This paper describes how the Electrical and Computer Engineering Department at South Dakota School of Mines and Technology has chosen to integrate ethics into their curriculum. All university freshmen engineering students are introduced to ethics through the presentation of ethical dilemmas. During this exercise, students are forced to argue both sides (‘for’ and ‘against’) of a hypothetical ethical engineering dilemma. It provides a setting for great discussion with the desired outcome that they learn to carefully analyze a situation before they (...) draw conclusions. In the sophomore year, students are introduced to methods to use the fundamental principles, the fundamental canons, and the suggested guidelines for use with the fundamental canons of ethics when analyzing appropriate action to be taken when confronted with ethical dilemmas. We currently use the ‘sophomore’ method for seniors because the sequencing is just beginning. Next year the seniors will do more indepth analysis of ethical case studies. (shrink)

There is extensive discussion in current Just War literature about the normative principles which should govern the initiation of war (jus ad bellum) and also the conduct of war (jus in bello), but this is the first book to treat the important and difficult issue of justice after the end of war. Larry May examines the normative principles which should govern post-war practices such as reparations, restitution, reconciliation, retribution, rebuilding, proportionality and the Responsibility to Protect. He discusses the emerging (...) international law literature on transitional justice and the problem of moving from a position of war and possible mass atrocity to a position of peace and reconciliation. He questions the Just War tradition, arguing that contingent pacifism is most in keeping with normative principles after war ends. His discussion is richly illustrated with contemporary examples and will be of interest to students of political and legal philosophy, law and military studies. (shrink)

In "The Rule of Rules" Larry Alexander and Emily Sherwin examine this dilemma.

This paper is a culmination of our new foundations for recursive analysis through recursive topology as reported in Kalantari and Welch 125; 98 87). While in those papers we developed groundwork for an approach to point free analysis and applied recursion theory, in this paper we blend techniques of recursion theory with those of topology to establish new findings. We present several new techniques different from existing ones which yield interesting results. Incidental to our work is a unifying explanation of (...) various schools of study for recursive analysis. (shrink)

The first section examines how jus in bello necessity was understood in the work of the sixteenth and seventeenth century philosophers. In the second section we show how a revised understanding of necessity fits into the kind of considerations that are involved in the principle of humanitarian treatment. Based on that analysis, the chapter concludes that the principle of necessity creates a very small class of cases that may be treated in an exceptional way. In the third section we discuss (...) the problem that occurs when considerations of jus in bello necessity seem to involve the irrelevant factor of luck. The fourth section relates necessity to the philosophical concept of practical necessity. The final section spells out how the principles of necessity and proportionality relate to each other: proportionality puts a restraint on the principle of necessity, so the two must be understood in tandem. (shrink)

lawpubPublic International LawlawphiPhilosophy of LawIn this book we have tried to offer more than just a descriptive survey of the various ways that the concept of necessity is used in international law. We have offered a normative account that suggests how and when necessity should be deployed as a powerful concept to justify and excuse State action in various domains. However, that normative task could only be accomplished once a coherent descriptive mapping was performed. We considered the different and unique (...) elements of necessity in international law with the hope of elucidating a deeper structure for the concept. We identified at least three different senses of necessity: as a state of exception to generally applicable laws, as a constraint on government action, and as a license to engage in conduct that is otherwise consistent with generally applicable laws. Using these conceptual distinctions, we analyzed and ultimately criticized how necessity functions in diverse areas of international law. Although the same term is used in... (shrink)

lawpubPublic International LawlawphiPhilosophy of LawNecessity is quite possibly the most powerful concept in the law. It has the almost mystical power to transform what would otherwise be illegal or immoral into a justified or excused act, all because the action was “necessary.” Herein lays its utter dangerousness. Whether the inquiry is individual self-defense in domestic criminal law, national self-defense under international law, or killing during armed conflict, the concept of necessity is often the key element that drives the outcome of (...) the analysis. If the action is necessary, then it is often permitted; if the action is not necessary, it is often forbidden. But what does “necessary” really mean in these debates? And does it mean the same thing in each context, or does its meaning and function depend on the nature of the inquiry at hand? Is necessity a universal moral and legal concept, or is its meaning fundamentally context-dependent?... (shrink)

