This paper assesses the relationship between corporate social responsibility and downside equity tail risk, a field of research that is underdeveloped at this moment. Using global equities data over the period of January 2003 to December 2011, inclusive, the downside tail risk of each company is estimated using techniques of extreme value theory and CSR is approached using stakeholder theory. Our findings show a significant relationship between certain aspects of CSR and downside tail risk. The nature of the relationship differs (...) across region, stakeholder and time. Furthermore, the relationships we found are sequential, which makes a causal link between CSR and tail risk plausible. (shrink)

The argument is that on moore's analysis of normative language, which is both nonnaturalistic and cognitivistic, one must adopt two distinct criteria of truth. and that any theory which fundamentally assumes two distinct and independent types of truth need not be committed to a logical dualism, that there are some sets of deductive rules homomorphic to the rules of propositional logic which validate certain arguments the premises of which may be true in different ways, and that a system having (...) these properties is a normal alethic modal logic. (shrink)

According to G E Moore,1 we commit the naturalistic fallacy when we infer ‘x is good’ from non-evaluative premises involving x such as ‘ x is pleasant’ or ‘ x is desired’. On Moore’s view, the mistake is to think that we can reduce moral goodness to anything else or explain it in any other terms. We cannot analyse ‘good’, Moore thought, because goodness is simple, non-natural and sui generis. If Moore were alive today, and if (...) he were to ask contemporary bioethicists the right questions, he would probably find that many of them commit the naturalistic fallacy when they move from empirical premises to normative conclusions or when they articulate complex notions of the good. Pugh et al 2 might commit the naturalistic fallacy themselves when they conclude that people with natural immunity to COVID-19 should be exempt from vaccine mandates because such exemptions would achieve desired public health benefits. Moore would probably find me guilty of committing the naturalistic fallacy if I were to present my arguments against such exemptions. A reanimated Moore would find that the naturalistic fallacy pervades bioethics and public health. In contrast, as I shall argue, the un naturalistic fallacy is probably nowhere to be found. In this commentary, I explain what the so-called unnaturalistic fallacy really is and raise doubts about whether anyone really commits it. Decades after Moore published Principia Ethica, Bernard Williams observed that the naturalistic fallacy is unfortunately named since it is neither a fallacy nor an argumentative tendency unique to ethical naturalists.3 Ethical non-naturalists make the same mistake—if it is a mistake—when they move from, say, ‘x is commanded by the gods’ to ‘x is good’. Just as Moore’s ‘naturalistic fallacy’ misnames, Pugh et al ’s ‘unnaturalistic fallacy’ misleads. To be …. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Reason 1: It's a Lie, and Lying is Wrong Reason 2: Santa Doesn't Have Your Best Interests in Mind Reason 3: The Damage to Credulity Having Faith in Santa Cut It Out, Wrap It Up.

This essay argues that the concept of ‘reasonableness’plays an important role in Scanlon's, Rawls's, and Barry's theories of justice (or morality). The relationship between moral motivation and reasonableness is critically analysed. Specifically, the paper questions whether it is plausible to impute to the agents of construction the desire ‘to justify our actions to others on impartial terms’. It also argues that most of the work is done by the assumption that people are reasonable rather than by the contractarian formulation. Indeed, (...) the paper argues, the argument could proceed entirely by making explicit and arguing for the moral assumptions embedded in the concept of reasonableness [1]. (shrink)

Do English speakers think about time the way they talk about it? In spoken English, time appears to flow along the sagittal axis (front/back): the future is ahead and the past is behind us. Here we show that when asked to gesture about past and future events deliberately, English speakers often use the sagittal axis, as language suggests they should. By contrast, when producing co-speech gestures spontaneously, they use the lateral axis (left/right) overwhelmingly more often, gesturing leftward for earlier times (...) and rightward for later times. This left-right mapping of time is consistent with the flow of time on calendars and graphs in English-speaking cultures, but is completely absent from conventional spoken metaphors. English speakers gesture on the lateral axis even when they are using front/back metaphors in their co-occurring speech. This speech-gesture dissociation is not due to any lack of lexical or constructional resources to spatialize time laterally in language, nor to any lack of physical resources to spatialize time sagittally in gesture. We propose that when speakers are describing sequences of events, they often use neither the Moving Ego nor Moving Time perspectives. Rather, they adopt a “Moving Attention” perspective, which is grounded in patterns of interaction with cultural artifacts, not in patterns of interaction with the natural environment. We suggest possible pragmatic, kinematic, and mnemonic motivations for the use of a lateral mental timeline in gesture and in thought. Gestures reveal an implicit spatial conceptualization of time that cannot be inferred from language. (shrink)

