Ecological psychologists and enactivists agree that the best explanation for a large share of cognition is nonrepresentational in kind. In both ecological psychology and enactivist philosophy, then, the task is to offer an explanans that does not rely on representations. Different theorists within these camps have contrasting notions of what the best kind of nonrepresentational explanation will look like, yet they agree on one central point: instead of focusing solely on factors interior to an agent, an important aspect of cognition (...) is found in the link or coupling between an agent and the external world. This link is fluid, dynamic, and active in a variety of ways, and we do not need to add any internal extra something in the perception-action-cognition process. At the same time, even devout defenders of ecological psychology and enactivism recognize that plenty happens inside an agent during cognition. In particular, no one denies that the brain plays an important role. What, then, is the role of the brain if it’s not in the game of representing the environment? One possible option is to describe the brain as a resonant organ instead of a representational organ. In this paper we consider the history of resonance in more detail. Particular focus will be placed on two different sets of approaches that have developed the concept of resonance: a representational reading of resonance and a nonrepresentational, dynamic account of resonance. We then apply these accounts to a case study on music performance, specifically in the context of standard tonal jazz. From this application, we propose that a nonrepresentational resonance account consistent with both enactivism and ecological psychology is a viable way of explaining jazz performance. We conclude with future considerations on research regarding the brain as a resonant organ. (shrink)

In this paper I shall closely examine some of Gilbert Harman's cases that purport to show that one can have a justified true belief that does not constitute knowledge because of the social environment. I shall provide an account of these cases that helps us not only understand why the people in these situations lack knowledge, but also why philosophers have a difficult time evaluating these cases. More specifically, I shall argue that in these cases we should conclude that the (...) cognizers lack justification. I shall also show how this account sheds some light on certain aspects of the internalism/externalism debate. (shrink)

Marx concentrated on Western Europe and North America in his core writings, but discussions of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America are scattered throughout his work. In the Communist Manifesto (1848) and his writings for the New York Tribune Marx posited a universal theory of historical and economic development in which non-Western societies represented backwardness, but could progress into modernity with the external impetus of the world market. Later, especially in the Grundrisse (1857-58) and the recently (...) available Ethnological Notebooks of 1879-82, Marx gradually altered this implicitly unilinear model, replacing it with a more multilinear one in which non-Western societies (in which he included Russia) might be able to embark upon an alternate form of modernity that would offer a new challenge to capitalist modernity. The basis of this alternate form was economic, in the “communal” property forms that he saw as underlying many Asian societies, as opposed to Western-style private property. (shrink)

Dopo aver considerato i caratteri generali dei prologhi di Tommaso ai commenti aristotelici, ed in particolare i proemi alla Fisica e al De sensu et sensato, l'A. dimostra come Pietro di Alvernia utilizzi queste due fonti tomiste nel suo proemio al De sensu. Del proemio, diviso in sette sezioni esaminate singolarmente, viene data anche una edizione critica in appendice , che si basa sull'unico manoscritto che tramanda il testo, conservato a Oxford, Merton College, 275. Nell'ultima parte del saggio l'A. propone (...) alcune considerazioni finali, ribadendo che la fedeltà di Pietro al testo di Tommaso non può considerarsi «tomismo», ma rivela piuttosto il bisogno avvertito da Pietro di una guida all'interpretazione dei testi aristotelici. (shrink)

Movements like the Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street, and the Tea Party embody some of our deepest intuitions about popular politics and 'the power of the people'. They also expose tensions and shortcomings in our understanding of these ideals. We typically see 'the people' as having a special, sovereign power. Despite the centrality of this idea in our thinking, we have little understanding of why it has such importance. Imagined Sovereignties probes the considerable force that 'the people' exercises on our (...) thought and practice. Like the imagined communities described by Benedict Anderson, popular politics is formed around shared, imaginary constructs rooted in our collective imagination. This book investigates these 'imagined sovereignties' in a genealogy traversing the French Enlightenment, the Haitian Revolution, and nineteenth-century Haitian constitutionalism. It problematizes taken-for-granted ideas about popular politics and provokes new ways of imagining the power of the people. (shrink)

