The goal of this article is modest. It is simply to help illuminate the nature of egalitarianism. More particularly, I aim to show what certain egalitarians are committed to, and to suggest that equality, as these egalitarians understand it, is an important normative ideal that cannot simply be ignored in moral deliberations. In doing this, I distinguish between equality as universality, equality as impartiality, and equality as comparability, and also between instrumental and non-instrumental egalitarianism. I then characterise the version of (...) egalitarianism with which I am concerned, which I call equality as comparative fairness. I discuss the relations between equality, fairness, luck, and responsibility, and defend egalitarianism against rival views that focus on subsistence, sufficiency, or compassion. I also defend egalitarianism against the Levelling Down and Raising Up Objections, and present several key examples to illustrate egalitarianism's distinct appeal, in contrast to prioritarianism's. I conclude by considering two common questions about my view: first, whether my ultimate concern is really with comparative fairness, rather than equality, so that my view is not, in fact, a substantive, non-instrumental version of egalitarianism, and second, whether my view ultimately reduces to a theory about desert. (shrink)

Critical Thinking: An Introduction to Analytical Reading and Reasoning, Second Edition, provides a nontechnical vocabulary and analytic apparatus that guide students in identifying and articulating the central patterns found in reasoning and in expository writing more generally. Understanding these patterns of reasoning helps students to better analyze, evaluate, and construct arguments and to more easily comprehend the full range of everyday arguments found in ordinary journalism. Critical Thinking, Second Edition, distinguishes itself from other texts in the field by emphasizing analytical (...) reading as an essential skill. It also provides detailed coverage of argument analysis, diagnostic arguments, diagnostic patterns, and fallacies. Opening with two chapters on analytical reading that help students recognize what makes reasoning explicitly different from other expository activities, the text then presents an interrogative model of argument to guide them in the analysis and evaluation of reasoning. This model allows a detailed articulation of "inference to the best explanation" and gives students a view of the pervasiveness of this form of reasoning. The author demonstrates how many common argument types--from correlations to sampling--can be analyzed using this articulated form. He then extends the model to deal with several predictive and normative arguments and to display the value of the fallacy vocabulary. Ideal for introductory courses in critical thinking, critical reasoning, informal logic, and inductive reasoning, Critical Thinking, Second Edition, features hundreds of exercises throughout and includes worked-out solutions and additional exercises at the end of each chapter. An Instructor's Manual--offering solutions to the text's unanswered exercises and featuring other pedagogical aids--is available on the book's Companion Website at www.oup.com/us/wright. (shrink)

This paper is a culmination of our new foundations for recursive analysis through recursive topology as reported in Kalantari and Welch 125; 98 87). While in those papers we developed groundwork for an approach to point free analysis and applied recursion theory, in this paper we blend techniques of recursion theory with those of topology to establish new findings. We present several new techniques different from existing ones which yield interesting results. Incidental to our work is a unifying explanation of (...) various schools of study for recursive analysis. (shrink)

In his 1911 paper, “On the Relations of Universals and Particulars,” Bertrand Russell supposes the question whether universals are spatial or non spatial turns on the question of the existence of particulars. If particulars could be shown to exist, then since, according to Russell, they obviously are spatial, the non-spatiality of universals would be established. On the other hand, the denial of the existence of particulars would entail the spatiality of universals.In this paper, I argue that Russell’s claim is plausible (...) only if particulars are construed either as quality instances or as ordinary objects. If, however, particulars are either substrata or collections of qualities, nothing follows in regard to the spatiality or the non-spatiality of universals. Since the alternative interpretations of particularity are, I contend, at least as attractive as Russell’s, his failure to consider them makes his position less interesting than it might otherwise have been. (shrink)

In various places today we encounter a veritable cult of happiness, a socially mandated optimism, and a pathologization of persistent negativity or reluctance to participate as sickness to be treated. In this essay, I develop a critical perspective on this system of hegemonic happiness through an engagement with the thought of Adorno. It acts, I argue, as ideology in his sense of the term. After situating the discussion in the context of the broader philosophical project of Negative Dialectics, I elaborate (...) the sustained critique of “the doctrine of inner health” laid out in Minima Moralia. Then, as an expansion and update of this critique, I consider in more detail the prevailing form of the inner health discourse—what I will call “the happiness machine.” As a brief excursus into popular culture, I read an episode of The Twilight Zone as an apologue for this ideological mechanism and its functioning. Finally, I suggest a way of articulating refusal of the happiness machine rooted in Adorno’s conception of resistance. (shrink)

lawpubPublic International LawlawphiPhilosophy of LawNecessity is quite possibly the most powerful concept in the law. It has the almost mystical power to transform what would otherwise be illegal or immoral into a justified or excused act, all because the action was “necessary.” Herein lays its utter dangerousness. Whether the inquiry is individual self-defense in domestic criminal law, national self-defense under international law, or killing during armed conflict, the concept of necessity is often the key element that drives the outcome of (...) the analysis. If the action is necessary, then it is often permitted; if the action is not necessary, it is often forbidden. But what does “necessary” really mean in these debates? And does it mean the same thing in each context, or does its meaning and function depend on the nature of the inquiry at hand? Is necessity a universal moral and legal concept, or is its meaning fundamentally context-dependent?... (shrink)

