What kind of entity is a committee, a book group or a band? I argue that committees and other such social groups are concrete, composite particulars, having ordinary human beings amongst their parts. So the committee members are literally parts of the committee. This mereological view of social groups was popular several decades ago, but fell out of favour following influential objections from David-Hillel Ruben. But recent years have seen a tidal wave of work in metaphysics, including the metaphysics of (...) parts and wholes. We now have the resources to rehabilitate the mereological view of social groups. I show how this can be done, and why we should bother. (shrink)

When used clinically, psychedelics may appear unusual or even unique when compared to more familiar or long-standing medical interventions, prompting some to suggest that the ethical issues raised may likewise be exceptional. If that is correct, then perhaps psychedelics should be treated differently from other medical substances: for example, by being subjected to different ethical or evidentiary standards. Alternatively, it may be that psychedelics have more in common with various existing medical interventions than first meets the eye. We argue in (...) favor of the latter position, drawing on parallels from earlier debates around genetic exceptionalism in bioethics. We suggest there are risks to adopting a stance of “psychedelic ethical exceptionalism,” and propose that consistent ethical rules and evidentiary standards should be applied across all relevant areas of clinical medicine. Importantly, this does not preclude the possibility that changes to existing standards should be made; but if so, this should not be justified by appealing to the alleged uniqueness of psychedelics. (shrink)

Resolving religious disagreements is difficult, for beliefs about religion tend to come with strong biases against other views and the people who hold them. Evidence can help, but there is no agreed-upon policy for weighting it, and moreover bias affects the content of our evidence itself. Another complicating factor is that some biases are reliable and others unreliable. What we need is an evidence-weighting policy geared toward negotiating the effects of bias. I consider three evidence-weighting policies in the philosophy of (...) religion and advocate one of them as the best for promoting the resolution of religious disagreements. (shrink)

How should we respond to extremist views that we know are false? This paper proposes that we should be intellectually humble, but not open-minded. We should own our intellectual limitations, but be unwilling to revise our beliefs in the falsity of the extremist views. The opening section makes a case for distinguishing the concept of intellectual humility from the concept of open-mindedness, arguing that open-mindedness requires both a willingness to revise extant beliefs and other-oriented engagement, whereas intellectual humility requires neither. (...) Building on virtue-consequentialism, the second section makes a start on arguing that intellectually virtuous people of a particular sort—people with ‘effects-virtues’—would be intellectually humble, but not open-minded, in responding to extremist views they knew were false. We suggest that while intellectual humility and open-mindedness often travel together, this is a place where they come apart. (shrink)

This paper focuses on how experiences of trauma can lead to generalized fear of people, objects and places that are similar or contextually or conceptually related to those that produced the initial fear, causing epistemic, affective, and practical harms to those who are unduly feared and those who are intimates of the victim of trauma. We argue that cases of fear generalization that bring harm to other people constitute examples of injustice closely akin to testimonial injustice, specifically, mnemonic injustice. Mnemonic (...) injustice is a label that has been introduced to capture how injustice can occur via the operation of human memory systems when stereotypes shape what is remembered. Here we argue that injustices can also occur via memory systems when trauma leads to a generalized fear. We also argue that this calls for a reformulation of the notion of mnemonic injustice. (shrink)

Sometimes it is epistemically beneficial to form a belief on authority. When you do, what happens to other reasons you have for that belief? Linda Zagzebski’s total-preemption view says that these reasons are “preempted”: you still have them, but you do not use them to support your belief. I argue that this situation is problematic, because having reasons for a belief while not using them forfeits you doxastic justification. I present an alternative account of belief on authority, the proper-basing view, (...) which enables the agent to base her belief on as many reasons as she has. A salient result is that the notion of a preemptive reason, useful though it may be in accounting for acting on authority, does not have any place in an account of believing on authority or in epistemology more generally. (shrink)

Faith is often regarded as having a fraught relationship with evidence. Lara Buchak even argues that it entails foregoing evidence, at least when this evidence would influence your decision to act on the proposition in which you have faith. I present a counterexample inspired by the book of Job, in which seeking evidence for the sake of deciding whether to worship God is not only compatible with faith, but is in fact an expression of great faith. One might still think (...) that foregoing evidence may make faith more praiseworthy than otherwise. But I argue against this claim too, once more drawing on Job. A faith that expresses itself by a search for evidence can be more praiseworthy than a faith that sits passively in the face of epistemic adversity. (shrink)