This chapter examines how the concept of necessity is used in Just War theory as a principle of last resort—a criterion that must be satisfied before the recourse to force can be justified. It reassesses the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense, and the larger question of the justifiability of preemptive and preventive war, from the Just War perspective. The second and third sections rehearse an important debate between Alberico Gentili and Hugo Grotius. It then looks at “first strikes” and then at (...) “last resorts” to see what, if anything, is to be said for these as markers of aggressive or defensive war. These sections address directly the justifiability of preemptive war with reference to the principle of necessity in jus ad bellum debates in Just War theory. (shrink)

This chapter evaluates how necessity works as a central element of jus ad bellum legal arguments. In particular, it notes that the concept of necessity works differently depending on whether it is asserted as an independent excuse in international relations or whether it is one component of a self-defense analysis. In the former case it is invoked as an exception to general rules of conduct, whereas in the latter case necessity functions as a constraint on the application of a general (...) justification. Although both examples share structural similarities, the former is more dangerous, and for that reason international lawyers have generally placed external constraints on the application of the necessity doctrine. (shrink)

This chapter contrasts jus in bello necessity with necessity as the concept is used in human rights thinking. The task here is to explain what is distinctive about jus in bello necessity and to explain why conceptions of necessity that reign in other areas of international law cannot be automatically grafted onto the laws of war without reflection and deliberation. Indeed, any attempt to transplant a more restrictive version of necessity will result in a substantial alteration of the legal architecture (...) of jus in bello. Although this is not necessarily a bad thing, it can only be accomplished if one offers a separate normative defense for that alteration. It cannot be presumed. (shrink)

This chapter discusses how jus in bello necessity can and should be balanced against the principle of humanity. In many ways, the principle of humanity covers much of the same ground as human rights principles, except in this case the principle is already internal to jus in bello. So this chapter explains how some human rights principles—under the guise of the principle of humanity—have a proper role to play in checking the inherent permissiveness of jus in bello necessity. To accomplish (...) this task, the chapter examines how the principle of humanity and necessity work in both legal and philosophical arguments about just conduct during warfare. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt’s Jewish writings were central to her thinking about the human condition and engaged with the dialectics of modernity, universalism and identity. Her concept of the ‘conscious pariah’ attempted both to define a role for the public intellectual and understand the relationship between Jews and modernity. Controversially she accused Jewish victims of lack of resistance to the Nazis and argued that their victimization resulted from apolitical ‘worldlessness’. We argue that although Arendt’s analysis was original and challenging, her characterization of (...) Jewish history as one of ‘powerlessness’ is exaggerated but, more importantly, her underdeveloped concept of ‘the social’ is insensitive to the complex modalities of resistance and consciousness among subaltern Jewish communities. Furthermore, her lack of interest in religious observance obscures the importance of Judaism as a resource for resistance. This is illustrated by the ‘hidden transcripts’ of Jewish resistance from the early modern period. (shrink)

Corporate change and employee dislocation are inevitable in a free market. However, the current employment relationship in the U.S. that affords a perceived employment safety net is contrary to the natural canon of honesty. Employees cannot be guaranteed employment when a company fails or a product is no longer viable. Attempts to provide costly employment safety nets cause a firm to allocate resources to nonproductive programs that may ultimately cause a loss of competitiveness. These strategies to provide alternate employment may (...) provide only short-term solutions. But even short-term safety nets against unemployment may be sending employees unrealistic messages ... a permanent safety net against unemployment. As a result, employees may lose incentive to be innovative in creating their own personal safety nets. The resolution is candor about the risk of employment. A false employment safety net is not what employees want or need and in the long run it may be detrimental to American competitiveness. (shrink)

We develop the concepts of recursively nowhere dense sets and sets that are recursively of first category and study closed sets of points in light of Baire's Category Theorem. Our theorems are primarily concerned with exdomains of recursive quantum functions and hence with avoidable points . An avoidance function is a recursive function which can be used to expel avoidable points from domains of recursive quantum functions. We define an avoidable set of points to be an arbitrary subset of the (...) avoidable points of a single avoidance function, and we study an effective union of such sets which we call a piecemeal avoidable set. We note that each of ‘the set of recursive points’ and ‘the set of avoidable points’ is of first category but not recursively of first category. We show an exdomain exists which is recursively nowhere dense, as well as one that is nowhere dense but not recursively nowhere dense. After establishing that every exdomain is recursively of first category, we prove that given any fixed exdomain, there is another exdomain, which while dense in the underlying space, is disjoint from the fixed exdomain. Finally, we show how to build a recursive sequence of recursive quantum functions that have mutually disjoint, dense exdomains. (shrink)

This book from award winning author Dr. Larry Crabb seeks to think through a model of counseling which can be integrated into the functioning of the local church. It contains a chart appendix.