Hannah Arendt’s Jewish writings were central to her thinking about the human condition and engaged with the dialectics of modernity, universalism and identity. Her concept of the ‘conscious pariah’ attempted both to define a role for the public intellectual and understand the relationship between Jews and modernity. Controversially she accused Jewish victims of lack of resistance to the Nazis and argued that their victimization resulted from apolitical ‘worldlessness’. We argue that although Arendt’s analysis was original and challenging, her characterization of (...) Jewish history as one of ‘powerlessness’ is exaggerated but, more importantly, her underdeveloped concept of ‘the social’ is insensitive to the complex modalities of resistance and consciousness among subaltern Jewish communities. Furthermore, her lack of interest in religious observance obscures the importance of Judaism as a resource for resistance. This is illustrated by the ‘hidden transcripts’ of Jewish resistance from the early modern period. (shrink)

We develop the concepts of recursively nowhere dense sets and sets that are recursively of first category and study closed sets of points in light of Baire's Category Theorem. Our theorems are primarily concerned with exdomains of recursive quantum functions and hence with avoidable points . An avoidance function is a recursive function which can be used to expel avoidable points from domains of recursive quantum functions. We define an avoidable set of points to be an arbitrary subset of the (...) avoidable points of a single avoidance function, and we study an effective union of such sets which we call a piecemeal avoidable set. We note that each of ‘the set of recursive points’ and ‘the set of avoidable points’ is of first category but not recursively of first category. We show an exdomain exists which is recursively nowhere dense, as well as one that is nowhere dense but not recursively nowhere dense. After establishing that every exdomain is recursively of first category, we prove that given any fixed exdomain, there is another exdomain, which while dense in the underlying space, is disjoint from the fixed exdomain. Finally, we show how to build a recursive sequence of recursive quantum functions that have mutually disjoint, dense exdomains. (shrink)

This article gives a brief overview of Rethinking the Good, whose impossibility arguments illuminate the difficulty of arriving at a coherent theory of the good. I show that an additive-aggregationistprinciple is plausible for some comparisons, while an anti- additive-aggregationistprinciple is plausible for others. Invoking SpectrumArguments, I show that these principles are incompatible with an empirical premise, and various Axioms of Transitivity. I argue that whether the “all-things-considered better than” relation is transitive is not a matter of language or logic, but (...) the nature of moral ideals. If an Internal Aspects View holds, then many standard assumptions about rationality follow, including the Axioms of Transitivity, but not if an Essentially Comparative View holds. Yet many important ideals are essentially comparative. My results have important implications for the normative significance of economics, and require substantial revision in our understanding of the good, moral ideals, and the nature of practical reasoning. (shrink)

In 2009 Larry Alexander and Kimberly Ferzan published Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal Law. The book set out a theory that those who deserve punishment should receive punishment commensurate with, but no greater than, that which they deserve. Reflections on Crime and Culpability: Problems and Puzzles expands on their innovative ideas on the application of punishment in criminal law. Theorists working in criminal law theory presuppose or ignore puzzles that lurk beneath the surface. Now those who wish (...) to examine these topics will have one monograph that combines the disparate puzzles in criminal law through a unified approach to culpability. Along with some suggestions as to how they might resolve the puzzles, Alexander and Ferzan lay out the arguments and analysis so future scholars can engage with questions about our understanding of culpability that very few have addressed. (shrink)

Many philosophers have discussed problems of additive aggregation across lives. In this article, I suggest that anti-additive aggregationist principles sometimes apply within lives, as well as between lives, and hence that we should reject a widely accepted conception of individual self-interest. The article has eight sections. Section I is introductory. Section II offers a general account of aggregation. Section III presents two examples of problems of additive aggregation across lives: Derek Parfit's Repugnant Conclusion, and my Lollipops for Life Case Section (...) IV suggests that many may have misdiagnosed the source and scope of anti-additive aggregationist considerations, due to the influence of Rawls's and Nozick's claims about the separateness of individuals. Accordingly, many leave Sidgwick's conception of self-interest—which incorporates an additive aggregationist approach to valuing individual lives—unchallenged. Section V suggests that the separateness of individuals may have led some to conflate the issues of compensation and moral balancing. Section VI argues that an additive aggregationist approach is often deeply implausible for determining the overall value of a life. Section VII discusses a Single Life Repugnant Conclusion, first considered by McTaggart. Section VIII concludes with a summary, and a brief indication of work remaining. (shrink)