In this chapter I identify a phenomenon that is closely allied to testimonial injustice: mnemonic injustice. Mnemonic injustice occurs when stereotypes shape memory and jointly epistemic and practical harms that constitute injustice ensue. I argue that just as people can achieve testimonial justice by combatting the negative effects of stereotypes on the process of testimonial exchange, there are ways that people can achieve mnemonic justice by addressing the impact of stereotypes on memory. It is shown that mnemonic justice, like testimonial (...) justice, can involve personal, interpersonal and structural change. It is argued that testimonial injustice and mnemonic injustice should be treated on a par, with those concerned with reducing epistemic and practical injustices driven to tackle each. (shrink)

I argue that faith is a type of trust. It is also part of a relationship in which both parties are called on to be faithful, where faithfulness is a type of trustworthiness. What distinguishes faith relationships from trust relationships is that both parties value the faith relationship intrinsically. I discuss how faith on this account can, and cannot, be rational when it goes beyond a person’s evidence. It turns out that faith has the same rationality conditions as trust, differing (...) from it only in the cases that fix our intuitions. (shrink)

In his paper ‘Ethical problems with kindness in healthcare’, Jesudason sets out an interesting examination of the concept of kindness, arguing that it poses significant ethical challenges due to its discretionary nature. I suggest that kindness, a concept difficult to define, may still have a role to play in healthcare. Different treatments of kindness show us that it need not be discretionary, and that kind care can be provided to all. Finally, curiosity may also have a role to play in (...) medicine to help promote inclusiveness. (shrink)

If we are sympathetic to the project of naturalising metaphysics, how should we approach the metaphysics of the social world? What role can the social sciences play in metaphysical investigation? In the light of these questions, this paper examines three possible approaches to social metaphysics: inference to the best explanation from current social science, conceptual analysis, and Haslanger-inspired ameliorative projects.

Findings from the cognitive sciences suggest that the cognitive mechanisms responsible for some memory errors are adaptive, bringing benefits to the organism. In this paper we argue that the same cognitive mechanisms also bring a suite of significant epistemic benefits, increasing the chance of an agent obtaining epistemic goods like true belief and knowledge. This result provides a significant challenge to the folk conception of memory beliefs that are false, according to which they are a sign of cognitive frailty, indicating (...) that a person is less reliable than others or their former self. Evidence of memory errors can undermine a person’s view of themselves as a competent epistemic agent, but we show that false memory beliefs can be the result of the ordinary operation of cognitive mechanisms found across the species, which bring substantial epistemic benefits. This challenge to the folk conception is not adequately captured by existing epistemological theories. However, it can be captured by the notion of epistemic innocence, which has previously been deployed to highlight how beliefs which have epistemic costs can also bring significant epistemic benefits. We therefore argue that the notion of epistemic innocence should be expanded so that it applies not just to beliefs but also to cognitive mechanisms. (shrink)

Polysemy is a phenomenon involving single lexical items with multiple related senses. Much theorizing about it has focused on developing linguistic accounts that are responsive to various compositional and representational challenges in semantics and psychology. We focus on an underexplored question: Why does systematic polysemy cluster in the ways it does? That is, why do we see certain regular patterns of sense multiplicity, but not others? Drawing on an independently motivated view of kind cognition – i.e. the formal structures for (...) different classes of kind representations – we argue for an answer centered on conceptual individuation. Specifically, we argue that classes of kind concepts vary in what they individuate (i.e. counting as one and specifying what makes it the same or different from others). By elucidating these differences, we can explain why a range of patterns of systematic polysemy are found cross-linguistically and why other patterns are not attested. Overall, our account provides an explanatory framework addressing an important question at the interface between language and mind and opens new avenues for future theoretical and empirical research. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Psychedelics, including psilocybin, and other consciousness-altering compounds such as 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), currently are being scientifically investigated for their potential therapeutic uses, with a primary focus on measurable outcomes: for example, alleviation of symptoms or increases in self-reported well-being. Accordingly, much recent discussion about the possible value of these substances has turned on estimates of the magnitude and duration of persisting positive effects in comparison to harms. However, many have described the value of a psychedelic experience with little or no reference (...) to such therapeutic benefits, instead seeming to find the experience valuable in its own right. How can we make sense of such testimony? Could a psychedelic experience be valuable even if there were no persisting beneficial effects? If so, how? Using the concept of psychological richness, combined with insights from the philosophy of aesthetics and the enhancement literature, this essay explores potential sources of value in the acute subjective experience, apart from the value derived from persisting beneficial effects. (shrink)