Abstract:This paper is a further development of two previous pieces of work (Moore 2002, 2005) in which modern virtue ethics, and in particular MacIntyre’s (1985) related notions of “practice” and “institution,” have been explored in the context of business. It first introduces and defines the concept of corporate character and seeks to establish why it is important. It then reviews MacIntyre’s virtues-practice-institution schema and the implications of this at the level of the institution in question—the corporation—and argues that the (...) concept of corporate character follows from, but is a novel development of, MacIntyre’s schema. The paper contrasts corporate character and virtues with the more familiar concepts of corporate culture and values. The constitutive and substantive elements of corporate character, including the essential corporate virtues, are then drawn out and illustrated with reference to the cases explored in Koehn (1998). Finally, the paper acknowledges and counters a specific criticism of this approach. (shrink)

In the late Middle Ages the philosopher and mystic Meister Eckhart preached that to know the truth you must be the truth. But how to be the truth? Eckhart's answer comes in the form of an imperative: release yourself, let be. Only then will you be able to understand that the deepest meaning of being is releasement. Only then will you become who you truly are. This book interprets Eckhart's Latin and Middle High German writings under the banner of an (...) imperative of releasement, and then shows how the twentieth-century thinker Martin Heidegger creatively appropriates this idea at several stages of his career. Heidegger had a lifelong fascination with Eckhart, referring to him as "the old master of letters and life." Drawing on archival material and Heidegger's marginalia in his personal copies of Eckhart's writings, Moore argues that Eckhart was one of the most important figures in Heidegger's philosophy. This book also contains previously unpublished documents by Heidegger on Eckhart, as well as the first English translation of Nishitani Keiji's essay "Nietzsche's Zarathustra and Meister Eckhart," which he initially gave as a presentation in one of Heidegger's classes in 1938. (shrink)

A.W. Moore presents eighteen of his philosophical essays, written since 1986, on representing how things are. He sketches out the nature, scope, and limits of representation through language, and pays particular attention to linguistic representation, states of knowledge, the character of what is represented, and objective facts or truths.

The translation of honraisei as “authenticity” has caused scholars to compare Watsuji with Heideggerian and Taylorian accounts of authenticity. In this article, it will be demonstrated that this translation of “authenticity” is misleading insofar as it suggests a sense of subjective individuality as prevalent within Western philosophical thought. However, rather than rejecting a Watsujian account of authenticity, it will be argued that we can salvage this understanding by rethinking honraisei as a distinctly Japanese approach to authenticity and one which is (...) underpinned by the Buddhist concept of emptiness. (shrink)

A. W. Moore argues in this bold and unusual book that it is possible to think about the world from no point of view. His argument involves discussion of a very wide range of fundamental philosophical issues, including the nature of persons, the subject-matter of mathematics, realism and anti-realism, value, the inexpressible, and God. The result is a powerful critique of our own finitude. 'imaginative, original, and ambitious' Robert Brandom, Times Literary Supplement.

Some scientific realists suggest that scientific communities have improved in their ability to discover alternative theoretical possibilities and that the problem of unconceived alternatives therefore poses a less significant threat to contemporary scientific communities than it did to their historical predecessors. I first argue that the most profound and fundamental historical transformations of the scientific enterprise have actually increased rather than decreased our vulnerability to the problem. I then argue that whether we are troubled by even the prospect of increasing (...) theoretical conservatism in science should depend on the position we occupy in the ongoing debate concerning scientific realism itself. (shrink)

This essay compares two philosophical proposals concerning the relation between values and science, both of which reject the value-free ideal but nevertheless place restrictions on how values and science should interact. The first of these proposals relies on a distinction between the direct and indirect roles of values, while the second emphasizes instead a distinction between epistemic and nonepistemic values. We consider these two proposals in connection with a case study of disputed research on the topic of environmental justice and (...) argue that the second proposal has several advantages over the first. (shrink)

Richard Neely, Take Back Your Neighborhood New York: Donald I. Fine, Inc., 1990, 224pp.