Here is the usual way philosophers think about science and induction. Scientists do many things— aspire, probe, theorize, conclude, retract, and refine— but successful research culminates in a published research report that presents an argument for some empirical conclusion. In mathematics and logic there are sound deductive arguments that fully justify their conclusions, but such proofs are unavailable in the empirical domain because empirical hypotheses outrun the evidence adduced for them. Inductive skeptics insist that such conclusions cannot be justified. But (...) “justification” is a vague term— if empirical conclusions cannot be established fully, as mathematical conclusions are, perhaps they are justified in the sense that they are partially supported or confirmed by the available evidence. To respond to the skeptic, one merely has to explicate the concept of confirmation or partial justification in a systematic manner that agrees, more or less, with common usage and to observe that our scientific conclusions are confirmed in the explicated sense. This process of explication is widely thought to culminate in some version of Bayesian confirmation theory. (shrink)

A truly inclusive democratic politics must be understandable, or cognitively tractable, for ordinary people busy with the rest of their lives. This extends not only to everyday politics and policy, but to constitutional politics as well—non-specialist democratic citizens should be able to grasp the fundamental law that governs them and imagine their own role in shaping it as political agents. Yet these requirements raise a difficulty: in many countries, including the United States, constitutions are treated as the exclusive domain of (...) lawyers and judges. As a result, constitutional matters are typically discussed using legalistic jargon that is inscrutable even to non-specialist lawyers, let alone ordinary citizens. How then can constitutional politics be made legible to ordinary citizens? In this essay, I argue this challenge is partly one of political ideas—specifically, the ideas ordinary citizens use to think about their constitutions, or their folk constitutionalism. This may sound strange because insofar as constitutions are treated as lawyers’ exclusive turf, the problem may seem to be one of practice, not merely ideas. But popular practices of what scholars like John Finn and Elizabeth Beaumont call popular or civic constitutionalism involve citizens and social movements in transforming constitutions. These transformations often occur behind the backs of everyone involved, as new frames and understandings come to gradually transmute constitutional meaning, which in turn pervades the public political culture and reshapes the public’s constitutional imagination. I suggest we need ideas that more closely reflect what democratic citizens already do in democratic constitutional politics, so that they can do it more self-consciously and dispel the impression of an anti-democratic lack of control that recent constitutional innovations reveal to be illusory. I explore the utility of ideas of unwrittenness and functional multi-textuality to the end of a folk constitutionalism appropriate for democracy. (shrink)

In his critique of the therapeutic, Taylor argues that therapy fails to engage with the ethical and spiritual significance of human suffering. Therapy’s denial of ethics is representative of a wide...

Consider "Sam is sad" and "Sam exemplifies the property of being sad". The second sentence mentions a property and predicates the relation of exemplification. It belongs to a large class of sentences which mention such formal objects as propositions, states of affairs, facts, concepts and sets and predicate formal properties such as the truth of propositions, the obtaining of states of affairs and relations such as falling under concepts and being members of sets. The first sentence belongs to a distinct (...) class of sentences in which only non-formal objects are mentioned and only non-formal properties and relations are predicated. We can, it seems, infer validly from the first sentence to the second. They are also equivalent. And Sam exemplifies the property of sadness because Sam is sad. What is the relation between inference, equivalence and explanation in the case of our two sentences and in analogous cases? What right have we to assume that there are formal objects? (shrink)

The City-State of the Soul: Self-Constitution in Plato’s Republic offers a reinterpretation of Plato’s philosophical masterpiece, which presents the moral life as consisting, most deeply, in the constituting or “founding” of one’s own soul. Plato wants to persuade the brightest and most ambitious that the life of justice and, in particular, of just governance puts their talents and ambitions to their best possible use.

We argue that uncomputability and classical scepticism are both reflections of inductive underdetermination, so that Church's thesis and Hume's problem ought to receive equal emphasis in a balanced approach to the philosophy of induction. As an illustration of such an approach, we investigate how uncomputable the predictions of a hypothesis can be if the hypothesis is to be reliably investigated by a computable scientific method.