At the empirical center of James’s theory of emotion is the prediction that people induced to act emotionally will report feeling the corresponding emotion. While the research more or less inspired by James is complex, it is also large. Reisenzein and Stephan (2014) identify a number of problems in this literature, but we think, on balance, the research supports James’s hypothesis. At a minimum, there are literally hundreds of studies showing that people induced to act as if they felt an (...) emotion, an attitude, or a judgment report those feelings. Critics of James’s theory are left with the task of accounting for these findings. (shrink)

Although a second-person neuroscience has high ecological validity, the extent to which a second- versus third-person neuroscience approach fundamentally alters neural patterns of activation requires more careful investigation. Nonetheless, we are hopeful that this new avenue will prove fruitful in significantly advancing our understanding of typical and atypical social cognition.

This paper describes a presentation on ethics for accounting and business students. In 2001 and 2002, major corporate failures such as Enron and Worldcom, combined with questionable accounting practices, made ethics a paramount concern to persons working in business and accounting. While financial statement analysis and regulatory requirements are important technical topics, the issue of ethics provides faculty a unique and very appropriate setting to discuss deeper truths about doing business and living life well. This paper briefly describes the development (...) and assessment of one approach to presenting ethics built around a computerized slide show (PowerPoint). The goal of the presentation is to increase students’ understanding of the essential role of ethics to accounting and business. Following the presentation, students indicated a heightened recognition of the importance of ethics. Educators should do all that they can to encourage students to do the “right” thing, even in difficult circumstances. This encouragement may serve them well in school and later in their careers. (shrink)

Psychedelics such as psilocybin reliably produce significantly altered states of consciousness with a variety of subjectively experienced effects. These include certain changes to perception, cognition, and affect,1 which we refer to here as the acute subjective effects of psychedelics. In recent years, psychedelics such as psilocybin have also shown considerable promise as therapeutic agents when combined with talk therapy, for example, in the treatment of major depression or substance use disorder.2 However, it is currently unclear whether the aforementioned acute subjective (...) effects are necessary to bring about the observed therapeutic effects of psilocybin and other psychedelics. This uncertainty has sparked a lively—though still largely hypothetical—debate on whether psychedelics without subjective effects (“nonsubjective psychedelics” or “non-hallucinogenic psychedelics”) could still have the same therapeutic impact, or whether the acute subjective effects are in fact necessary for this impact to be fully realized.3,4,5. (shrink)

This paper proposes and defends the multifactorial view of stereotyping. According to this view, multiple factors determine whether or not any act of stereotyping increases the chance of an accurate judgment being made about an individual to whom the stereotype is applied. To support this conclusion, various features of acts of stereotyping that can determine the accuracy of stereotyping judgments are identified. The argument challenges two existing views that suggest that it is relatively easy for an act of stereotyping to (...) increase the chance of an accurate judgment being made. In the process, it shows why stereotyping that associates black people more strongly than white people with criminality in the United States cannot be defended, and actions to reduce the stereotyping criticized, on the basis that engaging in this form of stereotyping increases the chance of accurate judgments. As each of these important conclusions is supported by results from empirical psychology, the discussion exemplifies and vindicates the naturalistic approach to epistemology, according to which psychological findings provide an important contribution to understanding the epistemic standing of beliefs. (shrink)

Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ.8 argument for the priority of actuality to potentiality poses an immediate interpretive problem: the argument uses two distinct tests for priority, one of which threatens to reverse the results of the other. This paper argues that the standard approach to this passage, according to which one thing is prior to another when it satisfies the ontological independence test from Metaphysics Δ.11, fails to secure the argumentative unity of the passage. It introduces a new, causal account of priority (...) which explains both Aristotle’s claims about priority and the way he argues for them. (shrink)

In this chapter, we argue that Du Châtelet’s account of motion is an important contribution to the history of the absolute versus relative motion debate. The arguments we lay out have two main strands. First, we clarify Du Châtelet’s threefold taxonomy of motion, using Musschenbroek as a useful Newtonian foil and showing that the terminological affinity between the two is only apparent. Then, we assess Du Châtelet’s account in light of the conceptual, epistemological, and ontological challenges posed by Newton to (...) any relational theory of motion. What we find is that, although Du Châtelet does not meet all the challenges to their full extent, her account of motion is adequate for the goal of the Principia: determining the true motions in our planetary system. (shrink)

Shen et al. (2024) present a new and updated framework on the ethical, social, and legal implications of returning individual research results (IRRs) in digital phenotyping psychiatric research. Th...

