, I will read Ricœur's reference to G. Bachelard, considering the reverberation in the poetic image. Thirdly, I will study his reference to E. Minkowski, who thinks about reverberation within a cosmological scope. Finally, based on these analyses, I will outline the transfer of the phenomenon of reverberation to the field of social praxis. (shrink)

Levinas entfaltet seine ethischen Uberlegungen von der konkreten Begegnung mit dem Anderen her, der in seiner radikalen Andersheit einen ethischen Anspruch an das Ich stellt. Dieser Anspruch zeigt sich insbesondere im Antlitz und im Blick des Anderen. Somit gehort das Antlitz des Anderen zu den zentralen Denkfiguren der Philosophie Levinas. Der vorliegende Sammelband entfaltet das Kernmotiv des Antlitzes in unterschiedlichen Richtungen (etwa im Gesprach mit der philosophischen Tradition) und zeigt zugleich seine Wirkung auf verschiedenen Feldern: in der Kunst oder im (...) Politischen. (shrink)

Über das Moralische an der Moral : der evaluative Charakter moralischer Wertungen und die Problematik deontischer Moralauffassungen -- Der konkrete und der generalisierte Andere : über das Verhältnis von Moral und Politik -- Moralische Dilemmata und die Grenzen der Moral -- Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte -- Warum Gerechtigkeit? : über die normative Verfasstheit der sozialen Welt in Auseinandersetzung mit Amartya Sens Theorie der Gerechtigkeit -- Was ist Religion? : über die Präsenz des Ewigen im Zeitlichen und das Verhältnis von religiöser und (...) säkularer Wirklichkeitsauffassung -- Weltgestaltung als ethische Aufgabe : über die Bedeutung der Reformation für die Entstehung des ethischen Denkens der Moderne -- Über die spirituelle Dimension der Medizin -- Bioethik oder "Biomacht?" : über intellektuelle Mythifizierung. (shrink)

This volume, edited by three leading proponents and practitioners of human science psychology, serves as an invitation to readers new to this approach while also renewing that invitation to those who have long embraced and advanced research in the field from this perspective. It is a timely and important invitation. In 2009, the American Psychological Association declared psychology to be a core STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics) discipline and advocated the teaching and practice of psychology with this natural science understanding (...) in mind, but in 2014 further reaffirmed alternative methods by adding a new journal, Qualitative Psychology. The varied essays in this volume, certainly, bolster the view that a purely STEM-centered vision would ignore much about the very experience of being human.In fact, it would be dangerous to rely solely on the methods of the natural sciences to study human beings, who operate in the realm of meanings, lived experience, and complex and complicated relationships with self and others. We create societies and belief systems, orient ourselves in time, experience beauty and pain. The Qualitative Vision for Psychology: An Invitation to a Human Science Approach argues that because we have aspects that are distinctly and uniquely human -- we are not rats, hydrogen, or rocks, for example -- this necessitates a distinctly human science, one that regards persons as humans rather than objects of study. The laws and formulas of the natural sciences simply do not take into account that particularly human way of being in the world.There are few comprehensive books on psychology conceived as a human science, even though it has a long history with roots in phenomenology, existentialism, psychoanalysis, humanistic psychology, and hermeneutics. In recent years, as these essays discuss, the field has been transformed through its contact with feminism, critical historical analysis, and deconstruction, and it has continued to examine new challenges. Further, we see here its specific applicability to issues as diverse as empathy, cultural history, apartheid, sexual assault, fetishes, and our natural environment. (shrink)