This article challenges an argument from Tom Donaldson''s recent bookThe Ethics of International Business with a claim that distributive justice, deemed in many circles to impose a duty of mutual aid on individuals and nations, establishes a basis for holding multinational corporations to such a duty as well. The root idea I advocate is that Rawls'' theory of justice can be deployed — beyond its original intent yet in line with its spirit — to underwrite aprima facie obligation of international (...) business to render aid to ameliorate suffering on behalf of the inhabitants of developing countries in which they operate. (shrink)

The environmentally friendly or ‘sustainable’ products have been launched in various markets in response to the growing concerns for the environmental deterioration and the alarming effects of climate change in past years. However, the uptake of green products does not seem to fully reflect the self-claimed pro-environmental concerns and attitudes. Consumers who profess to be environmentally conscious and believe they could help slow down environmental deterioration do not necessarily purchase eco-friendly products. This discrepancy between behaviour and attitude has been termed (...) as ‘intention-behaviour gap’ or ‘green gap’. This study aims at exploring the green gap in the purchases of high-involvement products such as skincare products. Focus groups and thematic analysis were conducted. It was found that environmental concern was virtually non-existent in making purchase decisions with regard to skincare products because the perceived product effectiveness is found to be the key determinant of the choice of skincare products. Other factors such as weak social norm, weak perceived consumer effectiveness, and a sense of powerlessness facing the environment degradation, to some degree, attribute to the consumers’ justification of their non-green consumption practices. Implications for closing the gap have been drawn for marketing practitioners and policy makers. Directions for future research are also provided. (shrink)

This paper argues that human agency is not simply a function of intrinsic properties about the agent, but that agency instead depends on the ecology that the agent is in. In particular, the paper examines ways that disabilities affect agency and shows how, by paying deliberate attention to structuring the social environment around people with disabilities, we can mitigate some of the agential impact of those disabilities. The paper then argues that the impact of one’s social environment on agency isn’t (...) restricted only to those agents that have disabilities, but also characterizes all human agency. All of our agency is environmentally dependent. (shrink)

This paper provides an empirical test of a model for the strategic management of stakeholders. More specifically, it provides a methodology that linksstakeholder expectations of business with the strategic expectations of managers. This is achieved by operationalising the idea of bi-directionality in stakeholder research and by applying rigorous statistical data analysis.

States are not only claiming the right to grant or deny entry to their territories but also enforcing this right against non-citizens in ways that cause significant harm to these individuals. In this article, I argue that endorsing the presumptive right to restrict immigration does not settle the question of when or how it may permissibly inflict harm on individuals to enforce this right. I examine three distinct justifications for causing harm to individuals. First, the justification of defensive harm holds (...) that harming individuals is morally permissible when they pose an unjustified threat to others. Second, the justification of protecting property states that harming individuals is morally permissible when they pose an unjustified threat to others’ property interests. Third, I consider the state punishment justification, which maintains that harming individuals is morally permissible when punishment is an appropriate response to their previous conduct. I conclude that any immigration enforcement measure that involves lethal force or the infliction of severe bodily harm is morally impermissible, whether it is used to defend the state or its property. Moreover, criminal sanctions for immigration violations are difficult to justify. (shrink)

This paper aims at a cross-cultural comparison between friendship in Aristotle and friendship in Buddhist traditions. Aristotle’s thorough analysis of friendship results in Buddhist concepts of friendship necessarily a sub-category as Aristotle deems friendship within religious communities to be a niche category of friendship. Although Buddhist notions of love and compassion are universally prescribed, monastic friendship is necessarily highly selective to be between like-minded individuals within a Buddhist community pursuing the shared end of enlightenment. Buddhism however offers three categories of (...) friendship: lay community friendship, monastic friendship and spiritual friendship. Buddhism, therefore, while unavoidably a sub-category of Aristotelian concepts of friendship, reveal nuanced approaches to friendship depending on an individual’s place in the Buddhist tradition. (shrink)