A collection of essays with themes in human rights and legal history, spanning several centuries, containing a tribute to one of the most remarkable jurists of our time. Linked by an historical and contextual approach, these essays add to knowledge of legal history and human rights and provide a reference point for future research.

Calls for public engagement on emerging agricultural technologies, including genetic engineering of farm animals, have resulted in the development of information that people can interact and engage with online, including “Frequently Asked Questions” (FAQs) developed by organizations seeking to inform or influence the debate. We conducted a frame analysis of FAQs webpages about genetic engineering of farm animals developed by different organizations to describe how questions and answers are presented. We categorized FAQs as having a regulatory frame (emphasizing or challenging (...) the adequacy of regulations), an efficiency frame (emphasizing precision and benefits), a risks and uncertainty frame (emphasizing unknown outcomes), an animal welfare frame (emphasizing benefits for animals) or an animal dignity frame (considering the inherent value of animals). Animals were often featured as the object of regulations in FAQs, and questions about animals were linked to animal welfare regulations. The public were represented using a variety of terms (public, consumer) and pronouns (I, we). Some FAQs described differences between technology terms (gene editing, genetic modification) and categorized technologies as either well-established or novel. This framing of the technology may not respond to actual public concerns on the topic. Organizations seeking to use FAQs as a public engagement tool might consider including multiple viewpoints and actual questions people have about genetic engineering. (shrink)

Background Moral resilience is the integrity and emotional strength to remain buoyant and achieve moral growth amid distressing situations. Evidence is still emerging on how to best cultivate moral resilience. Few studies have examined the predictive relationship of workplace well-being and of organizational factors with moral resilience. Research aims The aims are to examine associations of workplace well-being (i.e., compassion satisfaction, burnout, and secondary traumatic stress) and moral resilience, and to examine associations of workplace factors (i.e., authentic leadership and perceived (...) congruence of organizational mission and behaviors) and moral resilience. Research design This study uses a cross-sectional design. Participants and research context Nurses practicing in a hospital in the United States were surveyed using validated instruments (N = 147). Individual factors were measured using demographics and the Professional Quality of Life Scale. Organizational factors were measured using the Authentic Leadership Questionnaire and a single item measuring organizational mission/behavior congruence. Moral resilience was measured using the Rushton Moral Resilience Scale. Ethical considerations The study was approved by an institutional review board. Findings Resilience was noted to have significant small correlations with burnout, secondary traumatic stress, compassion satisfaction, and organizational mission/behavior congruence. Burnout and secondary traumatic stress predicted less resilience, whereas compassion satisfaction and perceived congruence between organizational mission and behaviors predicted higher resilience. Discussion Burnout and secondary traumatic stress, increasingly experienced by nurses and other health professionals, have negative effects on moral resilience. Compassion satisfaction can increase resilience, which is especially important in nursing. Organizational practices promoting integrity and confidence can have positive effects on resilience. Conclusions Continued work to confront workplace well-being issues, especially burnout, is needed as a way of increasing moral resilience. Studies of organizational and work environment factors to bolster resilience are likewise needed to assist organizational leaders in devising the best strategies. (shrink)

Gatekeeping, or determining membership of your group, is crucial to science: the moniker ‘scientific’ is a stamp of epistemic quality or even authority. But gatekeeping in science is fraught with dangers. Gatekeepers must exclude bad science, science fraud and pseudoscience, while including the disagreeing viewpoints on which science thrives. This is a difficult tightrope, not least because gatekeeping is a human matter and can be influenced by biases such as groupthink. After spelling out these general tensions around gatekeeping in science, (...) we shed light on them with a case study from psychology. This concerns whether academic psychologists rightly or wrongly classify the applied-psychology framework of NLP (‘neuro-linguistic programming’) as unscientific and even pseudoscientific. This example of gatekeeping is particularly instructive because both the NLP community and the psychology community, we argue, make legitimate but also illegitimate moves. This case gives rise to several general insights about gatekeeping in science more generally. (shrink)