This article gives a brief overview of Rethinking the Good, whose impossibility arguments illuminate the difficulty of arriving at a coherent theory of the good. I show that an additive-aggregationistprinciple is plausible for some comparisons, while an anti- additive-aggregationistprinciple is plausible for others. Invoking SpectrumArguments, I show that these principles are incompatible with an empirical premise, and various Axioms of Transitivity. I argue that whether the “all-things-considered better than” relation is transitive is not a matter of language or logic, but (...) the nature of moral ideals. If an Internal Aspects View holds, then many standard assumptions about rationality follow, including the Axioms of Transitivity, but not if an Essentially Comparative View holds. Yet many important ideals are essentially comparative. My results have important implications for the normative significance of economics, and require substantial revision in our understanding of the good, moral ideals, and the nature of practical reasoning. (shrink)

In 2009 Larry Alexander and Kimberly Ferzan published Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal Law. The book set out a theory that those who deserve punishment should receive punishment commensurate with, but no greater than, that which they deserve. Reflections on Crime and Culpability: Problems and Puzzles expands on their innovative ideas on the application of punishment in criminal law. Theorists working in criminal law theory presuppose or ignore puzzles that lurk beneath the surface. Now those who wish (...) to examine these topics will have one monograph that combines the disparate puzzles in criminal law through a unified approach to culpability. Along with some suggestions as to how they might resolve the puzzles, Alexander and Ferzan lay out the arguments and analysis so future scholars can engage with questions about our understanding of culpability that very few have addressed. (shrink)

Many philosophers have discussed problems of additive aggregation across lives. In this article, I suggest that anti-additive aggregationist principles sometimes apply within lives, as well as between lives, and hence that we should reject a widely accepted conception of individual self-interest. The article has eight sections. Section I is introductory. Section II offers a general account of aggregation. Section III presents two examples of problems of additive aggregation across lives: Derek Parfit's Repugnant Conclusion, and my Lollipops for Life Case Section (...) IV suggests that many may have misdiagnosed the source and scope of anti-additive aggregationist considerations, due to the influence of Rawls's and Nozick's claims about the separateness of individuals. Accordingly, many leave Sidgwick's conception of self-interest—which incorporates an additive aggregationist approach to valuing individual lives—unchallenged. Section V suggests that the separateness of individuals may have led some to conflate the issues of compensation and moral balancing. Section VI argues that an additive aggregationist approach is often deeply implausible for determining the overall value of a life. Section VII discusses a Single Life Repugnant Conclusion, first considered by McTaggart. Section VIII concludes with a summary, and a brief indication of work remaining. (shrink)

Can a society be just if it ignores the plight of other societies? Does it matter whether those societies are contemporaries? Moral “purists” are likely to assume that the answer to these questions must be “no.” Relying on familiar claims about impartiality or universalizability, the purist is likely to assert that the dictates of justice have no bounds, that they extend with equal strength across space and time. On this view, if, for example, justice requires us to maximize the expectations (...) of the worst-off group in our society, it also requires us to maximize the expectations of the worst-off group in any society, at any time, so far as it is in our power to do so. Is such a position plausible? Is it more plausible than alternative positions? I am unsure about the answers to these questions, but both the questions, and the answers, are important. Clearly, the nature and extent of a just society's obligations will vary markedly depending on the scope of the correct principles of justice. (shrink)

This short but highly ambitious book asks us to rethink the evolution of the ideas on which modern states are built. Larry Siedentop argues that the core of what is now our system of beliefs, liberalism, emerged much earlier than generally recognised, established not in the Renaissance but by the arguments of lawyers and philosophers in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. There are large parts of the world--fundamentalist Islam; quasi-capitalist China--where other belief systems flourish. Faced with these challenges, understanding (...) our own ideas' origins is more than ever an important part of knowing who we are."--Publisher's Web site. (shrink)

Abolitionist theory combines both ideas and struggle into a vision for a better world. This review of Tommie Shelby’s book “The Idea of Prison Abolition” argues that Shelby’s critique of prison abolition separates out philosophical ideas from those born of struggle, and by doing so, necessarily sells the idea of prison abolition short. Using two examples of abolitionist on-the-ground practices connected to the work of Angela Davis--community bail funds and collective defense campaigns--this review argues that the collective work of experimenting (...) with and prefiguring a world without prisons is part of what gives prison abolition its moral and empirical content. (shrink)