In the past 20 years or so, the psychological research on imitation has flourished. However, our working definition of imitation has not adequately adapted in order to reflect this research. The closest that we've come to a revamped conception of imitation comes from the work of Michael Tomasello. Despite its numerous virtues, Tomasello's definition is in need of at least two significant amendments, if it is to reflect the current state of knowledge. Accordingly, it is our goal in this paper (...) to reformulate Tomasello's definition of imitation in order to account for both the latest empirical findings and the conceptual considerations that follow from them. Specifically, we argue that a satisfactory definition of imitation ought to be formulated as follows: imitation is the reproduction of an observed behavior where the agent imitating recognizes the behavior of the demonstrator as goal-directed and has some particular interest in or concern for replicating the precise technique performed by the aut.. (shrink)

Ongoing research in nanotechnology promises both innovations and risks, potentially and profoundly changing the world. This book helps to promote a balanced understanding of this important emerging technology, offering an informed and impartial look at the technology, its science, and its social impact and ethics. Nanotechnology is crucial for the next generation of industries, financial markets, research labs, and our everyday lives; this book provides an informed and balanced look at nanotechnology and its social impact Offers a comprehensive background discussion (...) on nanotechnology itself, including its history, its science, and its tools, creating a clear understanding of the technology needed to evaluate ethics and social issues Authored by a nanoscientist and philosophers, offers an accurate and accessible look at the science while providing an ideal text for ethics and philosophy courses Explores the most immediate and urgent areas of social impact of nanotechnology. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 1, Page 63-70, January 2022.

It might seem incoherent or a contradiction in terms to suggest that we can be philosophical naturalists while nonetheless resisting the scientific realist's view that that the claims of our best scientific theories concerning otherwise inaccessible domains of nature are at least probably and/or approximately true. I suggest, however, that this conclusion follows only from a dogmatic and unappealingly scientistic conception of naturalism itself. I go on to argue not only that a more attractive form of philosophical naturalism can indeed (...) be coherently combined with a rejection of scientific realism, but also that this combination of views is the one that thoroughgoing and sophisticated naturalists should in fact embrace. And I conclude by offering a systematic conception of the role of philosophy of science in the resulting integrative form of naturalistic inquiry. (shrink)

‘The soul hypothesis’ enjoys near unanimous support in the general population. Among philosophers and scientists, however, belief in the soul is far less common. The purpose of this essay to explain why many philosophers and scientists reject the soul hypothesis and to consider what the non-existence of the soul would entail.

The rise of political polarization and disagreement within the United States and other democracies indicates an erosion of the social contract, a deterioration exacerbated by the balkanization of social media, that can negatively impact our social relationships. Recent anti–Critical Race Theory (CRT) narratives in education provide insights into how policy narratives can be used to sow distrust in an educational context. In this paper Jane Lo and candace moore argue for the ways policy narratives can sow distrust as opposed (...) to mistrust. Mistrust points to an ongoing process of determining trustworthiness, while distrust connotes a more decisive and deliberate lack of trust in a person or institution. Lo and moore argue that educational research should pay more attention to the building of trust or mistrust in schools in the current context, where the anti-CRT policy narrative, through amplifying and manipulating existing anxieties and fears in order to motivate political action, capitalizes on and seeks to reinforce the natural mistrust of schooling. (shrink)

G. E. Moore 's 1912 work Ethics has tended to be overshadowed by his famous earlier work Principia Ethica. However, its detailed discussions of utilitarianism, free will, and the objectivity of moral judgements find no real counterpart in Principia, while its account of right and wrong and of the nature of intrinsic value deepen our understanding of Moore 's moral philosophy. Moore himself regarded the book highly, writing late in his career, "I myself like [it] better than (...) Principia Ethica, because it seems to me to be much clearer and far less full of confusions and invalid arguments." Short but philosophically rich, and written with impressive precision and intellectual candor, Ethics is a minor classic which repays careful study. This new edition includes Moore 's essay "The Nature of Moral Philosophy" as well as editorial notes, an introduction, and a guide to further reading. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, “confirmation bias”. Confirmation bias is the human tendency only to look for evidence that confirms what one wants to believe or what one already thinks is true. Usually people are not too keen to look for evidence against what they want to believe is true. The human propensity for self‐delusion is strong. When one is confronted with sufficient evidence against some belief that one holds, what one should do (...) is reject that belief ‐ at least if one is concerned with truth. When we surround ourselves with people and views that already agree with our own, we can draw erroneous conclusions. Confirmation bias greatly hinders one's ability to find the truth. Confirmation bias and evidence denial is why we start “seeing something everywhere” once you learn about it. The more scrutiny a belief can withstand, the more likely it is that it's true. (shrink)