Policy work is often cited as one of the primary functions of Hospital Ethics Committees (HECs), along with consultation and education. Hospital policies can have far reaching effects on a wide array of stakeholders including, care providers, patients, families, the culture of the organisation and the community at large. In comparison with the wealth of information available about the emerging practice of ethics consultation, relatively little attention has been paid to the policy work of HECs. In this paper, we hope (...) to advance the development of best practices in HEC policy work by describing the quality improvement process that we undertook at Hamilton Health Sciences, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. In the first section of the paper we describe the context of our HEC policy work, and the shortcomings of our historical review process. In subsequent sections, we detail the quality improvement project we undertook in 2010, the results of the project and the specific tools we developed to enhance the quality of HEC policy work. Our goal in sharing this organisational case study is to prompt other HECs to publish qualitative descriptions of their policy work, in order to generate a body of knowledge that can inform the development of best practices for ethics policy review. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic laid bare systemic inequities shaped by social determinants of health (SDoH). Public health agencies, legislators, health systems, and community organizations took notice, and there is currently unprecedented interest in identifying and implementing programs to address SDoH. This special issue focuses on the role of medical-legal partnerships (MLPs) in addressing SDoH and racial and social inequities, as well as the need to support these efforts with evidence-based research, data, and meaningful partnerships and funding.

This paper argues for an interpretation of what Heidegger means by 'angst' in Being and Time that begins from the methodological role angst is supposed to play in Division I as that which disrupts falling. It argues that angst is a distinctive kind of ontological insight.

Question: Do clinicians providing abortion practicing in states that restrict abortion experience more moral distress than those practicing in states that protect abortion? -/- Findings: In this national, purposive survey study of 310 clinicians providing abortion, moral distress was elevated among all clinicians, with those practicing in restrictive states reporting higher levels of moral distress compared with those practicing in protective states. -/- Meaning: The findings suggest that structural changes addressing bans on necessary health care, such as federal protection for (...) abortion, are needed at institutional, state, and federal policy levels to address clinician moral distress. (shrink)

Wexler and Specker Sullivan (2023) reflect on the field of neuroethics by highlighting criticisms from both scholars within and outside the field. Among these criticisms, are claims that neuroethic...

This paper explores the concept of “gendered seeing”: the capacity to visually perceive another person's gender and the role that one's own gender plays in that perception. Assuming that gendered properties are actually perceptible, my goal is to provide some support from the philosophy of perception on how gendered visual experiences are possible. I begin by exploring the ways in which sociologists and psychologists study how we perceive one's sex and the implications of these studies for the sex/gender distinction. I (...) then discuss feminist philosopher Linda Alcoff's concept of “interpretative horizons,” which highlights the role that one's social and political identities play in how we understand the world around us. I also discuss Elizabeth Grosz's notion of double sensation. I then apply some work in the philosophy of perception on perceptual learning and the cognitive penetration of perception to gendered seeing. My hypothesis is that we can explain how one's interpretative horizons are acquired through some notion of perceptual learning. I conclude by suggesting some of the epistemic and ethical implications of gendered seeing. (shrink)

Through a reading of Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle on the pathe, this paper develops an account of what it is for finding or attunement to be authentic or owned.

Metaphysics can be used to help us understand the world, and has applications both within philosophy and beyond. Within philosophy, metaphysical questions arise whether we are thinking about ethics, art, religion, or science. Beyond philosophy, there are many areas where metaphysics can be applied. Case studies in this chapter include applied ontology in information science, social ontology in both philosophy and the social sciences, and questions about classification and kinds in psychiatry.