Can a society be just if it ignores the plight of other societies? Does it matter whether those societies are contemporaries? Moral “purists” are likely to assume that the answer to these questions must be “no.” Relying on familiar claims about impartiality or universalizability, the purist is likely to assert that the dictates of justice have no bounds, that they extend with equal strength across space and time. On this view, if, for example, justice requires us to maximize the expectations (...) of the worst-off group in our society, it also requires us to maximize the expectations of the worst-off group in any society, at any time, so far as it is in our power to do so. Is such a position plausible? Is it more plausible than alternative positions? I am unsure about the answers to these questions, but both the questions, and the answers, are important. Clearly, the nature and extent of a just society's obligations will vary markedly depending on the scope of the correct principles of justice. (shrink)

This article argues that the study conducted by Facebook in conjunction with Cornell University did not have sufficient ethical oversight, and neglected in particular to obtain necessary informed consent from the participants in the study. It establishes the importance of informed consent in Internet research ethics and suggests that in Facebook’s case (and other, similar cases), a reasonable shift could be made from traditional medical ethics ‘effective consent’ to a ‘waiver of normative expectations’, although this would require much-needed change to (...) the company’s standard practice. Finally, it gives some practical recommendations for how to implement such consent strategies, and how the ethical oversight gap between university-led research and industry-led research can be bridged, potentially using emerging Responsible Research and Innovation frameworks which are currently gathering momentum in Europe. (shrink)

This short but highly ambitious book asks us to rethink the evolution of the ideas on which modern states are built. Larry Siedentop argues that the core of what is now our system of beliefs, liberalism, emerged much earlier than generally recognised, established not in the Renaissance but by the arguments of lawyers and philosophers in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. There are large parts of the world--fundamentalist Islam; quasi-capitalist China--where other belief systems flourish. Faced with these challenges, understanding (...) our own ideas' origins is more than ever an important part of knowing who we are."--Publisher's Web site. (shrink)

Psychotherapists in mental health institutions as a professional group are part of the medical system, and from this perspective, as representing an occupation that serves the public health interests, as well as those of the individual seeking help. Despite the different existing therapeutic approaches and diverse forms of therapy deriving from these approaches critical theories, however, consider psychotherapy as a profession with a specific jurisdictional claim and own highly specific interests. In contrast to most of the recent discussion around therapy (...) culture, in this article, I argue that sociology and social theory could benefit from an understanding of psychotherapy as a profession with a separate logic and claim for jurisdiction for mental health. Moreover, I present some general trends showing that, regarding psychotherapy, we face a concurrence of a professionalisation, and simultaneously, an already ongoing deprofessionalisation. To develop my argument, I first discuss the perspectives of sociology of the psychotherapy professions. Second, I present the potential lack of professionalism in four dimensions. Third, I discuss possible tendencies of deprofessionalisation. Finally, I conclude by pointing out the importance of theorising the psychotherapy professions for medical sociology. (shrink)

Normative naturalism is a view about the status of epistemology and philosophy of science; it is a meta-epistemology. It maintains that epistemology can both discharge its traditional normative role and nonetheless claim a sensitivity to empirical evidence. The first sections of this essay set out the central tenets of normative naturalism, both in its epistemic and its axiological dimensions; later sections respond to criticisms of that species of naturalism from Gerald Doppelt, Jarrett Leplin and Alex Rosenberg.

A significant part of responsible innovation is engagement with diverse groups of stakeholders; this remains true for projects investigating responsible innovation practices. This chapter discusses strategies for engaging small and medium-sized enterprises in co-creating visions of and plans for implementing responsible innovation, drawing on the example of engagement with United Kingdom cyber security companies. The key aspect of the engagement was building trust between the responsible innovation researchers and the companies. Trust was built by a movement away from traditional recruitment (...) procedures for research projects, towards proactive engagement with the culture and traditions of the sector – participating in company sponsored talks and conferences, finding ways to communicate effectively, and ensuring a tailored message that fit the expectations and requirements of the sector. This chapter reviews the context in which the recruitment took place, the assumptions made prior to recruitment, the approaches taken, the revisions made to these approaches, and ultimately offers some general recommendations for industry engagement in responsible innovation activities. (shrink)