A lot of what we understand to be trust is not trust; it is, instead, an active and conscious decision to feign trust. We call this ‘as-if’ trust. If trust involves taking on risks and vulnerabilities, as-if trust involves taking on surplus risks and vulnerabilities. People may decide to act as if they trust in many situations, even when they do not have sufficient warrant to trust – which is to say even when they do not trust. Likewise, people might (...) decide to act as if they trust even when they have good reasons to actively distrust. The surplus risks of as-if trust may be worth taking in a number of different contexts and for many reasons. We argue that as-if trust is a concept that should be added to our theoretical, practical, and political vocabularies of trust and distrust. In doing so, we discuss the main reasons for someone to act as if they trust. We then show that the practice of as-if trust has been recognized by other scholars but treated as trust. In response, we clarify how as-if trust differs from trust, and we discuss the utility and ubiquity of as-if trust, especially in politics. (shrink)

The previous studies have shown that human infants and domestic dogs follow the gaze of a human agent only when the agent has addressed them ostensively—e.g., by making eye contact, or calling their name. This evidence is interpreted as showing that they expect ostensive signals to precede referential information. The present study tested chimpanzees, one of the closest relatives to humans, in a series of eye-tracking experiments using an experimental design adapted from these previous studies. In the ostension conditions, a (...) human actor made eye contact, called the participant’s name, and then looked at one of two objects. In the control conditions, a salient cue, which differed in each experiment (a colorful object, the actor’s nodding, or an eating action), attracted participants’ attention to the actor’s face, and then the actor looked at the object. Overall, chimpanzees followed the actor’s gaze to the cued object in both ostension and control conditions, and the ostensive signals did not enhance gaze following more than the control attention-getters. However, the ostensive signals enhanced subsequent attention to both target and distractor objects (but not to the actor’s face) more strongly than the control attention-getters—especially in the chimpanzees who had a close relationship with human caregivers. We interpret this as showing that chimpanzees have a simple form of communicative expectations on the basis of ostensive signals, but unlike human infants and dogs, they do not subsequently use the experimenter’s gaze to infer the intended referent. These results may reflect a limitation of non-domesticated species for interpreting humans’ ostensive signals in inter-species communication. (shrink)

I have argued elsewhere that scientific realism is most significantly challenged neither by traditional arguments from underdetermination of theories by the evidence, nor by the traditional pessimistic induction, but by a rather different historical pattern: our repeated failure to conceive of alternatives to extant scientific theories, even when those alternatives were both (1) well-confirmed by the evidence available at the time and (2) sufficiently scientifically serious as to be later embraced by actual scientific communities. Here I use August Weismann's defense (...) of his influential germ-plasm theory of inheritance to support my claim that this pattern characterizes the history of theoretical scientific investigation generally. Weismann believed that the germ-plasm must become disintegrated into its constituent elements over the course of development, I argue, only because he failed to conceive of any possible alternative mechanism of ontogenetic differentiation. This and other features of the germ-plasm theory, I suggest, reflect a still more fundamental failure to imagine that the germ-plasm might be a productive rather than expendable resource for the cell. Weismann's case provides impressive support for the problem of unconceived alternatives while rendering its challenge to scientific realism deeper and sharper in a number of important ways. (shrink)

The British National Lottery has now been running for almost three years and it arouses social and ethical misgivings in several quarters, whether in its contribution to the British gambling scene or in the size and distribution of its prizes or in its contributions to the good causes which it was introduced to benefit. Bringing wide experience and an expert eye to analyse and comment on the lottery, Dr Moore, DSc PhD FIA, is Emeritus Professor of Decision Sciences at (...) London Business School, Sussex Place, Regent’s Park, London NW1 4SA. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Band ist die schriftliche Fassung einer Vorlesung, die Moore im Wintersemester 1910/11 an der Cambridge University als Einführung in die Philosophie gehalten hat und erst 1956, zwei Jahre vor seinem Tod, veröffentlicht wurde. Nach einer ausführlichen Erklärung dessen, was Philosophie überhaupt ist, was der Gegenstand und die Aufgabe der Philosophie ist, führt Moore im Ausgang von unseren sinnlichen Erfahrungen in das Gesamtgebiet der Philosophie ein. Behandelt werden Themen wie Existenz, materielle Dinge, Dinge in Raum und Zeit, (...) Propositionen, Wissen und Erkennen, die Philosophie David Humes und weitere Themen. Der vorliegende Band ist sowohl für Philosophiestudenten und interessierte Laien zur Einführung in die Philosophie gut geeignet, als auch für den philosophischen Experten, der sich eingehender mit Moores Philosophie beschäftigen möchte. (shrink)