In Radical Skepticism & Epistemic Intuition Michael Bergmann attempts to overcome the threat of radical skepticism as it arises in several different forms. The key to Bergmann’s response to skepticism is his method of intuitionist particularism wherein we give our intuitions about particular beliefs being justified more weight than we do intuitions about the premises of arguments for skepticism. There are two general problems for Bergmann’s response to skepticism. First, he fails to accurately portray the key principle of the skeptical (...) argument. As a result, much of the apparent motivation for looking to intuitionist particularism as opposed to other responses to skepticism is merely apparent. Second, intuitionist particularism faces significant problems when it comes to the Problem of the Criterion and the resolution of conflicting intuitions. However, a related intuitionist method, one incorporating explanationism, may be able to deliver what intuitionist particularism promises while avoiding its problems. (shrink)

The paper links philosophical reflection with business-and-society considerations concerning a culture of compassion for economic life. The initial part of the paper explores the philosophical genealogy of the concept of compassion, revealing it as a primordial feature of the human condition, albeit a feature subject to a variety of interpretations. In the analysis, the paper highlights several tensions attending alternative interpretations of the concept of compassion that appear across ancient, medieval, modern, and postmodern treatments in the Western philosophical tradition. The (...) paper then proceeds to extend some of these interpretative perspectives on compassion into contemporary economic life, focusing on hybrid social enterprise. The paper concludes that compassion can constitute a motivation and inspiration for seeking pro-social entrepreneurial business solutions in our deeply divided and profoundly needy world. (shrink)

This chapter analyzes two facets of mindfulness for servant leadership of B-Corporations, which is an emerging form of social enterprise. One facet concerns inner states and motivations for leading business for non-instrumental reasons. This facet encompasses an ethics-in-practice dimension alongside of merely theoretical approaches, a dimension well suited for leadership of B-Corps, whose governance structure places ethics and sustainability at the center of the non-instrumental quest for the creation of social value and respect for human rights by business enterprises. The (...) motivation for care of the mindful servant leader matches the investors’ expectations of social impact for the firm. The other facet concerns leadership decisions and actions fulfilling the mission of B-Corporations in creating social value alongside of economic value for a broad spectrum of stakeholders. Concerning this second facet, mindfulness is vitally involved in that servant leaders pay attention to the whole business and its explicit social benefit, not just this or that element of the firm’s operations. The chapter advances two arguments. The first argument—tied to the first facet—posits that the virtue of mindfulness contributes a key element of non-instrumental motivation for leadership generally missing from extant leadership approaches. The second argument—tied to the second facet—addresses the decision-making side of mindfulness. It asserts that the virtue of mindfulness is especially poised to equip servant leadership for the B-Corporation movement for two vital challenges: balancing demands from multiple stakeholders; and assimilating multiple criteria and values—both financial and non-financial. (shrink)