Several prominent debates in biology, such as those surrounding adaptationism, group selection, and punctuated equilibrium, have focused on disagreements about the relative importance of a cause in producing a phenomenon of interest. Some philosophers, such as John Beatty have expressed scepticism about the scientific value of engaging in these controversies, and Karen Kovaka has suggested that their value might be limited. In this paper, I challenge that scepticism by giving a novel analysis of relative significance controversies, showing that there are (...) three forms they can take. I argue that these controversies can have significant epistemic upshots, in that they help scientists form predictions about new instances of the phenomenon of interest. Finally, using two historical examples, I show how engaging in these controversies can improve our understanding of causal relationships. (shrink)

Critical Notice on Organizations as Wrongdoers By Stephanie Collins Oxford University Press, 2023. -/- Extract: What, if any, role does metaphysics have to play in addressing moral questions? When answering questions about moral responsibility, many theories rely on answers to questions about the nature of agency and agents, the persistence of persons and the existence and nature of free will. In recent work in social ontology, philosophers have argued for views of social categories or identities that take ethical and social–political (...) desiderata into consideration in several ways. Some argue for views of gender identities that depend on epistemic and ethical considerations (Bettcher, 2009). Others develop views of gender categories in ways they take to be metaphysically realist, tracking robust explanatory patterns in the world. For instance, Barnes (2017) argues for this interpretation of Haslanger’s views of racial and gender categories. Others argue that injustice and oppression are reflected in the nature of social categories. For instance, while it ought not to be this way, some gender categories are, for instance, trans-exclusionary (Ásta 2018). Indeed, one might even argue that social categories can involve a distinctively metaphysical form of oppression (Jenkins 2020, 2023). It is clear that many philosophers argue in ways that draw close connections between metaphysical and moral theorizing. ... (shrink)

The timing of the origin of flowering plants (Angiosperm) is hotly debated. It has been suggested that the disagreement between the fossil record of angiosperm origin strongly conflicts with the origin estimates generated by molecular clocks. I argue that this conflict reveals lessons about whether or under what conditions scientific disagreement is likely to bear fruit. Specifically, I point to issues of evidence quality and social epistemic structures which deserve more attention in understanding the productivity of disagreement.

Efforts to address child trafficking require intensive collaboration among professionals of varied disciplines. Healthcare professionals have a major role in this multidisciplinary approach. Training is essential for all professionals, and policies and protocols may assist in fostering an effective, comprehensive response to victimization.

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

The ancient Greek philosopher and teacher Aristotle was the founder of the Lyceum, a school in Athens dedicated to the study of nature and philosophical inquiry for over a hundred years. In opposition to his own teacher, Plato, Aristotle developed a metaphysical and ethical theory based on the view that human beings are embodied creatures, not merely thinking things. In doing so, he clarified and expanded the concept of virtue, developing a theory of virtue that has impacted how we think (...) about mental states, states of wellbeing, and states of moral character. In Book II of his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle explains how we learn good (or bad) habits through experience, education, and training. Pleasure and pain provide starting points for us, because they help orient us toward the good, but eventually our primary motivation should be to do good because it is good. Excellent habits are those that cause us to react in neither excessive nor deficient ways to the things around us. Once we have the right motivation to do good because it is good, and once our habitual righteous action exemplifies our stable character, we are virtuous and thriving people. (shrink)

In this study, we explored how high school students’ participation in a local history research project about a historically Black cemetery in the Southeast United States contributed to their demonstration of historical empathy. Major findings show that students displayed historical empathy in research activities that occur beyond the traditional classroom through their examination of perspectives concerning representations of race and diversity in the social studies curriculum, the historical contexts about the impact of enslavement and Jim Crow segregation in their community, (...) and affective connections they made to their identities as citizens. We recommend that future studies focus on how social studies teachers, community organizations, and other educational providers can collaborate to promote historical empathy in and outside of schools with equity frameworks and curricular initiatives such as the National Council for the Social Studies College, Career, and Civic Life (C3) Framework. (shrink)

Aristotle is often taken to define priority in being in Metaphysics Δ.11, where he says that those things are prior in being which “admit of being without other things, while these others cannot be without them: a division which Plato used” (1019a3-4). But Aristotle’s pattern of arguments about priority – some of which use Plato’s Test and others of which use distinct, causal tests – looks puzzling if Plato’s Test is his definition. This paper offers a new interpretation of Δ.11 (...) on which it offers a guide to the Aristotelian use of Plato’s Test, given that being is said in many ways, rather than endorsing it as Aristotle’s own definition of priority. This reading illuminates Aristotle’s pattern of arguments in the corpus – explaining why Aristotle uses Plato’s Test in some cases and departs from it in others – and suggests a plausible story about how these arguments were shaped by engaging with Plato. (shrink)