In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke makes an extravagant claim: Morality is as capable of demonstration as Mathematics. In the sixth Conversation between the seventeenth-century philosopher John Locke and the student of language Terence Moore, Moore points out that Locke's own arguments on the nature of language demonstrate that morality in a strong sense is not demonstrable. The Conversation then turns to Locke's real concern ??? ways in which words used in moral judgements might be made less (...) ???uncertain, vague, ambivalent??? (shrink)

Moore maintains that, in principle, there is an objective answer to questions of right and wrong. More specifically, that a particular action cannot be both right and wrong, either at the same time or at different times. In this chapter and the next, Moore argues against theories that deny this latter proposition and thus reject the objectivity of moral judgments. Beginning with a critique of the thesis that when one asserts that an action is right or wrong, one (...) is merely asserting that one has a certain feeling towards it, this chapter focuses its critical fire on various attitudinal theories of ethics. (shrink)

T W Moore; Education and the Ethics of Discrimination, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 15, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 235–240, https://doi.org/10.11.

The South Park “Go God Go” saga raises some very important questions. In these episodes, the scientific worldview stamps out religion. But are science and religion really in such irreconcilable conflict? Would the supremacy of a scientific worldview really lead to atheism? And in the South Park future of 2546, a cartoon version of Richard Dawkins has pioneered efforts which culminate in religion’s demise and atheism becomes its own religion. But is atheism—and specifically “The New Atheism” that Dawkins champions—really just (...) a religion? The article tackles those questions. (shrink)

Two‐ and 3‐year‐old children (N = 96) were tested in an object‐choice task with video presentations of peer and adult partners. An immersive, semi‐interactive procedure enabled both the close matching of adult and peer conditions and the combination of participants’ choice behavior with looking time measures. Children were more likely to use information provided by adults. As the effect was more pronounced in the younger age‐group, the observed bias may fade during toddlerhood. As there were no differences in children’s propensity (...) to follow peer and adult gestures with their gaze, these findings provide some of the earliest evidence to date that young children take an interlocutor’s age into account when judging ostensively communicated testimony. (shrink)

Terence Moore explains why Locke is perhaps not quite the many suppose him to be.

Conscious technology features in many Black Mirror episodes. For example, there are the cookies in White Christmas, the people uploaded into the San Junipero simulation, Robert Daly's digital copies of his coworkers in USS Callister, and the copy of Clayton Leigh that is exhibited in Black Museum. But would such pieces of technology really be conscious? Would they, for example, feel pain? And how could we tell? Is uploading or replicating someone's consciousness even possible? This chapter explores these questions and (...) discusses the ethical issues that are raised by consciousness technology. (shrink)

This book is an original critique of contemporary liberal theories of justice, focusing on the problem of how to relate the personal point of view of the individual to the impartial perspective of justice. Margaret Moore's examination of prominent contemporary arguments for liberal justice reveals that individualist theories are subject to two serious difficulties: the motivation problem and the integrity problem. Individualists cannot explain why the individual should be motivated to act in accordance with the dictates of liberal justice, (...) andDSrelated to thisDSoffer radically incoherent accounts of the person. Revisionist liberal attempts to ground liberalism in contextual and perfectionist terms offer more defensible foundations, but Dr Moore argues that such theories do not support liberal political principles. She concludes by sketching a historical and concrete approach to political and ethical theorizing which reformulates the relation between self-interest and morality, and is not subject to the problems that beset liberal individualist theories of justice. Her book advances the debate between communitarians and liberals about the kind of moral foundation which a liberal society requires. (shrink)