Martin Hägglund’s This Life: Secular Faith and Spiritual Freedom offers a naturalistic, this-worldly theology with eloquence and heart. Nevertheless, from a religious studies perspective, there is a fair amount to criticize. This review essay identifies two shortcomings in this book and then develops a typology of religious teachings about eternal life in order to assess places where Hägglund’s critique succeeds.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Why Artists StarveKevin MelchionneAlthough cultural types may fear being branded as philistines for saying so, a remarkable amount of contemporary art is so awful that the very fact and regularity of this awfulness is in want of an explanation. Outside the art world, this observation is jejune. Inside, it makes for immediate disqualification. Is there something about the most common artistic motivations and attitudes that make this awfulness bound (...) to happen yet hard for insiders to sniff out?There are probably many factors in need of elaboration. One reason is widespread self-deception about the motivations for pursuing art. We often hear artists explain their commitment to art by a desire to express themselves or develop their gifts. We hear of a love of beauty or the challenges of craft or the chance for insight into self and world. Frequently, artists describe being called to art, a feeling of being chosen by art rather than choosing it. These are familiar accounts of what makes a life or career in art worth pursuing. But the piety of these high sounding explanations is strikingly incongruent with so much—though by no means all—contemporary art and suggests that, among artists, self-deception about motivations looms large.Franz Kafka's "A Hunger Artist" is a parable of artistic motivation and a case study in the self-deception of the artist. In the brief story, Kafka unwinds an account of artistic motivation that begins with the familiar explanations but gives way eventually to less flattering admissions about artistic ambition. Professional fasting ultimately becomes a path to truth for the hunger artist. But the truth that it yields reduces [End Page 142] art from a source of intrinsic value to a somewhat desperate form of attention seeking. In the figure of the hunger artist, Kafka captures one self-delusion common among artists.IIn "A Hunger Artist," Kafka charts the decline of an accomplished artist.1 Kafka tells us that the artist, a practitioner of what the author describes as a now forgotten genre of performance art known as professional fasting, garners a degree of notoriety for his ability to sustain fasts of death-defying lengths. Half-art, half-sport, Kafka's professional fasting amounts to sitting in a contained but public space such as a cage, where the fast is observable round-the-clock by watchers whose job is to verify its authenticity. The fast is also subject to the attention of paying spectators. Presumably, it is this commercial element as well as the secular hubbub surrounding the fast that most distinguishes it from religious fasting (out of which artistic fasting must have emerged sometime in previous centuries, had Kafka also bothered to concoct a history of the practice). A professional fast typically lasts for periods of up to the biblically resonant forty days, after which the artist is carried from his cage with great fanfare to a modest, performance ending breakfast. Through the practice of fasting, the hunger artist lifts self-denial and by implication, self-control, to the level of virtuosity. The grace of the fast and even a sense of moderate contentment in it are part of what is on display for the audience.Notwithstanding a light routine of bonhomie, Kafka's hunger artist remains distant from his audience. He is neither buoyed by their adoration nor deflated by their vulgarity. Instead, the hunger artist seems entirely sustained by his practice. In his self-possession, we glimpse a familiar ideal of the authentic artist devoted to his practice for the sake of its intrinsic rewards. Indeed, doubts about the authenticity of his performance only fuel the hunger artist's determination. Far from insulted by the zeal of official observers, the hunger artist welcomes their vigilance. In their distrust of the hunger artist, the most severe of watchers convey a respect for the practice of professional fasting. Their desire to scrupulously ratify the authenticity of his effort is also an endorsement of its value. The earnestness of the referees pleases the hunger artist, though we are assured that their presence hardly matters. As in any authentic art, the bystanding critics are hardly necessary to ensure the integrity of the performance... (shrink)

. The potential for financial conflicts of interest to influence scientific research has become a significant concern. Some commentators have suggested that the development of standardized study protocols could help to alleviate these problems. This paper identifies two problems with this solution: scientific research incorporates numerous methodological judgments that cannot be constrained by standardized protocols; and standardization can hide significant value judgments. These problems arise because of four weaknesses of standardized guidelines: incompleteness, limited applicability, selective ignorance, and ossification. Therefore, the (...) standardization of study designs should not serve as an alternative to addressing the interests and power relations that pervade science policy-making. Policy makers should take at least two steps to prevent powerful interest groups from co-opting standardized guidelines. First, their development and review should be made as transparent as possible and should be subjected to broadly-based deliberation. Second, standardized guidelines should be supplemented with efforts to scrutinize the conditions under which financial COIs tend to have the most worrisome effects so that additional steps can be taken to eliminate and mitigate those conditions. (shrink)

The difficulty of conducting relevant experiments has long been regarded as the central challenge to learning about the economy from data. The standard solution, going back to Haavelmo's famous “The Probability Approach in Econometrics” (1944), involved two elements: first, it placed substantial weight on a priori theory as a source of structural information, reducing econometric estimates to measurements of causally articulated systems; second, it emphasized the need for an appropriate statistical model of the data. These elements are usually seen as (...) tightly linked. I argue that they are, to a large extent, separable. Careful attention to the role of an empirically justified statistical model in underwriting probability explains puzzles not only in economics, but more generally with respect to recent criticisms of Reichenbach's principle of the common cause, which lies behind graph-theoretic causal search algorithms. And it provides an antidote to the pessimistic understanding of the possibilities for passive observation of causal structure in econometrics and related areas of Nancy Cartwright and others. (shrink)