Professor Michael S. Moore, Charles R. Walgreen, Jr. Chair and Co-Director, Program in Law and Philosophy at the University of Illinois College of Law, delivered Duke Law's Annual Brainerd Currie Memorial Lecture entitled "The Elusive Quest for a Constitutional Right to Liberty." One of the country's most prominent authorities on the intersection of law and philosophy, he has published eight books and some 60 major articles, which have appeared in the country's top law reviews and peer reviewed journals in (...) philosophy and psychiatry. He is the author of Placing Blame, a General Theory of the Criminal Law, widely regarded as the leading modern statement of the retributivist theory of punishment and of that theory's systematic application to criminal law doctrine. In Act and Crime: The Philosophy of Action and its Implications for Criminal Law, Moore provided a unified theory of action that underlies English and American criminal jurisprudence. Professor Moore has presented more than 150 lectures and papers in law, jurisprudence, political theory, legal philosophy, political science and economics, philosophy, psychology, and psychiatry. Sponsored by the Office of the Dean. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called 'Galileo gambit'. Perhaps the best way to describe the fallacy is as an association fallacy or a faulty analogy. The Galileo gambit fallacy is committed by those theories that contradict the mainstream scientific consensus. The Galileo gambit is often used to suggest that science is not open to criticism, but nothing could be further from the truth. No one is more open to criticism than the scientist; that (...) is how we make sure we are not wrong and get closer to the truth. Persons who are making the Galileo gambit in recent times are Rupert Sheldrake and his morphic resonance/fields, Bigfoot believers, UFO enthusiasts, creationists, conspiracy theorists of all stripes, and people who deny climate change. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called 'subjective validation'. An objective validation of a statement can be accomplished by showing that the statement actually matches up to the way the world is; this can be done by comparing the statement to the world itself. Combined with other mistakes, like confirmation bias and availability error, subjective validation can fool people into thinking that psychics can read their minds, predict the future, or even communicate with the (...) dead. Although the subjective validation of Nostradamus's “predictions” doesn't fuel much else besides silly beliefs in the paranormal, falling prey to subjective validation can be much more costly. The same subjective validation “retrodiction” techniques are also used to interpret the prophecies of the Bible, like those that are supposedly in the Book of Revelation. (shrink)

Two aspects of mothering—using drugs during pregnancy and giving up the rearing of one's children—are the focus of this analysis of 58 addicted Chicana mothers who spent their adolescent years in barrio gangs. From a traditional stance, such women were doubly deviant, since they violated gender-role prescriptions by joining a barrio gang and by becoming involved in heroin and street life. Half of these women added to this deviance by using heroin during pregnancy, and 40 percent relinquished at least one (...) of their children. This article explores what distinguishes these classically “bad mothers” from addicts who maintain some degree of conventionality in their mothering. We found that Mexican gender-role traditionalism is not the only influence on these women. Many came from cholo or underclass families with a tradition of street involvement. In addition, their involvement in gang and heroin worlds may influence their behavior as mothers. We found that women who used drugs during pregnancy were more likely than abstainers to be cholas and to reject traditional gender-role values. However, those who gave up their children were more likely than those who kept their children to be from traditional families. We discuss the implications of these findings for research on deviance and the underclass among Hispanic women. (shrink)

T W Moore; Punishment and Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 1, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 29–34, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1967.t.

From Geoffrey A. Moore, author of Crossing the Chasm, which has sold more than 1 million copies, The Infinite Staircase is a bold new book that combines science and philosophy to answer two fundamental questions for humanity: the metaphysical "where do I fit in the grand scheme of things?" and the ethical "how should I behave?".

A philosophical look at the movie Inception and its brilliant metaphysical puzzles Is the top still spinning? Was it all a dream? In the world of Christopher Nolan's four-time Academy Award-winning movie, people can share one another's dreams and alter their beliefs and thoughts. Inception is a metaphysical heist film that raises more questions than it answers: Can we know what is real? Can you be held morally responsible for what you do in dreams? What is the nature of dreams, (...) and what do they tell us about the boundaries of "self" and "other"? From Plato to Aristotle and from Descartes to Hume, Inception and Philosophy draws from important philosophical minds to shed new light on the movie's captivating themes, including the one that everyone talks about: did the top fall down (and does it even matter)? Explores the movie's key questions and themes, including how we can tell if we're dreaming or awake, how to make sense of a paradox, and whether or not inception is possible Gives new insights into the nature of free will, time, dreams, and the unconscious mind Discusses different interpretations of the film, and whether or not philosophy can help shed light on which is the "right one" Deepens your understanding of the movie's multi-layered plot and dream-infiltrating characters, including Dom Cobb, Arthur, Mal, Ariadne, Eames, Saito, and Yusuf An essential companion for every dedicated Inception fan, this book will enrich your experience of the Inception universe and its complex dreamscape. (shrink)